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Chapter 0
General introduction and overview
As the title of this thesis suggests we focus on the interrelated notions partiality
and knowledge. Both the representation of human knowledge and the representation
of knowledge in computers systems is expected to benefit from partial logic. The
aim of this thesis is to provide a systematic study of partial logic, which will be
developed further in order to be applicable to knowledge. We will first introduce
the notion of `partiality' below, motivate its incorporation into logic and argue for
its intimate connection to knowledge. From this overall relation between partial
logic and knowledge representation some major research yuestions are obtained. This
introduction closes with an overview of the thesis: its themes, its parts, its chapters.
Partiality
In classical logic propositions are either true or false. In other words, truth and falsity
are the classical truth values. Partial logic deviates from this: the truth value can
be left open, i.e. the proposition can be undefined. There are quite a lot reasons for
introducing partiality into logic: ]
. lack of information: we simply may have insufficient knowledge to decide
whether or not a proposition is true; conseyuently, the truth of the sentence
(1) Mary works.
may be undetermined, from an agent's point of view.
. lack of assertoric value: linguistic examplcs like (1) are mentioned rather than
used in their normal meaning.
. solving semantic paradoxes: a sentence such as(2) cannot have a classical truth
value, Z since both assuming truth and assuming falsity leads to a contradiction.
(2) This sentence is false.
~This list is not exhaustive; consult, for example, [Ba81 ~. [Ve851 and ~BI861 for more motivation.
2Cf. [Kr75]
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. ungrammaticality or selectional restrictions: the two following sentences are
also intuitively wrong, but here one cannot even dream of assigning truth or
falsity, since the sentences are meaningless.
(3) Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.
(4) Green sleep furiously ideas colourless.
. presupposition: a sentence such as
(5) She loves her children.
is usually considered to be neither true nor false when `she' in (5) is childless.
Although the evidence for partiality is overwhelming, there is a problem connected
to the diversity of the arguments: since `undefined' has a number of ineanings (un-
derdetermined, absurd, or something in between), this may corrupt the possibility of
an overall partial logic covering the phenomena listed. Should we not distrust such a
panacea?
Indeed webelieve that we have to distinguish among different senses of`undefined'
as employed in the arguments above, since these differences are reflected in different
logical behaviour. Underdeterminedness of a proposition may become irrelevant when
it is combined with a true statement: for example, although `Mary works' may lack
a truth value, `Mary works or Mary is Mary' should be counted as true. Absurdity is
not removable just like that, and presuppositional undefinedness may sometimes be
eliminated (when the presupposition is cancelled, for example in `If she has children,
she loves her children') but not always (cf. `If she is a nice person, she loves her
children'). Though this diversity may obstruct the emergence of a logic covering all
types of partiality, it does not contradict the desirability of a partial approach. What it
certainly dces call for is a clear choice of the kind of undefinedness we are going to
model.
In this thesis we will opt for the informational interpretation of partiality, because
this is the one that is most relevant to knowledge and belief. So our main motivation
stems from this area. In fact we lind it difficult not to see the obvious relation between
lack of truth value and lack of knowledge: with regard to available infotmation they
amount [o the same. There is a slight shift of perspective: if some fact is not known
to an agent, we may `objectively' report her ignorance by saying that the proposition
is unknown to her, whereas a more `subjective' report would be that the truth of the
proposition is undefined for the agent.
Apart fmm the direct link between knowledge and information, and the intuitions
conceming this dependence, we are also confronted with less direct evidence, related
to awareness. Some inferences or validities from classical logic badly fit real life
knowledge. To wit,
(6) John knows that Mary works or does not work.
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is not a logical truth (under the most natural sense of the word `know'): even when
we are fully informed about John's state of mind, the assertion may not be true, for
John may not know Mary at all, or may not care whether she works or not. Yet, a
classical semantics such as in [Hi62] and [Kr63] wrongly predicts the alleged validity.
Generally speaking, partiality may cause a significant weakening of the logic, as is
desirable for knowledge: unintuitive consequences can thus be removed from the
logic.
Notice that in the given view, a logic dces not merely consist of a set of axioms
and inference rules, but contains a proper semantics as well. This licenses the very
term `partial logic', for it is the semantics that is incomplete, not the deductive system,
nor the kind of deduction.
So, partial logic may be useful to describe logically weaker notions of knowledge,
closer to our epistemic intuitions. But can it really cope with the psychological
peculiarities of knowledge? Explicit knowledge is related to awareness, and chapters 6
and 7 deal with this relation. It tums out that there is no ubiquitous concept of
knowledge: the epistemic logic depends on the way knowledge is used and construed.
It is possible to give a general purpose system covering all weak types of logic, but
one may argue that the overall logic has become almost void: virtually everything can
be modelled in it, not just knowledge. Therefore we also present stronger and less
general epistemic logics.
To illustrate the epistemic diversity we note that the kind of knowledge implicit in
utterances (the `added' assertoric value) requires the combination of different pieces
of knowledge to account for pragmatic paradoxes such as in saying `It is raining, but
I don't believe it is raining' (see chapter 5), whereas an agent may also (implicitly)
hold inconsistent beliefs in different frames of mind, without any chance of a mental
collapse (see section 6.6). In chapter 7 we argue that partial semantics is a good
candidate for describing an epistemic logic of intermediate strength, i.e. between the
very weak logic of the most general models and the stmng logics modelled by classical
possible world semantics.
Besides appealing to intuition and to the possibility of modelling weaker logics,
partiality is connected in yet another way to knowledgc: the representa[ion of knowl-
edge in partial models can be relatively simple. The latter point is especially relevant
when it comes to the representation of knowledge in computers. One striking differ-
ence with human knowledge is that computational knowledge is usually required to be
stronger: in many respects, we expect an automated information system to be `better'
than ordinary human beings, i.e. not to forget, not to be confused, and, if possible, not
to be incomplete.
Knowledge representation dces not merely amount to storing data in a file, but also
consists of providing enough structure to combinc these data and derive new facts from
them. Although this is usually achieved by deductive methods, we advocate a semantic
approach in this book. However, it may not be casy to model weak knowledge, both
in the sense of missing data and in that of limited inference.
For example, imagine the following situation. Suppose the [cNt~tl, the Dutch Me-
teorological Office located in de Bilt, receives incomplcte infomtation from a weather
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station in, say, Amsterdam: it is either raining or snowing there. The basic translation
p V q cannot be modelled by one classical or partial propositional interpretation, since
this would necessarily imply more knowledge, i.e. the model would decide which one
of p and q is true (or both). So, we have to incorporate more possibilities into the
model. This can be done in a possible world structure. This, at least in principle,
allows a representation of more complex and accurate facts such as `de Bilt knows that
Amsterdam knows that it is raining or snowing', abbreviated here as KbKa(p V q). In
this modal language we can also express queries which require some introspection of
the infonnation system, such as `If it is raining in Amsterdam, would you know about
it?'. This can be seen as a call to check whether or not p~ Kbp is true in the model.
Now the prospects for classical possible world models tum out to be rather limited:
incomplete knowledge usually lcads to a proliferation of possible worlds, if it can be
modelled at all (see chapter 8). Since irrelevant aspects need not be modelled in partial
semantics, there is reason to hope for a significant improvement there.
As may have incidentally become clear, a lot of partial logic is used and studied in
this book. Yet, we do not wish to be narmw-minded: we will also use classical logic
when more convenient, or in order to contrast the `virtues' of the partial approach to
the `vices' of the classical one.
Overview
From the considerations above a number of more detailed issues can be obtained. In
fact this thesis centres around thc following themes:
. partial logic: what can be done in it and with it?
. language and knowledge: what happens to knowledge in conversations?
. knowledge and human beings: can we find more realistic accounts of human
knowledge by using partial logic?
. knowledge and computers systems: can we find more efficient and adequate
ways to store and retrieve information by using partial models?
The two intennediate themes are combined in one part of this book, the other themes
are dealt with in separate parts. So we have the following partition, with a rough
characterization of the constituting chapters:
part I explor~es the logical space of partial logic, in particular its expressiveness and
completeness, to make a motivated choice in subsequent parts. Chapter 1 is de-
voted to the expressiveness of purely propositional partial logic, with a perspec-
tive akin to that of Generalized Quantifier Theory3, in that it addresses the ques-
tion which syntactic constructions correspond to which semantic constraints.
Chapter 2 aims at a similar characteriration of partial modal logic, although here
3Cf. for example [vB84c], [We84], ~ KM85] and ["7.w83].
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the similarity with first order definability in Correspondence Theory4 is more
fruitful. Chapter 3 charts the literature on validity and completeness in partial
propositional logic within a unifying framework. This is extended to modal
logic in Chapter 4, where proving completeness by techniques similar to the
usual Henkin method for classical logic tums out to be a non-trivial enterprise.
part II deals with knowledge implicit in language use, and knowledge made explicit
by human agents. In chapter 5 we assess the amount of knowledge which can
be attributed to a language user in uttering assertions. In chapter 6 we will try
and see to what extent human knowledge can be treated in `classical' models
(with a number of adaptations). Slightly generalizing Fagin 8r. Halpem's logic of
general awareness, we are capable ofmodelling virtually every logic. Since this
`most general logic' may be rather more psychological than logical, we also deal
with stronger logics, more suitable for other senses of human knowledge. Much
of this can be done in a more natural way in partial semantics, as demonstrated
in chapter 7.
part III deals with a model-theoretic approach to knowledge bases, where chapter 8
shows the possibilities and limitations of the approach with respect to classical
possible worlds models, and the concluding chapter 9 improves on this by using
partial world models.
The relationship between the parts is fairly obvious: panial logic may be used to
provide adequate models for human knowledge. Knowledge in its tum manifests
itself in ordinary language, both in semantics and in pragmatics. Knowledge-based
systems also obtain their prime motivation from human knowledge, yet in a rather
idealized form. Though not implemented herc, the combination of weak human
knowledge and strong computational knowledge may give rise to interesting `hybrid'
logics, which can be used for building future information systems. Such an intelligent
knowledge based system combines the derivation or verification procedures needed for
the different kinds of knowledge, yielding a very user-friendly device. This program
is well beyond the scope of this thesis - in fact it is still beyond the entire field of
artificial intelligence.
Waming: the first part is rather technical, for rcasons that hopefully are clear now.
Although we would like to encourage the logically minded reader to start with part
one, for less trained persons it may be wise to tum to the applications in parts two and
three, and to consult the initial part afterwards, if necessary. Anyway, although there
is an obvious systematic order in the chapters, a strictly linear order of reading does
not seem obligatory.
~Vide [vB84b], [vB851, [vB90j, etcetera
Part I
Partial logic
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Introduction to part I
Even within the infonnational perspective on partiality underlying this thesis possi-
bilities abound. In fact a multitude of partial logics have emerged in literature during
the eighties. Our initial idea was just to give an overview of these proposals, possibly
extend them with modal operators to cover knowledge, and incorporate the resulting
logics in an overall system. To facilitate comparison, we restricted ourselves to the
purely propositional part of these theories, focussing on two main reseazch questions:
how expressive is the logic, and what is the complete deductive system capturing the
valid fonnulas and logical consequences. Then it tumed out that, on the one hand,
the field of expressiveness was still largely unexploited in the propositional case, and
largely unexplored in the modal case. The issue of completeness, on the other hand,
also presupposes a separate semantics. But here, the choices conceming such key
notions as rule and validiry were sometimes seemingly arbitrary or ad hoc. In other
wonds, the attempted regimentation forced us to consider altematives and to fonnulate
a general framework which covers both existing proposals and altematives.
In general our enterprise may be characterized as a systematic exploration of
partial logic, first for propositional languages in chapters l and 3 and then extended
to the modal language in chapters 2 and 4. This inquiry is performed in a unifying
framework with enough freedom to cover the diversity observed. Although a number
of the proposals in the literature do not fit into this framework, the overall theory
makes clear what makes them, in our view, non-standard. Some parts of this design of
a suitable framework for partial logic may well go beyond what is expected in the light
of the application to knowledge representation. However, a semantics that is strictly
based on private intuitions is in danger of being ill-motivated: it may disregard other
qualifying possibilities.s
To get an idea what is at stake we first introduce a basic partial logic.
Basic partial logic
Consider the simple propositional language with a finite numberof atomic propositions
p, q, ... and the ordinary connectives ~(negation, `not'), n(conjunction, `and'), v
(disjunction, `or'), --. (implication, `if . . . then') and H (equivalence, `iff'). The set
of well-formed formulas is defined recursively by:
. the atoms p, q, . .. are well-formed formulas (wFFS);
~ if ~p and s(i are wFFs, then ~~p, (cp ~~t~i), (~p V ~t(,), (cp --~ ~t~i), and (~p .-. ~i) are
WFFS.
Fonnulas of [his language are, for example, p, q, ~p, ~q, p ~ p, (p ~ q) V ~p, etcetera.
In a partial interpretation these formulas may be undefined. It is often easier to treat
~i'he drawback of our'pazamount' view is that the systematics causes some laborious digressions and
intricate proofs, which the reader may skip at first reading.
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`undefined' as if it were a third truth value, represented here by the symbol ~ 6 Then




























How strong is this language? Can it express what we want to say about p and q?
Recall that in classical (two-valued) logic all possible facts related to p, q, etcetera can
be expressed, i.e. the logic is functionally complete. This does not hold for partial
(three-valued) logic. For example, the proposition that is always undefined cannot be
expressed in the language. Of course, this case offunctional incompleteness can be
eliminated by adding an extra connective ~ with is interpreted as `undefined'. But then
again, the proposition which is always truc cannot be defined in the given language.
Well, add another (0-place) connective T with fixed intetpretation `true'. Are we
already complete? No, we still cannot express the proposition that is false ifp is true,
and true ifp is not. So again add an operator, ti, to this effect. Is the extended language
functionally complete? Fortunatcly, it is!
This kind ofgame, familiar from old work in multi-valued logic, wrongly suggests
that the incomplete languages are less interesting, for less expressive. The point is
that perhaps we do not want to express all possible truth tables. Notice that before ~
was added, the language had the important property of being persistent: if a formula
is either true or false, adding extra information with respect to p and q does not result
in a different tnith value.
Somewhat more technically, let C be the (partially ordered) relation of extension
of truth values such that ? C 0 and Z C l. Moreover, let V and V' be valuations,
assigning truth values to the alom s; V C V' means that for all atoms p: V(p) C V~(p).
By means of the truth tables V can be extended to an interpretation [.]y of arbitrary
formulas. Then persistence can be characterized with full rigour:
persistence V C V' ~[~p]y C [~p]v~, for all V, V` and ~p.
~I'his symbol, which can akeady be found in the pioneering work of i,ttkasiewicz, is chosen for
mnemonic reasons: within the informational perspective, it is clear that 2 can be 'resolved' by adding
information, then becoming ei[her 1(truc) or o(false); so it is somewhere in between, intuitively speaking.
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This, of course, raises the question whether all persistent facts related to p and q can
be expressed in this language. This question was answered affirmatively by Fine and
Blamey.~
In its tum the persistence result led to a reconsideration of the intermediate lan-
guages: which conditions characterize the initial standard language and its subsequent
extensions. One condition suggested by van Benthem and Langholm is classicalclo-
sure, which says that the formula has a classical truth value when both p and q have.
We will also introduce a new condition called freedom, which says that the truth value
of every formula is undefined when p and q are. More formally, we have (2 -{ 1, 0})
classical closure if V(p) E 2 for all p then [cp[y E 2, for al] V and ~p;
freedom if V(p) - ~ for all p then [~p~y - 2, for all V and ~p.
In chapter 1 we will showthat classical closure combined with freedom and persistence
manages tocharacterize the standard language, and that freedom f persistence captures
the extension with ~.
Four-valued semantics
There is an important altemative with respect to truth values: the truth value of
a proposition may also be overdefined, i.e. both true and false (for instance, from
diffen;nt points of view). Usually, inclusion of this extra possibility does not rule out
undefinedness, so it leads to afour-valued logic. We use the symbol2 to incorporate
`overdefined' as a fourth truth value. The previous truth tables can be extended to
this four-valued semantics, but we refrain from doing so here.s Since the semantics is
richer, it is hardly surprising that we may consider more conditions constraining the
wealth of possible truth functions. In addition to the earlier conditions we suggest
the following two conditions. The first one propcr[y generalizes classical closure, the
second one means that the interpretations are invariant under switching from `true'
to not-false', and vice versa. Let 1- 1, 0- 0, Z- 2, 2- 2, 3-{0, Z, 1} and
3-{0,1,2}; moreover, let the dual V of a valuation V be defined by V(p) - V(p)
for all p.
general closure if V(p) E 3 for all p then [~p}y E 3, and if V(p) E 3 for al[ p then
[~p]v E 3, for all valuations V and formulas ~p;
duality preservation [~p]f, -[~p}y, for all valuations V and formulas ~p.
In characterizing the classical connectives, the r81e of c[assical closure for the three-
valued case is replaced by that of duality preservation for the four-valued case. How-
ever, both classical and genera[ closure characterize appreciable intemtediate lan-
guages.
~Cf. [Fi75a] and [B186], reproven here as theorem 1.3.
BSee section 1.3 for these'extended strong Kleene' truth tables.
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There is no unanimity among `partial' logicians whether we should have three
or four truth values. The relation between `quadrivalent' logic and classicial logic
is somewhat more transparant than between `trivalent' and classical logic (see sec-
tion 2.4). [La88] and in particular [Mu89) are good examples of the use ofquadrivalent
approach. Most modem literature on partial logic, however, is written in the thr~ee-
valued paradigm.9. Although our sympathy is with the three-valued approach, which
seems closer to the intuitions conceming human knowledge, we have incorporated the
four-valued case, since this is not only sometimes technically easier (and sometimes
more difficult!), but may also be more suitable for certain computational applications.
In large knowledge bases inconsistencies often occur and this should not result in a
major breakdown. In the four-valued appmach, inconsistencies can be verified, and
thereby `isolated'. Since in a three-valued approach (under the prevailing notions of
consequence), everything follows from a contradiction, inconsistencies are extremely
harmful for the performance of such a knowledge based system (`intelligent data
base' ).
Varieties of validity
Now let us tum to validity, illustrated on our basic language. Typical classical validities
in the standard language are p v--~p and p ~ ~p~q. Are they valid in partial logic as well?
The answer to this question depends on how we define validlry. For notice that p V~p
will not always be tnae, it is not valid in a`verificational' sense. Yet, the formula is
never false, so it is valid in a`falsi ficational' sense. Both types of validity also manifest
themselves for the evaluation of the argument p n ~p~q, but here there are additional
possibilities connected to the status of the inference. One construal of inference rules
is that whenever the premise is valid, so is the consequent. Since the actual premise
is invalid for both types of validity (if, for example, p is true, the premise is false),
the consequence relation holds in this `absolute' construal. An altemative, `relative'
construal of inference rules is that the conclusion is true (not-false) if the premise is true
(not-false, respectively). Then p ~ ~p~q is valid with respect to relative verification:
p ~~p can never be true, so there is no counterexample to this inference. However,
the inference is not valid under relative falsification: p ~~p may be undetermined
(when p is), and therefore not false, while q may be false.
In chapters 3 and 4 we give finite descriptions of the logical systems corresponding
to the various notions of validity. The rules will be given in the familiar format of
natural deduction. Forexample, the basic rules for relative veri fication on three-valued
models are: (read ~ as `is derivable from' and H as `are derivable from each other')
9See fotezample [Ve85], [B186J and also [La88J.
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Apart from types of tvles and validity, the semantic engine has other flexible parts:
truth conditions and truth values. For example, both ~ and ~ may be used to interpret
natural language negation, but as long as we can express `not' in the language that
satisfies the conditions, there is hardly a logical problem.to Really different truth
conditions invoke the relation of informational extension (as used in persistence), but
we consider them to be off the main track.
Extension to modal logic
Modal operators such as ~(necessity, `must') and O(possibility, `may') can be added
to the basic propositional language, yielding (pmpositional) modal logic. The partial
models for modal logic combine the frames o(' classical possible world semantics
with partial valuations. In partial modal semantics one usually speaks of `situations'
or `partial worlds' rather than of possible worlds; so the valuation is supposed to
manifest itself in the worlds. Similar to classical possible world semantics there is
an accessibiliry relatioR R between situations. More precisely, a partial modal model
M is a triple (S, R, V), where R C S x S and V is a partial function mapping
atom-situation pairs into {0, 1 }. -
The truth table format does not suit this type of semantics. Instead we use the
partial truth relation ~ and the falsity relation ~.11 We may recast the truth tables
for the connectives in the new format and incorporate the truth conditions for the modal
operators o and O as: (the model (S, R, V) is fixed in these clauses)
a~ pqV(p,a)- 1 (tlpEProp)
a~~aqs~a
a~ an(.Iqs~ a8ta~ p
a~ aV~3qa~ aora~ (i
s~ a~pqdt: aRt~t~ ~p
a~ Otp q 3t : aRt 8r. t~ ~p
s~ pqV(p,s)-0(dpEProp)
a~~aqa~a
a~ anQqs~ aors~ (i
s~aV~iqs~a8cs~~i
s~ a~pq 3t: sRtBct~ ~p
s~O~pqdt:sRt~t~~p
toTttere may be a problem from the standpoint of natural language semantics in formulating a compo-
sitional translation procedure from syntax into logic, but this does not concern us in this thesis.
t tThese symbols, sometimes disrespectfully called'rakes', are convenient since they express the partial
chazacter of truth and falsity, without indices messing up thc notation. The distinction between classical
and partial truth is not merely cognitive, but also serves a technical goal, especially in a hybrid style of
semantics in which both types of truth relations are used within a single model (cf. chapter 7). ~ was
inspired by Kamp's notation for strong consequence. Other common symbols for ~ and ~ are: ~ and
~ , ~f and ~-, or ~T and ~F.
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For example, consider the two world model below, where the anrows denote accessi-
bility, and p and q are tnie in situations a and t, respectively.
Clearly, the model verifies o(p V q), e.g, a~ o(pV q).
This combination of partiality and modal models has not been studied intensively,
thus far. Again we will focus on some of the most fundamental issues, conceming
definability and completeness. as we did for propositional partial logic. Moreover, the
flexibility obtained by the accessi bility relation will be used to model a variety ofpartial
modal systems: as in classical modal logic, various kinds of propositional attitudes
such as knowledge, belief and desire are captured by conditions on the accessibility
rclation.
Some notes on the history of partial logic
The still recent history of partiality is interesting on its own and warrants an extensive
research. Here is a first impression. [vB84a] suggests that already Beth's semantic
tableaux, originating from the thirties, contain implicitpartiality. In a Beth tableau one
tests the validity of an inference by trying to construct a counter-example: if such an
attempt fails the inference is valid. For cxample, the classical validity of the inference
p, p--~ (q V r)~q V r may be shown as follows. Assume there is a truth-assignment
such that the inference is invalid, so p and p-~ (q v r) are true but q V r is false. Now
the truth of p--~ (q V r) implies that p is false or q V r is true, contradicting p is true
and q V r is false. This argument is usually formalized by means of a tableau or tree.
Notice that not all propositional variables occurring in the argument need to get a truth
value.
Another source of partiality is intuitionistic logic; this is made explicit in sec-
tion 3.4.4 by partializing (and thereby simplifying) Kripke's semantics given in
[Kr65b], thus sticking to the original intuition.
In fact much research in multi-valued logic from the first half of the century may
also be considered partial logic avant la lettre.t2 This is illustrated by construing
`undefined' as a third truth value, which tumed out to be convenient for the truth
tables. Especially when we are dealing with propositional definability in chapter 1,
we will touch upon old results in multi-valued logic by, for example, [I;u20], [Po21]
and [S139]. Yet the two angles are different, and in some respects the partial view is
more transparant. For example, incorporating extensions of situations is at least more
natural in partial semantics. An important and influential step with regard to such
extensions has been [vF66]. This semantics uses so-called supervaluations which
make a formula true (or false) if it is verified (respectively falsified) in the usual sense
by all completions (-complete extensions) of the supervaluation.
~ZGood surveys of multi-valued logic aze [Re69j and [Ur861.
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An early combination of partial and modal logic is [Se67], where the underlying
propositional logic is characterized by the `weak Kleene' truth tables, cf. [Bo37]
and [K152]. The transition from worlds to situations was made independently by
several authors, most explicitly by [Hu81] and [Ba8l ]. Barwise's theory, covering the




This chapter concems the expressiveness of propositional languages with respect to
partial semantics. After providing some background for the subject of functional
completeness and partial semantics, we define the key notion of definability of a set
of (partial) truth functions by means of a set of connectives. Interesting sets of truih
functions are those determined by general conditions; we will restrict ourselves to
conditions with a very natural ring.
Many conditions such aspersistence and clas.cicalclosurel are definable by certain
connectives. Some isolated definability results wcre already known, many others were
not. This chapter approaches the subject in a more systematic way, and provides a
considerable number of new definability results, some for 3-valued models and some
for 4-valued models.
Our general strategy is to start with nocondition at all and give a general ' functional
completeness' theorem. Then we add conditions, one after the other, thus successively
narrowing down the set of defining connectives.
After proving and reproving several old and new definability results we tum to an
issue which has apparently been neglected so far: the relative and absolute strength
of the conditions. More precisely, how many functions of certain arity are allowed
by some combination of conditions? After a summary of thc main results, there is an
appendiz containing a more detailed mathematical account of definability matters and
a comparison to existing literature conceming conditions and connectives.
1.1 Introduction
To explore the ficld of panial logic, we first have to inquire into its expressiveness:
which classes ofpartial models can be defined by which sets of formulas? This chapter
focusses on questions ofpropositionaldefinabilily, in relation to conditions on the set
of (3- or 4-valued) truth functions. Some isolated results ane known in this area,
whereas other plausible questions have not been answered so fac The aim of this
chapter is simply to partly fill the gap.
~These conditions are informally described in the introduction to part I.
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1.1.1 Definability in classical logic
In classical propositional logic one easily obtains so-called functional completeness
for the usual set of connectives, or a proper subset such as {~, ~, }: every bivalent
tntth function can be expressed in a logical formula, using only the given connectives
propositional variables.
Theorem 1.1 The bivalent truth functions aredefinable by ~ and ~.
Proof: Let f: 2" ~ 2 be a classical n-place wth function (2 -{0, 1}). The behaviour of
f on z E 2n is described by a conjunction of literals: when f(z) - 1 the literal is p; if x; - 1
and ~p; if x; - 0; when f(x") - 0 both literals p; and ~p; occur in the conjunction. Then the
fotmula Xt, which characterizes f, is the disjunction of the conjunctive subformulas for all
possible arguments x". So formally:
XI
P; ifx;-landf(i)-1
- ~p; if x; - 0 and f(x) -]
Pin~P: if f(x)-0
~yy~ M i-n
- 1t 2 IA`t-~ X2,t
The wth table of Xt coincides with f (i.e. ~X f~,r - f(x) for each valuation [.],r that assigns
x; to p;), since Q~; XY,;~~ - f(x) if x' - y, and 0 otherwise.
Finally disjunction can be eliminated by the equivalence of ~p V,I, and ~(~~p ~~~t~,). ~
1.1.2 Definability in partial logic
For partial logic, where at least the value Z( `undefined') is added to the classical truth
values 1 (`we') and 0(' false'), functional completeness no longer holds: three-valued
functions ( from 3" to 3 - {0, Z, 1}) Z cannot in general be described by the stock of
classical connectives, since for example the constant wth functions are not definable
in this way. So, the function f such that f(x )- 1 where x- 1, 2 or 0, is not definable
by means of a formula using only p, ~ and ~, as will become clear in the course of this
chaptec Of course the same holds for the four-valued case which contains the extra
wth value 2 (` overdefined').
One possible reaction to the obtained incompleteness is to add new connectives
that restore functional completcness. This can be done in many ways.3 Though
extensionally equivalent to other completc systems, we will favour some systems
which we believe to be more natural than others. Our favourite systems are perfecdy
equipped for the weak, yet Flexible propositional logic involved in knowledge and
belief. 4
ZSo, the symbol '3' may refer to the ordinary ordinal number 3 and to a set of truth values. Also, '2'
may indicate a set of truth values as in the proof of theorem 1.1, or a truth value itself; the lauer '2' is
the algebraic counterpart of the set (of underlying wth values) {o, 1}, the fonmer of the set {{o}, {1}}.
Likewise the truth value 1 has a set-theoretical counterpart {1 }, etcetera. Though this may seem rather
confusing, all ambiguities should be resolved by the context.
3See [Ro77] for general properties of functionally complete systems.
4See chapters 5-9 of this book.
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Another possible reaction to incompleteness is to accept it as a consequence of
allowing truth value gaps and overlaps, and to search for general constraints that single
out classes offunctions which can be defined by a set ofconnectives. Then definability
questions appear in two related forms:
. Given some set of connectives, which semantic constraints characterize them?
. Given some set ofsemantic constraints, which bunch of connectives can be used
to define precisely the functions fulfilling this constraint?
We shall discussdefinability matters both from the perspective ofnatural conditions
and from that of intuitively plausible connectivcs. Since definability results can be
obtained from both perspectives, we do not employ a systematic division between
them in the next section.
Before we go on, we have to be more precise about somekey notions.s Definability
is one way of relating the syntactic and the semantic side of a logic. Assume there are
k truth values.b For some n, x is short for (x~, ..., x„) (with x; E k), and kn is the
set of such i's. Think of n as being the finite number of pmpositional atoms in Prop
and z as essentially a valuation.~ kk" will be the set of n-ary k-valued truth functions.
Then the set of k-valued truth functions is called the (k-valued) function space.
Definition 1.1 (function space)
Fk, the funetion space for the k-valued case, denotes ~JnE~, kk"
The syntactic side of definability is, of course, the logical language, i.e. the set of
well-formed fotmulas. Let C be a set of connectives (possibly 0-place). Unless stated
differently, we assume C to contain at least ~ and ~.
Definition 1.2 (propositional language)
The set of well formedformulas Gc (Prop), with logical con.stants in C and using the
atoms of Prop, is the smallest set containing Prop which is clnsed under the operations
of C.
In other words, for given Prop and C, G~ (Prop) is recutsivcly defined bys
1. Prop C Gc(Prop),
2. if c E C is an n-ary operation and {~pl ,..., ~p„} C Gc (Prop), thcn c~pl ... tpn E
Gc (Prop),
3. no other elements occur in G~ (Prop) than pmduced by 1 and 2.
SA number of technicalities such as a definition of the notion of a cto.ced class of truth functions have
been transferned to the appendix.
6In this book, k is either 2, 3, or 4.
~This is related to the more usual form given in the general introduction by V(p; )- x;, and similarly
~~P~~ - ~~~a.
8We leave out Prop or C from G~ (Prop) when inelevant or clear from con[ext.
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For two-place operators such as n and V, we will use the more common infix notation
in parentheses, for example p V(q ~ r) instead of Vp ~ qr.
Instead of inerely defining functional completeness, we want to have a more general
notion of expressiveness at hand: definability of a restricted set of truth functions by
means of some set of connectives or other. T'hink of C as a(combined) condition
singling out truth functions and let C~n~ - C fl kk".
Definition 1.3 (propositional definability)
C C Fk is definable by a set of connectives C iJf (i) for each f E C~n~ there is a
~p E G~{pl, ..., pn} such that Q~p]ï - f(i) for all i E kn, where ~pi]~ - x;; and
(ii) for all rp E G~ {pt ,..., p„} the mapping f: i H ~rp]ï is in Clnl.
1.2 Classes of three-valued functions
A functionally complete system for Fk in general was already given in [Po21 ].9 Yet,
in line with what fo]lows here, we want to pay attention to particular systems for F3
and F4 which we be]ieve to be more intuitive than the one featuring in Post's general
result. Focussing on the 3-valued case first, our favourite system uses 0-place ~ with
constant interpretation 2 , stmng Kleene n, and two negations, a standard one (~)
and a non-standard one (~), attributed to Bochvar who is supposed to have named it





~ is discussed in [FH~`87] and [La88]; in the former it is called `weak negation',
in the latter ` exclusion negation'; yet another (folk) name is `Nordic negation', for
obvious reasons. ~ gives a classical flavour to partial systems, which has interesting
consequences for the set of tautologies.
From the truth tables of ~ and n, thosc for V, -~ and H can be derived by the usual
definitions: ~PV ~ - ~(~~P ~ ~~G)~ ~P ~ ~ - ~~PV ~, ~ H ~ - (~P ~ ~) ~ (~ -' ~P).












9 For the initial part of the natural numbers {o, 1, ..., k- 1} with the usual ordering and addition,
Post's system consists of the generalizedconjunction nk and cyclica! negation ~~ which aze semantically
characterized by: x nk y - min{x, y} and ~wx - x t 1(mod k).
taI'he attribution of both Urquhart [Ur86, p.75] and Langholm [La88, p.17], possibly following Rescher
[Re69, pp.31,32], to Bochvaris notentircly correct (Ro37, E. tr. pp.91,93] gives a'formal extemaldenial'
with the intention of formalizing being (alse and which produces a different truth table, viz. one Ihat has
0 when the fortnula is undefined; it can be defined in the [FH'87]-format by e.g. ~~ ~. The negation
corresponding to ~ is nameless, and captures the intuition of being not true.
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By a direct proof ( cf. theorem 1.6 on page 25), a reduction to another system known
to be complete (for example, to the Post system by ~3P -(p n~) V(~p n~~p) and
n3 - n), or an application of the Slupecki completeness criteriontl, it can easily be
shown that
Theorem 1.2
Every trivalent truthfunction is definable by {~, n, ~x, ~}. 12
Notice moreover that the system presented in this theorem is independent (non-
redundant): every connective it contains is necessary. This follows from the fact
that subsystem such as {~, n} are incomplete.
As was indicated before the somewhat isolated and seemingly dead branch of
many-valued logic involved in definability revived as soon as one got interested in
subclasses of the entire function space, and, correspondingly, certain conditions on
admissible operators.
One of the first logically relevant results in this direction concems Belnap's notion
ofpersistence (or, monotonicity):
PERS f is persistent iff for all z", y: x" C y ~ f(z) C f(y~,
where f : 3n ---~ 3, i C y means that x; C y; for every i- 1, ..., n, and C is the
approximation relation which is the partial order such that Z C 0, 2 C 1. The simple




Notice that this semi-lattice is closed with respect to the meet operation n, but not
with respect to the join U. Persistence is an important notion, which can be motivated
independently, cf. [B186].
By adding some connectives to the classical ones (~ and n), for example the
constants T (`verum', interpreted as 1) and ~(`ignoratio'), we arrive at what is
presumably the first definability result of this son:
Theorem 1.3 ( FinelBlamey13)
The persistent trivalent truthfunctions are definable by {~, n, T, ~}.
~~The criterion of [5139] says [hat a subset of F~ is complete for Fk iff it contains all unary functions
and at least one surjec[ion which is not equivalent to a unary function, where f is equivalent to unary g
means that there is an i such that for all i: f( i) - g(z; ), i.c. f depends on only one of its arguments.
t2T'he theorem in [La88, p.29] amounts to the same, despite ite very different appeazance and proof.
His language Iti,,, also uses the symbols ~, v and T; of course v and n are interdefinable modulo ~, and
T is redundant: ~T] - [~,~8.
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Proof: a simple version of the proof tvns as follows. First notice that the interpretations of




Then for a tven 3n --. 3 define R
if x; - 1
S f: `pa,~ - ~R if x; - p .
If f- i, let ~p1 - T and if f - 0, let ~pt -~T; otherwise
I(a)-t Z:~} 1(a)-a s~~iw~ - ~W~ If(`; w~,:~ ~ ~~W~ l1!`: ~va,.~ ~ ,
where, for each x, ~j(~ is the finite conjunetion of the ~pa,; such that x; ~ z, and W, similariy,
the finite disjunction of these conjunctions for which i satisfies the displayed condition. Then
QcPf~a - f(x).ta ~
Theorem 1.3 provides an answcr to the question which set of connectives defines
persistence,ls and so illustrates the second research question from the introduction.
Altematively, we can start at thc other end: given a set of connectives look for the
conditions characterizing them.
An evident question of the latter type concems the suitable constraints for the
classical connectives, i.e. those definable by, for example, ~ and ~. From theorem 1.3
it follows that PERS has to be one of the constraints, but also that there must be others
eliminating T and ~, and our task is to find them. An important move in this direction
was made independently by (amongothers) Albert V'isser and Johan van Benthem who
propose the obvious condition ol' what wc will call classical closure:l b
CCLOS f is classica[ly clo.ced iff f[2n] C 2, where 2 - {0, 1}.
The conditionexcludes ~: for n- 0 the only 0-place functions are those corresponding
to T and 1, since 20 - 30 -{0}. Combination of PERS and CCLOS leads to the
following theorem:
Theorem 1.4 (Van BenthemlLangholm)
Every classically closedpersistent trivalent truthfunction can be defined by aformula
using {~, ~, T}.
13This result is usually attributed to Blamey (BI86, p.36,37], but can already be found in [Fi75a, p.288],
who uses the phrase 'stability' instead of persistence. The proof is Blamey's, though.
1~Notice that this proof uses a partial ( !) definition of ~pa,;; we can tum it into a full one by adding
~Ga,: - T if x: - 2.
~SOf course this set is not unique; lor example, {-~, l,~} defines PERS3 [oo; in fact we can do
better than this and give a complete system of two connectives, but in [Th90c, appendix] it is shown that
no single connective can define persistence. But already the two connectives system fails to have the
naturalness of the text system.
tóThis condition is equivalentto what is called'refinability' in [Ja91a] (butcf. the appendiz fordifferen[
notions of refinability): f is refuiable iff f(á) - Z implies that there exist g, i~ i such that f(y) - 1
or f(z~-0.
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Proof: from now on we will mostly skip the `con-ectness' part of the definability theorems,
which can be shown by a straightforward induction. For the 'completeness' part, employ the
construction of [vB88], which is essentially the following.~~ Let f: 3" -. 3 be a closed
persistent function. The characterizing formula ~p~ takes the form
t-n
~~ - VVM ~~.~.~ ~-t
The contributions ~p~,; are deóned by:
p; ifx;-1
. if f(x) - 1 then ~p~,; - ~P; if x; - 0
T ifx;-?
p; ifx;-1
. if f( x) - Z then rp~,; - ~P; if x; - 0
P; n~p; if x; - 2
. if f(x) - 0 then rp~,; - 1-~T
ThenanintricateargumentshowsthatforthevaluationQ.~sthatassignsx;top;: [~pt~~- f(x).
Addopting the other petspective on definability questions, we note that PERSfCCLOS
can indeed be de6ned by other systems, such as {-~,1}.Is
To see where we are, let us give a recapitulation of the main results. Starting with
no condition at all we noticed definability by ~, ~, T, ~ and ~(T has been added
to enable comparison). Then subsequent addition of the conditions persistence and
classical closure amounted to elimination of thc connectives ~ and ~x, respectively.
To characterize the classical connectives a final step is necded: how to exclude T and
those functions definable by it, such as 1-~T and p ~~T. The proposed condition
is dubbed freedom, since when a function does not satisfy the requirement the whole
function is detennined, modulo persistence.
FREE f is called free iff f( 2)-~.
nX
~~~
where 2- (?,...,Z). So adding freedom19 to persistence eliminates essentially
two functions, viz. for each arity n the constant functions 0 and 1. In the spirit
of information and partiality freedom is a very natural condition. The premeditated
definability result is now embodied by:
Theorem 1.5
Everyfree classically closedpersistent trivalent truthfunction is definable by {~, ~}.
~~In order to diversify the presentation we give a full definition where ~vB88J gives a partial one. The
structure of Tore I,angholm's proof is more complex.
1eBut again not by a single connective, see [Th90c, appendix~.
19Notice this amounts to closure with respect to { 2}.
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Proof: an adaptation of the proof for the previous theorem suffices.
First notice that all the (classical) connectives with standard interpretations are free: a
(classical) truth value is only obtained when at least one of atoms has a classical wth value.
Second, by jreedom then; is an z such that f(z') ~ 0, viz. ï- Z; therefore, all disjuncts
for i such that f(x) - 0 can be omitted by logical equivalence from ~p~, without making the
formula empty.
Third, conjuncts of the fonn T can also be left out; the only case where such a deletion
would be troublesome is where all x; are Z and f(x) - 1; but again this case is excluded
because of the fact that f is free. In all, a partia! definition of ~p~; works where the last item
and the third case of the first item in the earlier definition are left out.















is characterized by the formula (p n q) v(p n q n~q) v(p n~p n q) v(p n~p n q n,q) v
(p n~p n,q) v(,p n q n ~q) which is equivalent to (p n q) V(p n,p) v(q n~q) .
This completes what we consider tobe the main trail of this section. However, given the
conditions that were introduced hefore, we may wonder by which connectives they are
definable, both in isolation and in combination. To begin with, recall a result presented
in [vB88]. Which set ofconnectives defines precisely the classically closed functions?
To this end we reconsider the wcak negation ~, which is clearly not persistent, but it
is classically closed and its addition to the classical connectives guarantees funetional
completeness relative to CCLOS:20 the trivalent classically closed truth funetion are
definable by means of ~, n, ti. Zt
A complementary combination ( with respect to theorem l.5) deals with FREE
and PERS. The relevant characterization can be simply obtained by an adaptation of
Blamey's proof: the free persistent truth functions are definable by {~, n, ~}.ZZ
The latter fact has an interesting conscquence. Instead of laborious arguments
showing functional completeness of some combination of conditions by a set of con-
nectives, one might want a simple and general test predicting completeness. There is
some reason to doubt the existence of such a simple test. To illustrate the point notice
that the Slupecki criterion fails: all unary FREE functions are also persistent, hence
definable by ~, n, ~, which operators are free, one of them being a non-reducible two-
place function (n). Yet several binary frec functions are not persistent, thus cannot be
defined by these operators alone.
~CCLAS can also be defined by a smaller set of connectives, such as t.ukasiewicz's L3 (see the
appendix to this chapter), or even by a single connective (see (Th90c, p.39]).
ZtThe proof "is an easy matter of recording the truth table as in the classical two-valued case" [vB88,
p.85]. In [Th9lk, pp.15,16J there is an claborated version of this proof, cf. the proof of theorem 1.11.
~[Th90c. P.16]
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1.3 Classes of four-valued functions
Again the story starts with a familiar result: the functional completeness of F4. Recall
that the functional completeness ofone particular system was alneady shown in [Po21 ].
Once more, the connectives occutring in the following theorems are preferable, since
they also apply to certain conditions to be dealt with in this section. The first new
connective involved here is the 0-place q with constant interpretation 2 (overdefined);
~ is interpreted as 2 as before. The extended strong Kleene truth tables for ~, ~ and
v are displayed below. To motivate the extension of the interpretation of ~ to the
4-valued case, notice that the basic intuition behind ti is that ~ ~p is verified (supported)

















Every quadrivalent truthfunction is definable hy {~, ~,,~, ~, q}.
Proof:~ L.et f be an arbitrary four-valued n-place truth function. Then the formula charac-
terizing f is built from subformulas encoding x" and f(i) for each i, where such a subformula
is only non-zero for the interpretation corresponding to x". First we define some auxiliary
formulas that characterize some `most specific' unary truth functions, as illustrated by their
truth tables:
Xiooo(P) - Xoioo(P) - Xooin(P) - Xoooi(P) -
p ~ ..,p n ~. ~p .., p n .,, ~p .., p ~ -, .., ~p ~ .,,p n ~ ~, ~p
1 1 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 p






The conjuncts ~p~,; are then defined by distinguishing the followingcases:
. if f(ï) - 1 then ~p~,; - Xs,;
. if x - Z then ~p~; - X~,; n~f(') ~
. if f(z) - 0 then ~p~,; -~ n p
~I.e. formally: 0 C[... ~pJ a 1 C[rp~ and l C [~. ~pD a 1 ~~~p].
uWhere [La88, pp.27,28] uses areduction to classical models and [Mu89, p.123] gives a nice induc[ive
proof, we prefer a more direct argument for expository reasons.
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. if f(i) - 2 then ~pe,; - X~,,; ~ Y
The fonnula conrsponding to f is
i-n
~ - VV M ~~,:.i :-~
From the truth tables it follows that if ~p~ -~s-~ ~p~,;) y~ i, then [~p~],r - 0 if y~ z, and
[~f~~~a - f(i). So [~~a - f(x)- ~
As in the previous section we want to cut down the number of de6ning connectives by
imposing more and more conditions, until we have reached the classical connectives
(i.e. ~ and ~). Once again, the natural condition ofpersistence is a good starting point.
For F4, persistence is a condition on functions f: 4n -. 4- {0, Z,1, 2} which
preserve the approximation relation C. The graph of the approximation lattice (4, C)
is displayed below: (recall that C amounts to going upwards in the diagram)
2
2
Reinhard Muskens25 has extended the Fine~Blamey persistence theorem to four-valued
functions by incorporating the constant q.Z~
Theorem 1.7 (Muskens)
The persistent quadrivalent truthfunction.s are deftnable by {~, ~, ~, q}.
It may seem at this point that one may transfer definability results from the three-
valued case to the four-valued case by simply adding the operator q to the set of
connectives. In general there is no guarantec that such a strategy will always succeed.
In effect, the addition of q to thc connectives defining CCLOS will not do: q is not
classically closed itself.27 One may object that q should be put on a par with ~. Though
this seems intuitively right and will indeed be employed in the sequel, we notice that
persistence and classical closure do not jointly characterize {~, ~, T}: the function f
given by
f
1 1 0 2
0
is persistent and classically closed, but not definable by ~, ~, T. Whence we cannot
transfer van Benthem's result ( theorem 1.4) to F4 that easily. Let us therefore look for
~V'ide [Mu89, pp.46,124~5]; Muskens' proof resembles Illamey's (cf. theorem 1.3).
~Notice that T is now redundant: T-~(,~ n d).
~ For those who prefer a coun[erexample of non-zero arity: p n d is not CCLOS.
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another condition characterizing the functions definable by means of {~, n, T}. One
property that ~, ~ and T share, but the above f fails to have is duality preservation.2s
DUAL f duality preserving iff f(x) - f(i) for all x.
where l - 1, 0 - 0, ~ - 2, 2 - Z ,29 and x - (i ~ , . . . , in ) i f i - ( x t , . . . , x„). Now
in effect the addition of DUAL makes CCLOS redundant:
Pmposition 1.1 DUAL ~ CCLOS
Proof: We give an indirect proof. Assume that there is an f E F4 that is duality preserving but
is not classically closed; i.e. there is an x" E 2" such that f(i) ~ 2. So i- x and f(x) ~ f(x)
which contradicts DUAL. ~
Unlike CCLOS, the addition of DUAL to PERS captures {~, ~, T}:
Theorem 1.8
The quadrivalent truth functions definable by ~, ~ and T areprecisely those satisfving
both PERS anci DUAL.
Proof: notice that the simple idea to reduce this theorem to the Uivalent counterpart does not
work: not every f E Fa respecting PERS and DUAL is determined by its behaviour on 3",










where f(2, Z)- f( Z, 2) is still open. So we proceed more carefully; to this end define the
auxiliary formulas r7y,; and Q~,;: ( recall that 3-{0, ;, 1} and 3-{0, 1, 2})
Qy,:
P: ify;-1
p; n~p; if y: - 2
~p; if y; - 0




~p; if y; - 0
T ify;-2
~T




Now let a~ - ~j(`~ aj7,;, ~0~ -~í ~iy,;, ~p - Wy rxy V Wy ,Qy. We will show that [~p]~ - f(x)
by separating the different cases: (here the default index of [.] is x~
~(Vi84, p.184] uses the notation i instead of our i, and calls j self dual (which term we reserve for
the occasion where f- f) when it is duality preserving.
~Or, in terms of underlying truth values: 1 E i q 0~ z and 0 E z a 1~ x.
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l. f(i) - 1. Consider the following subcases:
. if i E 3n U 3" then (f3~~;] - 1 for all i, so [fi~,] - 1~[rp]- 1;
. if i ~ 3" U 3" then i contains both ~ and 2, say x~ -~ and xk - 2. Now
[a~,;] - Z or 1 for all i, and [a~,~] - Z, so [a~] - Z. Moreover (for, by DUAL,
f(x~ - 1) [a~,k] - 2 and [a~;] - 2 or 1 for all i, so [a3] - 2. Put together this
yields [cp] - ~ v 2 v . - - - 1.
2. f(z) - Z. By PERS and CCLOS (cf. proposition 1.1 and footnote 32 on page 33) there
is a j such that x~ - 2 and so [a~] - Z. We would like to show that for all y [a~] and
[~3~] are either 2 or 0. We give an indirect proof of this: assume there is a y such that
either
.[a~] - 1 or 2, which implies for azbitrazy i: [ay,;] - 1 or 2. So both
(a) f(y~ - 1 or Z, and
(b) y;-x;-lory;-x;-0ory;-2orx;-2.Inshort,yCi.
Thus (PERS,2b) f(y~ C f(x") ~(DUAL,2a) l, 2 C 2, which is an absurdity.
. or: [Q~] - 1 or 2~ for arbitrary i: [~y~,;] - 1 or 2. So both
(C) f(y~ - 1 óC y E 3n U 3n, and
(d) (yi - 1 Bc x; - 1, 2 or -~) y:-gor(y:-08~xc-~,2)ory:-2.
Again we Ueat two cases separately:
- y E{0, Z, 1}n, i.e. y; ~ 2 for all i and by 2d above we obtain y" C z~
(PERS) f(y~ C f(x') ~(2c) 1 C Z. Contradiction.
- y E{0, 1, 2}n, i.C. y; ~ z fOr all i and by 2d: y C x" ~(PERS,DUAL,2C)
1 C Z. Contradiction.
In all, since [a~] - z, [ay] - 2, 0 and [,Q~] - Z, 0, we obtain [,p] - 2.
3. f(x) - 0. Suppose there is a y such that [a~] ~ 0 or [Q~] ~ 0. Thus either
.[f3~] ~ 0, so there is no i such that [,Qi7,;] - 0, and moreover there is no pair j, k
such that [~iy,~] - Z, and [~3~,k] - 2. This entails that
(a) f(y~ - 1 B~ y E 3n U 3n, and
~ y;-Z,ory;-08tx;~l,ory;-2.(b) y; - 1 8r, x; 0, or ~
(c) either for all i such that y; E{0, 1}: x; ~ Z or all such i: x; ~ 2.
Then distinguish:
- y E{0, Z, 1}", i.e. y; ~ 2 for all i and by 3b and 3c we obtain y C z or
y" C i~(PERS,DUAL,3a) 1 C 0. Contradiction.
- y E{0,1, 2}", i.c. y; ~ Z for all i and by a similaz azgument: x C y' or
x" C y" ~ 0 C 1. Contradiction.
.[Q~7] - 0 and [a~] ~ 0. This implies that each [a~,;] is non-zero and does not
take the values Z and 2 for different i. So f(y~ - Z or 1~ f(i) f~ f(y) ~
(PERS) i~ y~ for some k: xk ~ yk, and therefore xk ~ Z, which leaves us
with the following possiblities:
- xk - 0~ yk -;, 1, but then [ay,k] - 0. Contradiction
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- xk - 1~ yk - 2 , 0 and [~~,k] - 0. Contrddiction
- xk - 2~ yk ~ 2, [o!~,k] - 2. So for all i[a~,;] - 1 or 2, i.e. (y; - 1 8c
x; - 1, 2) or (iJ; - 2 8t x; - 2) or (yi - 0 8t x; - 0, 2) or y; - 2. So i C y
~ 0 C f(y~. Convadiction.
The joint effect is that in this case [cp] - 0.
4. f(x) - 2 Since f E DUAL we know that f(i) - i. By case 2 we obtain [hat [cp]~ - 2.
Also, since T, ~ and n are duality preserving, it follows by induction that [~p]~ - [~p]~.
Therefore [cp]~ - [cp]~ - Z - 2. ~
This immediately suggests a closely related result characterizing the basic connectives
~ and ~, reaching our temporary end goal, the four-valued counterpart of theorem l.5.
Theorem 1.9
The quadrivalent truth functions definable by ~ and ~ are precisely those satisfying
the combination of conditions PERS, DUAL and FREE.
Proof: referring to the previous proof, turn the full delinitions of a~,; and Q~,; into partial ones
by dropping the cases T and ~T. The formula cp cannot be void, since f( Z) -?, so cr contains
at least the disjunct ~j(~;(p; n~p;). ~
This is the end of the main road through this section; we do want to retum shortly to
some sideways which also lead to nice spots.
Given the crucial effect of DUAL we may wonder which connectives characterize
this condition alone. Consider the new negation3~ symboli-r.ed by 8:
1 ~ 0 2
8 0 2 1 2
It may be argued that this dual negation 8, despitc its typical 4-valued appearance,
gives a classical ring to the system. To illustrate this, note that cp V 8cp is always true
(i.e. either 1 or 2). In this respect 8 is very much like ~, but there are differences
too, as will become clear soon. In fact much of this can already be understood once




~Incidentally, this operator suggested itself by a print error in [Re77, p.l3j, where the truth table for
~ coincides with the one given for 8 here, obviously con0icting with the intended persistence. Yet the
operation corresponding [0 8 is known as involWion in relevance logic, cL [Du86].
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In a sense 8 is stmnger than ~ since together with ~, n and ~ it already defines F4.31
Without,~ these operators capture DUAL:
Theorem 1.10
Every dualiry preserving 4-valued truth function is definable by {~, n, 8}.
Proof: First some heuris[ics. Consider the two-place function in DUAL characterized by the
matrix
1 ~ 0 2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 l 0 0
Though the unary function which assigns value 1 for arguments ~ and 2 and has as many
i
zero-values as possible, i.e. ~ 1 ~ ~, can be characterized by the given connectives,
this dces not help: the (conjunctive) product of two such unary funetions will result in the
wrong matrix
1 z 0 2
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
Therefore, we employ a different strategy: `split' the initial matrix into the pair
1 ; 0 2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 Z 8c 2
0 0 0 0 0






1 2 0 2
0 0 0 0
0 ~i
and notice that the initial matrix is the sum of the last two. Moreover, lhe latter matrices can
be considered the two products of the matrices corresponding to the functions
1 Z 0 2
~ 0 2
1 2 0 2
0 2 0 ~
Now consider a number of expressions thal are 'most specific':
P P n~aP P n-,p ,p n 8p 8p n~8p p n 8p
1 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 2 (l 2 0
0 0 0 I 0 0
2 0 2 0 2 0
~~This is a consequenceof theorem 1.6 and the reductions: p - 8. and ti ~p -(~p n~r) v(e~ n q).
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By means of these expressions we define, for any mapping f that is duality preserving, a
characteristic fonnula ~p that maximally exploits DUAL:
P; n~ap; if y; - 1




and f(y~ - Z or 1
y~ i-n
~ - W~ lA`i-~ ~~7,i
if f(y) -0or2
To show that x we start with a useful observation where y - M '-" )~[~]i - f( y) ( ~' - IA`i-1 ~ii,; .
observation If f(y) - 2 or 1, then [~p~] - Z or 1 when y- x", and [~py~] - 1 or 2 when
y- i; in all other cases [~p~] - 0.
Once again we treat the different values of f( i) separately:
1. if f(z) - 1 there are two subcases:
(a) z E 2" ~[~p~,;] - 1 for all á ~ [~p iD - 1~[~] - 1;
(b) if x" ~ 2n then for some j: x~ ~ 2, so [~p~,~] - z and [~p~~] - 2, whereas for
other i (cf. the observation) [~p~,D - z or 1, and [~p~ i] - 2 or 1, and therefore
[~p~] -~ and [~p~] - 2. So in this case too [~p] -~ v 2 V~..- 1.
2. f(x") - ?. By proposition 1.1, f E CCLOS, thus x' ~ 2". Similar to case lb we know
that [~pi] - ~ and moreover for any other y": [~p~] - 0, q for suppose, by contrast, that
there is a y~ i such tha[ [~p~] - 1 or 2, then, witness the observation above, f(y~ - Z
or 1 and y - x, and therefore (DUAL) f(y~ - 2. Contradiction. So [~p] - Z.
3. f(z) - 0. Suppose there is a y"such that [~py] ~ 0. Thus the observation tells us that
f(y) - Z or l, and y - x or y" - x, and so (by DUAL) f( y~ - 0. Contradiction.
4. f(x) - 2 Since f E DUAL, f(x) - 2. By casc 2 we obtain that [~p]s - Z. Also, since
8, ~ and A are duality preserving, it follows by induction that [~p]~ -[~p]~ -~- 2.
We may also study the effect of CCLOS in isolation. Again incorporation of dual
negation is helpful. One way of transferring Langholm's and van Benthem's earlier
result to the 4-valued case thus becomes:
Theorem 1.11
Every classically closed quadrivalent truthfunction is definable by {~, ~, ~, 8}.
Proof: first notice that [he listed operators respect CCLOS. We can now proceed as in theo-
rem 1.6, i.e. for some given closed function f produce subformulas characteristic for (i, f(x').
Apart from the auxiliary formulas Xiooo, Xmoo, Xooio and Xoooi wc introduce:
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Xo}oo(P) - Xozoo(P) - Xooo~(P) - Xoooz(P) - Xoooo(P) -
P Pn~P ~Pn~aP aPn~~P ~Pn~~P ~Pn~~P
1 0 0 0 0 0
~ ~ 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 ~ 2 0
The conjuncts ~p~,; are defined by distinguishing the following cases:
Xtooo(Pi)
Xotao(R ). if f(i) - 1 then ~pz,; - X~to(P;)
Xooo1(Pi)
X1o00(Pi)
Xo}ao(Pi). if f(x") - 2 then ~ps,i -
Xooto(Pi)
Xopoz (Pi )
. if f(i) - 0 then ~p~,; - Xa,oo(p; )
Xtaoo(Pi)
. if f(i) - 2 then ~p~,; - xozoo(Pi)
Xooto(p;)
Xoooz(Pi)
Now the formula corresponding to f is
i-n
~ - ~ M ~~,;.
i i-,
In order to check that - f(x), we first calculate Q~`-n ]~~~]x - i-1 ~Y',i i.
. if y~ i, then there is an i such that y; ~ x; ~[~p~,;] - 0(for example, if y; - 2~ x;
tnen ~~p;,,;] - Qxooos(Pi)] - o) and so ~~j(~; ~p,,.;] - o;
. if y - z then
- if f(i) - 1(or 0) then by thc dcfinition of ~p~,;: ~~pz,;] - 1(0) for all i, and so
[~i ~pï,;] - 1 (or 0, respectively);
- if f(i) - z then by CCLOS there must an i such that x; - z or 2, and furthennore
Q~p~,;] - Z or 1 for other i, and so Q~; tpZ,;] - 2;
- if f(x") - 2 then by a similar argument ~~j(`; ~p~,;] - 2.
In all, ~~P] - ~~ ~G~,i]~ - f(x). ~
T'his is in fact only one of the counterparts of the 3-valued CCLOS-theorem: we
may opt for the other perspectivc on definability and start with the set of connectives
{~, n, ~} and ask for the characteristic condition. The preceding theonem indicates
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that we need a stronger condition to capture these connectives. Notice that there are
several ways to modify or extend CCLOS, but one that is particularly appropriate for
the quadrivalent case is what we call general closure: (recall that 3 - {0, 2, 1} and
3 - {0,1,2})
GCLOS f is generally closed iff f[3"] C 3 and f[3"] C 3.
GCLOS obviously implies CCLOS. Since 8 is CCLOS but not in GCLOS, we know
that this condition is really stronger than CCLOS.32 Because ~, ~ and ~ are in CCLOS,
we also obtain that 8 is not redundant in the previous theorem. The latter connectives
are in fact functionally complete for GCLOS, so we may argue that this is the correct
counterpart of CCLOS in the 4-valued case.
Theorem 1.12
Every generally closed quadrivalent truth funetion is definable by {~, ~, ~}
Proof: in fact it suffices to reinspect the proof of theorem l.l 1. The only characteristic formu-
las using 8 were Xo2oo and X~z. The latter formulas are not in GCLOS and in defining ~p~,;
should be replaced by Xoioo and Xo~~, respectively. The rest of the proof is analogous to the
previous one. ~
Although we succeeded in giving definability results which fotmed the main road
through the jungle of four-valued semantics, we do not have similar results for every
possible combination of conditions.33 Especially the condition freedom is still quite
indetenninate in this respect, but here we should ask ourselves whether we really want
to be dragged into such an exhaustive experience: without persi.ctence, freedom is
hanily interesting.
Apart from mere definability, we may also want to compare the conditions for their
relative strength. Again this problem can be approached in a way that is reminiscent
of Generalized Quantifier Theory: count the number of functions they single ouL This
will be the subject of the next section, which can be skipped without loss ofcontinuity.
1.4 The strength of conditions: counting results
Probably one of the best ways to compare the strength of conditions is to measure the
size of the class of functions of fixed arity fulfilling the requirements. For example,
there are 416 ~ 4.3 . 109 two-place quadrivalent functions, of which 415 ti 1.1 . 109
are free, 414 ti 2.7 . 10g are classically closed, 4K - 65 536 preserve dualization and
28 224 are persistent. Also the numerical effect of combinations of conditions can be
interesting, for such conditions can act independently, reinforce or weaken each other.
For example, out of the 4-valued two-place functions 413 : 6.7 .]0~ are free and
~GCLOS and CCLOS are, however, equivalent modulo PERS, see ~Th90c, prop.5.2].
~3For example, which connectives chazacterize PERS t CCLOS 7
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classically closed, yet no more than l68 respect PERS t DUAL, almost all of which
(166) are also free.
Instead of calculating through every single case, we would like to have general
formulas for combinations of conditions, or at least provide upper and lower bounds.
For any combination of conditions C, the numberof n-ary k-valued functions fulfilling
C will be denoted by ~Cknl~. It is obvious that ~Fknl~ - kk" and ~FREEkn)~ - kk;-1
(k - 3, 4). Here are results about closure properties:
Proposition 1.2
I. ~CCLOSkn~~ - 22" , k~k"-Z");
2. ~GCLOSqn]~ - 4(4"-Z'3"f3'Z"-~) .9(3"-Z")
Proof: straightforward from the definitions, for example, the calculation for GCLOS rests
on a partition of the argument space 4" into groups which can get the same values: for
azguments x" in 2" all and only values in 2-{0, 1} qualify; for arguments in 3n - 2n
all and only values in 3; for 3" - 2" in 3 and finally for 4n -(3n U 3n) all members
of 4 qualify. Counting numbers of these independent choices produces the total number:
22~ , 33"-2~ , 33T-2~ , 44w-2.3T}2n - 4]4T-2.3~t3.2T-~) . 9 ]3~-Z~l. ~
The addition offreedom to either CCLOS or GCLOS reduces the relevant exponent in
the predictable way.
More interesting and less obvious is the behaviourof PERS and DUAL. For k- 3
[B186] gives some numbers: ~PERS3~~~ - 3, ~PERS3tl~ - 1], ~PERS32~~ - 197, and
(calculated by A. W. Roscoe) ~PERS331 ~- 129 615, ~PERS341 ~- 430 904 428 717 ti
4.3 . 1011. So far, nobody has been able to give an explicit formula predicting this
sequence. We do not have a solution for this problem, but we do have a formula relating
the case for k- 4 to a well-known unsolved mathematical puzzle. Let On be the
number ofmonotonically increasing general ized quanti fiers on the domain { I,..., n},
the `Dedekind number' of n.34 Then the problcm for ~PERS4n~~ can be reduced to
Dedekind's problem witness the next result, wherc PERS is also compared and related
to DUAL:
Proposition 1.3
1. ~PERS4n~~ - (02n~2
2. ~DUAL4nl~ - 24"
3. ~PERS fl DUAL4nl~ - OZ„
4. ~DUAL f1 FREE4n~~ - 24"-Z;
3`A generalized quantifiers Q on { 1, ... , n} is a subse[ of p{ 1, ...,n}. Q is monotonically inaeasing
iff A C B 8c A E Q~ B E Q. Cf. (Th85] for background and explanation.
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S. ~PERS n DUAL n FREEán)~ - OZn - 2;
Proof:
1. The lattice (4n, C) is isomorphic to the lattice (p({0, 1} x{1, ..., n}), C) since each
z E{0, 2,1, 2} corresponds to a set
S~-{(a,i) ~a-0,lál GiGnótaCx,}.
It is easy to see that this cotrespondence is one-to-one (for example, that i t is onto follows
from building up co-ordinates x; by consideration of inembership of the underlying wth
values, combined with i) and preserves the partial order. FurthetTrtore every persistent
function f: 4n -~ 4 can be encoded in two independent monotonic subsets of
p({0, 1} x{1,...,n}), or rather their characteristic functions fo and fi, which aze
defined by f;(S~) - 1 q i C f(z).
2. ~DUALá~) ~- 22" . 4(4"-Z")IZ - 24".
3. Using the proof of 1, this is a straightforwazd consequence of the fact that f is now
detetmined by just one of fo and fi , witness thc following equivalences:
f0(S~) - 1 q 0 C Ï(x) q 1~ Ï(x) q 1 ~ f(x) q f1(S~) - 0.
4. ~DUAL (1 FREEyn) ~- ZZ" . q(4"-Z"-2)IZ - 24"-Z-
5. Notice that now only two functions are eliminated when adding FREE to PERS and
DUAL. First focus on PERS t DUAL. By thc implied GCLOS we have f(2) E 3; if
f( 2)- 1 we also have (by DUAL) f( 2) - 1 and so by persistence f(x) - 1 for all i.
And, similarly if f(Z) - 0, f(z) is constanUy 0. ~
The result immediately provides some values: ~PERS4o)~ - 4, ~PERSá~)~ - 36,
~PERS4~1~ - 168Z - 28 224 and ~PERS431~ - 7 828 3542 ti 6.1 . 1013 (the last may
seem much, but is still less than for example ~DUAL431~ - 264 ~ 1.8 . 1019). Yet
a general expression in terrns of standard arithmetical operations is not known for
~,,. Although this relation to a longsianding open problem may be interesting, for
the purpose of this section it is more important to estimate the number of quadrivalent
persistent functions than to assess their precise amount. Using well-known results
about the Dedekind number, we arrive at the following appmximations:3s
Proposition l.4
1. 4` Zn ~ C IPERSqnI ~ C 9` Zn 1
~A further ( rough) approximation is ~ Zn 1 ti~. The absolute deviation of this approximation
n
increases, but the relative one decreases for large n.
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2. 2` Z" ~ G ~PERS fl DUALq"1 ~ G 3` 2" ~
So for the 4-valued case the strength of the single conditions is ordered as follows:
PERS ~~ DUAL ~ GCLOS ~ CCLOS 1 FREE ~ no condition
To recapitulate, we have shown the precise relation between some counting tasks
related to persistence on the one hand, and an open combinatotical problem on the
other. Moreover, we were able to assess the relative strength of conditions used in
isolation or in wmbination. Finally, note that there is no point in comparing the order
ofthe numbers ~Ckn~~: they all are superexponential. But of course this is what makes
definability worth while: the enormous cxpressive potential of small sets of logical
constants.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter a number of conditions on (3- and 4-valued) truth functions have been
discussed in relation to certain connectives. Several combinations of conditions have
been shown to correspond to gmups of operators. This, of course, raises the question
of the success of this enterprise. Moreover, since there is no way in which we could
deal with every possible condition or connective3ó, we may wonder whether we have
really treated the most evident and interesting cases.
To stan with the latter question, we bclieve that indeed we have: the proposed
conditions37 seem quite natural and moreover characterize sets of independently mo-
tivated connectives.
As regards the former question of the success of the definability task, notice that,
although the picture is by no mcans complete, we are quite satisfied, since the most
evident cases have been covered.
Moreover, our route thmugh the field of possiblc results was motivated by the
attempt to characterize the classical connectives within partial semantics; this was
achieved by successively adding conditions, first for the three-valued models:
no condition: ~, ~, (T), ~, ti
persistence: ~, n, T, ,~
persistence f classical closure: ~, ~, T
persistence f classical closure f freedom: ~, ~
This is mirrored in the four-valucd case by a similar sequence:
no condition: ~, ~, (T), ~, q, ~
persistence: ~, ~, (T), , ~, p
persistence f dualiry preservation: ~, ~, T
persistence f dualiry preservation t freedom: ~, n
~Unless in such general tenns as in proposition 1.7 of the appendix.
~In the appendix we discuss some olher conditions suggested in the literature.
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Apart from this main road, there were some miscellaneous results. First, for the
three-valued truth functions:
classical closure: ~, ~, ~
persistence f freedom: ~, ~, ~
Second, for four-valued ttuth functions:
classicalclosure: ~, ~, ~, 8
general closure: ~, ~, ~
duality preservation: ~, ~, 8
To see to what extent we have covered the possibilities, we may again employ the
twofold perspective mentioned in the introduction.
Reasoning from conditions to connectives, we note that out of the 8 possible
combinations for the trivalent conditions PERS, CCLOS and FREE, only 6 have been
shown to be definable by sets of connectives (leaving open the combinations FREE and
CCLOSfFREE). We display the order of the combined conditions for F3 in figure l.l
(a condition is abbreviated as its first letter).




However, if we take the classical connectives ~ and n to be a fixed kemel (as
we have done before), the 8 possible combinations with ~, T and ~ are describable
by PERS, CCLOS and FREE. How can [his be`? The simple reason is that T can be
defined by ~, so there are two redundancies in the general scheme. Hence, figure 1.2
shows full success of the characterization task for the connectives encountered in the
three-valued case. It also implies that the open problems with regard to figure 1.1 can
only be resolved by intn~ducing new connectives.
For the quadrivalent case definability is more complicated. First notice thai PERS,
DUAL, GCLOS, CCLOS and FREE do not present 32 cxtensionally di fferent subsets:
since GCLOS implies CCLOS, and DUAL implies CCLOS, certain combinations
can be identified, and only 16 survive (figure 1.3). So far only 7 oui of these 16
combinations have been covered by definability results. Although we have some ideas
how to fill these gaps (involving new conditions and new connectives), this will not
be pursued here.
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Figure 1.2: Characterization ofconnectives in F3
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Figure 1.3: Combined conditions for F4
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Starting with ~ and n, addition of ~, q, T, ti and 8 improves the situation: after
removing redundancies, 7 out of 13 different systems are definable by the stated
conditions, see figure 1.4.
Despite the open spots in this diagram, we conclude that the most relevant results
have been added to the knowledge of the subject. Definability results provide a deeper
understanding of the expressiveness of thc language, and guides the choice of the
connectives in the subsequent chapters. Moreover, this kind of definability is useful
for answering questions like: Is connective co definable by ct ,..., cn? We do not
have to go through intricate syntactic arguments, especially in the case of a negative
answer. For example, it now immediately follows that ~ is not definable by ~, ~ and
8, since the latter all preserve duality whcreas the former does not.
Appendix: which conditions are definable?
There were some issues omittcd from the main text which do not belong to the
kemel of this thesis, but may ncvertheless be of interest to some readers. The 6rst
subsection deals with the precise definition of what constitutes a proper condition,
with the kind of subtlety familiar from basic recursion theory. This may be of interest
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to the mathematically minded. After treating onc altemative in some more detail, we
recapitulate some other proposed conditions, to serve the more historically minded.
some general definitions
The search for proper conditions is constrained by the fact that, in order to be definable,
classes of functions need to reflect some basic pmperties of the syntax of propositional
logic.
~ Well-formed fonnulas (wFFS) can reoccur in more complex formulas, i.e. the
notion of wFF is recursive.
~ The propositional atoms may occur within a formula in any order, may or may
not be used, and may reoccur.
These simple facts correspond to semantic properties, and these constraints will
delimit the set of proper classes of truth functions.
Definition 1.4 (projection)
Forany i- l, ..., n the function ~r; : kn ---~ k is a pro,jection iffor all i E kn:
a;(i) - z,.
Definition 1.5 (generalized composition)
I.f Í E kkTM a~9i ,...~ 9m E kk" then f og~ 92 -~~ 9m E kk" i.s the generalized compo-
sitionof f and9i,...,9„~,whichisdefinedby fo9t ..-9m(x) - Í(9t(x),...,9m(x))
for all i E k".
Definition 1.6 (closed class)
C C Fk is a elosed elass ifffor each n 1 0 it contain.e the projections ~r~ ,. .., ~r„ E kk"
and is closed under generalized composition.
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The extended notion of composition may seem incapable of describing arbitrary
composition as is needed for closed classes of truth functions. For example, the
complex function given by (x, y, z) ~--~ f(g(y, z), h(x), i(z, x)) combines functions
of arity 3,2,1 and 2, respectively. However, we can describe this mapping by f o
(g o ~r2~rg)(h o ~rt )(i o ~rg~rt ) which belongs to kt`' by recursive use of the definition
of composition. This function could cornespond to a logical formula such as (q ~
r) V~p V(r -~ p); this correspondence becomes especially clear when we use the
`Cambridge Polish' notation with many-place disjunctions: (v(~qr)(~p)(-. rp)).
Here are some simple, yet useful facts about closed classes:
Proposition 1.5
. Combination of conditions corresponding to closed clas,ses corresponds to the
intersection of these clas,ses.
. The intersection of closed classes i.c a closed class.
. Every closed class contains functions of arbitrary ariry n ) 0, viz. the n
projections.
From the above definitions it also follows that there are two trivially closed classes
in the case of k truth values:
1. the whole function space Fk;
2. the set of all projections; f~~r it is easy to see that a composition of projections is
a projection again.
These two trivial classes are the simplest illustrations; they are the top and bottom
elements in a lattice ofclosed classes, ordered by ordinary set inclusion. The interesting
cases are somewhere in between. Also, we can now easily give examples of classes
which are not closcd:
Proposition 1.6
. A class offunctions offexed ariry is not closed.
. The complement ofa closed elass i.s not closed. 38
The vague ideasmentioned in the beginning of this appendix can now be formalized
by the following proposition:
Proposition 1.7 C C Fk is definable by some C iff C is a closed class; moreover, C
is definable by a finite C ijj`'C is the closure under compositions of the projections and
a finite set of otherfunctions.
~Nor dces union preserve closure ol classes: ~~ p n,~ is neither classically closed nor hee though
its defining operators aze either way.
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Of course this apparatus may be used to justify a condition, but also to reject a
condition, if it dces not meet the standards of definability. Below we discuss the
possible condition of distributivity, providing a non-trivial illustration of the notions
introduced.
distributivity
Distributivity is an interesting condition since itmotivates the strong Kleene extensions
of the binary truth tables for the classical connectives.39
First we reconsider the operations n(meet) and u(join) which are the greatest
lower bound and the lowest upper bound in the approximation lattice. These operations
correspond to the intetsection and union of underlying truth value sets.
Meet and join can be generalized in the usual way to vectors (by pointwise defini-
tion) and sets (notation Íl and fl ). Then distrihutiviry can get its fotmal description:
DISTR f is distributes over ~J iff f (~f X)- ~J f[Xt x.-. x X„],
where X C 4" and X; - ~r;[X]. The definition of distributivity with respect to fl is
completely analogous (and may be applied to 3n as well).
One simple case is that in which X contains only two members which coincide
except for one co-ordinate, then for a binary function f:
f(x, y U z) - f(x, y) U f(x, z).
In fact distributivity can be defined from this restricted form by iteration. Another easy
case is when f is a unary function; then the criterion simpli fies to f (~J X) - ~J f[X ].
In fact one may wonder whether this transparam equation can replace the one in the
above definition, for n-ary functions. But there are counterexamples to this idea, for
example, let f be the interpretation of n, then
f((l,o)U(o,l))- f(2,2)-2~ f(l,o)U f(o,l)-ouo-o.
Therefore the simplified equation is in general incorrect.~~
Now what are the connectives defining distributivity, if any? Since the usual
connectives are distributive with respect to n(and U in the 4-valued case), the expres-
siveness result suggested by this is:
Conjecture 1.1
The distributive functions can be defined using only ~ and ~.
However, this conjecture is wrong - in fact it fails in both directions:
~See [Th90c) for a lengthy demonstration of this.
~Yet, it is this equation that is proposed by [Be77]. Belnap requires X to be directed, i.e. confluent in
the right d'vection; for u the requirement is that for any z, y E X there is a z E X such that z C z and
y C z. Referring to Scotr, he calls the property of distributiviry for d'trected sets conlinuity, which is, for
finite X, equivalent to persistence.
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. the distributive function f: z H 1 is not definable in terms ofstandard connec-
tives and propositional variables (for motivation see theorems 1.5 and 1.9).
. the function f with f( l)- f(0) - 0 and f( Z )- 2 is definable (by p A~p) but
not distributive: f(1 n 0) -~~ 0- f(1) n f(0)
Momover, the latter counterexample points at an insurmountable problem:
Theorem 1.13
The class of distributivefunetions is not definable by a set of connec[ives.
So, neither 3-valued functions which are distributive with respect to fl, nor 4-valued
functions with respect to n or u, are in general definable by a set of connectives. The
simple reason is that if they were, the standard connectives, being distributive, would
be definable, and so would their compositions be. [n other words, distributivity dces
not correspond to a closed class. By proposition 1.7 this implies the above theorem.
Hence distributivity is a powerful tool for producing extended truth tables, but,
though appealing, it is not a proper condition on truth functions in general. Next we
shall come across other conditions suggestcd in the literature.
other conditions proposed
Throughout the chapter we have noticed the use of conditions by other authors, for
example, PERS (Fine, Blamey), CCLOS (van Benthem, Langholm), DUAL (Visser).
But in fact some other conditions have been proposed as well, and we will treat them
here.
In a modal setting, [Hu81 j suggests a condition of refinability (besides PERS) to
the effect that indeterminacies can be resolved both ways:
REF~` If [p](s) - Z then there exist s', s" such that s C s', s C s", ~p](a') - 1 and
~P](s~~)
- ~ - -
This condition may be motivated by what Langholm calls determinability41: a gap
means insufficient data. Transfen.ed to ourextensional ~emantics REF~ is the condition
resolution discussed in [Ve87~.42
RES f is resolute if f(z") - 2 implies there exist y, z~ i such that f(y") - 1 and
f(~ - 0.
Notice that RES differs only from Jaspars' rcformulation ofCCLOS mentioned in sec-
tion 1.2 in that RES has `and' where REF has `or', a small difference with significant
41At least this is a way to interpret a remark in the introduction of [La88, p.3]; later on [1.a88, p.18]
the technical appearance of determinability is that of CCLOS.
uIn his account of 'supertruth' (cf. van Fraassen's supervaluations) [Fi75a, p.278191 also discusses a
condition called 'resolution' which however is completely equivalent to Humberstone's REF~, modulo
persistence.
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consequences. Veltman himself notices that resolution is only proper for certain f,
interpreting standard connectives. Resolution can be related directly to distributivity:
PERS t RES are equivalent to DISTR, modulo CCLOS. This can be used to show that
RES is not definable in the sense of this chapter: for if it were, then, by proposition 1.5
and theorem 1.4, PERS t CCLOS f RES would be definable, and by the above equiv-
alence, so would CCLOS t DISTR be. However, the counterexample to definability
of DISTR (cf. theorem 1.13) is also CCLOS, which shows that CCLOS f DISTR is
not a closed class, contradicting definability. Therefore the class of resolute functions
is not definable.
Apart from existing conditions we may also think of new ones. Notice in this
respect that PERS, DISTR and the like refer to the ordering of extension (C). A
striking possibility is to consider the C ordering instead. For example, it can be shown
that C-monotonicity forms a closed class, and seems to be defined by the positive
formulas of 3- and 4-valued logic.
other connectives proposed
Also we might consider other connectives (or other interpretations) than the ones we
have been focussing on. Again, without appeal to `intrinsic naturalness', we can but
inspect existing proposals. In fact we have to restrict ourselvcs to only some proposals,
since on this side possibilities abound.
The first altemative concems [~.u20]'s sys~em L3 which extends the standard
system {~, ~} with the stronger implication ~(sce the following truth table). This is a
proper extension of the standard system, since H is neither persistent nor free and hence
not definable by ~, ~. However, H is classically closed, and so in expressive force L3
is a subsystem of {~, ~, ~}.43 The converse holds too, because of ~p - p f-. ~p. So
t.3 just appears to be another way to define the class CCLOS! A similar result holds

















At least one other proposal deserves mentioning: thc Bochvar~weak Kleene inter-
pretations of the usual connectives, represented in the table by ~, which differ from
their usual (`strong Kleene') counterparts by getiing the value Z in each row and col-
umn headed by 2. Of course the 'weak' tables still satisfy PERS, CCLOS and FREE,
so it follows by theorem 1.5 that these new connectives can all be defined in terms of
~, ~(in their strong interpretations, of course).44 Here the converse does not hold: ~
is not definable by, for example, ~ and ~. This is a straightforward consequence of
43t;ukasiewicz noticed that n is redundanC p n q- ~((q ~-. p) H~q).
~For example, weak conjunction as defined in the proof of theorem I.5.
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the fact that the weak connectives semantically map 3n - 2n onto ~. This condition
presumably describes the weak Kleene system.
Chapter 2
Modal definability
In this chapter we focus on the expressiveness ol' the modal language with respect to
partial world semantics. Extending funetional completeness from partial propositional
logic to modal logic faces a number of problems. A priori it may not even be clear
how to define functional completeness for (partial) modal logic. Such a definition is
feasible and will be presented in section 2.2, which is dcdicated to what may be called
the structura! approach to modal completeness. One essential observation is that the
modal operator O corresponds to the `inverse image' operation R-~, where R is the
accessibility relation.~ This is the mostobvious counterpart of thekind ofpropositional
definability studied in the first chapter. Here the leading question is: which formulas
correspond to which semantic operations under what conditions? Though interesting,
this method tums out to suffer from severe limitations.
Hence we will employ a different, reductive approach in section 2.4. There we
do not seek for an ( in some sense) absolute characteri-r.ation, which relates syntax to
semantics, but for a more moderate and relative characterization, which relates modal
logic to first order predicate logic. For example, the first order formula 3y(Rxy ~ Py ~
Qy) corresponds to the modal formula O(p ~ q), since they are verified by essentially
the same models. However, not every first ordcr formula over R, P, Q corresponds
to a modal formula. Then the definability question becomes: which modal formulas
correspond to which first order formulas under what conditions?
Crucial preservation properties are introduced and studied in the intermediate
section 2.3, including some other related techniques. We start with an introductory
section which deals with the partial models thai will be used to interpret the modal
language.
2.1 Partial models for modal logic
At first sight we may wonder why modal definability is so much harder than propo-
sitional definability: after all, by the presence of the modal operators O and O we
'R-'[XJ -{y ~ 3z E X: Ryx}.
46 CHAPTER 2. MODAL DEFINABILITY
have extra expnessive power. Yet this only holds for a truth-functional in[erpreta-
tion of modalities.2 This truth-functional semantics has been treated in the previous
chapter, so we cannot expect anything new from this perspective. Moreover, the truth-
functional approach lacks the flexibility which is typical for modal logic, and in fact
dces not capture the basic intuition of necessity.
Therefore we adopt the much more flexible Kripke semantics34 which is charac-
terized by the presence of frames underlying the models. Recall that a frame is a
pair (S, R), where S is a set of (as such unstructured) situations and R C S x S an
accessibility relation between situations. A Kripke model M based on frame (S, R)
is a triple (S, R, V), where V is an interpretation of atomic propositions, depending
on the situation. In general V may be undefined or overdefined on the situations. If
V is classical, i.e. always assigns either true orfalse, the situations are called possible
worlds; if V is partially defined they are called coherent situations or partial worlds
and if V is always defined but maybe overdefined, total situations.
The modal operators are interpreted relative to the accessibility relation; in possible
worlds models we have: (R[s] - {t ~ sRt}, for convenience)
M, s~ t7~p q dt E R[a] : M, t[- rp
M,s~O~pq3tER[s]:M,t~~p
By contrast, in partial models we have separate truth and falsity relations, which we
symbolize by ~ and ~ , respectively.
The standard truth and falsity conditions for partial Kripke semantics area
M, s~ a~p q dt E R[s] : M, t~~p M, s~ o~p q 3t E R[s] : M, t~ ~p
M, s~ O~p q 3t E R[s] : M, t~ ~p M, s~ O~p q b't E R[s] : M, t~ tp
We omit M if possible; a~ ~p should be rcad as `a supports (or, verifies) ~p' or `~p is
true in s', and s~ ~p as `a rejects cp' or `~p is false in s.
2.2 Modal truth functions
Perhaps the most evident approach to modal definability would be to extend proposi-
tional definability by incorporating the global effect of modal models into the notions.
Kripke semantics is not truth-functional (in the usual sense of the word), since truth
and falsity in one world may dcpend on truth and falsity in other worlds. As such
this does not preclude the possibility of functional completeness; it just means that
the semantic objects describcd by (syntactic) formulas will be more involved. What
2t,ukasiewicz once advocated such an approach to necessity.
3This type of possible world semantics is usually attributed to Saul Kripke, who was one of the
originators, although, for example, Stig Kanger and laakko Hintikka did pioneering research in this area.
~Though Kripke semantics is already quite flcxible, wc will study more general fonns of possible
world semantics in later chapters (vir. the chapters 4, 6, 7).
SFrom a'partial' point of view, these are the most simple and obvious clauses one can think of, so it
seems. We will, however, discuss altemative proposals in later chapters.
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we need is what we will call modal truthfunctions, which take the set of worlds into
account. This new perspective still leaves a lot of freedom for a precise definition of
the notion of modal truth function. One of the essential parameters controlling such a
notion concems the amount and nature of the structural information we are willing to
presuppose. Some options for this starting point are:
. a designated frame, i.e. a given frame with a fixed world in it;
. a given frame simpliciter;
. a class of frames (possibly fulfilling structural conditions);
. a class of models (idem).
These possibilities can obviously be mixed; in addition to this liberty, there are several
ways to connect the presupposed structure to definability. For example, assuming a
frame, we may require the interpreted formula to be equal to the modal truth function
in some world or, by contrast, in every world. We opt for a given frame and global
definability (`all worlds'), because this notion of modal truthfunction seems the most
manageable and perspicacious one.
To introduce this notion observe that a fomiula can be interpreted in a Kripke
frame as a set of possible worlds (its denotation). Consequently, a(modal) operator
can be interpreted as a semantic operation on sets of possible worlds. For example,
[o](X)- Y for some sets of worlds X, Y may con-espond to the truth conditions of
~~P,if[~P]-Xand[o~p]-Y.6
To generalize this to partial semantics, firsl notice the familiar equivalence of
subsets and their characteristic functions, i.e. of ~(S) and 2s. Switching to this
functional format, and generalizing to k-valued interpretations (k - 2, 3, 4), a formula
of partial modal logic may be conceived as a frame valuation, i.e. a mapping from
situations to (k) truth values. Given some frame the interpretation of an arbitrary
formula depends on the frame valuations assigned to the primitive propositions it
contains. So the modal truth functions are operators on frame valuations. Formally,
a modal truth function f is a function f:(ks)" --~ ks Bearing in mind that
frame valuations are the modal counterparts of propositional truth values, we amve at
definitions of the basic notions modal funcrion space and modal definability.~
Definition 2.1 (modal function space)
Fs,k, the modal funetion space for the k-valued cace with .cet of ,cituations S, stands
.for UnEm(ks)(t`S)n.
Instead of the valuation V, we use the equivalent notion of an(n-tuple) frame
valuation ~, which is closer to the notation for propositional definability. V and ~are
related by:
óThis construal is one way of putting the idea of neighbourhood semantics, as explained in chaptet 6.
~The technical notions projection, composition and closed clas.s (cf. the appendix to chapter 1) can be
adapted likewise.
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V (P~~ s) - ~:(a)
Let [.]É recursively extend [p;]f - a:;, where ~; E ks.
Definition 2.2 (modal definability)
Let (S, R) be afixed frame. A n-place modal truthfunction f E Fs,k is definable by
aformula ~p using the atoms p~ ,..., pn ifj`' [~p]É - f(~~. Likewise, a class C C FS,~
is definable by a set of logical constants C iff
(i) every f E Cl"1 is definable by some ~p E Ga{p~, . .., pn} and conversely
(ii) for all ~p E Gc {Pt ,-.., Pn} the function f:{ t-. [~y]É is in Clnl.
The definition is sufficiently general to allow a renewed look on definability, even
with respect to ordinary two-valued semantics. Then it shows that the expressive
power of the ordinary modal language is very limited: for non-trivial frames there will
be modal truth functions that do not correspond to any formula.
Example 2.1
Let n - 1, k - 2 and consider the displayedframe.
Not all operators areexpressihle since, roughly speaking, the fact that v does not `see'
w prohibits definability of operators in which the state-of-affairs in w influences the
one in v. More technically, it crtn be .shown by induction thatfor each formula ~p E
G,,n,o{p}, [~p]f(v) only depend.s on 1;(v), i.e. if ~(v) -~(v) then [~p]E(v) -[~p],~(v).













A fortiori, thc extended modal language G,,~,o,.,r,ti(Prop) is not functionally
complete with respect to 4-valucd semantics eithec Since we feel that the 'poor but
proud austerity' of the standard modal operators should not be sacrificed too easily to
more (e.g. bimodal) or stronger (e.g. dyadic) modalities, there is a need for suitable
restrictions that may help to define the (extcnded) standard language.
One condition that comes to mind is automorphism invariance, which holds vac-
uously in the purely propositional case:
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AUT Relative to a frame ( S, R) a k-valued, n-ary modal ttuth function f is automor-
phism invariant iff f a(r;~ - af(1;~, for all automorphism a with respect to the
given frame and all { E (ks)"
Here the notion `automorphism with respect to (S, R)' is defined as usual: a is
a bijective (1-1) function on S that respects R, i.e. xRy ~ a(x)Ra(y). Its use
in the definition of 'AUT' in fact needs the hereditary effect on frame valuations:
a(~~ - (a(i;t ), ..., a(~„)) where a(~;) is defined pointwise bY a(~;) - aa~;(a(a)).
It is easily verified that AUT holds for the extended modal language and in general
it indeed restricts the semantic class, yet it does not succeed in characterizing the
language. In some cases the restriction has no effect: reinspection of example 2.1
shows that the only automorphism on the frame is the identity mapping.
V15thout strong modal additions it seems hard to fully characterize the extended
language. To get an idea of what is at stake, we focus on the somewhat simpler two-
valued case, where a frame valuation is essentially a set of worlds. Observing what is
expressible for the frame in example 2.1, we flnd evidence for a positive definability
result.
Example 2.1 (rnntinued)
Note that all expressible unary funetions are unions of the truthfunctions related to
theformulas in the table:
p OOp p A Op p n O~p ~p N Op ~p n O~p p A 00-~p ~p n OO~p
w v w ro w v w ro w ro w ro w v w v
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 I
Notice that the expressible operators ` run in blinkcrs': the operation transferring X
into R-t [X ] is expressible (by O), its inverse X H R[X ] may not be expressible.g To
illustrate this we retum to the example once more. (Let ~ be the characteristic function
of a set X C{w, v}.)
Example 2.1 (second continuation)
!t may help to contrast R[X ] and R-t [X ]:
X R[XJ R- [X]
w v w v w v
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
So, R-1 [.] is expressed Op, R[.] is not expressible. as follows from earlier observations.
BReca11 that R-' [X] -{x ~ 3y E X: xRy} and R[X] -{y ~ 3z E X: xRy}.
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In temporal logic the problem of one-sided definability is solved by having oper-
ators looking both ways (e.g. F and P). A good illustration of structural definability
within tense logic can be found in [vB86, p.102~3]. Van Benthem introduces a notion
of continuiry (i.e. W~istributivity):
CONT (k - 2, n - 1) On a frame (S, R) a unary modal truth function f is continuous
iff f (~J; X;) - ~J; f(X;), for all families {X; ~ i E I} where X; C S.
Now let ('it, G) be the set of reals ordered by `smaller than'.
Theorem 2.1 For the frame (~t, c), AUT n CONTI'1, the set of unary modal truth
functions which areautomorphi.cm invariant andcontinuous, is definable by Gl,v,~,P{p}.
Setting aside such bimodal definability, it will be hard to find equally informative
results. The point is that there is no a priori difference between relations and their
inverses, whence it is impossiblc to give a semantic property possessed by R, but not
by R-'. The only way out may be a direct invocation of R-'. Then the nesult for the
classical case would amount to
Theorem 2.2 ForKripke semantics, the language G,,~,o(Prop) defines the class A2
which contains the projections and is closed under the operations complementation,
intersection, R-' [-] and composition.
Of course this is nothing but an algebraic rcformulation of the syntactic structures of
modal formulas within semantics; neverthcless it is the best we can do in general,
under the present perspective.
Similar nsults are readily obtained in a partial setting, once R-' has been nrcast
as the operation e, which interprets O.
Definition 2.3
Foraframe (S, R) the unary operation p: ks ---. ks is defined by (k - 2, 3)
1 iff sRt ác ~(t) - 1 for.rome t
p(~)(s) - 0 iff~(t) - 0for all t such that sRt
' elsez
Thuswehave (~)-'[1J - R-'[f-'[1JJand (pf)-'[OJ - (R-'[~-'[OJ`J)`. Observe
that the definition can be simplilied to
B(~)(s) - ~mR~~l f (t),
which on its tum can be generalized (for k- 2, 3, 4) to
e(E)(,) - W tER( .l f(t).
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This refonnulation shows that Q preserves disjunctions. Thus we obtain a similar alge-
braic characterization, featuring operators which are counterparts to the connectives;
e.g. - for ~, x for ~, ~ for ~, 2 for q, Q for O and, say, e for ~, etcetera.
Theorem 2.3 (Ak) Forthe trivalent(quadrivalent) semantics, the respective language
G,,~,o,.,ti(Prop) (G,,~,o,.,ti~(Prop)) defines the class A3 (A4) which contains the
projections, 2(and 2) and is closed under the operations -, x, Q, A and composition.
Having given this rather ctude form of definability we may impose the condi-
tions proposed in chapter 1, appropriately generalized to the modal case (by pointwise
definition). This amounts to replacing (vectored) tnrth values by (vectored) frame
valuations in the definitions of PERS, CCLOS etcetera. Then these conditions com-
bined with Ak are definable by the subsets of the extended moda] language that one
would expect from the propositional case. For cxample, PERS nA3 is definable by
~, I`, ~r, T, ~.
Although this line may be worth pursuing, wc will not do so here. Instead we will
pay more attention to the full extended language and continue with a less revolutionary
approach, using a translation ofmodal logic into the first order predicate calculus. This
also involves the introduction of an important eyuivalence relation between models,
which will be defined in the next section.
2.3 Preservation under bisimulations
One way to characterize normal modal logic is in terms of its truth preservation
under semantic operations such as filtration9, disjoint union, generated submodels
and p-morphisms. In classical modal logic these notions are covered by the more
general notion of bisimulation. In this section we will try and see whether a similar
characterization can be obtained for partial modal logic.
To have an equivalence relation between mode]s that, in some sense, characterizes
them as being models of modal logic, the notion of bisimulation has been suggested.lo
We accommodate this notion for partial semantics:
Definition 2.4 (bisimulation)
A relationZ C S x S' is a bisimulation between two models (S, R, V) and (S', R', V')
ifftl -
1. (aZa' 8c aRt) ~ 3t' : ( tZt' á, a'R't')
2. (aZa' 8t a'R't') ~ 3t :(tZt' 8t aRt)
9Filtrations will be considered in chapter 4, where we derive the finite model property for several
systems of partial modal logic.
to[vB85] uses the term 'p-relation', [vB84bJ 'zigzag relation' (both are 'full'), [vB90] 'bisimulation'
(without bitotality). 'Bisimulation' is independently used in computer science, see e.g. [St87].
tt Without (3) Z is a bisimulation between frames. Notice that (I ) and (2) can be summarized by: (M -
Mt,M' - Mz, etcetera, s;,t; E S;, i~ j, i, j- 1,2) (si Zsz Bc s;R;t;) ~ 3t~ :(ttZtz ~. stRit~),
cf. [dR90].
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3. V(p, a) - V'(p, a') ifaZa'
Z is a full bisimulation when in addition to (1-3) clause (4) holds:
4. dom(Z) - S and ran(Z) - S'.
This definition may be clarified by the following diagram.
Figure 2.1: Bisimulation diagram
A bisimulation (or the existence of a suitable bisimulation) is indeed an equivalence
relation, both between global models and between frames (or between local models
and frames), symbolized by M oa M' and F ~a F' (M, s ~a M', s' and F, s oa
F', a' respectively): the identity mapping guarantees re0exivity, the inverse relation
symmetry, and composition transitivity.
The obvious question now cmerging is whether partial truth and falsity are pre-
served under bisimulations, like classical truth is. The answer is `yes', even when
extra operators T, l, ~, q, ~, 8 are added to the modal language.
From now on, let the extendeci modal language be the propositional language which
contains the above operators and o and O, i.e. essentially12, G,,~,o,ti,,,,t(Prop). We
also make use ofa panialized notion ofmodal equivalence: ( likewise forpropositional,
elementary equivalence)
M, s m~ M', s' iff M, s~ ~p a M', s' ~ ip for all modal cp.
Then
mod
M, s ~a M', s' ~ M, s- M', s'.
as is shown by the following pmposition.
Proposition 2.1 (preservation under bisimulations)
If Z is a bisimulation between M and M', M, s~ ~p q M', s' ~ ~p, for all ~p and s, a'
such that aZa'.
~ZCf. chap[er 1, theorems 1.2 and 1.6: of course q only pops up in the 4-valued case.
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Proof: by simultaneous induction on the swcture of ~p we prove that
M, a~ rp q M', a' [: ~p 8t M, a~ rp q M', a' ~ rp
for all a, s' such that sZa'. For the propositional variables this is given by definition, for the
0-place constants it is obvious, and for the other connectives it is easy. We will therefore only
spell out the case of ~, as well as the crucial modal step. So assume that the properties above
hold for ~p (IH), let aZa' then:
. M, s~ ti rp q M, a~ rp q (IH) M', a' ~ tp q M', a' ~ ti rp.
. M,a~ ~cpqM,a~ rpq (IH)M',s'~ rpqM',s'~ ~.rp.
. M, s[- []rp q b't E R[s] : M, t~ rp p t1t' E R'[s'] : M', t' ~ rp q M', s' ~ ~rp,
where
~: assume the left-hand side, then for an arbitrary t' E S' by clause (2) of bisimu-
lation there is a t" E S such that t"Zt' and sRt", so M, t" ~ ~p, and so by IH:
M', t' ~ ~p;
G: by a symmetric argument, using clause (1) of the definition of bisimulation.
. M,s~otpq3tER(s]:M,t~rpq3t'ER'(t']:M',t'~rpqM',s'~atp,
where
~: assuming the left-hand side, by (1) there is a t' E S' such that tZt' and s'Rt', so
by IH: M', t' ~ ~p;
G: analogously, by (2).
Generally speaking, the notion of bisimulation has tumed out to be strikingly stable
and applicable to many branches of modal logic. This is reflected in partial semantics
by the fact that additional connectives (if extensional) do not mar the game. In other
words, differently, the preservation holds for the extended, functionally complete
propositional language with modal operators addcd.
An older characteristic of normal modal logic is truth preservation under p-
morphisms.13 From ourmodem perspective a p-morphism is essentially a bisimulation
which is afunction, often assumed to be surjective (onto).
Another simple but useful result in classical modal logic is the so-called generation
lemma. Informally speaking, it says that the truth value of a formula in some world
only depends on that particular world and those worlds accessible from it in a finite
number of steps. This result is easily transferred to partial modal logic.
Definition 2.5 (generated submodel)
Let M-(S, R, V) be a partial modal model. A model M' -(S', R', V') is a
generated submodel of M iff
. S' C S;
13From [Se70], but it has presumably been folklore f~r quite a while; the term is said to be an
abbreviation of 'pseudo-epimorphism'.
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. if a E S' and aRt then t E S'; (i.e. R[S~ C S')
. aR't iff a, t E S' and sRt; (i.e. R' - R fl S' x S')
. V'(p, a) - V(p, e) If a E S'.
Notice the relation generated submodel is a special case of bisimulation: for if S' C S,
let Z be the embedding of S' in S(i.e. the identity function restricted to S'). So again
we obtain an easy consequence of proposition 2.1.
Corollary 2.1 (generation lemma)
If M' is a generated submodel of M, then for all a in M': M, a~ ~p q M', a~~p.
An important class of generated submodels are the so-called rooted submodels, in
which thene is a world (situation) (the root.or generator) from which all worlds of the
generated submodel are accessible in a finite number of jumps, i.e. the submodel is
generated from the root. First we de6ne the iterative composition of a relation.
Definition 2.6 (iterative relational rnmposition)
!f R is an arbitrary relation on some set S, let
. Ro - {(a,a) ~ s E S};
. Rntl - R. Rn - {(a, t) ~ 3a' E S:(s, s') E R 8c (s', t) E Rn};
~ n. R - nE~ '
Definition 2.7 (rooted submodel)
M, -(S„ R', V') is a rooted submodel of M-(S, R, V) (or a submodel generated
by a) iff M, is a generated submodel of M where S, - R' [a].
The de6nition is justified by the fact that S, is closed with respect to R. So we have a
constructive kind of generated submodel at our disposal.
Corollary 2.2 The generation lcmma holdc for M,.
1'his more particular form ol' the generation lemma can be used to derive another
familiar property of modal modcls.14 M is a local model for ~p if for some a in M:
M, a~ cp ( we sometimes also say that ( M, s) is a local model); M is a global model
for lp if for all a in M: M, a~ ~p.
Corollary 2.3 (preservation under disjoint union)
!f ~p is locally (globally) truefor ,some family of models, it is also locally (globally)
truefor the disjoint union of tho.se model.s.
~~The special fortn of the generation lemma and preservation under disjoint union are intensively used
in part III of this thesis. Since these cascs are subsumed under bisimulation there is virtually no technical
reason to discuss them separately, bul we consider these special ins[ances to be more transparant and
easier to visualize.
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Because of preservation and flexibility one may cherish the hope that bisimulation
techniques may be applicable to definability matters in partial modal logic too, just
like in `classical' logic. Before realizing this expectation we are eager to make some
simple, yet useful observations. The first is that proposition 2.1 can be converted in
the important special case where the models are finite.
Proposition 2.2 Forfinite models moda! equivalence entails bisimulation equivalence
(in the extended language):
mod
M, s- M', s' ~ M, s ~a M', s'.
Proof: for given models M and M' define the relation Z by tZt' q M, t m~ M', t'. Then Z
is a bisimulation between M and M' since
1. Let (i) tZt' and (ii) tRu. We have to show that uZu' and t'R'u' for some u'. Suppose
on the contrary that R' [t'] fl Z[u) - 0. Thus for all v E R' [t'] there is an extended modal
formula ~p, such that either M, u~ ~p, 8t M', v~ ~p, or M, u~ ~p, 8c M', v~ ~pq .
Now define ~i, by tl,, - ~p, for the first possibility, and ~i, -ti ~p, for the second one.
Then in either case M, u~,I,, 8r, M', v~,li,. Since R'[t'J is finite the formula
~ - IA~oER'[t'] ~ti
is well-defined and moreover ( iii) M, u~ ,I, and (iv) M', v~ ~, for all v E R'[t']. By
(ii) and ( iii) M, t~ O,j, and so by ( i) and the definition of Z: M', t' ~ 0,,,, therefore
M', v~,I, for some v E R'[t'J, contradicting (iv).
2. The reverse clause goes in the same fashion.
3. If tZt' then M, t~ ~p q M', t' ~ ~p for all (extended modal) ~p. Now inspection of the
cases for the literals (~p - p or ~p -~p) shows that V ( p, t) - V'(p, t').
So, if M, s m~ M', s' then by definition of Z sZs', and so M, s ~a M', s'. ~
The second remark is [hat due to the global nature of modal equivalence we can
stick to just truth preservation under bisimulations, without keeping track of thefal.riry
side, which makes things a lot easier when trying to establish definability.
One way to make this approach to definability work is to translate the modal logic
into first order predicate logic, and see what makes these translations special among
the other first order formulas. The semantic property that captures the translations
should not be surprising anymore.
2.4 Translating into first order logic
The idea behind the translational approach is to regard possible world models as a
special kind of first order models where the objects are the worlds. Then one way
to characterize classical modal logic is to use a fotmalization of the meta-language,
which, by the nature of the truth conditions, amounts to a translation into first order
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logic. Apart from quantifiers and identity, the language of this first order logiccontains
only one dyadic predicate (to represent the accessibility relation), and one monadic
predicate for each propositional variable of the original modal object-language. The
definability question then becomes: which first order fonnulas express modal truth
conditions? Depending on the art of the translation it is possible to characterize
this sublanguage recursively. More interesting, however, and independent of the
specific translation, is a purely semantic characterization: in [vB85] it is shown that
what makes the translations special is their invariance under full bisimulations and
generated submodels. This criterion has been simplified in [vB90] to preservation
underarbitrarybisimulations. The main theorem of this section is a similardefinability
result for partial modal logic:
An (extended) partialfirst order formula ~p(x) with only monadic predi-
cates and one specialdyadic relation is equivalent to an (extended) partial
modal formula iff rp is truth preserved under bisimulation.
Here the standard partial lirst order language contains the operators ~, ~, `d,
monadic predicates Pt ,..., P„ and exactly one bivalently interpreted relation symbol
R; the corresponding standard partial modal language contains o instead of `d and R,
and pti instead of P;. The extended partial ( first order or modal) languages contain the
additional operators ~, ~, and in the quadrivalent case q . The persistent languages are
obtained from the extended ones by removing ti from the stock of logical constants.
Finally the positive partial 6rst order language contains the operators ~, v, d, 3, ~, q
(and R, P, as always) whereas the positive partial modal language makes use of only
the operators T, l, ~, V, o, O, ~, q(and p, of course). So, in an ultimate attempt to
keep the terminology manageable, we dmpped the attribute propositional from the
modal languages.
The main results in this section will be demonstrated by a number of successive
translations, which essentially rcduce the problem of panial (rclative) definability to
that of classical (relative) definability.
From modal logic to first order logic
Fitst consider a suitable translation from the language of classical modal logic into
that of classical predicate logic. The standard translation sT ignores all connectives
and merely changes the atoms and modal operators: (x is a given variable, P a distinct
(monadic) predicate symbol for each propositional atom p, and R a fixed dyadic
predicate symbol)
ST(p) - Px ST(-~~p) - ~sT(~p)
ST(~p n t~i) - (ST(rp) n ST(~i)) sT(t]cp) - dy(Rxy -~ [y~x]sT(~))
Then, a Kripke structure can bc rcgarded as both a predicate logical model and a modal
model:
M, w~ cp iff M ~ sT(rp)[w]
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The classical result, from [vB85] and [vB90], shows whatmakes the formulas produced
by the standard translation special among the arbitrary formulas in the first order
language G,,~,v{R, P}: bisimulation preservation.
Theorem 2.4 (van Benthem)
A classicalferst orderformula ~p using R, PI ,..., Pn and exactly onefree variable x
is equivalent to a modalformula iff ~p is preserved under bisimulation.
We are looking for similar `partial' results in the rest of this section. We will not give
direct proofs, since this would imply a thorough treatment of partial predicate logic,
which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather we wish to reduce the problem
of determination by preservation under bisimulations between partial models to that
between classical models. This involves the following translations:
. The standard translation sT from a classical(ly interpreted) modal language Go
to a classical first order language Gy;ls
. A similar translation, also denoted by sT, from a panial modal language Cti,o
to a partial fitst order language Gti,y; 16
. A`forward' translation t from a partial first order language Gti,y to a classical
first order language Gy;l~
. A`backward' translation x from a classical modal language Go to a partial
modal language C~,o.
The most important translational steps are summarized in the next diagram:
Figure 2.2: translationaldiagram
Go ST . Gv
Then the main argument boils down to:
1. an extended first order formula ~p is preserved under `partial' bisimulations a
tsTo keep this survey transparant, we omit the similarity type (the non-logical vocabulary) (mm the
specifications of these languages, as well as ~ and n.
tóFor partial logics, extend ST with obvious clauses, such as sT(ti rp) -,..ST(~p), etcetera.
t~This translation invokes an auxiliary translation -.
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2. its translation ~pt is preserved under classical bisimulations a
3. there is an ordinary modal formula ~i which is classically equivalent to (validated
by the same classical models as) ~p} q
4. ~p is equivalent to the extended modal formula tl, x.
From partial logic to classical logic, and back
Following the initial idea of [Gi74] for partial set theory, [La88] translates partial
(propositional and predicate) logic into classical (propositional and predicate) logic.
In this way he derives a number of definability results.~s Let us first deal with the
propositional languages. The trick is that for each atom p of the original language
there are two counterparts p},p- in the new language, where the (total) truth of pt
and p- amounts to the (partial) truth and falsity of p, respectively. Simplifying the
presentation, the translation can be defined by recursively extending } and -:
~f-1 ~x--1
q}-T q--T
(~~P)} - ~P- (~~P)- - ~P}
(w ~ ~G)} - (s~} ~ ~G}) (~ ~ ~G)- - (~- ~ ~G-)
(~ ~)} - ,~v} (~ ~)- - ~}
By virtue of the other definitions we obtain, for example, Tt - T, T- - L,
(p V~p)} - p} V p-, (~(p n-~p) V q)t - p- V pt V qt. Notice that for formulas
that do not contain ~, the translation pmduces a positive normal form. Also notice
that 1 can be eliminated by taking p} ~~p} instead, and T on its tum by ~1, and
finally V and O can be defined in terms of ~, ~, o by familiar equations. However,
these replacements destroy a pmper back and forth translation, and therefore can only
be applied after the translation procedun;.
We can extend this approach to modal formulas by putting:
(o~P)} - o~P} (o~P)- - ~~P-
This choice allows for a relativc characterization of extendcd modal formulas. The
following facts are expansions of results reported by Langholm:19
Lemma 2.1 ( forward translation)
} transforms extended modalformulas in standard modalformulas; moreover, N free
formulas are trans[atedin positiveformula.c.
Proof: In fact the same result holds for the `negative' translation -. That the output of both
translations is of the intended format can be shown by a simultaneous induction on the swcture
of input-formulas. ~
18This altemative to our earlier method of is especially useful for partial predicale logic.
19 [La88, p.22,23,26,27,111 ]
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For a proofofour main theorem we also need a reverse function X:
(P} ) X - P (P- ) X - ~P
Tx - d lX - ~
(~v ~ ~G)x - (~vX ~ ~x ) (w ~ ~G)x - ,(,~vX ~ ,~Gx )
(,sv)x -N~x
(o~)x - o~x (ow)x - ,o,~x
Lemma 2.2 ( backward translation)
X transforms standard modal formulas in extended formulas; ~free formulas are
translated in persistent formulas. Moreover, (~px)f - ~p ~(~p})X~ -[~p~ and
[(w-)xl - Q,svD.
Proof: straightforward induction ~
So, unlike (cpX )} and ~p, (~pt)X and ~p may not be identical, yet they are equivalent.
These lemmas obviate the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3 (enrnding partiality)
The mapping } is onto (and so is -), i.e. Zo
[G,,n,o,~,~,tl(Prop)~} - GT,1,,,n,v,o,o([Prop~})
[G,~n~o,x,tl(Prop)~} - GT,l,n,v,o,o([Prop~t).
Proof: The first lemma ensures that the functions map into the con-ect language, the second
one that the functions are onto, since (~pX )f -~p, thus also (~(~p)X )- - ~p. .
The function x is strictly speaking not onto, but it is up to logical equivalence. Let us
therefore tum to the semantic side of the translations.
There is an 1-1 correspondence between (gencral) partial modal models on the one
hand and classical Kripke models on the other hand.
Proposition 2.4 (forward modal truth transfer)
For any general model M -(S, R, V) with V: Prop x S-~ 4 define the cor-
responding classical model M' -(S, R,V') by V'(pt, s) - 1 q 1 C V(p, a)
and V'(p-, a) - 1 q 0 C V(p, e). Then for all ( extended) modal formulas ~p:
M, s~ rp iff M', a~ ~p}.
Proof: We can show by simultaneous induction that M, s~~p q M' , a ~ ~p} and M, a~ ~p q
M', a~ ~p-. For example, assuming the IH for an arbitrary ~p, here are the induction steps
for ti and o:
. M, a~ ti rp q M, a~ rp q (IH) M`, s~ rPt a M', s[- -~rpf q
M`,a ~ (~~)}
. M,s~ ti~pqM,a~~pq (IH)M",9~~pfaM',s~(ti~p)-
~[~]} - {~pt ~ ~p E ~} and similarly for [~]-. Finally, [~]f - ~t u ~-.
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~ M, a~ O~p q`dt E R(a] : M, t~~p q (IH) dt E R[aJ : M', t~ ~pt q
M', a ~ C7~pt q M', a~(~~V)}
~ M, a~ orp q 3t E R[a] : M, t~ ~p q (IH) 3t E R[a] : M', t~ ~p- q
M', a ~ O~p- q M', a ~(t]rp)-
This result has a valid counterpart in predicate logic, which will also be of use for the
special purpose language over R and P. First extend the t translation to quantióers
and predicates:
(Pi)} - P}x (Pi)- - P-x
(b'xrp)f - t1x~p} (dxcp)- - 3x~p-
Proposition 2.5 ( forward first-order truth transfer)
For a general first order model M-(S, V) withZt V(P, 8) E 4 define the classi-
ca[ model M' -(S,V') by a similar transformation (replacing p in the previous
proposition by P) Then for all (extended) first orderformulas ~p:
M~ ~p[s] iff M' ~ ~p} [s]
ProoP: by an analogous induction. ~
Proposition 2.6 (backward truth transfer)
Under the same circumstances a.c in the previous propositions,for all standardmodal
formula ~p: (similarlyfor first orderfnrmulas)
M' , s ~ rp iff M, a~~p X
Proof: follows immediately from Icmma 2.2 and proposition 2.4. ~
(There is an obvious inverse to the model transformation, leading from a classical
model N to a panial, possibly incoherent model N', cf. the construction in proposi-
tion 2.4.)
partial and classical bisimulations
A final step for reducing the (relative) definability problem for partial modal logic to
that for classical modal logic involves a direct relation between partial bisimulation
(here in the sense of bisimulations between partial models) and total bisimulations. In
esoteric terms, bisimulations simulate bisimulations.
Proposition 2.7 (partial vs total bisimulations)
An extended first order formula ~p over P and (bivalently interpreted) R is truth
preservedunder partial bisimulations iff ~pt ispreserved under classical bisimulations.
Z1 V is usually presented by pairs (V (P)f , V(P)- ) marking its positive and negative denotation. The
model transformation may then be defined as V'(Pt) - V(P)f and V'(P-) - V(P)-, which is
concise by possibly confusing.
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Proof: there are two things which have to be shown:
(~) Assume that partial bisimulations preserve the truth of ~p. Suppose that Z is a bisimulation
between the classical models M~ and MZ, where M; -(S;, V;) interprets the standard first
order language with predicate symbols R, P~ , Pl ,..., P„,P„ and V(R) - R;~ Define the
partial models Mi -(S;, V') bY V'(R) -(R;, R;) and V'(Pi) -(Y (P}), Y(P~ ) ). Z also
relates M~ and MZ; with respect to the latter models call it Z'. Then Z' is also a bisimulation:
the structural conditions are met since Y(R) and V'(R) amount to the same; furthermore
Vi(Pf)} - Vi(P,t) ? Vz(P,}) - Vi(Pi)} and likewise V'(Pi)- - Vz(Pi)-. So, since
Z' is a bisimulation, Z' preserves ~p and M; - M,", we have that for all s, , sZ such that
at ZaZ: Mi ~~pt [si ] p(proposi[ion 2.5) M~ ~ ~p[st ] q MZ ~ ~p[aZ] q(proposition 2.5)
MZ ~ ~p} [a2J and so ~pt is invariant under classical bisimulations.
(G) By a very similar argument, now starting with the assumption of preservation of ~p}
under classical bisimulations and then considering a partial bisimulation Z between M~ and
MZ. Transforming them into Z", M~` and Mz (cC proposition 2.5), we again arrive at vuth
preservation of ~p under partial bisimulations. ~
All the machinery needed for [he definability theorem has now been an-anged. Let
~p(x) be a first order formula from the extended language with one free variable x.
Theorem 2.5 (partial first order definability)
An extended partialfirst orderformula ~p(x) with monadic predicates Pt ,... P,,, and
a dyadic, bivalently interpreted R is equivalent to an (extended) partialmodal formula
over pt ,..., pn iff ep is truth preserved under (partial) bisimulation.
Proof: ~p E G.,l,~,v(R, P) is truth preserved under bisimulations on partial models a(propo-
sition 2.7) its translation ~p} E Gy(R, Pf, P-) is preserved under bisimulation on classical
models q(theorem 2.4) ~pt is equivalent to a modal formula ~i E Go(pf,p-) p(proposi-
tion 2.6) ~p is equivalent to the modal formula ~i X E Gt,t,ti,o (p~, where the last slep is 1 icensed
bYM~ ~[s]pM~ ~~P}[']pM~,s~~pM,s~,~x. ~
Also it is now easy to say what makes ~ spccial. Note that standard partial
formulas are not in general semantically persistcnt 23, but possess the weaker quality
of external persistence: if M-(S, R, V), M' -(S, R, V'), and for all p E Prop, a E
S: V(p, a) C V'(p, s) (shortened M, s C M', s; i.e. M' extends the valuation of M),
then persistence holds `pointwise': -
M, s~ ~p ~ M', s~ ~p M, s~ ~p ~ M', s~ ~p
This property can be strengthened to another dcfinability result.
Theorem 2.6 The externally persistent formulas of the extended modal language are
precisely those equivalent to ~free formulas.
~For Z to be a bisimulation the models should have the format M; -(S;, R;, V,.), but the special first
order formulation is more convenient here.
~I.e. for different situations under different valuations based on the same modal frame; see chapter 4.
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Proof sketch: (for the non-trivial side) Let ~p be an extended modal formula which is externally
persistent for partial models M. Then by proposition 2.4, ~pt is truth persistent on models
M'. ~pf can be brought in negation normal jorm ~p', where each negation immediately pre-
eedes an atom p; (by double negation, de Morgan's laws, ~l - T, ~T - 1, ~o - O~ and
~O - o-,). Then theorem 2.4 implies that sr(~p' ) is bisimulation invariant and wth persistent
with respect to P;}, P; , whence a modification of Lyndon's persistence theorem~ shows that
there is a~ equivalent to s'r(~`) which is positive in every occun.ence of P;f, leaving the
restricted quantification unaltered. Whence by retranslation, ( s'r-~ (~)) x is the desired ~-free
fonnula. The equivalence of ~p and (sT-' (~,)) x is then straightforward:
M~~P[sl p M' ~ sv} [a] p M' ~~P' [sl p M' ~ ST(~v' )(sl p M' ~ rGfs] p M' ~
ST-~(~G)~s~ p M,s~ (ST-'(~))x. ~
2.5 Conclusion
ln this chapter we first tried to accommodate the method of propositional definability
by means of semantic conditions to suit the modal language. This structural approach
lead to the definition of the prima jacie paradoxical notion of `modal truth function'.
We obtained a rather gratuitous algebraic characterization and the insight that without
direct invocation of the accessibility rclation modal definability will be hard to come
by in this way: even fairly strong conditions as automorphism invariance did not
manage to trigger definability for simple frames.
So we tumed to a different, translational perspective. By essentially r~educing
partial modal logic to classical logic, we were able to provide the more satisfactory
result that what makes the translations of modal formulas special among the other
first order fonnulas is their prescrvation under bisimulations. By similar techniques,
we also identified the (extemally) persistent modal formulas as being essentially the
~-free formulas.
Apart from adapting the notion `bisimulation' for partial semantics, we pointed at
a number of special bisimulations, such as `generated submodel', which will be of use
further on.
' Wise after the event' we may even speculate whether preservation under bisimu-
lation cannot be used directly in Ihe structural approach, thus combining the two views
of this chaptec Like generalized quantifiers may be assumed to be invariant under
isomorphisms, modal truth functions would have to be preserved under bisimulations.
This, however, presupposes the modal truth functions to be indexed for models, and,
moreover, a notion of bisimulation restricted to parts of the models. We postpone this
interesting but complicated mattcr to anothcr occasion.




As we saw in the introduction to part I, partial logic gives rise to a wealth of possible
notions of logical consequence. First we chart the parameters that detennine the nature
of logical consequence: the underlying notion of validity (for example, `aiways true'
vs. `never false') and the notion of rule (for example, relating valid formulas or true
formulas). The actual outcome, the set of valid consequences, is influenced by two
other factors: the nature of the models (2-, 3- or 4-valued) and, of course, the truth
(and falsity) conditions.
Then we investigate into the properties of the resulting notions of consequence.
Not all possible combinations lead to different systems and not all systems are equally
interesting. Yet some are, and a number of proposals known from the rather diverse
literature on partial logic pop up within this framework. Because of their own interest,
and to pave the way for the modal extensions in the next chapter, we study the most
interesting and natural systems in more detail.
In particular, we provide deductive systems and prove strong completeness with
respect to the consequence relation under inspection. To achieve this, the usual Henkin
method is adapted to partial logic.
3.1 Introduction
One of the charrns of partial logic is its flexibility. Another its richness. This already
appeared from the previous chapters on the subject of definability and it also holds
for validity: there is no ubiquitous notion of validity in partial logic. In fact there is
at least one aspect of the notion of logical consequence that may already tum up in
classical logic.
For instance, what do we mean when we say that ~p ~ r(i is a valid rule? One
possible interpretation is that if ~O is a theorem, so is ~; another that given an(arbitrary)
fonnula ~p we can derive ~i. The celebrated rule Modus Ponens (~p, ~p -~ tl, ~~,)
is used both ways, and in classical propositional logic the difference between these
interpnetations is fairly small. Pefiaps this is thc reason that the distinction is often
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neglected. But already in normal modal logict the difference is important: the tule
Necessitation (~p ~ t]cp) operates on theorems, not on arbitrary fotmulas. The
distinction between what we call absolute and relative consequence rules is especially
relevant for partial semantics, even in the propositional case. Moreover, the distinction
presented dces not exhaust the possibilities: one might also want to reduce the validity
of rules to that of formulas. This can be achieved by invoking the deduction theot~em
as a heuristic principle; then ~p ~~t~i is valid iff ~p -. ,fi is a valid formula.
The choice of the type of rule interacts with the way validity is defined in the
semantics. We can choose, among other things, between a`true everywhere' (verifi-
cation) and `false nowhere' (non falsification orfalsifiabiliry) concept of validity. For
example, the law of excluded middle ~p V ~tp is valid for coherent situations under
the falsification perspective (it is never false), but it is not valid under the verification
(`always true') perspective, for the valuation may be undefined with respect to ~p.
There is yet another option: validity can be obtained by evaluation on a designated
subset of the worlds involved in a model. This possibility proves especially relevant
for the modal language; one typc of this nonstandard approach is treated in chapter 4.
The effect of such distinctions also depends on the sort of indices and valuations
used: are they partial or total, coherent or incoherent? For example, the relative
construal ofModu.s Ponens is verified on three-valued models, but not for four-valued
models.
Finally, one may opt for di fferent truth conditions. It was shown in the first chapter
that different truth-conditions are compatible with classical logic, for example in the
case of implication. But in our general setting even in propositional logic ttuth con-
ditions with a genuinely modal (lavour qualify, in the sense that they make reference
to extensions of the situation of interpretation. These `eventual' conditions are illus-
trated by intuitionistic logic (section 3.4.4), supervaluation semantics (section 3.4.6)
and other systems. Yet in what we consider the standardcase, truth conditions will not
be eventual, but `actual'. In other words, the standard interpretation of the connectives
will be tntth-functional. Sections 32 and 3.3 deal with completeness in the standard
propositional case.
In this chapter and the next one we develop a general framework for truth and
validity in partial semantics, controlled by the following parameters.
. situations 8t. valuations: partiality and coherence
. truth-conditions: standard (`actual') vs. non-standard `cventual'
. validity:(unrestricted) verification (VERIF) or falsifiability (FALSIF) or some
restricted set of situations
. type of rule: absolute or rclative
In principle no combination of parametrized possibilities is excluded. T'his may lead
to a mixture of the validity type in rules: for example, the approach that reduces con-
sequence to valid implication can be construed as one leading from verified premises
'And, similarly, in first order predicate logic.
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to a non-falsified conclusion. Generally speaking, quite a number of proposals made
in the literature nicely fit into the framework. In particular, it captures almost all truth-
functional accounts.2. This points at adequacy of the framework and may hopefully
lead to more insight in the specific logics, which often seem quite ad hoc.
Since the intetplay of the different parameters regulating the logic proves to be a
complex matter, we have refrained from incorporation of new propositional or modal
connectives, and largely stick to the standard logical language. So, at least on the
syntactic side the logic looks traditional.
3.2 Coherent situation semantics
Presumably the most intuitive form of partial semantics is displayed in the following
system, which is usually attributed to [Ba81 ].3 Assume the propositional language to
be constructed in the obvious way with a set ofpropositional atoms called Prop. Since
our prime goal is to model modal rather than mere propositional logic, (and sometimes
we even need ' modal' models to interpret propositional languages, cf. section 3.4) the
valuation function will be indexed as in section 2.1.4 Given a model M-(S, V), S
being a set of coherent situations (or: partial worlds) and V a partial function from
Prop x S to {0,1 }(truth values), the usual truth conditions relative to M and s E S
are:5
s~ pqV(p,s)- 1(dpEProp) s~ pqV(p,s)-0(`dpEProp)
s~ ~at~s~ a s~ ~aqs~ a
s~ a~,Qt~s~ aands~,Q s~ a~Qt~s~ aors~Q
One says that s verifies ( or satisfies, supports) cp whenever s~ ~p and that s falsifies (or
rejects) ~p whenever s~ cp. Else, when s ~ ep and s~ ~p, ~p is unknown or undefined
in s.
The truth conditions for the other propositional connectives then follow directly
from the given conventions and the usual recursive definitions:
~ a v Q :- ~(~a ~ ~Q),
r, a-~~i:-~aVQ,
~ a.--~Q:-(a-~Q)~(Q-'a).




ZAn exception is [BI86] (see section 3.4) which has a different type of validity.
3Although the perspective of partiality was presumably new, the text clauses were known from multi-
valued logic, possibly in a somewhat different fonnat, though for examplc [Se67] already uses the ~, ~
notation.
~Likewise, we use the 'modal' notation M, e~ rp right Irom the start.
SM, s~ ~p is abbreviated to a~ ~p when no confusion arises.
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In fact it will be convenient for several results to make the presentation endrely
symmetrical by adding V as a basic symbol.
Due to the above clauses a situation need not verify classical tautologies, such
as the `law of excluded middle'. So, possibly a~ ~p V~tp (which is intended when
employing a truth value gap) and a~ ~p ~ ~p (which is counterintuitive)6.
The semantics presented here has the following important properties:
Proposition 3.1 (coherence)
For no tp, S, V, a E S: M, s~ tp and M, s~ rp (where M-(S, V)).
Proof: by simultaneous induction on the swcture of ~p. [Th90a, appendix B] ~
Proposition 3.2 (inherited classicality) ~
For all ~p, M-(S, V), s E S such that V is bivalent (ran(V) - 2):
M, s~ tp a M, s~ ~p a M, s~ ~p.
Proof: by simultaneous induction on the structure of ~p. t,
Proposition 3.3 (partiality)
There is a model M and a situution s(called the empty situation) such thatfor all
formulas ~p: M, s~ cp and M, s~ tp.
Proof: let S -{2}, and V (p, Z)- Z for all p E Prop. The proposition then follows by
induction on the structure of ~p. ~
Anotherproperty, already familiar from earlier chapters, tells us that more complex
facts are known when more basic facts are known, for example when more data
have become available. Persistence of truth values is defined with respect to the
relation of extension. C, which was introduced in chapter 1, is nrdefined here in the
present fotmat. The definition is somewhat more general than usually, because of our
intensional preoccupation.
Definition 3.1 (C)
If s, s' E S, M-(S, V) and M' -(S, V'), then M, s C M', s' iffor every atom p:
V(p, s) - V'(p, s') whenever V(p, s) is defined. -
Whenever M and M' are clear from the context, and especially when M- M'
(internal extension), we will write s C s'. If for all s E S: M, s C M', s, we write
M C M' (external extension).
bl:.ukasiewics' proposal 'to fill the gap' by making a~~i true when both antecedent and succedent
are unde6ned (see the appendix to chaptcr 1) solves this problem but produces many othercounterintuitive
results, for example when a and ,A are independent unknown propositions.
~Cf. the notion of `reliability' in [La88, p.181, which is subordinate to classicality t persistence.
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Proposition 3.4 (persistence)
If M, e C M', e', then M, a~ ~p ~ M', s' ~ ~p, and M, a~ ~p ~ M', a'~ ~p for
every ~p in the standardlanguage.
Proof: by simultaneous induction on the swcture of ~p. ~
But the force of a semantics is not solely determined by its truth conditions. One
other important factor is validity. In the classical propositional case (i.e. when V
is bivalent) a formula is valid iff it is verified everywhere, or, equivalently, falsified
nowhere. Interestingly, in a partial setting the notions of verification and falsifiability
diverge widely, akin to what comes to mind fmm the perspective of philosophy of
science. We shall discuss both options below.
3.2.1 Propositional verification
Presumably the first possibility which suggests itself is to call a formula valid if it is
supported by every situation in each model. So we define
Definition 3.2 (VERIF)
~p is verifiably valid iff for every model M-( S, V) and every s E S: M, s~ cp
(Notation: ~ ~p).
This notion tums out to have weird logical consequences, given the fact that a
logic is usually described to a large extent by the set of valid formulas. Nowever, by
partiality (proposition 3.3) it follows that
Corollary 3.1 The set of verifiably valid formulus is empry.
Since there are no valid formulas according to the verification perspective, there
is no point in invoking a deduction theorem which reduces valid consequence to valid
implication. So, for verification, the absolute and the reductive approaches to rules are
uninformative: these notions would yield the total set of rules (G x G) or the empty set
(~) respectively. But in the relative approach, verification of full-fledged arguments
(i.e. possible rules) is essential since the logic is specified by its rules rather than by
its axioms. What we need is a definition of relative vcrifiable validity, called strong
consequence in [Ba81 ]:
Definition 3.3 (VERIF,~t)
~t ,...,~m~Qt ,. ..,~n is relatively verifiably valid ifffor every M, s such thatfor all
t: M,s~ a~:,forsome j: M,s~ Nj (~1,...,Ctm~ Nl,...,Qn~~
Typically, the rule of ex falso sequitur quodlibet is verified, i.e. ~p ~~cp~ ~i. This
is an immediate consequence of coherence. Its contrapositive, the rule of tertium
non datur, is not verificationally valid, howevcr: tli ~ ~p v ~~p does not hold in
general, since for example p~ q v ~q (take V( p, s) - 1, V(q, s) - Z). A fortiori, the
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principle ofextensionality (substitution under logicaql equivalence) dces not hold for
this semantics: a~~ Q dces not in genera] imply ~p(a) ~ ~p(A). To wit, p n ~p~ p n
~p n g but not ~(P n~P) ~~(P n~P n 4).
Notice that Modus Ponens is va]id for relative verification on coherent models,
but dces not characterize the set of valid rules on its own. [Ka83] contains such a
complete set of inference ru]es. Though elegant, his characterization invokes a special
normal formg and corresponding proof technique which does not seem to generalize
easily to the modal case. The system we propose here is more direct and closer to
natural deduction9 in classical logic. lt1 t 1
(R1) ~~~p H ~p (`the law of double negation')
(R2) ,(~p n ~i) H ,~p v ,~
(R3) ,(~p v ~i) H ,~p n ,~i
(first `de Morgan's law')
(second `de Morgan's law')
(R4) ~pn~i~tp ~pn,~~,~
(RS) ~p ~ ~p v tli t~i ~ cp v~t~i
(R6) if~G~P~X~d~G~BFXthen~P~~,e~X
(R7) if X ~~P~ P~d X~~, P then X~~P n T~~ P
(RS) ~p n ~~p ~ ~, (ex falso [sequitur quodlibetJ)
(R9) if cp ~~i and -t[i ~ X then rp ~ X
(R10) I' ~ 0 iff there are nonempty sets {al, ..., a„i} C I' and {[31i ...,,Qn} C ~
such that al n . . . n a„1 f- Ql v . . . V ,On (al ~ . . . , am ~ Ql e . . . e ~n)
The usual starting rule, viz. al ,..., a„~ f- [~l ,..., Q„ if some al equa]s some Q~, is
provable in this system. It follows from the two observations just below.
Proposition 3.5 (reflexivity) ~p ~ ~p
Proof:1z
1. ~p n rp ~ ~p [R4]
2. {~p} i- {~p} [1, R10]
3. ~p ~ ~p [2, R10]
BSee section 3.4.2.
9Note however that we do not adopt Segerberg's terminological distinction between inference rules
(such R1-5) and deduction rules (R6,7,9,10), cf. [AS84, p.28].
tow H~ abbreviates ~p I- 16 8r. ~ F rp. The altemative symbols ~ and q aze here reserved for
meta-level implication and equivalence, respectively.
t~A concise, yet elegant rule system lor the smaller language G,,n is given by [Ur86].
'ZNotice the first application of Rl0 in the above proof serves to eliminate n, the second one to
eliminate braces.
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Proposition 3.6 (monotonicity)
ifI'~O,I'CI"andOCO'thenI"~~'.
Proof: this is an immediate consequence of R 10. ~
Other common propetties such as commutativity, distributivity and associativity




Associativity was already used in the formulation of R10, which actually has to








Proof: We only show the first equivalence:
(~)
1. ~p n,~, ~ (ip n~,) v ( ~p n X) [RS]
2. ~P, ~G ~(w n~G) ~ (~ n x) [1, Rlo]
3. ~P~ x~(~P n~) V ( ~V n x) [by analoBY1
4. ~P ,~GvxF(svn~G)~(wnx) [2,3,R61
5. svn(~G~x)~(~vn~G)~(svnx) [a,R1oI
(~)
1. ~p I` ~i ~ rp [R4]
2. rp n ~ ~ ~ [R4]
3. ~ ~ t,i V X [RS]
4. ~pn~,l-,[iVX [2,3,R9]
s. wn,~~svn(~Gvx) [1,4,R~]
6. ~ n x~~ n(rG v x) [by analogy]
7. (sv n~) ~(sv n x) ~ w n(~ v x) [s, 6. R6]
t3The proofs are easy exercises, cf. [Th90a, appendix A]. We reprove the first !aw of distribulivity
because the proof in [Th90a] was given for the wrong sytitem, viz. Kamp's. The cut-rule is proven
because of its importance.
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Proposition 3.10 (cut)
ifEl-D,yandE,ry~ ~thenE ~ ~.
Proof: Assume E~ t1, ry and E, ry~ 0 then by R 10 there are c~t ,...,~rtt E E and
Qt,...,Qn.fnE~suchthata,n...ntrk~QtV...VQ„~VryandrYk~tn...nak~,nry1-
~~, V.-- V~~„ (if ry does not occtu in the premise or consequence, we are ready). Let
cx-a,n...na,~~,andp-Q, V...VQ„~~n,thenbyRlO: (i)af-~3Vryand(ii)anry~Q.
Since (R4,R 10) a I- a, put together with (i) this implies (R7) ~~ a n(Q V ry), and so by the first
distribution law and R9: ( iii) c~ ~(a n(j) V (cz n ry). By R4, (ii) and R6, (a n,0) V(a~ n ry) ~~3,
which combined with (iii) by R9 shows ~~,Q, hence E~ A, by R10. ~
Now let rL} be the set of deduction rules generated by R]-10. We obtain the
following important completeness result.
Theorem 3.1 E ~ ~p q E~rLf ~.
Proof: It is easily checked that verification on coherent situations is sound for the rules of
rLt. To prove the other direction we use the Henkin-style proof inethod. So we argue by
contraposition. Suppose that E Ff ~p. Now the standard way to extend E U{~~p} does not fit
into this semantics, for ~p y~p n (~, V„(i), yet {~p, ~(~p n (~, V~~i))} is inconsistent. So we
have to proceed more carefully. But the idea is still basically the same: extend E to a set 0
such that ~p ~ 0 and for which wc can prove a trulh lemma: 0~,(i iff ,~i E 0 for each ~.
Then, obviously 0~ ~p and we are ready.
Extension of E to a suitable 0 is guarantced by the Lindenbaum lemma below. Such
suitable sets of formulas are at least consistent saturated theories" (cs'rs for shorl), as defined
below; they are the partial counterparts of the maximally consistent sets in the classical Henkin
proof. Then the situations of the cunonical model J~l - (S, V) are simply the CSTS, and the
canonical valuation V is defined by V(p, I') - 1 iff p E I' and V(p, I') - 0 iff ~p E I', for all
I' E S. Since each I' is consistent. V is a well-defined partial function. Then we obtain the
uuth lemma for all I'. Since we have E C 0 and ~p ~ 0, the trulh lemma shows J1~t, t1 ~ E
and M, 0~É ~y, whence E~~p. - ~
First we define the relevant syntactic notions of consistency, saturation (`deciding'
disjunctions) and theory (deductive closure) for an arbitrary set of formulas E and an
arbitrary inference relation F .
. E is consistent (for F-) iff E hf ~p n ~~p for all ~p;
. E is saturated (for ~) iff E f- ~p or E i- ~i for all ~p and ~ such that E F- cp V~i;
. E is a theory (for ~) iff E~ tp implies cp E E for all ~p.
14Cf.'saturated sets' in [Ac68] and (Th68] and'CS-theory' in [Ve85].
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In other words, if E is a theory it is closed under the rules of the deductive system;
for reftexive monotone f- the converse condition holds, i.e. E~ tp iff ~p E E. If E is
a theory then the additional mquirement of consistency amounts to tp ~ ~~p ~ E, and
saturation to cp V,~, E E ~ ~p E E or ,~ E E. Now let F~ be the inference relation of
rL}.
Lemma 3.1 (partial Lindenbaum lemma)
If E Ff ~p, then E can be extended to a esT s, such that ~p ~ 0.
Proof: Let E Ff tp and ~po, ~Pt, . ..,~n ...be an enumeration of the (well-formed) formulas such
that each fotlttula of the language occurs countably many times.~s On is defined recursively
in such a way that it dces not entail ~p:
. ~o - E;
. tf 03n y~n then 03n}3 - 03n}2 - 03n}I - 03n~
. if 03n ~ rpn then:
- 03n}1 - ~3n U {~n},
- 03n}2 - 03n}1 U{tG} if ~pn - t,i V X and 03n}1, ~ I} ~P, else ~3n}2 - 03n}];
~ ~3n}3 - 03n}2 U{;1(} if ~pn - a(, V X and 03n}z, X y~P, else 03n}3 - ~3n}2.
Let 0 be ~Jn ~n. Then 0 has the desired properties:
1. 0 is a theory with respect to rL} : if 0~,I, then there aze ói ,..., 6k E ~ such that
ót n... ~ ók I- ,~. So there is an L with D, ,..., ók E 0~ and, by the way we defined
the enumeration of ~pn, there is an n ~ 3 for which ~, -~pn. Therefore 03n ~~Pn, and
consequently,(, E s,3n}t C 0. -
2. ~ extends E, since E- Do C ~Jn On - p.
3. Because 0 is a theory, ~p ~ 0 if 0 y ~p, which in its tum is implied by Ok Fj' ~p for
every k; this can be shown by induction on k:
. For k- 0 this is given (E Ff ~p).
Next assume 03n y ~p, the induction hypothesis (lil)
. If k- 3n -f 1, suppose 03n ~~pn (the other case Ís trivial). So ~3n}1 -
03n U{~pn}. Now suppose ~3n}i F~P. The cut theorem then shows 03n F- ~p,
which contradicts 1ti, SO 03n}1 iÍ ~P.
. For k- 3n ~- 2 and k- 3n -}- 3 the proposition follows directly from the definition
of 0~,.
4. Due to R8, 0 y tp entaits that ~ is consistent with respect to rL}.
5. 0 is also saturated. We will give an indirect proof: assume that ~, V X E 0, yet ~~ s,
and X~ 0. Thus for some n: s,3n ~,~, V X. 03n, rG ~~G. ~d 03n, X~~. Then (R6)
03n, ~ V X~~p, and so by the cut theorem 0 F- ~p, which contradicts ~p ~ ~.
tsThe countable repetition of formulas fascilitates some steps of the proof.An enumeration
~o, ~i, ~bx, ~, .. . of L can be tumed into an enumeration with countable repetition by taking ever
larger initial parts: ~o, ~d,o, yói, ~~io, ~rt, t~, ~ybo, rbi, ~, ~3, ~.,., which amounts to a sequence {~pn},.
where ~p}cIe}tl}r - 1~r if k G l.
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Lemma 3.2 (partial truth lemma)
Let r be a esr, then: ~l , r~ ,~ ~}~,~ E r, and J~l, r~ ~i iff ~tli E r for all ~i.
Proof: by simultaneous induction on the swcture of ~i:
.(basic case) if ,~ is a propositional atom, the lemma holds by the definition ofV.
For the next cases assume the lemma to hold for ~, up to certain complexity, (the
induction hypothesis,lH); we will make excessive use of the fact that r is a theory.
. let ~i be of the form ~X.
r~~X iff r~ X iff (IH) ~X E r.
r~~X iff r~ X iff (IH) X E r iff (R 1) ~~X E I'.
.let~(i-~nQ.
I'~ ~nQiffI'~ ~Br.I'~ ,Oiff(1H)~ E I'8c(j E I'iff(R4andR7)~n(3 E I'.
r~ a ~ Q iff r~ a or r~ Q iff (I~a) ~a E I' or -~„[3 E I' iff ( RS and saturation)
~ce V~(3 E I' iff (R2) ~(a n(j) E I'.
.Iet~i-~vQ.
I' ~ a V,Q iff I' ~~ or I' ~,Q iff (IH) a E I' or (j E I' iff (RS,saturation) a V Q E I'.
I' ~ a v~3 iff I' ~~ 8c I' ~~3 iff (IH) ~a E I' óc ~Q E I' iff (R4,R7) ~a n~,Q E I' iff
(R3) ~(~ v (j) E I'. ~
Completeness is a very beneficial property, because it allows a shift ofperspective
(from inference to consequence, or vice versa). So, to show that something isderivable,
simply check whether it is a valid consequence. But also, the consequence test,
which needs a vast class of models, can be replaced by the much more restricted
combinatorics of inference. For example, efficient theorem provers based on partial
logic are feasible, even though the wth tables are larger than in the classical case. By
the property of partiality we can even show the consistency of the deductive system
itself (setting E- 0). Assuming a somcwhat more general definition of logical
consequence (E ~~p in which E may be infinite), completeness (non-vacuously)
implies compactness, which says that a set of formulas is satisfiable iff all its finite
subsets are) by moving to the syntactic side. Going the other way, it is now easy to
show decidability of the inferential system. What we have not established (and cannot
establish by completeness) is the independence of the rules R1-10. Although we want
our characterization of rLt to be as small as possible, this is usually considered a
minor issue.
In all, strong consequence and its syntactic counterpan rL} are interesting. Yet,
the verification approach may still seem strange since it produces no tautologies. So
let us pay attention to the other option of thc validity type.
3.2.2 Propositional falsifiability
A prime source of motivation of partiality and falsifiability are Beth's semantic
tableaus. In a Beth tableau one tcsts the validity of an inference by trying to conswct
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a wunterexample; the (in)validity only depends on propositional variables occurring
in the premises and conclusion and often not even all of them! As noticed by [vB84a]
the attempted falsification naturally leads to partiality, and, we might add, to falsifiable
validity. This perspective can also be found in early work on multi-valued logic. Then
sometimes 1 and ~ are the designated truth-valucs triggering validity, in other words,
0(and 2 in the 4-valued case) exclude tautologies.
Definition 3.4 (FALSIF)
~p is falsifiably valid (~ ~p) iff for no model M-(S, V) and no e E S: M, a~ ~p
For example, ~p V~tp is valid under this definition simply because it is never rejected.
Because valid formulas abound now, we do not really need a separate definition of
consequence: the notion fa[sifiably valid rule can be reduced to that for formulas
by stipulating, for example, a, ~3 ~ ry q ~(a n p) -~ ry, i.e. one can employ the
familiar deduction theorem not as a derived theorem but as a guiding principle. Since
s~(a n Q) -ti ry q if s~ a and s~ Q then s~ ry, the effect is that non-falsity of
the conclusion `mixes' with the truth of the premises. We shall therefore call this type
of validity mixed falsifiabiliry.
Definition 3.5 (FALSIFmix)
~Pt ,...,~Pn~~ is mixed falsifiably valid iff for every M and s:
if M, a~ tpt ,... , M, s ~ ~pn then M, s~~i.
This notion gives rise to a remarkable `unpartial' result.
Theorem 3.2 (van Benthem)
FALSIF„~;x on coherent models is completely described by classical propositional
logic pL.tb
We can obtain a similarresult for absolute falsifiable validity.
Definition 3.6 (FALSIFab,)
~pt, ..., ~p„~~t~i is absolutely falsiftably valid iff ~ cp~ and ...and ~ cp„ jointly imply
~ ~-
Absolute rules such as ~ ~p ~~ z~i suffer from a technical complication not yet
dealt with. The problem is that in addition to rclatively or mixedly valid propositional
rules there is a class of absolute rules that qualify lor the simple reason that the premise
is a contingent formula: for example ~ p~ F- q whereas of course p FJ q. 17 Without
claiming elegance, we can give a very simple solution: let the rules ofpL be combined
with scheme
16[vB84a] uses Beth tableaus (or Gentzen sequents) and the no[ions of strong and weak consequence,
where we (would) use ordinary models, and relative verifiable and mixed falsifiable validity, respectively.
t~This complication seems to have been widely overlooked, but (Cu63, p.97~8,175~6] is very accurate
on this point.
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~rp~~tli if F-X~~tP~
together fotming the absolute propositional logic pL,. But are not we overdoing
things? For notice that the above scheme can be reformulated as:
~ ~p ~ E- ~i if Ff rp
and does not this follow from the very meaning of the inference relation ~? The
answer to the latter question is that although the `implication interpretation' is clearly
intended, it does not exist a priori, for it can only be obtained once a cotrespondence
between deductive system and semantics has been established ... and for the latter
we need the above clause! In other words, without completeness the symbols i- and
~ in inference rules are strictly speaking meaningless - they could as well stand for
`is a sentence structure' and `derived by grammar', respectively. Still, it may be a
bit surprising that some common propositional properties are destroyed; for example,
contraposition does not hold anymore: in the extended system p~ p A~p, but
p V~p ~ ~p. Notice however that this deviation is not caused by either partiality or
coherence; precisely the same observation applies to a classical semantics.lg
Theorem 3.3 The coherent semantics with absolute falsifiable validiry is complete
with respect to the (absolute) propositional logic pL,.
Proof: Since otu construal of absolute deduction rules with respect to falsifiable validity mimics
ordinary logical consequence, the proof reduces to showing that FALSIF valid formulas are
the classical tautologies, i.e. ~~p a~~p for all ~p.
(~) we argue by contraposition. Suppose that M, s~~p, then classical inheritance shows that
M may be considered a coherent partial model, and M, s ~~p. (G) again by contraposition:
suppose that M-(S, V} is a coherent partial model such that M, s~ ~p for some a E S.
Then M can be extended to a classical model M} by putting, for example, Vt(p, s) - 1 iff
V(p, s) ~ 0 and V t(p, s) - 0 iff V(p, s) - 0(M{ is called the positive completion of M).
Then by persistenr,e ( proposition 3.4) M}, s~ ,~, so by classical inherirance Mt, s~~p. ri
Now how about relative falsifiability, still for coherent partial modcls?
Definition 3.7 (FALSIF,~i)
~pl , . . . , cpn~~i is relatively falsifiably valid (cpl , . . . , tpn ~ ~t~i) iff M, a ~ tpl and . . .
and M, s~ ~p„ jointly imply M, s~~i for every M, s.
Notice that relative verification and falsification are related by contraposition, regard-
less of the kind of models:
18An altemative solu4on to this problem is to change the notion of 'absolute rule' by imposing the
extensionaliry principle on it. So, in [FH V90], one way (called schematic inference) of construing ~p ~~
is to requ've the absolute validities to bc related for arbitrary substitutions v: if ~ o(rp) then ~ o(~).
Then cfeazly p~S q since under one suhstitution: ~ p V~p but ~ q.
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Proposition 3.11 ~p ~ ~i i,ff ~tli~ ~~p. 19
Proof: ~p ~ t[i q for every M, a: if M, a~~p then M, a~ ~, q for every M, a: if M, a~~i
then M, a~ rp q for every M, a: if M, a~~tli then M, a~ ~rp q~,G ~~rp ~
Relative falsifiability demonstrates a peculiar behaviour. As we have seen, the set
of valid formulas coincides with the set of classical tautologies. However, this does
not hold for nelative consequence. Crucially, the exfalso principle is now invalid. For
letp be undefined in a and q be false, then a~ p ~~p while a~ q. Thus the standard
(sometimes the only) rule in axiomatizations of pL, viz. modus ponens does not hold
either, exfalso and modus ponens are equivalent, modulo thc other rules of rL}. This
indicates that valid formulas and valid rules are independent devices, where a rule
that correctly produces tautologies may not qualify as a rule of (i.e. within) the same
system! By proposition 3.1 l FALSIF,~t valid rulcs tum out to be contrapositive to the
relatively verified ones. So put
(R8~) z~i I- ~O V~~p ( tertium non datur),
and let rL} be rL} with R8 replaced by (R8~).
Theorem 3.4
On coherent models the set of relatively falsifiably valid proper rules is completely
described by the system rL~, i.e. E~ ~p q E~~~. ~p, for all ~p and all E~ 0.
The proof of this theorem will be postponed to section 3.3 since it uses a reduction
technique active in a more general setting.
In connection to corollary 3.1, we are confronted with another striking result:
coherent partial semantics dces not select an interesting subset from the set of classical
tautologies; it either yields the empty set or else the total set of tautologies. So,
although this type of model seems to be better motivated for reasons of intuition and
eftïciency, at least for valid formulas the outcome is not much different from classical
logic. It may therefore have sense to relax the retitriction to cohcrence.
3.3 General situation semantics
Without the restriction to coherence, situations may be incoherent with respect to a
proposition and a valuation. We will call the resulting structure a (general) situation
model. Formally, V: Prop x S---~ p({0, 1}), i.c. thc valuation function is multiple-
valued. The truth and falsity relations are defincd in the same way as in section 3.2,
with one minor proviso for the basic case:
19Notice that this fact is independent of the kind ofmodel employed, as long as the truth conditions for
negation stay the same. Moreover, the proposition can be easily generalized for consequence between
arbitrary sets.
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s~ p q 1 E V(p, a), and a~ p q 0 E V(p, a) (where p E Prop).
The definition of coherent situation has to be modified accordingly. In addition
the notion of total situation is relevant in the present setting.
Definition 3.8 (for given M-(S, V) and Prop:)
(totality) a E S is total in M ifffor al! p E Prop : V(p, a) ~ 0(else, s is partial);
(rnherence) a is rnherent in M iff for all p E Prop : V(p, a) ~ 2- {0, 1} (else,
inrnherent).
Both properties inductively generalize to arbitrary standard formulas:
Proposition 3.12 (totality)
!f s is total in M then for all ~p : M, s~ ~p or M, s~ ~p.
Proposition 3.13 (local coherence)
If s is coherent then for all ~p : s~ ~p or s~ cp.
What kind of logic do general models yield for both definitions of validity?
First, for verification, corollary 3.1 still holds. Some of the relative rules of rL},
however, are now illegitimate. For example, Modus Ponens is invalid: if a~ p and
a~ p~ q, then possibly a~ q, notably when V(p, a) - {0, 1} and 1 ~ V(q, a). One
easily obtains the same result for Modus Tollens: ~q,p ~ q~ ~p. There are s[ill
valid rules, however, ranging from trivial ones such as ~p~ ~p to less trivial such as
~~~P~~~Pand~~ ~~~.
Next for falsifiable validity, we are confronted with a result similar to corollary 3.1,
with dual proof: consider a singleton model and a valuation which is overdefined (both
true and false) for every atom. Then the model falsifies every formula. So, in general,
we obtain for both sorts of validity:
Theorem 3.5 There are no validformula,s in general situation semantics.
Notice that proposition 3.11 still holds for general situation models. Instead of
enlarging the interrelation of contraposition and validity concepts, however, we can
now establish a more revealing connection between the two notions of validity. First
we recast the truth-functional notion of dualiry (cf. chapter 1) into a transformation of
models.
Definition 3.9 (duality)
For any model M-(S, V), its dua! M-(S, V) is defined by: 1 E V(p, a) iff
O~V(p,s),andOEV(p,a)iffl ~V(p,s).
The effect of this transformation generalizes to complex formulas, since the standard
language was shown to be duali~y preserving in chapter l.
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Proposition 3.14 (duality)
For all M, a, cp : M, s~ ip q M, s~ ip, and M, s~ rp q M, a~ ip.
We have paved the way for a useful reduction. The following proposition means
that the validity concepts coincide sort by sort: falsifiability and verification of fotmu-
las, absolute verification and absolute falsifiability of rules, etcetera.
Proposition 3.15 For general situation models: ~-~.
Proof: we shall restrict ourselves to relative consequence, in fact to one side of the simple case
~p ~ ,~, from which the more general case I' ~ 0 easily follows. So let ~p ~ ~ and M, s~ ~p,
then (proposition 3.14)1K, s ~ ~p, hence 111, s~ ~, and therefore M, s~ ,l,. Thus ~p ~~. The
other cases are similar. ~
Propositions 3.11 and 3.15 jointly imply that (strong) consequence on general
situations is closed under contraposition, and so in this respect the logic is more
`classical' than with coherent situations.
What is the syntactic counterpart of general situation semantics and what is the
relation between this rule system and that for vcriócation on coherent models? As
we saw before, these two systems are surely different, for example with respect to
Modus Ponens. Now if we inspect the rules of rLt, ex falso is typically not valid on
general models, but the other rules are. Indeed, the set of rules rL} -{R8} ( called rL
henceforth) provcs to be complete with respect to relative validityon general situations.
Theorem 3.6 The system rL is complete for generalconsequence.
Proof: Soundness ofrL iseasily checked. The completeness of thc rule system, i.e. that I' ~ ~p
implies I' F-~~ ~p is shown by `annchair-reasoning'. Just rcinspect the proof for theorem 3.1.
Use saturated theories sTS instead of csTS. Notice that R8 is not used in the proof or its
lemmas, apan from the check on coherence of 0 in the Lindenbaum lemma. But lhis step
is now superfluous. Apart from one minor technical detail this indeed completes the proof.
Since the valuation may be overdefined we must detine V by: 1 E V(p, 0) iff p E 0, and
0EV(p,0)iff~pEO. ~
This rule system coincides with one already existing. One way to reveal this is to
translate general situation models into the 4-valucd total ones encountered before. The
`underlying' sets of truth-values 0, {0}, { l}, {0, 1} arc idcntified with the new values
~, 0, 1 and 2, respectively. So, the new value 2 is used if p was overdefined in s, and Z
when p is underdefined. Likewise, the truth~falsity conditions given at the beginning
of this chapter correspond to the truth tables in chapter 1. These tables also pop up
in relevance logic, see [Be77]. In fact what can be shown is that the logic of general
situations provides the rules for Belnap's relevant propositional logic! (. .. and that is
why we dubbed the logic rL.) Instead of giving a syntactic proof of lhe equivalence,
we shall point out how the semantics of both systems are related. Recall the partial
order G of the four truth-values as displayed in thc logícal lauice (from bottom to top):





(`Tautological') entailment, i.e. r~elevant consequence, can be defined by means of
the logical ordering. ~p entails ~t~i (notated here as cp G ,,i) holds iff for every model
M-(S, V) and every s E S: [~p](s) G[:[i](a)where [.] extends V to interpretation
ofarbitrary formulas.
Now if we compare C to verifiable consequence, at first sight the two notions
seem to diverge. If [~p](a) and [tA,](a) have the values Z and 0(or: 2 and 2, or: 1
and 2) respectively, then a is no counterexample for cp~ ~i, but is a counterexample
for cp G,(,. What is at stake herc, is that we are comparing the consequence relations
locally, on just one model and one situation, although they expness universal facts:
in order to establish consequence, we have to consider all models. From this global
perspective we can argue as follows: assume one of the three problematic cases to
occur, for example the first one. Then although s is not a counterexample to ~p ~ tAi,
it is one for ~r~i~ ~tp, so by pmpositions 3.11 and 3.15, cp~ ~i cannot hold. In the
other cases, and in the other direction, we argue analogously. So, ~ q C.
An advantage of the more general setting is that it permits useful proof techniques.
One illustration of this was the reduction of partial logic to `duplicated' classical logic
executed in chapter 2.
Also the general setting allows for important subclasses: one is the set of cohenent
models, another the set of total modcls. These subclasses are related by the duality
transformation. Reconsidering proposition 3.15 we may note that duality transforrns
non-falsifying coherent models into verifying total ones. Equipped with one extra
syntactic notion we are ready to provc thcorem 3.4.
ri E is full (for ~) iff E~ ip V-~rp for all ip.
So, non-empty rL~`-theories arc full. Notice moreover that, modulo saturation, the
full sets are exactly the deductively complete sets20 (E ~ ~p or E~ ~cp for all tp.)
Theorem 3.4 (repeated)
On coherent models, E~ ~p q E~rt,. ~p for all ~p and all E~ 0.
Proof: Soundness of rL' with respect to FALSIF,e~ is straightforward. For completeness, the
considerations given above show that FALSIF,~c on coherent situations amounts to VERIF,~t
on total ones. Toprove that VERIF,~t on total models is complete with respect to rL'reconsider
the proof of theorem 3.1. As already shown for rL the truth lemma holds without reference to
R8 (or to R8~). Since the t1 constructed in the Lindenbaum lemma contains E and is closed
mAlso called 'complete theories', which is extremely confusing in the presen[ context since it uses
diflerent meanings of'completeness' and 'theory' (viz. arbitrary set of formulas) than used here.
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under rL', it is a full sattuated theory (FSr). For each Fs7' r we have p V~p E r, so (by
saturation) p E r or ~p E r, which implies 1 E V(p, r) or 0 E V(p, r), thus V(p, r) ~ 0.
Hence r is total. The rest of the proof remains the same. ~
3.4 Alternatives in partial semantics
Before we tum to `rival' proposals, let us make a few remarks about validity and
completeness for the extended propositional language. As noticed at the end of
section 3.1 we refrained from treating these aspects of the expanded language in
extenso, since the effectuation of the announced program tumed out to be a fairly
elaborate task, even when restricting to the basic propositional language.
3.4.1 extending the language
In chapter 1 two non-standard negations were considered: ti and 8. Each of them has
advantages of its own. ti can be interpreted both in 3- and in 4-valued semantics. 8
can only be interpreted properly in 4-valued models. So, ~ is more (lexible in this
respect. We repeat the crucial truth tables of the standard negation ~ and the two
non-standard negations below.
]~ 0 2 1~ 0 2 1~ 0 2
,0212 ~ollo ao212
These tables show that, unlike ~, the semantic operation corresponding to 8 is self-
inverse, and in this respect 8 behaves as~. The negations ~ and 8 can also be
contrasted with ~ in its truth and falsity clauses.
a~ -,rp á s~ iP e~ ~cG q a~ rP s~ 8tP q e~ iP
s~~~p a s~~p s~ ti~p a s~~p s~ 8~p a e~~p
So, ~ is the (symmetrical) standard negation, 8 a symmetrical nonstandard negation,
and ~ an asymmetrical nonstandard negation, which mixes the truth and falsity
conditions of ~ and 8 in one way.21
It can easily be ascertained that ordinary tautologies such as tertium non datur are
verified w.r.t. non-standard negation, i.e. ~~pV ti ~p and ~ ~p V 8~p. In other words,
there is a very classical ring to ti and 8.
By means of these new22 negations, we can define non-standard implications ~
and ~ in the usual way. We include the standard implication for comparison.
sv~~-,~v~G sv~~G-~w~~G ~~~-a~V~G
217'he other possible mixture is described by ~ ti~.
~It follows from results in chapter 1 that ~ and 8 are noi definahle hy means of standard connectives,
even when supplied with constants: neither is persistent. Also ti and 8 are not interdefinable, modulo
the standard connectives: 8 is not generallyclosed (as ,, n,~. are), and ~ is not dualuy preserving (but
~, n, 8 are).
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Despite theirdifferences, ~ and ! have an important feature in common: with respect
to verification they both formalire the notion of strong consequence. The reason for
this is that they share the partial truth condition, which is, in some sense, more natural
than the one for --~.
3~~~~Gps~~~~G~ 8~~~a~~G
In other wonis, it is the falsity clause that distinguishes ~ and ~.
Now what are the tautologics obtained in the extended languages? We do have
classical tautologies again, for example, ~ ~p ~~p and ~ ~p ~(~, ~ ~p). Since the
latter is one of the usual axiom schemes for classical propositional logic, we might
be led to think ihat the classical tautologies in G,,~ are precisely the partially valid
ones. This would be blatantly wrong, for at least two reasons. First, not all classical
tautologies in this language are strongly valid, for example ( ~q ~~p) ~(p ~ q)
is not partially valid (choose V(p, s) - 1 and V(q, s) - 2. Second, not all partial
validities could be obtained in this way, for example, ~ ~p ~(~i ~(rp n~i)), but ~
cannot be expressed in G,,~.
The other extended languagc, with a instead of ti is similar, to a large extent. The
main reason for this is the fact that tiand a are (verificationally) equivalent:
Again there are the usual validities such as ~ ~p --, (~, ~ ~p) and ~ cp ~(~, ~
(~p ~ t!i)), whereas ( ~9 ~~P) f(P f 9) is not valid.23
Notice, however, that there are some differences between these two extensions,
which are caused by the interaction of standard and non-standard negations. In
particular, we have ~a~p ~ ~~~p and ~ ti ~p~~a~p. One striking difference between
~ and a is that ~ ti ~p~ ~p, but not ~a~p~ cp. Another that ~a~pb a~[p, but not
~~~p~ ~~~p. We believe that addition of a number of such principles to the
standard system ( for 3- or 4-valued strong consequence) yields a complete deductive
system. We postpone the details of such a complete description to another occasion.
Another interesting remark concems notions of validity. In general the greater
expressive force of the extended language makes it possible to restrict validity to
verification: for example, relative falsifiable validity may now be formulated as ~
~~1 i . . . , ~.. ~~n ~ ~ ~~.
~So, f resembles the conditional occurring in [hc relevance logic R, cf. [Du86].
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The standard systems of `pure partial logic' studied in this chapter can be applied
to and compared with other proposals.24
3.4.2 Kamp
Following the original work of [Ba8l ] and [BP81 ], [Ka83] is treating the situation
semantics of perception verbs with formal rigour. Kamps's truth conditions for the
connectives and his notionofvalidity are standard-type. So, disregarding the ontology,
the semantics as such is standard.
The propositional part of the deductive system presented in [Ka83] deviates from
our system rLf: R7 is replaced by two rules:
(RO) if ~p ~ ~tj, and X is a positive context of ~o, then X(~P) ~ X(~)
(R7') ~P~ ~ ~ ~P ~ ~G
RO contains a simple but useful concept: if ~p, X E G,,~,v, then X is said to be a
positive context for ~p, if ~p is a subformula in X occurring in a positive position, i.e.
not within the scope of a negation. The application of this rule is more widespread
than might appear at first sight. A formula is then in negation normal form (NNF) if
its negations occur only in front of atoms, i.e. in Iiterals.25 For example, ~(~p V q) is
equivalent to p ~ ~q. So by the above method:
Lemma 3.3 Every formula is verifeably equivalent to aformula ln NNF.
Let rL' be the set of deduction rules generated by RO-10, with R7 replaced by R7'.
After showing the cut rule we may reprove completeness of rL' with respect to relative
veri fication.
Consequently, rL and rL' are equivalent. This can, of course, also be shown by a
direct syntactic argument.2ó
In all, we conclude that Kamp's approach is not essentially different from ours.
The altematives to follow are really non-standard. We shall start with the approach of
[B186].
3.4.3 Blamey
[B186] deals (mainly) with coherent situations and the usual connectives with standard
interpretation, but in addition there are some ` funny connectives', as he puts it: apart
from the constants ~r, T and 1, one encounters interjunction and transplication, here
symbolized by ~oc and ti:27
u[Th90a] treats these proposals more extensively; a short díscussion of [Mu89] is included at the end
of chapter 4.
uThe NNFof rp can also be obtained by back and forth translation: (~pf ) x, cf. chapter 2. See chapter 4
for the more specific disjunctive normal form.
~For example, R7' follows from R4 and R10: by reJiexivity, ~p n,6 F ~p n tb, and R10 ímplies
{~p, ~b} F{rp n t(r}. RO can be derived by induction on the structure of the positive context.
n[Mu89] notices that ~t amounts to the meel operation rl on the approximation (semi-)lat[ice.











So ~ot is a very weak counterpan of both ~ and V, whereas ti is a weak im-
plication. It follows from chapter 1 that neither is deónable in terms of the standard
connectives. Blamey notices that ~oc ,~-. and ~r are interdefinable, modulo the other
connectives. Each one added to the standard connectives ~, ~, and T provides defin-
ability of persistent truth functions.
Where ~x and ~oc are fairly artificial, y is motivated by its application to presup-
position phenomena. If ~tj, is the presupposition of ~p and X the assertoric contents of
~p, then ~p may be construed as TG ti X, which accounts for the negation test2s: if ~p is
true and if ~~p is true, t~i must be true. So we may now consistently require ~p~ ~(i and
~~p ~~i without running into inconsistencies for contingent ~t~i.
Although the construal with ~--~ is a major step forward in the slippy field of
presupposition, phenomena such as presupposition cancellation are still problematic.
For example, ( with ~p, e~,, X as above) the sentence `If ~t~, then ~p' dces not have the
presupposition ~tj~, and, roughly, means ~t~i ~ X. But ~t~i y(~t~i ti X) is strongly
equivalent to ~p, and the other possible translation ~, ~ (tli ~--~ X) is also not equivalent
to r~i ~ X.
With respect to logical conseyuence and equivalence Blamey argues for a so-called
"double-barrelled" approach, combining relative verification and falsification:29
'P ~ ~ i ff rP ~ ~ ~ ~P ~ ~
~~~~ ifT ~P~~~~~~P
Blamey notices that ~ and ~ can be defined in terms of (double-barrelled) ~, using
~:
~P~ ~ i~ ~P~~V~
rp ~ t~i i ff rp n ~t ~ ~i
For the standard language we notice that double-barrelled consequence on general
situations is axiomatized by rL; this follows from proposition 3.15. On coherent
situations double-barrelled consequence is characterized by rLt', which is rL} with
R8 replaced by the rule R8t`:
(Rg}~) ~P ~ ~~P ~ TG V ~~
rLt' is slightly stronger than rL, though weaker than rL} and rL~`. 30
~The negation test says that ry is a presupposition of ~p if both ~p and no1-~p logically imply ~b.
~Blamey uses ~ where we use ~~ , and ~ T and ~1 for our ~ and ~; notice that in this subsection
~ differs from the usual two-valued notion.
~Cf. the `mixed' system in [Ve87]; though technically correct, it seems intuitively dutrious to accept
R8t' on the one hand, and reject the transparant principles R8 and R8' on the other.
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Though, once we have one of the extra connectives, Blamey's concept of validity
and our two basic concepts of validity are interdefinable, he holds that the double-
barrelled approach is supported by "arguments stemming at least from theoretical
neatness".31 An advantage of ~~ is that it triggers strict identity of truth functions.
However, the mdefinitions of the verification and non-falsification are quite artificial.
By contrast, double-barrelled consequence can easily be derived from our standard
notions of validity.
Notice that the approaches of Kamp and Blamey are strictly truth-functional. A
different direction employed in several proposals is to `modalize' the truth conditions
by means of the relation C, usually restricted to one model at the time. We will
discuss a few of these proposals below. Apart from the truth conditions and some ad
hoc features, the following types of semantics are standard with respect to the other
parametets. For example, validity may be chosen to be verification.
3.4.4 Intuitionistic logic
A well-known theory with a clear intensional flavour is intuitionistic logic. As such
the semantical approaches of Beth and Kripke to intuitionistic logic are obviously not
partial. Still it is said that intuitionism is to be understood partially: the constructive
method urges partiality.
Following Gtidel's reduction of propositional intuitionistic logic to a fragment of
the modal system S4, assigning a`hidden box' interpretation to atoms, negation and
implication, Kripke proposed a possible world semantics to this effect. The evident
problem is thus: can we give an implementation of Beth's and Ktipke's ideas within
the partial framework? Actually the solution to this problem is already indicated by
one of Kripke's remarks. [Kr65b] notices that V(p, w) - 0 should not be read as
`p has been proved false at w', but as`p has not (yet) been proved, verified'. We
will implement this idea as follows: let V be a partial function of atom-world pairs
to values in { 1}, i.e. a partial l-valuedfunction. Notice that no Kripkean stipulation
for persistence (with respect to altematives) is needed, once we replace the relation
of accessibility by that of extension. So what is really difl'erent then from standard
accounts of partiality is in the truth conditions, which now become:
a~ paV(p,a)- l
a~ ~rpada'~s:a'~ rp
e~ ~~~Gpa~ sv~a~ ~G
a~ ip V~i q a~ ~p or a~ t,i
a~ ip--i~t~iqda'~a:a'~ ~P~a~~T~
~t[BI86, p.6,7j. However, (i) unlike Blamey we do not believe contraposition to be a necessary
ingredient of a logical system: this is supported by intuitions conceming incomplete knowlcdge, cf.
chapter9; ( ii) by deónition, logical equivalence is mutual consequence and (iii) notice that cp H ~p n 16 p
~ H tb v ~p q~p F,~ also holds for our systems rLf and rL'.
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So the semantics is not bivalent in the classical sense, but may still be considened
two-valued (or rather 12-valued!).
3.4.5 Humberstone
Viewed from our present perspective [Hu81 ] treats partiality in a deviant, asymme[ric
way. Situations (possibilities in Humberstone's terminology) are indeed partial and
coherent with respect to propositional variables. Yet there is but one single truth
relation ~, and a non-classical, seemingly intuitionistic clause for negation:
a~~cpq foralla'~a:s'~~p
The basic clause and the truth condition for conjunction are as usual (that is to say,
with ~ replaced by ~). Introducing the other connectives by the usual definitions,
this leads to rather complex and unintuitive truth conditions for V and -~. Validity
is of the relative type; of course the difference between verification and falsification
does not play a r81e here.
To illustrate this semantics wc notice that, for arbitrary propositions ~p and situations
s, it may be the case that neither s ~ ~p nor s~~ ~p. In this sense the models are indeed
partial. However, the effect of partiality in complex formulas is immediately reduced
(for example, ~p V~~p is always verified) and, in fact, the logic produced is entirely
classical. This can only be achicved by including C in the overt model structure and
impose constraints on admissible frames: persistence and refinabiliry32 have to hold
for the model structures. In our opinion, reliability is a bit strange a condition on
frames. In fact we can easily envisage models where part. of the formulas remain
forever undecided. Apart from this, the scmantics is remarkably complex given that it
characterizes classical propositional logic.
3.4.6 van Fraassen
While Humberstone used partial worlds to establish a total interpretation, we encounter
the opposite situation in van Fraassens's supervaluation seman[ics, where total worlds
serve to derive a partial interpretation. So, let (S, V) be a fixed coherent model, let
w range over for possible worlds (i.e. cohcrent and total situations), reserving a for
arbitrary coherent situations, then the 'supertruth' conditions are:
s~ cpqdw~s:w~cp
s~~pq`dw~s:w~cp
Notice that the partiality of V is only uscd in defining the relation C, not in defining
any relation of satisfaction. Incidentally, thc restriction to extensions of a is absent in
[vF66], but this condition is surely in the spirit of the original theory - in fact van
Fraassen has formulated more general accounts of supervaluation.
~See chapter 1.
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The supervaluation approach has some advantages, especially with regards to
penuntbra! truths, as [Fi75a] calls it. Suppose in some situation a we do not have
information whether p is irue or false. Then, intuitively, the formulas p, p V p and ~p
are not true, nor are they false. But independent of this indeterminacy, we feel that
p V~p is true: in the `real world' p has to be either true or false, and in both cases
p V~p is true. In fact all classical tautologies are valid in the supervaluation semantics.
We conclude that the supervaluation semantics is interesting and has certain advan-
tages for describing phenomena such as vagueness, but is not very Hexible: fonnally
spoken, it is merely a non-standard semantics for classical logic. Yet [B186] seems
to us too harsh in his judgement: the fact that partial truth is not persistent under
supervaluations should not be surprising since it is not truth-functional either, and
the latter intensionality is very much intentional. But can wc really blame intensional
semantics being intensional?
3.4.7 Veltman
Still in the spirit of intuitionism, but now in an overtly partial fashion is Frank Veltman's
datasemantics, discussed in [Ve81 ] and [Ve85 ~. The basic semantic entities are called
`(possible) information states', corresponding to our coherent situations, now with
the obvious intention to represent correct but possibly incomplete infonnation. The
format of an `infonnation model' is (S, C, V), where V is persistent with respect to
the partial order C among situations. Again C is included in the model structure to set
a constraint on it, which roughly corresponds to Humberstone's refinability33:
the Zorn property
Every maximal chain (linearly ordered subset) of situations contains a
maximal element; moreover, such maximal elements are total. 34
The validity type is that of relative verification. The truth and falsity conditions for
atoms, ~, V and ~ are standard-type. With regards to the other clauses data semantics
went through a number of transitions during its development.
Implications are treated in a somewhat inwitionistic way; in ( Ve81 ] the conditions
are:
a~ rp-~~iiffda'~a:s'~ ~~a~~ tli
s~ tp -. ~t~i iff 3s' ~ s: a' ~ ~p á s' ~ t~i
Notice the definition is still intrinsically partial: the truth value of ~p ~~i may be
undefined in a situation e. This partial effect has been eliminated in [Ve85], where the
truth condition is changed into:
8~ tp--~ t~lÍffda~C3:a~~ Sp~a~~T~J
~30r, rather, CCLOS as a condition on (possibly infinite) sets of situations.
~'Mazimal' means 'impossible to extend properly', for chains w.r.t. C, for situations w.r.t. C. The
baptizing of the constraint is ours and reminiscent of one of the early equivalent.c of the Axiom of Choice
in axiomatic set theory, i.c. Zom's lemma.
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The modal flavour of these conditions is also explicitly pnsent: the logical lan-
guage has some modal operators, with a semantics defined by means of the C relation.
Veltman's must-operator is interpreted by means of C as accessibility relation:
a~ Orp iffda~ ~ a: a~ ~ ip
a~~rpiff3a'~a:a'~ip
The operator O(may) is dual to O, which already yields its truth conditions. Again
the interpretation of modal fonnulas tums out to be total, quite different from what
would expect for a partial semantics. However, Veltman gives de[ailed motivation for
his truth conditions, and in fact the whole theory provides a convincing account of the
behaviour of conditional sentences.
With regards to the variations in the semantics we have not yet been complete. A
different route was suggested in [Ve81 [3s:
a~ O~p iff `d total w ~ a : w~ ~p
a~ ocpiff~ totalw Ca:w~ cp
To complicate matters furthcr, the form of data semantics presented in (vB84a]
is a`cross-section' of the previous options: -~ is treated `partially', o is given the
above `supervaluation' account, and O the earlier `total' clauses. So in all we are left
with four different forms of data semantics. Without going in great detail here we
notice that the deductive properties of these logics are also dif['erent. For example, the
argument ~p -. ~i, o~p ~ o~i holds in [Ve81 ] and [vB84a], but not in [Ve85], and the
duality principle orp ~~O~cp is not validated in [vB84a], but is in the other systems.
An important result is that similar to earlier findings for intuitionistic logic, data
logic as discussed in [vB84a] can be reduced to (a subset of) the ordinary modal system
~4.1.36
[Ve85] gives a complete recursive definition of the set of valid tules; in fact his
completeness proof inspired early attempts leading to some results in section 4.3 here.
3.5 Conclusion
Different values of semantic parameters (such as validity, kind of model, type of tvle)
resulted in various systems of logic. The relation between semantics and deductive
systems has been given in terms of completeness theorems. These results are summa-
rized in table 3.1. In order to be fully systematic, we have supplemented the picture
by adding some results that werc not statcd in the main text, but follow easily from it.
First, notice we have achievcd symmctry in the table by fully exploring total situ-
ations (which may be overdefined!). The completeness ofrL~ for relative verification
~V'ide [Ve811, footnote ]5.
~Presumably the eclectic nature of van Benthem's version serves to show that no matler which of the
suggested truth conditions are chosen, a translation of data logic into normal modal logic can always be
given -[Ve85, p.207] already gives an adapted translation, and it is an easy exercise to accomodate the
translation for the actual variants given in 1Ve81].
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was already demonstrated in the proof of theorem 3.4. By means of the duality op-
eration ( section 3.3), validity on total models can be reduced to validity on coherent
ones, meanwhile switching from verification falsification.
Second, we discussed mixed falsifiable validity on coherent models as one of the
altemative ways of characterizing classical propositional logic pL. How about mixed
veriftable validity on coherent models? In other wonis, which inference rules ~p~~i
have the property that a~ ~p implies a~ tli? Notice this is equivalent to requiring
a~ ~p ~~i, i.e. to the validity of implications. But no standard fonnula is verifiably
valid on cohenent models, so the set of rules searched for is empty.
Third, there is one possibility which has been disregarded so far: nothing prohibits
absolute rules with mixed validity type. In this way one can conclude from `always
verified' to `never falsified', or the other way round. [t turns out, however, that
this move only provides one new system of a rather pathological nature, where the
premises of the conclusion are non-tautologies and the conclusion arbitrary. This
system manifests itself for mixed absolute veri fication on coherent models: validity of
the inference ~p~~i amounts to ~~p ~ ~-r~i, thus to yP~ ~p. These strange rules also
pop up in a complete characterization of absoluie rules with `straight' validity type:
the resulting system pL, is the union of pL and pL` x G. The default case for absolute
and relative rules is still the one in which validity is straight; mixed is the exception.
The different forms of validity and consequence are summatized below:
VERIF ~ ~p iff for all M, s: M, s~ ~p.
VERIFab, ~p ~ ~(i iff if ~ ~p then ~ tli.
VERIFr,t ~p ~~ iff for all M, s: if M, s~ ~p then M, s~ tli. (~p ~~i)
VERIFa6~,mix ~P ~ ~ iff i,f ~ ~p then ~~i.
VERIF,n;x ~p ~ v~i iff for all M, s: if M, s~ ~p then M, s~~i.
FALSIF ~ cp iff for all M, s: M, s~ ~p.
FALSIFab, ~p ~,~, iff if ~ cp then ~~i.
FALSIF„t ~p ~~i iff for all M, s: if M, s~~p then M, s~~i. (cp ~~,)
FALSIFa6~,mix ~P ~ ~G i~ 4f ~ ~p then ~ tli.
FALSIF,,,;x cp ~ ~i iff for all M, s: if M, s~ ~p then M, s,~ rli.
We chart our main completeness results in thc table 3.1.
Especially relative validity tums out to be interesting, both in theory and in
application.37 How are the various systems of relative consequence related to each
other? Of course restricting the type of situations leads to an ex[ension of the set of
nSee [Ta921 for a fruitful combination of partial logic (rLf and rL) and non-monotonic reasoning.
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VERIF pL 0 pL ~
VERIF,~I pL rL rL' rL
VERIFmix pL e pL ~
FALSIF pL pL 0 0
FALSIF,.~I pL rL' rL} rL
FALSIF mix pL pL 0 0
valid rules.3S This state of affairs can be displayed in the following diagram of twin




rL~` coh dual. tot
rL gcn
The logical systems are related by inclusion ( lines, upwards) and contraposition (ar-
rows); the types of semantics are also connected by inclusion ( lines, downwards) and
dualization ( arrows). Are these structures really lattices? Yes, although perhaps not in
a self-evident way. The join of rL} and rL' indeed describes classical propositional
inference, in a somewhat redundant natural deduction style. The real problem resides
in the lowerhalfof these structures: the intersection of the systems rL} and rL~ is not
the system rL since it contains a rule which is not in rL, viz. the rule ` exfalso sequitur
tertium non datur' ~p ~~~p ~ tli V~~i, which we recognize as R8}~`, the typical rule of
Blamey's system rL}', which is rL} with R8 replaced by R8}~`. So, if we want the
meet operation to correspond with intersection of full inference systems, the bottom
element of the lauice should be rL}'(and rL could be added below rL}'). Yet the
displayed lattices are correct when not thc full systems but their finite descriptions
(R1-10 and the like) are intended.
In the next chapter the combination of partiality and intensionality will be exploited
more intensively, with full-Oedged accessibility instead of the relation of extension.
~More formally, let M be a class of models validating the system SM. If J~t C J1i then SN C SM.
For example, if (~p ~~) E SN, M E J~t and M, a~ rp, then M E J1Í and so M, s~{6.
Chapter 4
Modal completeness
4.1 Introduction and program
The intensional aspect implicit in various proposals for propositional logics (see sec-
tion 3.4) can and should be generalized to an approach merging partial and modal
logic. This chapter will show that such a generalization is feasible and interesting.
This in itself does not provide sufócient motivation for such an intricate enterprise.
Yet, although the later chapters will elucidate this further, some contemplation may
already make the point.
Notice the earlier intensionality depends on the relation of extension C. We saw
that C may of course be used to define the semantics of the modal operators o and
O. Though this approach is important and interesting, it is limited by the fact that
extension is a 6xed relation. One of the good things of modal logic is its flexibility:
it may be used for a large number of applications, ranging from logical necessity (the
alethic interpretation of modals), over knowledgc (epi.stemic), belief (doxastic), ethics
(deontic) to computer science (the dynamic interpretation). Much of this diversity is
semantically controlled by different choices of the accessibility relation in possible
world models. Although interpreting modals by plain extension still allows some
freedom in truth conditions and validity, this is not enough for the observed diversity.
In all, our approach is in the spirit of ordinary Kripke semantics, with partiality,
and possibly incoherence, permitted in the valuation. Apart from the dimension of
accessibility, there is considerable liberty in partial semantics, as we saw in previous
chapters, both forvariable (chapters 1 and 2) and for fixed logical languages (chapter 3).
We have explored this new area and found completeness theorems for the `mini-
mal' modal logics corresponding to standard types of partial semantics, without any
constraint on accessibility. Despite the preparatory work in the preceding chapter,
proving completeness by means of the Henkin method turns out to be a complicated
matter.
Some general model theory for partial modal logics was, in fact, already present
in section 2.3, providing basic techniques such as bisimulation. We believe such a
transfer of classical to partial modal logic to bc possible on a larger scale, but we
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confine ourselves to methods that will be used further on in this thesis.
To gain insight in the behaviour of specific systems, we discuss another useful
technique (filtration) and give completeness results for a number of the most obvious
systems, restricted to relative validity.
Finally we discuss what we consider a deviation from the main trail, where the
accessibility relation itself is partialized (see section 4.5.2).
4.2 Possible worlds revisited
Before we tum to truly partial models we reinspect possible world semantics. Why do
this? Surely, verification and non-falsification amount to the same on classical Kripke
models. And the set of valid formulas is consequently the same in both perspectives,
viz. the simple normal system K. This system is axiomatized by, for example:
(pL) the axioms and rules (especially modus ponens) of pL;
(K) ~ o(~P ~ ~G) ~ (D~p -~ D,~);
~
(N) if ~ tp then 1- D~p.2
The usual mode of verification of modal rules is the absolute approach. But even
then we have to be careful to add the principle of absolute closure introduced in
section 3.2; otherwise not all valid rules are derivable from K). In the sequel we shall
use `Ka' to denote the augmented absolute system, which is the system K with the
additional rule:
~~p~~r~ if Ffrp
More important is that already for classical worlds the relative approach yields a
system of rules different from K. The point is that the nature of the rules is essential
in modal logic. For N we note Ihat ~p ~ ocp is valid when construed as an absolute
rule, but not as a relative rule, i.c.
does not qualify as a rule of the relative system. So we are confronted with the
paradoxical situation that N can be involved in deriving valid formulas, though it does
not qualify as a valid rule itself (cf. the similar case expressed by theorem 3.4).
But what is the characterizing system for relative rules? Apart from pL one needs
the following inference rules:
cAlthough the formal language docs not contain y we can reconstruct n and V in terms of ~
and -~ and derive all valid formulas this way; altematively, one might prefer to replace K d'uec[ly by
D~p V O,~ V O(~~p n„~).
ZN may be restricted to axiom.s, cf. llniversa! Generalization in first-order logic.
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(Ir) if tp ~ ~i then o~p ~ o~i 3
(Cr) ~~P n ~~ F o(tP n~)
However, valid principles such as p q o(pV ~p) are not derivable from the combina-
tion of pL, Ir and Cr alone. In fact we have to restore N, again construed as a relative
rule, but now properly:
(1vr) P -' P ~ O(P ~ P).
p-~ phere serves as an arbitrary tautology; because ofIr, any otherclassical tautology
would do equally well. Now let Kr-pL t Ir t Cr t Nr. To motivate this nomenclature,
notice that axiom K relativized as t](~p --~ ~(i) F- Otp -~ o~t~i is derivable from Kr.
More formally, the systems K and Kr are related by the deduction theorem:
Proposition 4.1 ~p ~x, ~G q ~K ~P -~ ~
Proof: by induction on the length of the respectivederivation. T'he basic observation underlying
this is that the systems can simulate each other.
(~) It is well-known that pL, I, C aze derivable in K, see e.g. [Ch80] 4 Also, an application
Nr can be imitated in K, since by pL ~ p~ p, thus by N f- o(p -~ p). and by pL again
P~P~ ~(PyP).
(C) This boils down again to checking axioms and rules.
pL: as above;
N: assume f- ~p, then, by pL, p y p~ ~p, thus (Ir) o(p -~ p) ~ a~p and so, by pL and N,,
~ t]~p;
K: because of pL ~p ~(cp ~,[,) ~,I,, thus, by Ir, t](~p ~(~p --. t(i)) h- o~,, so, by Cr and
pL, o~p ~ o(~p -. ,I,)) F o~i, and finally, by pL (apply the deduction theorem twice),~ t7(~ -. ~) -. (o~p --~ o,~). .
So Kr is K in disguise.
This enables us to fonnulate a completeness theorem for the set of (relative)
consequences on ordinary Kripke models. In classical models the distinction between
ttue and not-false disappears; consequently, VERIF and FALSIF (both in straight
and mixed mode) coincide. Then the so-called `weak' completeness theorem for
K(characterizing valid formulas, see e.g. [ChSOj) implies the `strong' completeness
theorem for valid consequences in notmal modal logic, because of proposition 4.1.
Theorem 4.1
The possible world semantics with relative validity is complete with respect to system
Kr, i.e. E~K, 0 iff E ~ 0.
In all, the resulting logic is pretty much like the old system K where absolute rules
are circumvented. More changes are to be expected for panial or incoherent models.
3Ir and C, are the relativized counterparts of I: F- ~p ~ 16 ~~ orp -, ~~, and C: F([J~p n ~~b) ~
o(w ~ ~6)-
`Recall from section 3.5 that the 'pL' in Kr will be a system of natural deduction, whereas usually the
`pL' in K is obtained from only 3 axioms and modus ponens. Yet, these systems, though very different
in appearance, are equivalent.
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4.3 Coherent modal models
Especially for epistemic applications coherent modal models are of interest: we cannot
have inconsistent knowledge.
On the technical level, partial model theory for modal logics combines partial
propositional semantics and the possible worlds approach to modalities. Recall from
the introduction to part I and chapter 2 that a coherent modal model (or: a partial
Kripke model) is a Kripke frame with a partial valuation. More precisely, a partial
Kripke model is a triple (S, R, V), where R C S x S is an accessibility relation and
V is a partial function into {0, ]}. -
The truth conditions for the connectives are as stated in section 3.2. In addition the
most plausible conditions for thc modal operators o and O given earlier in chapter 2
are:
M, s~ o~p q b't E R[s] : M, t~~p M, s~ o~p q~t E R[s] : M, t~~p
M, a~ O~p a 3t E R[s] : M, t~ ip M, s~ O~p q dt E R[s] : M, t~ rp
The full standard language wil] contain both o and O, but the above clauses allow
redefining O as ~~~, which is convenient for inductive proofs.
Without explicitly stating or ( inductively) proving all of them, we notice that
most basic properties ofcoherent propositional models, viz. coherence, partiality and
inherited classicaliry hold in the modal case mutatis mutandis. This is illustrated by
the fol]owing proposition.
Proposition 4.2 ( partiality)
There is a model M and a situation s such thatfor allformulas ~p: M, e~~ and
M, e ~ rp.
Proof: let S-{2}, ? R2 and V(p, Z)- z for all p E Prop. The proposition then follows by
induction on the structure of ~p. ~
By contrast, generals persistencc for modal formulas may be violated. The intuitive
reason for this violation is that persistence in its general form has a local character
(comparing single situations), whereas the modal truth clauses have a more global
nature, involving accessible situations.
To be more specific, imagine a model in which s~ op, s C s' and suppose there
is only one t such that sRt. So t~ p. Then for any t' which is R-accessible from a'
it should be the case that t' ~ p, but nothing urges t C t'. For there is no compelling
reason why the relations in the following diagram should commute.
SIn particular: internal persistence does not hold, cf. section 3.2.
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On the basis of this consideration a concrete counterexample for general persistence is
easily consttucted (take, forexample S- {s, s', t, t'}, R -{(s, t), ( s', t')}, V(p, t) -
1 and V(p, t') - 0).
Fortunately, a weaker form of persistence does hold. Suppose we merely extend
the valuation, inother words employ what we callcd an external extension ofthe model.
Recall ( from page 66, adapted for the modal case) that M C M' if M-(S, R, V),
M' -(S, R, V'), and for every s E S: M, s C M', s.-Then persistence holds
`pointwise' with respect to this special type of extension.
Proposition 4.3 (external persistence)
If M C M' then M, s~ cp ~ M', s~ ~p and M, s~ ip ~ M', s~ cp for all
standardformulas ~p.
Proof: Due to general persistence for the standard propositional language we only have to
check the steps for the modal operators in an inductive proof. Assume the lemma for some ~p
and all s E S(tH). Let M, s~ o~p and M C M'. Then for every t such that sRt: M, t~ ~p,
and so by tx M', t~ ~p, and therefore M', s~ o~p. That M, s~ o~p implies M', s~ o~p is
shown analogously. ~
Like in the propositional case, for coherent models there is no general account
of the validated rules: the distinetion between verification and non-falsification is
important again.
4.3.1 Modal verification
As in [he propositional case, [he absolute and mixed approaches are hardly interesting
for verification on (partial) worlds: the empty set of validities induces, for example,
the total or empty set of rules. Much of this is implied by the observation that for
coherent models there are no verifiably valid standard formulas. For it follows by
partiality (proposition 4.2) that
Corollary 4.1 The set of verifiably valid standard modal formulas is empty.
So we focus on rules in the relative perspective. Fortunately the relative system is
interesting and certainly non-trivial in its deductive performance. With regard to the
problem of completeness, it is clear that the rule system should contain rLt (vide
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section 3.2), and a number of characteristic modal rules (Rl 1-19 below), together
forming the system Mt, which is the modal counterpart of the logic rL} for strong
consequence.
(Rll) O~~p H ~o~p
(R12) o~~p H ~O~p
(R13) o~p n a~, 1- o(~p n~i) (called Cr before)
(R14) O(~p V ~,) i- O~o v O~r~i
(R15) if ~p ~- -r(, then o~p ~ o~i ( called I~ before)
(R16) if ~p ~ ~i then O~ i- Oz~i
(R17) o~ n O,~ ~ O(~p n,(,)
( R18) o(~p v~i) ~ O~p v o~,
(R19) O(~p n ~~p) ~ ~i (mndal ex falso).
Some comments may help to clarify aspects of this deductive system:
l. Notice that most rules of M} come in dual pairs; except for the `ex falso'
principles R8 and R19, all displaycd rules are subject to contraposition, in the
sense that if ~p F- a(i then ~z[i ~ ~~p.
2. We conjecture that the rules of the system are independent. The claim is
based on abonive attempts to reduce the system, as well as on the fact that
dual pairs are not interreducible sincc contraposition does not hold in general.
Anyway, independence is of minor importance compared with consistency and
completeness.
3. The rules obtained when disjunction and conjunction in Rl3 and R14 are inter-
changed, as well as the converses of Rl3 and R14, also qualify ( the derivations
use Rl5 and R16). We shall demonstrate the latter:
1 ~p ~ rp V ~i [RS]
2 Orp ~ O(~pV t,i) [1, Rl6]
3 O~i ~ O(~p V~i) [by analogy]
4 O~p v O~i ~ O(~p v ~,) [2,3, R6]
4. Rl8 is equivalent to t7(cp ---~ ~i) ~ o~p ~ o~, which is a relative counterpart
of the K-axiom, already encountered in section 4.2
Notice that the important properties of I- such as reflexivity, monotonicity and the
cut-rule still hold for M}, since M} extends rLt. Consequently, the partial pendant
of the Lindenbaum lemma is also valid. We arrive at a central completeness result.
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Theorem 4.2 On coherent models VERIF,~t is sound and complete with respect to
the modal system M}, i.e. E~ cp q E~Mt cp.
Proof: It is easy to check that verification on coherent models is sound for the rules of M}. To
prove the other direction we use a Henkin-style proof. So we argue by contraposition: suppose
that E y~p. Then by the partial Lindenbaum lemma (lemma 3.1) E can be extended to a csT
il such that ~p ~ t1. Define the canonical model M-(S,1t, V) by: (especially the `twofold'
definition of R is crucial)
. s-{r ~ r is a csT};
. rRO irr
- r,oES,
- 0~ E r implies ~ E 0 for all ~t(~, and
-'G E A implies O~i E r for all ~i;
. V(p, r) - 1 iff p E r; V(p, r) - 0 iff ~p E r.
Since E C fT and ~p ~ fl, the truth lemma below shows: M, r~,~, iff ~, E r for all
~ E G, r E S. So, a jortiori, M, f1 ~ E and J~t, f1 ~ ~p, whcnce E~ ~p. ~
To facilitate the modal steps of the inductive pmof of the truth lemma, we need some
sublemmas. The complexity of these additional lemmas is presumably caused by the
twofold character of R. Yet a simple `singlc' definition of canonical accessibility
is impossible, because the two defining clauses are independent. Here is a simple
counterexample, in which the first clause holds but the second one does not: let r- 0
and 0 be a esT containing p. There is a dual counterexample with ~ - 0 and r a
csT containing op that shows a similar irreducibility in the other direction. For later
applications we also give a reformulation of R in a more concise format. Since ~
and O are syntactic operations on G, we may adopt thc usual functional notation.b So
rR0 amounts to o-t [r] c 0 and o[~] c r, where the latter conjunct is equivalent
to 0 C O-1 [r]. So, -
Lemma4.1 rR0 a o-t[r] C ~ C O-t(r]
The proofs of what are essentially the modal steps of thc partial truth lemma are
certainly less easy.~
Lemma 4.2 O~i E r ifffor some 0 such that rRO: ~i E ~.
Proof: From the right to the left this follows immediately from the definition of R. To show
the other direction assume that for fixed rl, and csr r: O,li E r. Let ~po, ~pc, ...,~p„ . .. be an
bf[X] -{f(x) ~ x E X} and f-1[X] -{x ~ f(x) E X}.
~We are indebted to Frank VelUnan for his help in setting up these proofs; the `diamond properties'
were suggested by Johan van Benthem. The proofs are quite long and may perhaps be skipped at first
reading. Yet we would like to encourage the reader to try them on occasion, since this is in some sense
the heart of the matter.
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enumeration of the fotmulas of the modal language such that exh formula occurs countably
many times. The required CST 0 is defined in such a way that for all e:
(O1) O~e~OeEr,
which is called the first diamond-property for 0. To achieve this, ~„ is defined recursively:
. oo - o-t [r] u {,~};
. t1nft - t,n Íf On ~ rPn;
~ ~nft - O n U{~n } if On ~(Pn and ~pn is not a disjunction;
~ On}] - ~n U{~n, X} ifOn ~ ~pn and ~Vn - XV 1(' and for all e: On, X~ t~ Oe E r;
~ Onft - ~n U{~n, X~} Íf On F- ~pn and ~pn - X V X' and not for all e: On, X~ e~
Ot: E r.
Let t, be ~JnEW ~n. We will show (O1) for On, i.e. On i- s~ Oe E r by induction on n.
. Assume Do ~ e, then by R 10 (and R4) there are ót ,..., 6m E ~- t[r] such that ó n~i ~ t:
(where ó- 6~ n.-- n ó,,,). With R16 and R17 this implies o6 n O~i ~ Oe (1). Since
oót ,..., aó,,, E r, R13 and the fact that CSTS are closed under conjunction, we obtain
Ub E r. Moreover, by assumption, O~ E r, and so, since r is a lheory, oó n O,~ E r,
hence, using (1), Oe E r.
. Suppose On has Ol (1H), ancl consider Ontt.
- In case O n F~ lPn there is nothing to prove.
- If On I- rpn, and rpn is not a disjunction, lel On~~ 1- E, i.e. ~n, ~n I- e. Then the
cut-rule yields On f- E and So by IH: Oe E r.
- If On ~ ~pn - X V X' and for all e': On, X F- e' ~ Oe' E r, then t,n~~ has (Ol).
For let ~n, ~pn, X F e, then (cut) On, X F e and thus by definition Oe E r.
- The last possibility is that in which ~n ~~n, wn - X V X' and for some et:
t,n, X F- et and Oe~ ~ r. We will show that ~n~t - On U{tpn, X'} has
(O1). For suppose not. Then there exists an eZ such that On, ~pn, X' ~ eZ and
OeZ ~ r. Consequently, (by RS and R6) ~n, ~Gn, X V X' ~ et V eZ, thus by cut:
On ~ et V c2, so (1H) O(e~ V e2 ) E r. With R 14, Oet V Oe2 E r, and by sattn-ation
of r: Oet E r or OEZ E r, which contradicts the assumptions.
Since ~n has the 01-property, so has ~ itself! The rest of the proof is easy.
I. ~ is a theory, for if t1 ~ X then there are bt ,..., ók E ~ such that 6, n... n bk ~ X.
So there is an P with át ,..., ók E ~c and by the way we defined the enumeration of
~pn: there is an n ~ P for which X-~pn. Therefore ~n ~(Pn, and consequently
X E Ontt C 0. -
2. ~ is consistent, for assume on the contrary that for some X: ~~ X n~X. (O1) yields
O(X n~X) E r, and thus by R 19: X n~X E r, contradicting consistency of r.
3. 0 is sattuated, for assume that X V X' E 0, then, by the special conswction of the
sequence {~pn}n, X V X' -~Pn and On F ~pn for some n. By definition, On}t contains
X or X', and so dces ~.g
eOne might object at this point that the definition seems to prohibit containment of both disjuncts.
However, this objection fails for at Ieast two reasons: (i) it may, for example, be the case that x' E ~.
while AR U{X} has ( O1), and then {X,X'} C 0„fi; (ii) in case x ~ A„ and X' ~ A,., whereas both
t1w U{x} and t1,. U{X'} have (O1), thc definition yiclds that only X E t1,.tt but X' ~ t],.~t. However,
the equivalen[ X' V x will eventually turn up as ~p4, and then possibly X' E t'kti.
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5. rR0 since
. 0 is a CST,
. oó E r implies ó E Do C 0,
. ó E 0 implies 06 E r by (OI).
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Lemma 4.3 O~p E I' ifffor all 0 such that I'1Z0: ~p E 0.
Proof: From the left to the right this follows immediately from the definition of R. To show
the other direction, we argue by convaposition. Suppose that o~p ~ r. We have to consvuct
a Cs'r 0 such that rR0 and ~p ~ ~. IJet ~po, ~p~, .. .,~pn ... be an enumeration with countable
repetition of the formulas of the standard modal language. On is defined in such a way that it
respects the second diamond-properly (02). E has 02 if for all e:
(02) E~eV~p~OeEr.
On is deóned recursively by:
. oo - O-~ [r] -{ó ~ t76 E r};
. ~ntl - ~n If ~n 'I ~n,
~ Onfi - ~n U{~p„} if On ~ ~p„ and ~pn is not a disjunction;
~ Onfl - On U{rpn, X} if On ~~pn, rpn - X V X' and On U{X} haS (02);
~ On~i - On U{~pn, X'} if 0„ ~~pn, ~Pn - X v X' and ~n U{X} dces not have (02).
Let 0 be ~Jn ~n. First we will check that the ~n and ~ share (02); next that 0 is a esT with
the desired properties. That On has the 02-property is shown by induction on n:
. Let Do F e v~p, then (R 10) there are 6~ ,..., ó,,, E Do such tha[ À f- e v~p, where
ó- ó, n.. . n 6„a. By R15 and R18 [his implies t7ó ~ Oe V t7~p (2). Since t7ó; E r,
R13 and closure of csTS under conjunction, wc obtain oó E r, consequently with (2):
Oe v t7~p E r. So, by saturation and the fact that o~p ~ r: Oe E r. Whence Do has
(02).
. Suppose On has 02 (IH), and consider ~nti.
- In case ~n Ff ~pn there is nothing to prove.
- If On ~~pn, ~pn not a disjunction, let 0„~i ~ e v~p, i.e. t,n, ~pn F- e v ~p. The
cut-rule then provides On ~ E V ~p ánd so by IH: Oe E r.
- If On ~ tpn - X v X' and ~n U{X} h~15 (02), s0 has On.~l - On U{tpw, X}
(apply cut).
-~t ~n ~~Vn, ~Gn - X v X' and for somc ei : On, X~ ei V ~p and Oe~ ~ r. Then
On~i - On U{~pn, X'} has (02). For suppose on the convary that there exists
an eZ such that On, ~Gn, X' ~ eZ v ~p while Oe2 ~ r. By RS and R6 (ineluding
associativity of V), On, ~Gn, X V X' F~ e~ v eZ v~p, thus by cut: On ~ Ei V EZ V~p, so
(IH) O(e~ V e2) E r. With R14, Oei v Oe2 E r, and by saturation of r: Oet E r
or OeZ E r, contradictory to the assumptions.
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So each On has the property (02). Consequently, 0 also has (02). The rest of the proof is
svaightforward.
1. 0 is a theory: the proof is the same as in the previous lemma.
2. ~p ~ t1, for assume on the contrary that ~p E 0. So 0~(~p n~~p) V~p, and by (02):
O(~p n~~p) E r, and therefore (R19) o~p E r, which contradicts o~p ~ r.
3. 77iis also shows that 0 is consistent (by R8).
4. 0 is saturated. The argument is completely similar to lhe one spelled out in the previous
lemma.
5. rR0 since
. 0 is a csT,
. ob E r implies b E 0„ C 0,
. óE0~0~6V~p~ (02)ObEr
We are ready to prove the trutlt~falsity lemma for the canonical model defined in
the proof of theorem 4.2.
Lemma 4.4 For all I' E S: I' ~~i iff ~i E I'; I' ~ ~r~i iff ~~i E I'.
I'roof: by induction on the swcturc of ~,.
. if ~i is a propositional atom, the lemma holds by definition of V.
Assume the lemma to hold for ,li and X(~H).
. r~~~i iff r~~ iff (iH) „I, E r.
r~~~i iff r~~ iff (IH) tG E r iff (Rl) ~~~ E r.
. r~1GnXiffr~~i8r.r~Xiff(IFí)~,ErBcXEriff(R4,R10)~inXEr.
r~,~ n X iff r~,G or r~ X ifr p~~) ~~, E r or ~X E r iff (RS and saturation)
~~ V~X E r iff (R2) ~(,li n X) E r.
. r~ o~, iff for all 0 such that rR~: 0~ ,li iff ( tx) for all 0 such that rR~: ,G E t1
iff (lemma 4.3) o~ E r.
r~ a~, iff for some 0 such that rRO: 0~~ iff (lH) for some ~ such that rRO:
~~ E 0 iff (lemma 4.2) O„G E r iff (R 11) ~o,(, E r.
The steps for V and O are skipped, since we can redcfine these in terms of ~, n and o. This
reduction was noticed before to be legitimate on the semantic side; now on the syntactic side,
it is licensed by Rl, R2, Rl 1, R15, ctcetera. ~
4.3.2 Modal falsifiability
Since for propositional formulas falsifiablc validity on coherent situations leads to
classical pL, one expects an analogous result for modal formulas. So, is K determined
by FALSIF on coherent models'! And, similarly for abolute rules: is K, sound and
complete for absolute falsifiable validity on coherent models?
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A prer~equisite for generalizing the proof of theorem 3.3 is a reinspection of some
properties discussed in sections 3.2 and 4.3. We noticed that in general persistence
does not hold for modal logic. We seem to be in big trouble here: the proof of theorem
3.3 depended on petsistence. But on second thoughts there is no reason to panic:
model completion satisfies extemal persistence which also holds for the modal case.
Theorem 4.3 Formodal logic the coherent semantics with absolutefalsifiable validity
is complete with respect to modal system Ka.
Proof: similar to the proof of theorem 3.3, by using inherited cla.rsicality and external persis-
tence (see proposition 4.3). ~
For mixed falsifiable validity, we notice that van Benthem's reintetpretation of Beth
tableaus easily generalizes to modal logic.
Theorem 4.4 FALSIF„i;: on partial Kripke models is completely described by the
modal logic Kr.
Proof: since FALSIF„i;: validity of ~p~~ is equivalent to ~ ~p -~ tli, which is described by K,
proposition 4.1 provides the suitable relational format. ~
Since the frame is not effected by the proof pmcedure, the last two theorems allow an
obvious extension to notmal systems:
Theorem 4.5
Forfalsifiable va[idity on coherent models the (frame complete) normal modal systems
are captured by the usual conditions on acces.sibility.
So the tenor of all this is similar to that for the purely pmpositional case: for formu-
las there is no descriptive difference between standard Kripke semantics and partial
semantics under the `never false' concept of validity. Similarly, for tules classical
and partial Kripke semantics (under the mixed vcrsion of relative falsifiable validity)
also amounts to the same. Yet, there may still bc important differences between both
approaches. One may be that of the greater intuitive (`realistic') appeal of situations.
Another the greater computational efficiency of the partial approach: the states of the
partial models can now be specified by considerably smaller sets. Moreover, a partial
model nonfalsifying a formula may contain ]css vtates than the classical model doing
the same job.
Apart from a relativized fonnulation, we need somc morc modifications to describe
(siraight) relative non-falsification. Similar to considerations leading to thcorem 3.4 in
chapter 3 we find that the exfalso principles are not validated anymore. So, compared
to M}, R8 and R19 are out. Let M~` be the system where R8 and R19 are replaced
by R8~` and R19~` (which may be thought as to result fmm the ez falso rules by
contraposition):
(R8') ~i I- ~p V~~p (tertium non datur)
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(R19~`) ~i ~ t7(~p V ~~p) (modal tertium non datur)
Theorem 4.6 On coherent models FALSIF,~t is sound and complete with respect to
the modal system Mt.
The proof of this is postponed to the next section.
4.4 Situational modal models
Releasing the restriction to coherence, the Kripke frame can be supplemented with a
partial, possibly incoherent valuation. We arrive at the notion of a modal situation
model.
Definition 4.1 (modal situation model) A structure (S, R, V) is a modal situation
model if R C S x S and V: Prnp x S---~ p({0, 1}).
The wth conditions are as before, i.e. the general situation clauses for atoms, the
standard ones for the connectives and the partial Kripkean ones for modal opera-
tors. Moreover, the definitions for the options with respect to validity and rules are
unchanged.
There is, however, a clear differencc on the issue of locally defined conditions
such as coherence and persi.stence. As we saw in section 4.3 the global versions of
these notions (for coherent models and external extensions) generalize to complex
formulas. As we already saw for persistence, the local variants of these conditions
(i.e. coherent situations, etcctera) do not allow for such a generalization, due to the
essentially global nature of Kripke models. So, a coherent situation can be incoherent
with respect to a modal formula if there exists an accessible incoherent situation. The
same holds, mutatis mutandis for totaliry and duality. What we can do, of course, is
to rede6ne the notions of total mndel and dualiry for situational Kripke semantics. We
omit these redefinitions since they are obviously obtained from those in section 3.3,
by decorating the models with an accessibility relation.
Presumably because of the global nature of validity, the propositional and modal
case are quite similar for general situation models. To begin with, the number of
possible systems allowed by the diffcrent types of validity and rules is immediately
reduced by the following two facts:
. there are still no valid formulas in this semantics (cf, theorem 3.5);
. duality preservation also holds for the standard modal language (cf. proposi-
tion 3.14).9
Consequently, the useful reduction of falsifiability to verification expressed earlier in
proposition 3.15 is maintained. Moreover, by their very nature, absolute and mixed
9See [Th90a p.48.63J
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verification of rules produce the trivial rule systems C x G(for inferences with one
premise) and ~, respectively. So, what remains to be inspected is relative verification.
Compared to coherent models we notice that neither the pair R8, R19 nor the
pair R8~`, R19~` hold. Analogous to the propositional case elimination of these rules
supplies a complete set of rules. Thus let M, the modal counterpart ofrelevance logic,
be generated by the description of Mt minus rules RS and R19.
Theorem 4.7
The moda! logic for relative validity on situation models i.c M.
Proof: The completeness proof is a modification of that for theorem 4.2. Since the canonical
situations now may be syntactically inconsistent sets, we consider saturated theories (sTS)
instead of CSTS. The canonical valuation function also needs some modification, since it can
be multi-valued. So, the canonical model ~t -(S, R, V) is defined by:
. s-{r ~ r is an sT};
. rRO ifr
- r,oES,
- o,~, E r implies tli E ~ for all ,1,, and
-~ E 0 implies O,~ E r for all ,~;
. 1 E V(p, r) iff p E r, and 0 E V(p, r) iff ~p E r.
Suppose E Ff ~p. Notice that the Lindenbaum lemma, the tru[h~falsity lemma and lemma 4,2
hold for sTS: R8 and R 19 were only used for proving consistency. The counterpart of lemma 4.3
is more complicated, since the subproof that ~p ~ 0 uses R 19. This lemma is reproven for sTs
and M below. Then by the Lindenbaum lemma (with respect to M) E can be extended to an
sT i2 such that ~p ~ n. Since E C f2 and ~p ~ S2, the truth~falsity Iemma gives ~t, f2 ~ E and
M, n~ ~p, whence E~ ~p. - ~
The remedy for the complication conceming the countetpart of lcmma 4.3 is to build
the desired fact (~p ~ 0) into the definition of 0. This can be done without using
either R8 or R 19.
Lemma 4.5 t7rp E I' ifffor all S7' 0 such that I'R~: ~p E ~.
Proof: From the left to the right this is trivial. The other direction is shown by an indirect
proof. Assume that t7~p ~ r.
Let {~pn}n be an enumerating sequence of formulas with countable repetition. 0„ is
defined in such a way that it respects 02 without containing ~p:
. Do -{b ~ ob E r};
~ On}1 - On ~f ~n ~ ~n;
~ Ont1 - On U{~pn} if An ~ tPn and ~pn is not a disjunction;
~ Onfl - On U{~nr ~G} if On ~ rpn, ~pn - t~i V X, On U{t~i} has 02 and On U{t~i} Ff rp.
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. Onfi - On U{~pn, X} if On F~n, ~p„ -,G V X, and either On U{,~i} does not have
02 or On U{,~} ~ ~p.
Again ~ - ~Jn On. The proof of theoremhood of ~ is still identical; saturation is quite
trivial again. This leaves two steps to be spelled out:
1. That On and thus 0 obey 02 is shown by an inductive proof similar to that for lemma 4.3;
in fact the only case that needs reconsideration is that in which On ~~pn and ~pn is a
disjunction, say ~pn -~ V X. There are but two possibilities:
. On U{,~,} has 02, and On U{,~} y ~p. Thus, by application of the cut rule
On}1 - On U{rpn, tG} 11áS 02;
. either On U{,~} dces not have 02, or On U{,G} F- ~p (or both).
- If On U{~,} dces not have OZ then by a reasoning analogous to lemma 4.3,
On}1 - On U{~Gn~ X} t1aS O2.
- tf On U {~,} F- ~p, suppose that L1n U{~pn, X} dces not have 02. So there is
an e such that ~n, ~pn, X~ E V ~p, and Oe ~ I'. However, by RS and R10 we
also have On, ~pn, ~~ e v ~p, and thus (R6): On, ~pn, ~ e V ~p, and by cut:
On f- e V ~p, and iH yields Oe E I'. Contradiction. Thus On~~ has 02.
2. ~p ~ 0 follows since it can bc shown by induction that On y ~p:
. For n - 0, suppose on the contrary that ~o F ~p. By R 10 there are 6~ ,..., b„~ E
s,o such that 6~ n -.. ~ 6,,, ~ ~p, so (R 15) 06 F o~p where 6- á~ n-.- n ó„~.
Since o6 E I' it follows that o~p E I'. Contradiction.
. Suppose ~n y~p (tH). Consider Ont~.
- In case On ~~n. On}1 - ~n ~~~
- If On F- ~pn, and ~pn is not a disjunction,suppose On~~ ~~p, i.e. On, ~pn F- ~p.
Then by the cut rule: ~n ~~p, which contradicts iH.
- if s,n ~ rGn, ~Vn -~ V X. On U{t~} has 02 and On U{t~i} Ff rp, [hen (CU[)
Ontl ~ ~.
- If On U{~,} dces not have 02, assume that Ont~ ~~p, i.e. On, ~pn, X h- ~p.
There is an E such that On, ~pn,,~ ~ eV ~p, and Oe ~ I'. However, by RS also
On, tpn, X~ EV rp, and thus (R6): On, ~Pn, ~ E V rp, and by Cut: ~n F EV tp,
and tH yields Oe E I'. Contradiction.
- If t,n, ~~ ~p, On~ rpn, X FÍ rG by Cul and R5.
Finally the step establishing I'RO is as before. ~
With this result another routc to our earlier proof for M} becomes available: show
for lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 that thc addition of axioms R8 and R19 brings about the
consistency of 0, given the consistency of I'. We avoided such a reformulation for
expository neasons: the earlier proof is surely more transparent.
By the same strategy as in the propositional case, dualiry may be used to prove
theorem 4.6. Duality boils down to interchanging true and not-false, and false and
not-true. Here its effect is a reduction of rclative falsification on coherent models to
relative verification on total ones.
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Theorem 4.6 (repeated) On coherent models FALSIF,~t is sound and complete with
respect to the modal system M'.
Proof: As indicated this reduces to showing that M' is sound and complete for VERIF,.t
on total models. Soundness is straightforward, and completeness amounts to showing that
the canonical model constructed for theorem 4.7 is total: the canonical situations arefu!! (i.e.
Fst's), which for M~ boils down to non-empty s'rs.
First notice that the main proof and the truth lemma itself are not affected by fullness. Next,
for the Lindenbaum lemma the conswction is independent of the extra rules; since E~ 0,
R8' immediately shows fullness. This leaves the lemmas 4.2 and 4.5 to be reconsidered. For
lemma 4.2 note that ~p E 0, so ~i V~~ E 0 by R8. For lemma 4.5, we note that I' is an FsT,
therefore I' ~ 0, so by R19' t7(tl, V~rli) E I', thus by the construction of 0: ~i V~~, E 0.
Hence 0 is also an FST. ~
4.5 Alternatives
In the literature one can find other proposals, suggesting to vary the truth conditions,
the notion of validity and the accessibility relation. Some of these proposals are rather
ecleciic or even ad hoc in nature. Here we will consider only two altematives to our
standard theory.to
4.5.1 extending the language
Reconsider the extended languages from chapten 1 and 2, and the remarks on validity
and completeness in section 3.4.1. It follows fmm the modal extension of the Langholm
reduction of partial to classical logic t t that the ~-free fragment of the extended
language is essentia]ly classical as far as validity is concemed:
Proposition 4.4 If ~y E G~~n,v,o,o then ~~p t~ ~ ~p.
Proof: For the }~- translation, see section 2.4. Notice that } can now be defined without
reference to -. Replacing output ~ by ~ implies that } dces not effect the formula. Then
by proposition 2.4 it follows that trivalent or quadrivalent truth can be transformed to bivalent
truth,and vice versa. ~
For the extended modal language with 8 instead of ~ we obtain a similar result.12
Proposition 4.5 If ~p E Ge,n,v,o,o then ~~p a~~p.
For the unrestricted extensions ( i.e. the standard languages including ~, conjoined
with either ti or 8) there are similar though more complicated reductions of partial
to['fh90b] also considers Levesque's logic of explicit belief from [Le84a], which differs in many
respects from our standazd logic. See also chapter 7 of this thesis.
~~Yrde chapter 2.
t2The Lattgholm t~- translation clauses for 8 aze (8rp)' -~~pt and (8~p)- -~~p-.
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to classical logic. An extended formula over the propositional variables pt ,..., pn
is translated into a standani fonnula over p~ ,p~ ,... , pn , p„. The extended formula
is partially valid iff the standard forntula resulting from the translation is classically
valid. Since we will restrict ourselves mostly to the standard language in the rrst of
this thesis, we will not go any further on this hen;.13
4.5.2 partial accessibility
In [Mu89] various modal operators connected to verbs such as `know' and `believe' are
analysed in an intensional type logic. The analysis may be conceived as to formalize
a modeltheoretic interpretation. It is obtained by a compositional translation that paz-
tializes virtually every relation. Consequendy, accessibility is given the same (partial)
treatment as other predicates. This results in splitting the accessibility relation.14
Now s~ o~p amoun[s to [a:bj(Rij ~ ~p(j))](a) - 1 and a~ O~p likewise [o
[.~s~dj(Rij--~ ~p( j))](s) - 0. Then by the (partial) interpretation rules for application,
a-abstraction, quantification, predication, and the clauses for --. stated in section 3.2,
this leads to the following truthJfalsity conditions for t7:
a~ o~p p forevery t: e[R]-tort~ ~p
s~ t]~p q for some t : s[R]}t : and t~~p
To simplify the fonnulation, let ([R]-)` - R and [R]} - R' 15, then
a~Ocpqb'tER[s]:t~~p s~Orpq3tER'[8]:t~~p
a~Orpq3tER'[s]:t[-~p s~OcpqbtER(s]:t~cp
So a model M is now of thc form ( S, R, R', V). For coherent models we need a
restriction on admissible frames: only modcls with R' C R are allowed. With respect
to these models, propositional coherence entails modal coherence.
We can also give strong completeness theorems that are intimately connected to
the earlier characterizations for the standard cases. Consider the deductive system
M}- - M}-{R18}.
Theorem 4.8 With partial acce,ssibility relations, VERIFre~ on coherent models is
sound and complete for the system M}-.
Proof: analogous to theorem 4.2, but somewhat easier. Let S be the setof all cx'rs with respect
lo M}-. The de6nition of R' is still `two-fold', but that of R is `single':
. I'RO iff o~p E T implies ~p E t, for all ~p;
. I'R'0 iff o~p E T implies ~p E 0, and ~p E 0 implies Orp E T for all rp.
~~Cf. [FH'871 for validiry on an extended modal language, with ~ interpreted by means of C.
1~Within Levesque's approach (cf. footnote 10), [La87] also has split accessibility, but different (non-
standard) truth conditions and validiry.
's(R]} is the so-called (positive) extension of R(-set of verifying situations), and [R]- the negative
(or, anti-~xlension of R(-set of falsifying situations).
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The wth lemma then holds since lemma 4.2 refers to the same two-fold canonical reladon and
does not use R 18; the counterpart of lemma 4.3 is easily proved, since the 02 property is not
needed anymore. To be more specific, define Do and Onfi as before, apart from the case of
disjunction which is:
~ Onft - On l) {tGne ~} if rpn -~ V X, On ~~n, and On, ~ y rP:
~ Ontl - On U{~n, X} if rVn -~ V X, On ~ ~Gn, and On, X FÍ rP.
Theoremhood and non-containment of ~p are straightforward. Saturation is likewise unprob-
lematic. Observe that a lot of properties directly follow from the fact that M}- contains all
ofrL} and from the fact that the construction of 0 resembles the one in the proof theorem 3.1. ~
Once we allow incoherent situations, as advocated by Muskens, the C-order be-
tween the accessibility relations can be entirely dismissed. The proof system is
consequently smaller: let M-- be M-{ R17,R18}.
Theorem 4.9 With partial accessibility relation.e, VERIFTet on situational models is
sound and complete for the system M--.
Proof: still analogous, and still easier. For the canonical model let S be the set of all sTS with
respect to M--. The canonical R and R' are now both defined by `single' clauses:
~ I'RO iff o~p E I' implies ~p E 0 for all ~p;
. I'R'0 iff ~p E 0 implies O~p E I' for all ~p.
The separated clauses avoid interference of O with O in the sublemmas, which trivializes the
proof. ~
Although the general version of Muskens's system is elegant and indicates its
feasibility ofbeing part of a typed partial logic, wc feel that the coherent version, which
should be preferable for modelling epistemic attitudes, seems technically less elegant
(cf. the asymmetrical nature of the canonical accessibility relation). More importantly,
we do not have intuitions that support the proposed splittingof the accessibility relation.
4.6 Special systems
We will now focus on some systems of particular i nterest for applications on knowledge
and belief. The usual attributes of knowledge and belief concem veridicality (truth
of knowledge, wnsistency of belief) and intro.cpection. So our quest is for the partial
counterparts of nonnal modal systems such as T, NKD4, S4 and S5.16 For the sake
of computational use of knowledge, we are espccially interested in some properties
of these systems that guarantee finite representation, in particular the finite model
property, decidability and logical finiteness. To achieve these we need a few additional
techniques: filtration and normal fortns.
16The system T is chazacterized by the axioms and rules pL, N, K and T, i.e. as NKT (extending the
so-called Lemmon code with `bf N'). Likewise, we have S4-NKT4 and SS-NKTS.
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4.6.1 Completeness results
Standard nonnal systems of epistemic and doxastic logic share some or all of the
following proper[ies:
(D) ~ o~p ~ O~p;
(T) ~ o~P -~ ~P;
(4) ~ o~p ~ oa~p;
(5) ~ O~p -~ oO~p;
In a cognitive interpretation these axioms are claimed to express consistency of
knowledge and belief (D), truth of knowledge (T), and positive (4) and negative (5)
introspection (self-reflection) of knowledge and belief. In many applications these
principles are indeed defensiblc. However, the normal systems they lead to (for
example, T, S4, SS) suffer from problems of logical omniscience (cf. chapter 6). In
our view, these problems do not arise because of the axioms above, but because of the
core logic K. As we saw earlier, the system K is not not valid on all partial models.
So the question arises whether the listed properties of cognitive operators can also
be captured in partial logic without reintroducing (all types of) logical omniscience
again. Since we do not have tautologies according to the preferential types of validity
and models (viz. verification on coherent or arbitrary situations), the determining
principles take the form of primitive deduction rules rather than axioms. These rules
can then be added to the `core systems' M, M} and M~, which correspond to the
different notions ofconsequence (verification on arbitrary, coherent or total situations,
respectively). The proposed rules are (with obvious nomenclature):
(Dr) ~rP ~ ~~P;
(Tr) D~P ~ ~P ~ ~P ~ ~~P;
(4~) ~cp ~ OO~p 8: OOcp ~ Orp;
(5~) Orp ~ L70rp 8c O~cp I- O~p;
Notice that apart from D~ the rules come in dual pairs. The reason for this is that for
M} and M} the meta-rule of contraposition is not valid in general, but appears to hold
for the listed principles and thercfore has to be stipulated. D~ is simply self-dual.
In normal modal logic D, T, 4 and 5 correspond to the following structural condi-
tions on frames:
seriality: for all s E S there is a t E S such that aRt;
reflexivity: for all a E S: aRs;
transitivity: for all a, t, u E S: sRt, tRu ~ sRu;
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euclidicity: for all a, t, u E S: aRt, aRu ~ tRu.
We are now in the position to state and prove the completeness of the partial
counterpatts of standard normal systems.
Theorem 4.10 (strong rnmpleteness for special systems)
Given the correspondingclasses ofmodelsfor the systems M, Mt, andM' (containing
arbitrary, coherent and total situations, respectively), addition of the following rules
is captured by structural constraints:
D~ is sound and complete for serialmodels
T~ is sound and complete for reflexive models
4~ is sound and complete for transitive models
5~ is sound and complete for euclidean models
Proof: soundness is straightforward and is mostly lcft to the reader. For example, consider
the case of 5~. Suppose that M is a euclidean model such that for arbitrary ~p, a: M, a~ O~p.
So there is a t such that sRt (1) and M,t~ ~p (2). Then for all u with aRu (by euclidicity
and (1)) uRL, and so (by (2)) M, u~ O~p, thus M, s~ oO~p. Therefore O~p ~ t70~p. The
contrapositive is similar.
Completeness is proved by a Henkin-type proof, cf. sections 4.3 and 4.4. It suffices to
show that the canonical model M for system S has the structural property. Recall that the
canonieal situations are saturated theories for M, consistent saturated theories for Mf, and
full saturated theories for M'. Moreover, canonical accessibility R is triggered by lhe elegant
I'ROc~a-'TC~CO-'I'.
The canonical interpretation is given by
1~(p, E) ~(
1 if p E E
l 0 if ~pEE
We can now treat the separate items, the first one being a bit hazder than the others.
(D~) Suppose that I' is an sT (csT, FsT) with respect to MD~ (M}D~, M~D~). Distinguish
between the following cases:
1. O~p E I' for some ~p. So by lemma 4.2, there is an sT (CST, FST) 0 such that I'RO
and~pEO.
2. O~p ~ I' for all ~o. Since S is an MD~-theory it cannot contain any formula
o~p either, so tJ-l I' - O-' I' - 0. Now if S dces no[ contain M~, we may
choose ~- 0, which is a csT. If S contains M', this case cannot occur. For
I' ~ 0~ ry E r for some ry, and so since I' is an M'-theory: a(ry v~ry) E I',
lhus (D~) O(ry V~ry) E I'.
Therefore M is serial.
(T~) Let I' be an sT with respect to S containing MT~. Then o~p E I' ~~p E T and
~p E 1' ~ O~p E I', so I'RI'. 3herefore M is rcflexive.
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(4r) Let I', ~, E be s'['s with respect to partial systems wntaining M4r and suppose ( 1) I'RO
and (2) ORE. We have to show that I'RE. This holds since o~p E I' ~ oa~p E I' ~
o~pEO (~~pE Eand~pEE(~O~pEO~OOrpEr ~O~pE I'.Therefore M is
transidve.
(5.) I.et T, 0, E be sTs with respect to partial systems containing M5, and suppose (1) I`RO




The completeness proof given above presupposes a suitable form of the good-old
Lindenbaum lemma, viz. if I' y ~p then T can be extended to an sT (EST, FsT) E such
that ~p ~ E. Although this was sufficient for the Henkin-completeness proof of the
core systems, for more sophisticated applications we need a strengthened fotm of this
lemma. Recall that
I' ~ 0 iff ~ I'' ~ W t,' for finite I'' C I', 0' C 0
Proposition 4.6 (generalized Lindenbaum lemma)
If I' Fj 0 then t can be extended to an s7' E such that E fl 0- 0. Moreover, E may
be chosen to be a cs7' if 0 ~ 0, and to be an Fs7' if I' ~ 0.
Proof sketch: Let {~pn}n be an enumeration of the modal formulas with countable repetition.
Starting with Eo - I', recursively define Ent~ by adding ~pn to En iff E„ ~~pn. Moreover, if
~pn is a deducible disjunction, also add disjuncts ~, such that E,,,,~ F~ 0. Let E- Un En. By
the definition of provability from arbivary sets and the countable repetition, E is an M-theory,
and the prudent clause for disjunction guarantecs saturation. An easy induction using the cut
theorem establishes E„ If 0 and thcrefore E FJ 0. So E f1 ~- 0 and I' C Fro C E.
If 0~ 0 the same conswction, now for M}, shows that E is consistent, for otherwise ex
falso causes the derivation of all formulas. If I' ~ 0 then also E~ 0. ~
We end this subsection with some considerations conceming more general types
of completeness. Is it possiblc to generalize theorem 4.10 such that it describes
completeness of a rype of schemata by some general condition? To make one more
step in this direction, we first prove complcteness with respect to a more complicated
condition. To this purpose wc introduce the structural condition called con~fuencet ~
and the deduction rule G~.
confluence: da, t, t' E S 3u E S: sRt 8r. sRt' ~ tRu 8c t'Ru;
~~'Confluence' has a bewildering variety of synonyms: 'convergency' [HC84], `d'vectedness' or `the
diamond property' (van Benthem) and 'incestualiry' ~Ch80].
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(G~) Oa~p ~ oO~p
Theorem 4.11 (completeness of G~)
MGr is sound and completefor confiuent models.
]09
Proof: soundness is straightforward. To prove completeness it suffices to show that the
canonical relation R is confluent. So suppose for some saturated theories I', ~, ~': I'RD and
I'RD', i.e. o-' I' C 0 C O-' I' (1) and C7-' I' C ~' C O-' I' (2). Proving the existence of a
E such that ~RE and 0'RE amounts to showing that there is an s'r E with
O'' ~ U o-' ~' C E C O-' ~ n O-' ~'
This can be shown by the generalized Lindenbaum lemma. For suppose that o-' 0 U o-' 0' F
(O-'~ n O-'t1')`, then there are ó;, ó~, Ek With Oá; E 0, oá~ E ~' and Oek ~ 0 n 0'
such that ~j(`; ó; n~~ ó~ h- Wk ek (3)' Put e - Wk Ek. SÍnCe for álI k OEk ~ 0 n t,'
and 0 n 0' is an sT, we obtain Wk Ock ~ 0 n 0', and so by R14: Oe ~ 0 n 0' (4).
By R16 and R17, (3) ~ o ~j(`; á; n O ~j(`~ 6~ F- Oe (5). Thus (R13) o~; 6; E 0 and
o ~j(`~ 6~ E 0' ~ Oo ~~ 6~ E I' ~ 00 ~~ 6~ E I' l~ O~~ 6~ E t1. By ( 5) therefore
Os E 0. An analogous argument shows Oe E 0'. In all, Oc E ~ n 0', contradicting (4).
Therefore, o-' 0 U o-' ~' y(O-' o n O-' o')` and the generalized Lindenbaum lemma
provides the desired E. ~
In fact, if S extends M by any of the principles discussed before (including M}and
M~`), SGr is sound and complete for confluent S-models. We claim that G~ itself can
also be generalized.
Conjecture 4.1
G~,[,m,n is sound and complete for k, l, m, n-confluentmodels.~g
Conjeeture 4.2 If ~ ~p ~,~, is sound and complete for classieal Kripke models
satisfying constraint C, the pairof rules ~p ~~i and ~r~i ~ ~p i.s sound and complete for
partial moda! models satisfying C, provided that ~p and ~i are positive schemata (i.e.
only use meta-variables, o, O, ~, V).
The former conjecture clearly covers all the cases treated above. T'he latter is more
general, of course. If true, it not only covers the Geachean rule schemata, but also the
converse rules (such as McKinsey's), for which the frame conditions are not in general
first-0rder definable. On the other hand, the second conjecture would imply the first-
orderdefinabilityofSahlqvistrules, i.e. ~p ~ r~iand itscontrapositivedual ~i ~ rp, where
~p and ~i are positive schemata, and ~p is constructed from onp;, O, ~, V(n 1 0). The
celebrated Sahlqvist theorem for normal modal logic provides first-order definability
of ~ ~p ~ rj, for ~p and ~i meeting the requirements above, so the second conjecture
'aG~'s'~`'A stands for OkOtrp F OTMO~rp t OTM~~~p F O~O~~p, mimicking the familiar generalized
Geach axiom G~'~'TM'` of L.emmon 8~ Scott, cf. [Ch80] or [HC84]. k, l, m,n-confluence is expressed
by ba, t, t'3u : eR~t 8c sR"`t' ~ tR~u á t'R'u.
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would have a'partialized Sahlqvist theorem' as a corollary.19 For the moment, we
can only speculate on the proofof a transfer result such as the second conjecture. One
possible transfer technique is the Gilmore~[.angholm translation procedure, adapted
for modal logic.ZO We leave this to future research.
4.6.2 The finite model property
7'he finite model property (~) says that validity can be determined on finite models.
The FMp provides decidability for finitely axiomatized normal modal systems. The
finite model property of normal modal systems is usually established by the method
of filtration. This section shows a transplant of the filtration method in the body of
partial modal logic.
Filtrations
Filtration transfonns an arbitrary model into a finite model. It acts by means of
an identification of worlds with respect to a particular finite set of formulas. More
precisely, let I' be a finite set thal is closed under subformulas, and M-(S, R, V) be
a partial modal model. First dcfine an equivalence relation ~ on S with respect to T
and M:2t
s~s' iff (a~aqs'~a)8r.(s~~qs'~a)forall~El'.
Then S may be partitioned according to ~, fonning equivalence classes [a]~ defined
by[s]~-{s'~s~s'}:
Definition 4.2 (filtration of model)
Let M-(S, R, V) be a partial modal rnodel and I' a finite set, closed under
,cubformulas. A filtration of M through I' i.c a model M' - (S', R', V') such that
1. S' - S~ti -{(a]ti ~ e E S}
2. if aRt then [a]R'[t]
3. if (a]R'[t] then M, s~ oa ~ M, t~~ 8c M, t~ n ~ M, a~ ocr for all
OaEI';
4. V'(p, [a]) - V(p, s) if p E Prop fl I' (else V'(p, [s]) - 1).
19In other words, such a Sahlqvist theorem has intermediate strength with respect to the given
conjectures.
~Cf. chapter 2
21 We omit the indices I' and M of ~ when clear from context. An altcrnative dcfinition is: i~ i' q
[~](s) -[a]~s') for all a~ E t.
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Notice that a filtereà model is finite. Definition 4.2 allows of several kinds of
filtrations22, in particular with respect to accessibility, but it suffices to establish the
desired preservation (restricted to I'):
Proposition 4.7 (filtration lemma)
If M' is a filtration of M through I', then for all a in M and a E I': M, a~ a q
M', [s] ~ a and M, s~ a q M', (a] ~ a.
Proof: (by simultaneous induction on the swcture of a E I'). Notice this holds for the
propositional variables in I' by definition, and the inductive steps for the connectives are
straightforwazd. This leaves us the modal case oa E I'.
. Assume M,s~ oa and let t be any situation such that [s]R'[t], then by clause 3,
M, t~ a, and so by IH, M', [t] ~ a. Therefore M', [s] ~ oa.
Next assume M', [s] ~ oa and let t be any situation such that sRt, then by clause 2,
[s]R'[t], and so M', [t] ~ a. Thus (by IH) M, t~ a, in all M, s~ oa.
. Assuming M, s~ oa, there is a t with sRt and M, t~ a, thus by clause 2[s]R'[t],
and by IH M', [t] ~ a. Therefore M', [s] ~ oa.
Now assume M', [s] ~ oa, so there is a t such that [s]R'[t] and M', [t] ~ a. Thus (by
IH) M, t~ a, and so by clause 3, M, s~ aa.
The generality of the filtration method may be illustrated by the observation that the
proposition obviously generalizes to non-standard connectives (~, N, ...).
Standard filtrations are the finest filiration R, which is the smallest R' satisfying
the stated requirements, and the coarsest filtration R, which is the largest R' meeting
the trquirements. These relations can also be obtained in a direct way:Z3
[s]R[t] q s'Rt' for some s' E[s] and t' E[t]
[s]R[t] q M,a~ oa ~ M,t~ aát
M, t~ a q M, s~ Oa for all [7a E r.
Notice that due to the definitions of ~ and [.], thc finest and coarsest filtered relations
R and R are well-defined. The choice of the filtered relation R' depends on the kind of
model: the filtration should obey the same structural constraints as the original model.
The relation R is particularly useful, although it sometimes nceds to be modified
further to make it fit into a class of models.
~The notion of filtration introduced is thus underdefined. Although this gocs unnoticed in the usual
textbooks on modal logic (such as [Ch80j and [HC84]), the notion is not even provably well-defined since
nothing assures [s']R'[t'] if s~ s', t~ t' and [s]R'[t]. All the concretc filtrations in the text to follow
are well-defined, of course.
vCf. [BS84] and [HC84j for similar redefinitions in the case o( normal modal logic.
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The FMP for special systems
Before actually proving the Ft~ for the special systems treated earlier in this chapter,
let us tvminate a bit on the notion itself. In normal modal logic the property refers to
the possibility of supplying (within the cotrect class of frames) finite counter-models
to nonvalid formulas. In partial logic validity of rules rather than of formulas is
what counts. This suggests that we look for suitable finite counterexamples to non-
consequences. However, this would be asking too much: I' FJ ~p may have no finite
countermodels. The point is that I' may be infinite, and since I' has to be verióed,
this may obstruct the construction of a finite counterexample. So it seems T has to
be restricted to a finite set of formulas. After all, we do not want to require this of
a normal system either (SS would have this `strong finite model property', but most
other systems would not).
Definition 4.3 ( finite model property)
A modal system S has the rMN iff for every finite set of formulas E and every ~p:
E~s ~p q(M, s~ E~ M, s~~p) for allfinite S-models M.
It tums out that the systems described in theorem 4.10 (i.e. extensions of M, Mt or M~
by a selection of rules out ofD~, T~, 4~ and 5~) share the FtvtP. A problem in proving this
theorem is that the correct type of filtration depends on the kind of structural wndition
and, moreover, these requirements cannot simply be superimposed. In other words,
each system S that belongs to the set indicated above has to be checked separately.
Fortunately, we do not have to dcal with 3. 24 systems since (a) the choice of the core
system is unimportant for the argument and (b) there is considerable redundancy with
regards to the choice of the extra rules. To wit, for a core system M'24 the eleven
possible systems can be put into a lattice, sce figure 4.1.
Theorem 4.12 (finite model prriperty)
The complete systems described in theorem 4.10 all have the finite model property.
Proof: One side is trivial, since if E~s ~p, then by the completeness theorem E~ s~p, and so
ajortiori M, s~ E~ M, s~~p for every finitc S-model M. For the other direction, suppose
that for a finite E: E ys ~p, then by completeness there is a model M such that M, a~ E and
M, s~ ~p. A suitable filtration with respect to I', the closure of E U{~p} under subformulas,
then produces the desired finite model M', which is also a counterexample for E ~ s~p. So
what is a suitable filtration? We nced not go through 11 separate cases, since some general
remarks give more reductions. First notice that (well-defined) filtrations preserve reflexivity
and seriality. Reflexivity, for example, since sRs ~ [s]R'[s] by clause 2 of definition 4.2 and
the fact that s E[s]. Next we discuss some salient cases, leaving the other ones to the reader:
. For a core system M' there is no structural condition on accessibilty, so every filtration,
for example the finest one, qualifies. By the above remark, the same holds for M'D~
and M'T~. (This already deals with 9 systems). Since R does not preserve transitivity
and euclidicity, we need other methods for dealing with 4~ and 5~.
uM' is either M or Mt or M'.
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Figure 4.1: Lattice of special systems
S5~




R can be augmented in the following way: let I' be as before andZb
[s]R'[t]q j M,s~ ~a~M,t~ Oana 8tl M,t~ oana~M,s~ oa forallDaEI'.
R' is a correct filtration since: ( i) it is well-defined (by bidirectionality of the definition
of R' and definition of ~); (ii) clause 2 of definition 4.2 holds, since M, s~ oa ~(R
is transitive) M, s~ C(Oa n a), and if sRt then M, t~ oa n a~ M, s~ ~a (by
vansitivity); ( iii) clause 3 ofdefinition 4.2 obviously holds; ( iv) vansitivity is preserved,
since if [s]R'[t] and [t)R'[u) then if M, s ~ oa for some oa E I', then M, t~ oa and
so M, u~ oa n a and vice versa for ~. Therefore [s] R'[u].
Since R' preserves seriality and reflexivity too, this shows the Ftvtp for 3 positions in the
lattice above (among which is S4'). A similar `augmented coarsest' filvation (to wit:
with qs instead of ~s in [he definition of R') deals with M'4r5r.
. For M'Sr a similar adaptation of the coarsest filvation dces not work27, but the coarsest
filtration itself will do, provided that I' is extended to the infinite set I'" by prefixing
arbivary modalities (i.e. sequences consisting of ~, o, O) to the formulas of I'. Notice
that infinity of I" does not preclude a proper filtration (although formally definition 4.2
has to adapted). The filtration M through I" will be finite, because the system allows for
only 14 logically distinct modalities: the positive modalities can be reduced by OOo -
Ooo - Oa, ao0 - 000 - a0, a0o - oao - oa, Oa0 - 000 - 00. R
is cotrectly defined and now preserves euclidicity. As before this also proves the FMP
for M'DrSr and M'Tr5r-S5'.
~
u[BS84, p.45] wrongly claim preservation of symmetry and transitivity by the coarsest filtration; in fact
any attemp[ along this line will fail, since KB and K4 have infinitely many logically distinct modalíties,
cf. [Ch80, p.169], so the text approach to M'Sr cannot be used here. Notice, however that symmetry is
preserved by the finest filtration.
~This is basically the approach of [Ch80, p.105,106] and [HC84, p.143,144].
nCf. [Ch80, p.108,109]
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Apart from [he intended applications on defining finite characterising models, the
Ftetp is important since it provides decidability of the question whether E F-s ~p for
finite E and Prop, S being one of the systems discussed above. For S is characterized
by a finite number of deduction rules, so the proofs and the deducible formulas are
enumerable. With respect to Prop the finite models are also enumerable, and the Ft~
predicts that counterexamples to non-theorems must be among them. Together this
provides decidability.
For classes of models with equivalence accessibility there are only finitely many
essentially different finite models if Prop is finite as well. Hence the FMp provides a
route to showing logical finitenetis of a logic corresponding to such a class. In [he next
subsection we provide a more traditiona] route to this result, via normal forms that are
useful anyway.
4.6.3 Normal forms and logical finiteness
A general normal form
In general we may put formulati of partia[ modal logic into a nonnal fonn which is
an analogue of the usual disjunctive norma] form of pL (DNF), which is a disjunction
of conjunctions of literals (p; or ~p;). One particular modal disjunctive nonnal fonn
(MDNF) is a slight modification of an elegant and useful fonn suggested by Fine?s
Fitst we define the auxiliary notion of conjunctive form. Conjunctive fonns act as
modal state-descriptions. If ~Y is any set of formulas, let (~)[~Y] consist of the formulas
in ~Y and theirnegations, i.e. (~)[~Y] -~Y U~[~Y].
Definition 4.4 ( conjunctive forms)
Fd the set of conjunctive forms qf degree d is defined recursively by:
. Fo - {~j(`A ~ A C (~)[Prnp] };
. Fd~t -{~ A n ~j(` ~ ~ A c (~)[Prop]á~ C (~)[O[Fd]] }.
A general lvtDNF is now simply a finite disjunction of conjunctive fortns. The
proposition below means that fonnulas of depth d may be normalized to htDNFS of
degree d.29
~Ytde [Fi75b], with a somewhat dilferent terminology: our 'conjunctive forms' are Fine's normal
forms. Since Fine discusses normal systems his conjunction M(~);Oa; is over all members of Fa,
ours is over a subset of Fa. Fine uses his MDNF for a completeness proof in which the canonical worlds
are conjunctive forms rather than maximal consistent sets of formulas. Jan laspars [Ja92] recently has
found another normal form, which though more complex, enables a simple completeness proof, similar
to [Fi75b].
~The ( modal) depth of a formula is defined by: d(p;) - 0, d(~~p) - d(~p), d(~p n r(r) - d(~p v~tr) -
max(d(~p),d(;b)) and d(t7~p) - d(O~p) - d(~p) f 1.
4.6. SPECIAL SYSTEMS ] 15
Proposition 4.8 (modal di~junctive normal form)
Every modal formula of maximum depth d is equivalent to an M~NF of degree d.
Proof: by induction on the depth d of a formula ~y.
. if d - 0, ~p is in pL. The DriF for pL still holds for the partial core system M(c.q. rL):
First eliminate -. and ~-.. Byvirtueof the rules ofdouble negation and de Morgan's laws,
negations can be pushed inwards until they reach the atoms. Then by the distributivity
and associativity (section 3.2), the propositiona! DrtF is obtained.
. assume the conjecture to hold for all ~p ofdepth ~ d(IH), and consider a particular rp of
depth d i- 1. As in the basic step, ~p can be shown to be equivalent to a orrF where the
conjuncts are literals or of the form O,[, or ~O~i with d(~i) G d. By (IH) ~, is equivalent
to a disjunction of conjunctive forms of degree d, say for some finite set of ry; E Fd:
~ H W~ ry;. Therefore O~i H W; Ory;. By the lemma below, the core system M is
closed under substitutions of equivalents, so we may replace all such ~, by such W; ry;
in ~p. Applying the propositional DNF once more, it follows that ~p is equivalent to a
disjunction of conjunctions of literals and (negations of) of diamonds of conjunctive
forms of degree d, i.e. to disjunctions ofconjunctive forms of degree d f 1.
Here we used an important feature of the system M:
Lemma 4.6 (substitution under equivalence)
Let ry(a) stand for a formula y which has a a,e a sub formula. Then a HM (3 ~
Í(a) HM Í(Ij).
Proof: a straightforward induction on the structure of ry. Notice that the step of negation is
licensed by the fact that contraposition holds for M. ~
Notice that the lemma dces not hold for M} and M~`. At first sight the restriction to
system M may be thought to deprive the previous pmposition of its generality, but
then again, all steps performed in the proof do not go beyond M. So the given nonnal
fonn holds for all extensions of M.
A special normal form
In the case of SS-like partial systems we can obtain a much stronger result. Recall
that SS- is the partial rule-based counterpart of SS-deduction without (modal) exfalso
and (modal) tertium non datur). For SS- we will show a reduction to formulas of
modal depth C 1. Then the result can be put into an M ~tvF of degree 1, which is now a
disjunctionofconjunctions of formulas of the form ~p, o~p or O~p wherc ~p E pL. First
we need some equivalences in SS-.
Lemma 4.7 (absorption)
In SS- the following equivalences hold:
at7~p H Oo~p H o~p o(a~p v~i) H o~p v o,~ O(o,p n~) H o~p n O,~
OO~p H oO~p H O~p O(O~p n~i) H O~p n O~i o(O~p v ~i) H O~p v o~i
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Proof:30 We only show the equivalences in the top line; the dual statements in the second line
are analogous. First for the left-hand equivalence:
olp ~ oa,p ~~~ o0o~p ~~k aa~p ~ a~p.
These reductions of iterations can be used to prove the middle equivalence:
t7(a~ v,~) R~" Oo~ v a,~ s.,~s,~ o~ v o~ t,~,~ t7o~ v o,,, 4'~'` o(o~o v~,).
And similarly for the equivalence in the right-hand corner.
t7 O V R~~ 00 V O t'~'` O V o ~~'~ 00 V t7 k'~'` t7 O V 3b). ~( ~V ~G) ~V ~ ~G ~G ~V ~ ( ~G
Proposition 4.9 (normal forms for partial SS systems)
ForSS-, every formula has a modal disjunctive normalform of degree 1.
Proof: by induction on the depth d of a formula ~p (cf. the proof of proposition 4.8). 'I1te basic
case d- 0 is now trivial. For the induction step, assume the conjecture to hold for all ~p of
depth c d(IH), and consider a particular ~p of depth d f 1. Again start by eliminating --~,
~ and o, and push negations inwards until they reach Os or propositional variables. So ~p is
equivalent to a formula composed of n, V, ( ~)p; and subformulas of the form O~, or ~O~
with d(~) G d. By (IH), for ~;j, (.3;k, ry; E pL:
~ H~(a; n~ OQ;i n j~ O7;k).
i j k
So O~, H W; O(a; n~j OQ;j n o!'j(`k ry:k H W;(O~; ~~j 0,0:~ n ~k o?':k), where
the last step repeatedly uses the absorption temma. The substitution lemma entails that ~p may
be reduced to a depth 1 formula. This can be brought into a ~NF wilh conjuncts of the form 6,
Oó, ~Oó, oó or ~~6 where 6 is purely propositional. Finally, simply replace ~O and ~0 by
o~ and O~, respectively.31 ~
Corollary 4.2 The extensions of'S5- are logically finite.
T'his particular consequence of the SS- normal form can, of course, be shown in a
semantic way as well, but the particular normal form has advantages, for example, in
constructing characterizing finite models for SS- knowledge.
4.7 Conclusion
Despite the additiona] richness of modal logic we may conclude that the results for the
standard cases parallel that of propositional logic.
Again different values for semantic parameters give rise to various systems of
logic.32 The relation between semantics and logical system has been given in tetms of
completeness theorems. In panicular, under (mixed) falsifiable validity on coherent
models, we were able to give a new partial semantics for the modal system K.
~Of course, the given reductions also follow easily from the strong completeness proof and the
properties of an equivalence relation. Deductive proofs are more concise, however.
~tA slightty stronger proposition, viz. that every SS--formula can be reduced to a Fine MDNPOf degree
1 has a similar, though somewhat more laborious proof.
~See section 3.5 for an overview of validity and rule concepts.
4.7. CONCLUSION l 17
In order to arrive at the full picture of what we consider the standard options for
partial modal logic, we reinspect total (possibly overdefined) models. Duality and
some simple observations help to fill in some slots. By duality, truth on a total model
can be transfonned into non-falsity on a coherent model, and vice versa. So validity
on total models can be reduced to validity on coherent models. So, essentially two
types of models are of prime interest for partial logic: models with arbitrary situations
and models with only coherent situations. For relative validity (logical consequence),
both types of models provide systems which are logically interesting; the more general
modal situation semantics is sometimes technically easier, whereas the more restricted
coherent partial semantics often has greater appeal. By contrast, in some cases, such
as veriócation on coherent models with aósolute or mixed validity, the resulting rule
systems are trivial. This can be shown analogously to our consideration for the
propositional counterparts of these cases in section 3.5. Thc completeness results for
the core logics are summarized in table 4.1.









VERIF K ~ K ~
VERIFr~t Kr M} M~ M
VERIFmix Kr ~ Kr 0
FALSIF K K 0 0
FALSIFr~I Kr NI~ Mf M
FALSIFmix Kr Kr ~ ~
Although we may dispense with total modcls, thcy are viable for showing the
connection between syntax and semantics. The most interesting case is for relative
rules, since they provide new systems. The systems in the triplet M, Mt and M~`
are shown to be complete for relative verification on the classes of modal situation
models, partial Kripke models and total modal modcls, repectively. Similar to the
propositional case, we display this by means of twin lattices.
Kr cohflol
Mt ~ontr.~ M~, coh . dual. . tot
gcn
Recall that the lattice meet should not be construed as intcrsection of the generated
systems, but as intersection of their finite descriptions ( R1-19, etcetera). Intersection
of the systems generated by Mt and M~ would lead to the modal system for double-
barrelled consequence on coherent models. This iype of validity seems to be modelled
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by the system M to which two principles are added, the propositional and modal rules
of `ex falso sequitur tertium non datur':
(R8}~) ~p n ~~ ~- ,G v ~~
(R19t') O(~p n~~p) I- o(~, v „Ji)
Since the top element of the lattice, Kr, is equivalent to the join of M} and M~,
and these rules are clearly in the style of natural deduction, we may, incidentally, have
solved a problem noticed in jBS84, p.28]:
It seemsfair to say that a deductive treatment congenial to modal logic is
yet to be found.
For we do not need the `alien element' of the accessibility relation within the deductive
system (as Hintikka and Kripke once proposed) or iterated modalities as Segerberg
himself proposes. Moreover, the rule-based approach given here seems as flexible
as nonnal systems are. So we do not need Prawitz's restriction to S4 and S5, nor
incorporation of systems by adding axioms as extra premises, as Segerberg seems to
favout33
Apart from the core systems we also showed completeness and decidability for the
partial variants of celebrated modal systems such as T, S4 and S5. The partial variants
of SS even tumed out to be logically finite. These results are particularly useful in the
last part of this thesis. In general we can say that a remarkable amount of classical
results can be transferred to panial modal logic.
Although on the dimension o F situations we seem to have exhausted the possibilities
(but one never knows ...), we surely have not examined every possible notion of
validity and consequence, or every possible trutlt~falsity condition. Pefiaps this is
intrinsically impossible, since there seems to be no upper bound to the complexity
of these notions. Nevertheless we seem to have succeeded in describing what we





Introduction to part II
Using the machinery developed in the first part, we now tum to the application of
modal logic on knowledge as used or present in human beings.
As noticed in the general introduction, classical epistemic logic34 attributes wrong
properties to actual human knowledge. Generally speaking, a classical modal logic
is simply too strong, in the sense that too many statements are counted as valid. For
example,
(7) John knows that Mary works or does not work.
is supposed to be logically valid, which is evidently wrong. So the main research
question is whether we can model human knowledge more adequately.
Partial models seem perfectly equipped for this enterprise. For example, there are
very simple partial models in which John knows a situation that leaves the proposition
`Mary works' undefined. However, the same notion of validity under which (7) is
invalid, would also reject
(8) Mary works or does not work.
yet to many people (8) is logically true. Now we can switch to another perspective
of validity, viz. that of `never false' (see chapter 4), which would indeed validate (8),
but this would also validate (7). So we find ourselves placed between the devil and
the deep sea. By modifying partial semantics, chapter 7 pmvides different ways out
of this dilemma.
Another, more conservative possibility is to use classical models after all, and
search for ways to weaken the logic. Sometimes this amounts to a simulation of
partiality within a total semantics, sometimes the departure is more radical. Chapter 6
deals with these `total'351ogics for conscious belief and knowledge.
Before we tum to these more general accounts, we study one aspect of knowledge
related to natural language: what is assumed to be known by the speaker when he
is uttering some assertion or other? Apart from understanding the way in which
information is conveyed in conversations, this special application also provides an
easy access to the field of epistemic logic.
~The key reference here is [Hi62].
~Here in the sense of `augmented classical', i.e. related to some form of possible world semantics,
but, differently from part I, not overdefined.
Chapter 5
The use of knowledge and the
knowledge of use
This chapter concems the epistemic force of language uuerances. Especially chal-
lenging for any proposal in this direction are the pragmatic paradoxes stemming from
G. E. Moore. Our proposal deals with these and all other assertions. It is argued
that the characterization can be considered as an explicitation and improvement of
Grice's quality maxims. The given explanation presupposes a distinction of the levels
of pragmatics and semantics, which can be argucd for on independent grounds. The
chapter also contains a discussion of earlier attempts to solve the problems at stake.
We conclude that our solution seems superior to other proposals, except for one, to
which it tums out to be technically equivalent.
5.1 Introduction: the problem
What do we mean when we utter a simple sentence such as
(9) It is raining.
Well, we obviously may mean that it is raining (right now).l But does it? This, of
course, need not be the case. It is clear, especially from the point of view of a hearer,
that the utterance of (9) does not entail that it rains (and therefore cannot mean that
either). Still we are inclined to stick to the Tarskian paradigm2: (9) simply means that
it is raining, i.e. (9) is true iff it is raining.
To avoid a contradiction here we have to assume that, generally speaking, the
meaning of a sentence is different from the meaning of the utterance of that sentence.
This calls fora fundamental question: what preciscly is the difference between sentence
~In fact for a simple indicative sentence such as (9) an assertation is not the only, perhaps not even the
most likely intention of the speaker. This dces not influence the validity of our argument, however.
ZAt least with tespect to the facts treated in this chapter a static approach to semantics seems possible.
Incorporation of other phenomena may require a dynamic approach.
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meaning and utterance meaning? And, can we derive one from the other by some
general scheme?
In this chapter we focus on declarative utterances, i.e. utterances of (usually
indicative) sentences to assert some proposi[ion or other. We claim that a significant
effect of uttering such a sentence is to bring about a certain change in the knowledge
of the agents present in the context of utterance. As we will see, this epistemic effect
is not reserved to the hearer, it also involves the speaker. In fact a great deal of the
explanation of certain pragmatic paradoxes resides in the effect of uttering on the
speaker herself.
In the rest of the chapter we proceed as follows. We first introduce the semantic
representation language, a variant of modal logic. Then we retum to the distinction
between sentence meaning and utterance meaning. By a case study of the semantics
of verbs such as know and believe we give other arguments for keeping both levels of
description. 1'hen we try to assess the additional epistemic force connected touttering:
is it speaker's belief or knowledge or what? This is where Moore's paradoxes come
in. Then belief is argued to be too weak, and knowledge too strong, but there exists a
satisfying middle course.
Although we take the pragmatic theory ofGrice as a point ofdeparture, we hope to
demonstrate that the theory needs some modification in onier to be able to describe and
explain the facts. The resulting assessment of the propositional attitude involved in
uttering is subsequently tested on a number of examples. Finally, there is a discussion
of several other proposals to solve Moore's paradoxes.
5.2 Semantics vs. pragmatics
In this chapter we will present sentences and utterances in schematic forrn, and conse-
quently we will, even in the examples, abstract somewhat from reality. Furthennore,
p is meant to be a(possibly complex) declarative sentence.3 For sheer convenience,
we do not make a notational diffèrence between a sentence p of natural language and
an assertion p of the logical representation language.
The meaning of sentences such as
(10) Adam knows that p.
(11) Adam thinks (believes, supposes, ...) 4 that p
will be represented by, respectivcly,
(12) Kap,
(13) Bap.
~I'he reader may complete the examples below by replacing p by, for example, 'it is raining'.
4Unless stated otherwise, we will ignore the semantic differences between these words as well as the
possible ambiguiry between different senses of these words.
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In these formulas the letters K and B stand for the logical counterparts of the English
verbs `to know' and `to believe', and the index a represents the agent to whom
that knowledge or supposition is ascribed, i.e. Adam in these examples. The modal
operators Ba and Ka express propositional attitudes; they are one-place operators that
produce a proposition when applied to another one, just like negation in elementary
logic. Since we do not need quantification and only need individual constants as
indices to modal operators, the logical language will be multi-modal propositional
logic, i.e. the logic contains two families of operators {K,}, and {Ba}„ where each
Ka and BQ functions as a modal operator o.
What do we gain by representing (10) and (11) by (12) and (13), respectively?
Although a shorter notation is useful, this is not the prime motivation for using logical
tr~tnslations. One advantage is the explicitness of the representation as required for an
account of the ambiguity in
(14) Adam knows that he thinks that p.
In one reading `he' is anaforic (refers to Adam), so can be replaced by a in the logical
translation. In another reading `he' is deiktic (refers to extralinguistic context), which
can be represented by using a free variable x:
(15) KaBQp
(16) K,Bxp
More important, however, is the fact that, by mcans of this translation, the meaning
of the matrix verbs in (10) and (i l) has been made (more) precise. The concise,
explicit and precise natun; of these logical operators enables us to reason with the
semantic representations and abstract from the idiosyncratic variation in the meaning
of epistemic verbs. Some people use `know' in cases where others would prefer
`believe'. Yet we only interpret wo~s by their standardized literalmeaning. Perhaps
it is clear now that an immediate translation of sentences into formulas which reflect
the speaker's intention is almost impossible, at least if we want to keep the translation
function compositional and fully general. Especially relevant to what follows are the
ficst person variants of the examples (10) and (11):
(17) I know that p.
(18) I believe that p.
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Instead of the individual constant a we encounter a special individual variable i
(representing `I', the speaker), which may be replaceci by a constant in a given context,
but possibly by different constants in different contexts. Similarly for the special
variable j which stands for `you', the hearer. This treatment of deiktic elements such
as `I', which refer to objects in extralinguistic contexts, is a bit simplistic, yet it suffices
for our purpose.
Now what is the effect of uttering (17)? Since saying something is in the first
place related to the speaker's state ofmind, the utterance meaning seems to be roughly
described by
(21) B: K.P,
for people can utter (17) if they sincerely think they know that p, whereas in fact p
is not the case. (19) would assign too strong an opinion to the speaker, and (20) too
weak an opinion, therefore (2l ) seems the correct compromise between these simpler
options. This is, in a nutshell, the gist of our later general proposal.
Meanwhile we have introduced a useful distinction between semantics and prag-
matics. The use of this distinction becomes especially evident with nespect to sentences
such as(17) and (18). Without the distinction the meaning of (17) would simply be
(21), for then this is the only meaning, overruling a purely semantic interpretation.
This state of affairs seems to be excluded by the so-called `truth axiom' for knowledge,
which states that knowledge should be tnie:
(T) Ka~P -i ~P
The validity of T for knowledge is being disputed. A typical counter-argument
runs as follows: "Consider an example such as (17). One can easily say ~p without
~p being true: people can be mistaken. So, `to know' does not imply that it has to
be the case." Those advocating this point of view insufficiently distinguish between
pragmatics and semantics in the narrow sense. In this view the meaning of a sentence
can differ from one context to another, and is completely determined by that context.
In short: meaning and use would coincide. The complications of such a point ofview
are enormous.
Firstly, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics has been introduced for
good reasons, of course. If `It is hot in here' in a certain context means that, according
to the speaker, a window has to bc opened, and in another that an unfortunate statement
has been made, then these different utterance meanings have to be explained without
reference to a formal meaning of the sentence. We claim that it will be very hard to do
this; at least it will be unnecessarily laborious to give a direct pragmatic interpretation
in a principled, compositional way, since the various pragmatic effects of words and
phrases have to be taken into account, leading to a proliferation ofdifferent readings,
all except one of which usually being absent in the context of utterance.
Secondly, and more positively, there are clear intuitions that an independent,
`context-free' meaning can be attributed to a sentence. Subsequently this literal se-
mantic meaning is the kemel on which pragmatic rules operate, or, to put it differently,
form an argument for a communicative function.
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Another view combines acceptance of a level of forrnal semantics with rejection
of T. This point of view also produces considerable problems:
. First and above all: it conflicts with our intuition (and with what is usually
accepted in epistemic logic or philosophy).
. It is unclear how the difference between `to know' and `to believe' (or: `to
suspect') can be accounted for in this way. At least we have deprived ourselves
of the possibility to mark the difference between knowledge and belief: in our
view, the T axiom holds for knowledge, but not for belief.
. Regardless ofa possible modal distinction between K and B there is a problem
of circularity: if a formal meaning of `know' is `suppose to know', then (one
reading of) `to know' would be synonymous with `suppose to suppose to know',
etcetera. However, to us it seems that iterating a doxastic modality (such as
'believe' or `suppose') leads to ever weaker beliefs. Consequently, in our logic
BaKarP H Ba Ba KarP
does not hold: the implication to the right is valid, but the one to the left is not.
So, if we represent (17) formally by (21), we would have mixed up semantic and
pragmatic meaning. For (17) basically means (19); if p is not true, then neither is
sentence (l7). When person i utters the sentence, (17) can receive an additional value.
Apart from this, such meaning-in-use already arises when a person only thinks of a
proposition: the act of uttering is not essential here. So the aim of this chapter is
primarily to formulate a general rule which ascribes the right pragmatic meaning (21)
to a sentence such as(17).
5.3 Logical preliminaries
The logical syntax contains the usual connectives ~(`not'), ~ (`and'), v(` or'), ~(`if
... then') and H(`if and only if'), as well as ihe modal operators Ka (`a knows')
and BQ (`a bclieves') for each agent a. The dual operators KQ and BQ abbreviate
~Ka~ and ~B,~, respectively. Apart from individual constants (a,b,...), we will
use arbitrary individual variabtes (x, y,. ..), and designated variables i, j.
The deductive system is basically the one pmposed in [Hi62], which is still clas-
sical. Each Ka behaves according to the modal system S4-NKT4, and each BQ to
NKD4, and K, is logically stronger than Ba. Rccall the following axioms and rules
from chapter 4: (o is either K, or BQ)
(pL) all the (modal instantiations of) propositional axioms;
(K) ~- o(~ -~ ,~) ~ (o~ -~ o,~);
(4) ~ o~p -~ ao~p;
128 CHAPTER S. THE USE OFKNOWLEDGE ...
(N) if ~ ~p then ~ o~p;
(MP) if ~ ~p and ~ ~p ~ ~i then ~ ,G;
(T) ~ Ko~p -~ ~p;
(D) ~ BQ~p ~ Ba~p;
(X) ~ KQ~p ~ BQ~p.
To avoid at least one type of so-called logical omniscience, N can be eliminated in
favour of the weaker nile I.
(I) if ~ ~p -~ ~i then ~ o~p -. o~i;
We mention but one useful property that is provable in systems containing IK:S
(C!) ~ o(~P ~~G) H(o~P ~ o~)
A sound and complete model theory for system IK can be given along the lines of
(Kr65a], or within neighbourhood semanticsb.
A further weakening of the required modal system is possible when K and in fact
all axioms are replaced by deduction rules. A partial semantics is then obtained in the
fashion of part I. Interestingly, both the elimination of N and the further weakening in
partial modal logic does not interfere with the logical derivations to follow. So, it is
possible to keep the deductive explanations in a more realistic logic of knowledge and
belief, supported by an appropriate partial semantics.~
5.4 The epistemic force of declarative utterances
Although the 'cognitive' meaning (21) of (17) can also arise without actual utterance,
with respect to communication it is necessary and essential that (17) is uttered. Ac-
cording to an objective and omnipresent observer (`God'), person i could indeed be in
an epistemic state where (21) is valid, but i's interlocutor j cannot inspect i's mind, so
this inference may not be available to j if (17) has not been uttered.
Now what is the precise connection between uttering sentence (l7) and pragmatic
meaning (21)? It seems as if we merely prefixed B; to the semantic meaning (19).
Generalizing this to arbitrary declarative sentences ~p, one obtains what we will call
the doxastic rule:
~ox z : '~p' --~ Bx ~p.
SThis is shown in chapter 7.
óSee section 6.6.
~We retum to this issue in section 5.7.
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Rule Dox implies that if speaker x utters assertion ~p, then, undernormal circumstances,
x believes that ~p is true.8 Here x : '~p' abbreviates normal utterance of (a sentence
corresponding to) ~p by x, where norma! refers to honest and sound language use. So,
for example, ironical or deranged use of ~p is excluded 9 Other types of sentences,
such as intenrogatives and imperatives, also fall outside the scope of rule ~ox. We
will test the correctness of rule Dox in a number of examples.
5.4.1 Moore's paradoxes
On several occasions the British moral philosopher G. E. Moore has pointed at a
puzzling problem involving self-belief (e.g. in [Mo12]). Sentences of the types
(22) p, but I do not believe that p.
(23) p, but I believe that not p.
are evidently paradoxical, for they seem to be both absurd and logically possible.
On the one hand the meaning of, for example, (23) is consistent: it represents the
very common case of incorrect belief. Tfiis meaning is also satisfiable in the type of
models, as will be discussed below. Yet, on the other hand, ordinary sane people,
unlike philosophers and linguists, would not dream of making such an "assertion":
using sentence (22) probably deprives the audicnce of the possibility of taking the
speaker seriously.
Interestingly, even if the agent is an inveterate liar, we do not expect a remark of
the above types.lo For a persistent liar to say (22) may imply ~p ~ B;p, which is of
the form (23); and, vice versa, saying (23) may imply ~p ~~Bi~p, which is of the
form (22). More importantly, one cannot lie by saying (23), since the hearer cannot
possibly believe that the speaker believes what he is saying, which seems essential
in the act of lying. So, unlike what Moore apparently thought, lying does not have
much influence on Moore's examples. Only in some special cases can (22) and (23)
be cotrectly used:
. when the words do not have their common meaning, usually encoded in the
intonation of the sentence, e.g.:
-`p, but 1 do not believe it (i.e. that p).'
where p, for example, reflects the official opinion of your company in
certain matters. In some cases a shift of ineaning of words can be obtained
without special emphasis, such as in Max Black's example 'Oysters are
edible, but I do not think so', provided the English allows for the shift of
gA more accurate statement of Dox would be that every occurrence of i in the utterance by x of rp is
replaced by x in the believed assertion, i.e. x:`~p(i)' --~ B~p(x).
9 All subsequent 'pragmatic transformations' [hereforc have to be rcad modu[o the assump[ion of
normal language use.
~o[BI52, pp.49,50] dces not seem to be fully aware of this point, although he corrects Moore, who
considers lying merely 'vastly exceptional'.
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meaning of `edible' from `apt to be eaten without getting ill' to `food that
I fancy'.
-`p, but I do not believe that p.'
where a special sense of `belief', such as in religion or when 'believe'
means accept, is iniended. In this and the previous case the speaker in fact
dces not believe that p.
-`p, but I do not believe that p.'
can also be used contrastively ( add: `, I know it'), or ironically, forexample
when echoing an earlier, but incorrect belief attribution to the speaker.
Also, the speaker can comment on his own belief, just recognized to be
false. In all these cases the speaker in fact believes that p.
. when the words do not have any meaning, such as in some forms of poetry or in
linguistic examples . . .
As we noticed before, sentcnce such as (22) are consistent, for we can easily
imagine situations where the statements are verified: (22) when p is a true fact which
does not belong to your belief, (23) when you incorrectly believe p. So the meanings
of (22) and (23) seem to be properly represented by
(24) p n ~B;P
(25) P n B:~P,
respectively. t t
T'hen what gives (22) such a funny ring? An explanation of this puzzle can be
supplied by Dox: the sentence (22) is not contradictory, but the utterance is! For,
when (22) is uttered, it receives the pragmatic meaning
(26) B:(P n -,B;P)
which is indeed a contradiction, in the literal as well as the logical sense of the word.
Here is a sample derivation of the (logical) contradiction:
1. B;(p n ~B;P) [given]
2. B;p n B,,B,P [1, C!1
3. BiB;p n~B;B,P [2, 4, U, PL]
ln shon, the results for these examples are in accordance with t~x. Besides, Hintikka
rightly observes that if we replaced `believe' in (22) by `believed', no pragmatic
contradiction as in (26) would arise. We confine ourselves here to the observation
that incorporation of time dependencies can be solved in different ways, but that the
difference between (22) and its past counterpart is anyhow explainable from the simple
observation that the utterance is always linked to the moment of speaking, whereas
the sentence may not; this results in different doxastic modalities and no contradiction
will arise.
11Someàmes (22) is interpreted as (25), cf. the discussion on page 132. This docs not interfere with
our argument, however.
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5.4.2 Epistemic counterparts of Moore's paradox
Another test-case, also analyzed by Hintikka, is
(27) I know the following: p, but I do not know whether p.
In [Hi62, p.79] (27) gets the logical translation:
(28) K:(P n ,K:p n ~K,~p)
This repnesentation explains why (27) is deviant: already the semantic contents (28)
is inconsistent (by C! and T), and so is the pragmatic meaning predicted by ~x:
(29) BiKi~P n ~K;P n ~K.~P)
(the contradiction follows from that of (28) by I and D). Apparently different from
Hintikka, we conclude at this point that a revision or altemative to ~ox is not required
to explain the anomaly in (27).
Hintikka rightly observes that the embedded sentence in (27)
(30) p, but I do not know whether p.
is indeed problematic. For, even after noX has bcen applied to the semantic represen-
tation of (30), no contradiction arises.12 Yet (30) is a strange sentence to utter (or to
think, for that matter). Hintikka explains the anomaly of (30) by relating it to (27).
Consider the following rule.
F.PI x : `tp' ~ Kycp
(here x :`~p' is subjected to the same condition oF notmality of the utterance as in
Dox.)
To avoid a dilemma of choice between nox and Fp1,13 only one of the pragmatic
rules can be maintained, and because of (30) that should not be oox but r:Pl. However,
this move is also wrong. If F.t~l were obligatory, ii would imply that everything we are
saying is true14 - in other words, every hones~ opinion should be necessarily ttve,
which is absurd. Something is not true merely by being asscrted. What does seem to
hold, however, is that the speaker has to be convinced of this truth.
The conclusion we can draw at this point is: ncither only ~)ox, noronly l:Pl provides
a satisfactory account of the facts. Is there another possibility left? Indeed there is:
one rule different from both 1)ox and EPt and with, roughly speaking, intermediate
strength15, which can still account for the facts (Moorc's paradoxes). Instead of
immediately proposing the rule we have in mind, we will relate it to a general and
well-known pragmatic theory, thus giving it independent motivation.
12The consistency of B;(p n~K;p n~K;~p) can easily be shown by means of a(partial) Kripke
model.
13This dilemma occurs in Hintikka's approach, see section 5.5.
~~Of course, we do assume that what we say is true; this, however, does not guazantee objective truth.
~s Notice that it is intuitively correct that the rule is stronger than Dox, but although ~I is too strong
itself, the new rule need not be implied by Fpl.
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5.4.3 Grice revisited
As a part of his theory of conversational implicature Grice suggested in [Gr75] the
pragmatic maxim of qualiry, which is a`Kantian' category of the more general coop-
eration prineiple:
Quality Try to make your contribution one that is true
Two special maxims are subordinated to the quality principle, viz.:
Belief Do not say what you believe to be false.
Evidence Do not say thatfor which you lack adequate evidence.
In our framework, the maxim of belief amounts to:
(31) ~(x : `~p' n Bx,~p)
which is equivalent [o
(32) x : `tp' -~ Bxtp
Perhaps this reformulation makes clear that l~ox is stronger than the Gricean maxim
of belief. We can ask ourselves, then, whether Grice may have meant:lb
Strengthened belief Do not say what you do not believe to be true.
which corresponds to DoX after all. And even if this was not Grice's intention, we
prefer it over the original maxim of belief. [t is true, of course, that `I do not believe
ihat p' is often understood as`I believe that not p', and by contraposition and the D
axiom, the strenghtened form of the belief maxim would be equivalent to the original
one, after all. There are two severe problems for such a`cooperative' interpretation of
Grice's belief maxim: (i) unlike colloquial language, linguistic rules have to be fully
explicit , and (ii) we do not see how to derive `bclieving not' from `not believing' by
the Gricean maxims.
In order to represent the meaning of the Gricean maxim of evidence within our
framework, we have to introduce a new operatoc Let E~ stand for `X has sufficient
evidence for'. Then the maxim of evidence may be recast as
(33) ,(x : '~P' n ,E:~P)
which is equivalent to
(34) x : `rp' --~ EytP
tóThe difference may be caused by the fact that Grice intended his maxims to be fully general, whereas
we focus on indicative uttcrances.
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What do we understand by `sufficient evidence' in the maxim of evidence? People
differ according to what they accept as adequate evidence. The sources of evidence
may also vary: of course, direct perception counts as providing sufficient evidence, but
a mathematical proof, a careful scientific experiment or information from a textbook
may do just as well. Anyway, we claim that the propositional attitude involved in
making a statement is more subjective than is suggested by `sufficient evidence':
usually people say this or that if they sincerely believe they are licensed to. So, what
is at stake is a modification of the maxim of evidence:
Modified Evidence Do not say thatfor which you do not believe to have adequate
evidence.
which can be reformulated in logic as:
(35) x : `~p' -~ BxEx~p.
Combining our adaptations of the Gricean maxims of belief and evidence results in:
(36) x : `~p' -. (Bx~o n BzEy~p).
We can simplify this pragmatic rule, if we take `sufficient evidence' to correspond
to `justiócation', and identify `knowledge' as `truc justified belief' (a familiarequation
in epistemology), i.e.
(37) KycV H (~P n Bx~P n Ex~P).
A simple deduction then shows that Bx~p n BxEx~p, the right-hand side of (36), is
equivalent to BxKy~p, given the identification (37).
Bx~p n BxEx~p 4~
Bx~p n BxBx~p n BxEx~p ~
Bx(SV n B:~v n Ex~P) a
Bx Kx ~P
So, the joined effect of (36) and (37) is that when x says '~p', she signifies that she
believes to know ~p. The resulting scheme is dubbed t~t-r, the (epistemic~doxastic)
utterance rule.
UTT x : `~p' -~ Bt Kxrp,
We have seen that this rule follows from a reinterpretation and modification of
Grice's work on conversational maxims. But does it meet the criteria mentioned
earlier?
First, is t7TT in between DoX and EPt? Indeed, it is, provided that Kz is positively
introspective:
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K:~P ~ K:K:~P ~ B: KarP T~I B: ~P
By some simple Kripke models one can show that the ordering is strict, i.e. the ]ogical
implications cannot be reversed. Recall from footnote 15 that, intuitively speaking,
nox should be subordinated to tsrr, since the former rule is correct, but just not strong
enough. Fpl, on the contrary, is too strong, but dces not really have to imply trrr. This
means that the positive introspection property of knowledge may be avoided, if one
chooses to.
Second, is [rrr empirically adequate? Since it is strongerthan ~ox it automatically
accounts for Moore's doxastic paradoxes. Now how about the epistemic variants? Lei
us reinspect (30).
(30) p, but I do not know whether p.
Application of vTT to the semamic representation of (30) produces the fotmula
(29) BtKt(P n ~K;p n ~K;~p),
which was already shown to be contradictory.
In order to check proposal uTT, we will review a number of Hintikka's examples.
5.4.4 Checking the proposal
Consider the utterance of
(38) He knows that p, but I do not know it.
Hintikka~~ claims that (38) is `sometimes (not always) a somewhat strange thing to
say'. We do not share Hintikka's intuition on this point. LJnfortunately, Hintikka dces
not motivate his restriction to `sometimes strange to say'. As before, we maintain that
(38) can only be used felicitously when one of the occurrences of `know' is given an
ironic intonation. Moreover, (38) seems ambiguous, depending on the reference of it.
Hintikka only treats the first reading.
(39) Kxp n ~K;p
(40) K:p n ~K;Kxp
That ( 38) is anyway pragmatically anomalous can be acounted for by the fact that [T[T
produces an inconsistency on both readings.tg After applying tftT and the T axiom
to the first reading (which by I a]so applies within a modal context), both resulting
formulas are of the form B;K;(~p n~K;~p). This scheme is contradictory, as can be
easily shown by using the principles C!, T, I and D, similar to the argument for (29).
By contrast, as Hintikka observes, the following sentence is absolutely unprob-
lematic:
'~[Hi62, p.80]
1e We omitted a similar account of `Hc knows that p but 1 don't believe it.'
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(41) He knows whetherp, although I do not.
This sentence may show a threefold ambiguity, with some preference for the second
reading:19
(42) ~K:P ~ Kx~p) n ~K;P
(43) ~KxP V Kx~P~ n~~KiP V Ki~P~
(~) iK:P ~ Kx,p) n,K~~KxP ~ K:,P)
Here the utterance rule operates as a pragmatic filter: the semantic meaning represented
in (44) leads to a logical inconsistency after application of uTT.20
Some rather simple epistemic variants of Moore's paradox have not been treated
so far. As a matter of fact we merely dealt with know whether constructions; we now
tum to know that cases. The reason for this postponement is a slight complication
caused by the factivity of the verb to know. The epistemic counterpart of (23), viz.
(45) p, but I know that not p.
is, of course, already contradictory on the semantic level. A simple test to show this is
to substitute a third person pronoun or a proper name for `I' in (45): the contradiction
will remain. The formal account of this contradiction hinges on the inconsistency
derived by the T axiom of knowledge and the scmantic representation p n K;~p of
(45).
The counterpart of (22), viz.
(46) p, but I do not know that p.
is again anomalous, but now the contradiction arises on the pragmatic level: unlike
(46),
(47) p, but he dces not know that p.
is pragmatically sound (and in accordance with our rulc uTT). Still, (47) seems rather
clumsy or redundant. In effect, we will only be inclined to use (47) when we want
to emphasize p(or, he, for that matter). The reason for this is probably the factivity
of the verb to know: `he dces not know that p' already implies p. Therefore (47) is
semantically equivalent to
(48) He does not know that p.
19It is not clear whether the first reading really exists.
~TFtis is not claimed to be the only or the best explanation of the mazkedness of reading (44). An
altemative explana[ion may be based on a syntactic or semantic constraint forbidding the antecedent
'know' to be copied twice into the succedent. However, this very restriction would no[ account for a
similar phenomenon occurring with a minor variant of the text sentence: ' He knows whether p, although
I don't know it.' In this case, there seems to be but one pragmatically sound reading.
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the meaning of which can be represenied by:
(49) p n ~Kxp.
Then rule UTT explains why (47) can be asserted by an agent a, whereas
(50) I do not know that p.
with the analogous analysis
(51) p n ~Kíp
isruledoutbyapplicationofu'rr': BaKa(pn~Kap)iseasilyshowntobecontradictory.
We may conclude that there is a reinterpretation of Grice's quality maxims from which
the pragmatic rule uTT follows. The new rule seems to cover the intuitions conceming
the reliability of assertions and accounts for a number of problematic cases, the so-
called Moore paradox and variants thereof.
5.5 Discussion and comparison
Grice
There are some differences between our logical reconstruction of the Gricean maxims
and the original cooperation principles. In particular, Grice might have objected
that our reformulations (such as i~ox) are genuine implications instead of implicatures
which have defeasible effects. Although we have restricted the application offormulas
like DOX by the built-in condition of normality21, this may still be insufficient for
pragmaticists working along the lines of Grice. Yet,
. Grice himself noticed that quality has a somewhat different status than the other
maxims:Z2
Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim
of Quality is such that it should not be included in a scheme of the
kind we are constructing; other maxims come into operation only on
the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.
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On our account, it will not be true that when I say that p, I conversa-
tionally implicate that I believe that p; [. ..] it is not a natural use of
language to describe one who has said that p as having, for example,
"implied", "indicated", or "suggested" that he believes that p; the
natural thing to say is that he has expressed (or at least purported to
express) the belief that p.
Grice favours an account in which the connection between utterance and belief is
more tight. Here is the procedure he had in mind which links the indicative mood to
speaker's belief:24 (S is an indicative sentence, and o the infinitive form of S)
Pl To utter [S] iffor some B, A wantslintends B to think A thinks o
Rephrased in our terms this amounts to a boulomaic~doxastic scheme:25
(52) i : `ip' -~ W;BIB;rp,
Notice this proposal works all right for Moore's original paradox by an argument
similar to the one based on Dox, because both wanting and believing should be
consistent.26. However, Grice's procedure dces not deal with the epistemic variants of
Moore's paradox, and is therefore empirically incorrect.27 ln [Ha77J, Hamish points
at another drawback of Grice's alleged solution: the proposed explanation hinges on
the positive introspection property 4 of belief. Hamish's intuition is that a Moore
sentence such as (22) is strange, even if belief is not introspcctive, i.e. even when (26)
is consistent. We will re[um to this interesting point in section 5.7.28
Gazdar
Gazdar, in [Ga79], also uses the identity of `knowledge' and 'true, justified belief', in
order to give a reintetpretation of Grice's maxim of quality. However, his conclusion
is different from ours: with him, quality takcs the form of EP129. Unfortunately the
intermediate steps of this replacement are not given. The superficial connection of
EPI with quality and its submaxims of belief and evidence consists of noticing the
keywords `true', `belief' and `adequate proof' in these maxims. Gazdar disregards the
fact that in Grice's formulation of quality not the truth of the proposition is demanded,
but the striving for that truth.3o
u[Gr68, p.65(ed. 1971)1
uW; stands for 'I want'. Again we have taken the líberty to change Grice's 'if' in 'only if', because
the converse of (52) would be unacceptable.
~In [KT89] we have investigated the weak modal properties of want.
nThere is a stronger interpretation of Pl which does lhe job; we will retutn to this.
~Unfortunately, Harnish relales failure of 4 to the cxistcnce of prejudices. This is a rather dubious
move, since B;B;p should not be interpreted as 'I explicitly believe that p.
~See [Ga79, p. 45~8]
~Gazdar's statement that qualuy boils down to our EPi is incompatible with the rejection ofa'sinccrity
rule' by G. Lakoff, which is similar to FP~. V'ute [Ga79, p. 321.
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Gazdar dces not discuss the problem that the original formulation of the maxim
of belief is insufficient to cover the intuition and account for the facts. Furthennore
we have found that (35) seems a better interpretation of the intention of the maxim
ofevidence than (34), or the original maxim. Of course the most important objection
against his conception of qualiry is that ~I is, logically speaking, too strong. Gazdar
dces give a rather curious quotation from a lecture of Sacks, which, according to
Gazdar, shows that quality concems knowledge, although something quite different
appears from the quotation.31
That knowing and not, say, believing, assuming, or something else is what
is involved is evidenced in the following:
"We have in the data, `Oh she knows you're crazy hehh!'
where that might be different from `She thinks you're crazy',
where the problem, I suppose, is that whatever is correct to say
about what she figures, then if I say `She knows you're crazy',
it's hard for you to be in a position to say `No, she thinks I'm
crazy. She happens to be tight.' That is to say, if some facts
are assertably so, thcn, that somebody thinks that they're so
can apparently be used in such a fashion as to say that they
know that it's so; whcther or not their thoughts tum out to have
a correct basis for that result."
The rather cryptical quotation oF Sacks may amount to: `knowledge' is true belief,
instead of true justified belief. Although thc former equation is extremely doubtfu132,
we may accept it for the sake of the argument. This still does not make Gazdar's
intn~ductory sentence comprehensible! To provide the intended reduction, we need at
least two more assumptions: thc quality maxim has to ensure truth of the utterance,
i.e.
x : `~p' -. rp
and the belief maxim has to be lormalized as ~ox. The first assumption is obviously
wrong and does not correspond to quality, as we have seen. The second assumption
dces not correspond to Grice's bclief maxim either, but captures the right intention, as
we have also seen. Finally, the evidence maxim seems to have been ignored in this
argument.
We may conclude that extra evidence for Gazdar's r.~t interpretation of quality can
not be derived from his arguments.
31 [Ga79, footnote 11, p. 46]. We would like to thank Kees van Deemter for helping to decode the
quote.
~We may betieve our favourite soccer team to win next Sunday. Now suppose it does in fact win. Can
we know this beforehand? We do not think so, in general.
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Levinson
By contrast, Levinson in his textbook on pragmatics, seems to favour a t~ox interpreta-
tion ofquality to solve Moore's paradox.33 Again it remains mysterious how the belief
maxim can be interpreted as Dox.34 Notice that a straightforward (32) interpretation
of the belief maxim
(32) x : `~P' -~ B2~P
cannot account for Moore's paradoxes: both B;(p n~B;p) and B;(p n B;~p) are
consistent, as can easily be shown by simple, verifying Kripke models. Now, even
for pox, Levinson's solution is not satisfactory, since there is no trace of a formal
derivation of the intended pragmatic contradiction. Moreover, the epistemic variants
of Moore's paradox and the problems they cause for an explanation along the lines of
nox, are completely absent.
Hintikka
We frequently referred to (Hi62], since it presents most relevant facts without much
philosophical bias. Some of the older accounts of Moore's paradox (in particular
[Mo12] and [B152]) are aptly discussed by Hintikka.3s
[Hi62, p.71 ] proposes a rule corresponding to t~ox, which, however, should be
considered a definition of the notion doxastically defensible, rather than an empirical
law. Similarly, t:Pl is triggered by the notion epistemically defensible. So, in Hintikka's
terms, (30) is doxastically defensible, but epistemically indefensible.
We have avoided the cautious approach of Hiniikka - our prime interest here
is to pmpose empirically correct rules, not to construct a methodological apparatus.
Moreover, in [Hi62] EPl dces not replace t~ox, but seems to constitute an altemative to
the latter. Unfortunately, the relationship between doxastic and epistemic defensibility
is quite uncleac One possible interpretation is that the hearer has the fre,edom to choose
between nox and EPI. This interpretation causes problems, as will be demonstrated
below. Another interpretation is that both criteria are used, where failure of ~ox is
more serious than that of EPI. The latter interpretation is supported by Hintikka's
remark that (30) is doxastically defensible, yet epistemically indefensible. However,
that (30) is merely `sometimes somewhat peculiar' and (22) `absurd to utter'36 appeals
to a spurious difference: to us both are pragmatically `out'. That (30) may sound
better than (22) has a very simple explanation: the former has a contrastive reading
`I believe p but do not know it', which is pragmatically consistent, whereas a similar
~[t,e83, p.lOSJ
xPerhaps some confusion concerning the conceptof modal dualily has caused this nonfactual interpre-
tation: [I.e83, p.135] claims tha['not knowing whether' is the logical dual of `knowing that', which it is
not. But then again, on [Le83, p.140] he aptly demonstrates the similar logical independence of 'maybe'
and 'maybe no['.
uSee, for example, [Le78, pp.84,85] for more recent literature
~[Hi62, p.9J
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rescue for (22) fails since `I know p but do not believe it' is semantically contradictory.
Mor~eover, 1-~t is just one way to specify what Hintikka could have meant by: 37
When somebody makes a statement - say utters the sentence q- we
ar~e normally led to expect that he can conceivably know that what he is
saying is true or that he is at least not depriving himself of this possibility
by the very fonn of words he is using.
The expectation to which the last quotation refers not only introduces undesirable
vagueness, but even vitiates the cxplanation to a certain extent. For one of the normal
expectations of a language user is that a speaker is consistent or at least tries to be
so. Yet, in the case of (30) the latter maxim will be violated, exactly when the former
expectation, namely that the speaker knows what he is saying, is maintained. In short,
if the hearer is allowed to make a choice between Dox and EPt, he will be forced by the
condition of consistency to choose boX, and consequently the deviation of (30) will
remain unexplained.38
So it seems fair to say that Hintikka's two notions `epistemically defensible' and
`doxastically defensible' together account for Moore's paradoxes, but it is not clear
how to choose between them in what circumstances. Consequently, we see no way
in which such a conceptual distinction can be implemented in a compositional seman-
tic~pragmatic interpretation: his logical representations are `miraculous translations'.
Áqvist
Aqvist, in [Aq64], also provides an analysis of Moore's paradox by deriving a wntra-
diction in a multi-modal logic. This is where the resemblance stops. As usual ~Aqvist
invokes a multitude ofoperators, not related to different agents, but to different senses
of belief: ranging from assertion over belief (in the strict sense) to conjecture.39 A;~p
(`I assert that ~p') is supposed to imply B;~p. Then Moore's paradox is resolved as
follows: the sentence
(23) p, but I believe that not p.
is still translated into p n B;~p. Uttering (23) logically amounts to
(53) A;p n B;,p,
from which the deductive system yields a contradiction. However, Áqvist's solution
contains a number ofoddities:
r[Hi62, p.78]; we treat other interprctations of this quotatíon in section 5.7.
~So a non-monotonic ( default) approach will also fail, for virtually the same reason.
~ We refrain fmm displaying and discussing all the details of his appmach. Technically, his system is
multi-IKD, where the (ten) operalors are linearly ordered with respect to relative strength by axioms of
the form Oi~p ~ or~p if k 1 l. t7~o corresponds to our A;. and ~5 to our B; operator.
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. The scope of A; in (53) is wrong; this is not due to a printing emoror something
like that, since wide scoping of A; would produce a consistent formula, modulo
the given system IKD(to) and the ordering axioms. But the small scope of A;
in (53) indicates that only the first part of (23) is actually asserted when the
sentence is uttered and the second part is not. It is hard to accept this judgement.
. A second problem for ~Aqvist's proposal arises in connection with sentences of
the form (30). Since'I assert thatp' and `I know thatp' are logically independent,
we do not obtain the desimd contradiction. Altematively, if we assume K;
to imply A; (cf. our modality B;K;), we still cannot derive a contradiction
within Áqvist's analysis: here the small scope of A; causes the consistency of
A;p n ,K;p n ~K;,p.
. We ónd it hard to consider `assertion' a sense of `belief'. Of course not just the
mental state, but also the act of utterance is involved in making an assertion.
Strictly speaking both concepts are logically independent: only given some
condition on the context of utterance, an assertion can involve some kind of
belief, although presumably not the kind of (strict) belief ;4qvist had in mind.ao
Lenzen
Some time after completing a preliminary Dutch version of the paper underlying the
present chapter,41 Johan van Benthem brought [Le80, chapter 5] to our notice, which
we had completelyoverlooked. Wolfgang Len-r.en gives a solution to Moore's problem
that is very similar to ours. With him, uttering a sentence ~p involves being convinced
that ~p.42 Now, `being convinced' is analyzed as `believing to know':
Uxtp H BxKx~.
The intimate connection between conviction (German: Uberzeugung), and assertion
is re8ected in the following quote:a3
In der Tat scheint mir die [. ..)~4quivalenz zwischen Uberzeugt-sein
und Zu-wissen-glauben ebenso wie die mehrfach erwílhnte pragmatische
Bedingung der Bereitschaft zu einer Wissens-Behauptung das Charakter-
istikum des `normalen', umgangssprachlichen Wissenbegriffs zu sein.
In all, his solution amounts to our uTT. His argumentation is partly different, though.
On the one hand, Lenzen dces not relate uTT to the Gricean maxims.44 On thc other
bAsuperior account of the relevance of various belief readings (involving different degrees of speaker's
commitment) for the problems at stake is [Fu71, pp.231-247]. Furberg's semi-formal counterpartof (53)
on [Fu71, p.247] has [o be rejected for roughly the same reasons, though.




"l.enzen dces discuss a rule similar to our pox and claims it to be derivable [rom the Gricean maxims,
[I.e80, p.129]. As we have seen, such a derivation is unlikely, since the most obvious (belief) maxim is
t,oo weak.
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hand, Lenzen provides independent motivation by analyzing other types ofepistemic
paradoxes (such as the scepticist's, and the surprise examination) by means of, essen-
tially, lrrr. In conclusion, we sympathize with his approach in this matter.45 Unlike
Lenzen, however, we do not believe the operator U to be mone than a convenience.
There ane in fact several reasons for keeping B and K as the basic operators:
. U can be defined in terms of B and K;
. B cannot be defined properly by U and K;
. K cannot be defined propcrly by U and B;
. the system based on U and K is in danger of collapse.
The first point is obvious. Thc second point is rather that there seems to be no
way to define the much weaker belief operator in tetms of the stronger notions of
conviction and knowledge. For example, taking duals of K or U, or taking belief to
be Btp - U~p ~~K~p would not lead to a normal modal logic for B. The third point is
even more fietorical: of course we can define knowledge as true conviction, as some
authors are willing to do, but this dces not imply thai knowledge is based on sufficient
evidence. The final point refers lo the observation that systems based on K and U are
less stable than those based on K and B: we cannot simply require stronger properties
of knowledge and belief withoul equating the two notions. For example, in [KL88] it
is noticed that if the modal system of Ka is S5, and that of UQ NKD4, KQ~p implies
Uacp, and the typical axiom
U UQ ~p -~ UQKa~p
holds, then the logic collapses in the sense that F- Ua~p ~-. Ka~p.4b We therefore
conclude that a logic based on K and B is more economical, sufficiently rich, and
easier to handle.
5.6 Extending the proposal
So far, we have only considered the effect of an utterance on the speaker himself.
Although the tvle trrr seems adcquate, at lcast for the set of data discussed, it cannot
be the full story. For the purpose of an utterance is usually not to make a self-belief
explicit, but to try to convey a piece of information or conviction. So, utterances are
usually part of a conversation, which implics the existence of a hearer different from
the speaker. Now what is the effcct ofan uuerance on the knowledge state ofa heare~?
~SThis is not to imply that we fully sustain the logical systems developed in [Le80J, which seem,
intuitively spreaking, often too strong. For examplc, ().~p is supposed to be equivalent to Íf.K.~p, which
seems wrong to me. This may be rclated to the interpretation of (~. as 'X considers it possible that' ('X
h~lt es fUr mSglich daB'), instead of the more accurate 'with respect to X's conviction it is possible that'.
~This collapse even occurs when the modal systems for K. and U. are NKS and NKD, respectively.
See e.g. [vdH91 J.
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A first aspect of this epist- -mic tran,~~- that the hearer is convinced that the
speaker is convinced of what he says, i.e.
i : `cp' -~ BjKjB;K;ip
In other words, the rule trrr is available to the hearer, and thus 'intemalized' by
him, so to speak. Notice that several obvious altematives, though more simple, do
not qualify. For example, the formula BjB;~p replacing the right-hand side of the
rule of generalized conviction is too weak, since the hearer is usually reasonably
sure of what he perceives. BjK;~p, by contrast, would be too strong in some sense,
since it implies B~~p. 7'he proposed revision of u7'r accounts for the fact that the
Moore sentences are also strange to hear. In fact, the speaker in his tum may be
convinced that this rule affects the hearer's mental state in the way described, i.e.
B;K;BjK~B;K;~p. There may be no limit to the depth of mutual conviction: the
next step would involve BjKjB;K;B~KjB;K;~p, and so on. Perhaps the conjunction
of this sequence, suggesting a new notion of common conviction, comes to mind,
but in general we do not see the need of such complex convictions in everyday
conversations.a~ Moreover, ihis is only one side of the coin: all these convictions can
eventually be traced down to the knowledge statc of the speaker.
A second aspect, therefore, concems the more direct cffect of the information
conveyed on the hearer: will he also be convinced that ~p? T'hat is simply asking too
much - the hearer may hold opposite views. Also, it seems too much to require the
speaker to merely believe that the transfer of infnrmation will always succeed. What
seems usually defensible, though, is that it is logically possible, as far as the speaker
believes, for the hearer to be convinced by what is said, i.e.
UTT2 i:`~p' ~ B;BjKjtP. ~'k`,, ~~;~ f~ t~
Notice that this rule refers to the situation occurring just after ~p has been uttered.
Before i utters ~p it may very well be the case that j is not convinced that ~p holds, and
that i rightly believes so: B,~B~K;c~.YAs a.ma tir.pf fact,.this may be a very good
reason for i to utter ~p! Also, it may not even bc likely that j is convinced by i with
respect-to cp; whát is important is that this possibility is open in principle.
The second utterance rule trrr2 accounts for-tkle anomaly of some second person
variants of Moore's~aradox, for example,
(54) p, but you do not believe that p.
(55) p, but you do not know whether p.
As with previous derivations, we can infer inconsistencies from the `second order'
pragmatic effects of rule uTT2 applied to the semantic representations of (54) and
(55):aa
~~For perfect communication, the sequence of ever stronger uuerance effecu
K~B;K;~p,K;K~B;K;~p,K~K;K~B;K;~p,... and iu limit CB;K;~p may be suggested. Again this
knowledge seems too 'deep', bu[ also too cenain in colloquial language.
~Both paradoxes and UTT2can be generalized to azbitrary subjecu x overhearing the utterance. Simply
replace j by such x.
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(56) B;B;K;(p n ~B;p),
(57) B;B;K;(p n ,K;p n ,K;~p).
Presumably (54) and (55) are less odd than their first person counterparts because
`believe' and `know' may also refer to the situation (shortly) before the uttering takes
place.49 This is consistent with the a posteriori status of rule t1TT2.
Again an altemative explanation is possible, which comes closer to planning an
utterance: then the speaker is supposed to want to convince the hearer th~. Notice
this involvés a partly a priór'ï-interpretation of the anomaly: one wants to convince
before or while saying ~p (the belief or knowledge still refers to the state after uttering).
This would produce the rule
(58) i : `~p' ~ W;B;K;cp.
Recalling our representation of Grice's procedure P1 on page 137 we could favour
another reformulation than (52) at this very point:
(59) i : `ip' -. W;B;K;B;K;ip.
The latter two rules can jointly replace the combination of trtT and uTT2:
(~) i : `~P' -' W;B;K;(rP n BtKt~P).
So far, we have found no empirical advantages for either the boulomaic or the purely
doxastic~epistemic approach. For the time being we prefer the doxastic~epistemic line,
since it dces not invoke the additional and rather complicated operation of wanting.
Another issue not dealt with is the procedure for update of information, or, rather,
update of the mental state. The above provides some rules for adding beliefs (or
knowledge), but does not deal with the removal ofcontradictory beliefs. We consider
this important but complicated issue to fall outside the scope of the present chapter.
5.7 Reinspecting the modal systems of B, K and U
The modal system behind the epistemic and doxastic logic presupposed in this chapter
was that of [Hi62J, i.e. essentially the multi-modal system in which Ka is S4, Ba is
NKD4, and KQ implies BQ.
Before we tum to a reconsideration of the modal properties of Ba and Ka, let us
investigate the logic of the modality BK, i.e. U. Assuming the above multi-modal
system for Ba and Ka, what an; the modal properties of Ua? It is easily verified that
U, is at least NKD4, but is it more than that? Of course, if the operator KQ is still
~9Interestingly, uttering (54) may sometimes be acceptable, whereas (55) is not. A possible ezplanation
for this is that belief may be bralional, but knowledge is necessarily rational. Also, you can rationally
believe someone else to be 'urational, hut you cannot rationally believe yourself to be irrational al that
very moment.
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available, there is a difference since U holds for U, but not for Ba (with respect to Ka).
Without Ka, the logic of iÏa does not exceed NKD4: the class of Kripke models such
that the accessibility relation for U, is ihe composition B. K, where B is serial and
transitive, K is reflexive and transitive, and B C K is provably sound and complete
for the system NKD4.SO This shows the doxastic nature of Ua.
Although largely defended and taken over by other authors, Hintikka's modal
system is not beyond criticism. In particular it can be criticized along four dimensions:
. the dimension of logical omniscience
~ the dimension of truth and consistency
. the dimension of introspection
. the dimension of interaction
In section 5.3 we noticed that a great deal of omniscience can be removed by
avoiding rule N.St But can we dispense with N, i.e. can we still derive the (prag-
matic) inconsistencies within a logical system that lacks N? Fortunately we can, if
N is replaced by the weaker rule I. Although N is presumably the gravest form of
omniscience, I, K and, sometimes, C!, are also blamed for this. A more radical move
is to pass to a form of partial modal logic which has no valid formulas at all. Again
inspection of the relevant arguments shows that inference rules (instead of axioms)
will do just as well, and that, moreover, the rule of tertium non datur (~p ~~t~, V~~r(~)
is not needed to derive the contradictions. Hence the given explanation is conserved
when passing to this weaker logical system.
The truth axiom T for Kx was discussed at some length in section 5.2. It was
supported by the semantic anomaly of (45) on page 135. The consistency axiom D
is crucial for the explanation of Moore's paradox. Yet Lemmon, in his [Le65] review
of [Hi62], noticed one can surely know or believc somebody else to have inconsistent
beliefs: Ka(Bbp ~ Bb~p) should be consistent. This calls for a distinction ofdifferent
sorts of belief: rational belief should be consistent, po.ssibly irrational belief may be
inconsistent. Consequenily, if our intuitions conceming Moore's paradox are correct,
it is, perhaps surprisingly, rational belief that is Ihe more usual notion.
Whether we want to give up (positive) introspection depends on the sense of
knowledge and belief we want to model. Idealized, implicit knowledge and belief
may be considered to satisfy positive introspection. intuitively, K and B are not
quite the same in this respect. To us, it seems more sound to infer `believing that
you believe p' from `believing that p', than to infer `knowing that you know' from
`knowing' simpliciter, since `believing that you bclieve' seems, in some sense, weaker
~Soundness is straightforward, and completeness follows from the fact that every non-NKD4-theorem
has a counterexample which is a Kripke model with a serial and transitive accessibility relation R. This
model can be transformed into one of the suitable form by taking B- R and K- R U id, the refiexive
closure of R. Then K is reFlexive and transitive, and B~ K- R~(R U id) - R~ R U R~ id -
R~ R U R- R, since, by transitivity, R~ R C R.
s~See chapters 6 and 7 for an extensíve treatment of this issue.
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than merely believe, whereas with knowledge it is the other way round. But then
again, how can we know: the only clear intuitions seem to stem from those concepts
we are reasonably aware of.
So possibly the 4 property for K and B should be avoided after all. Can we then
still keep the analysis given in this chapter? Notice that we used 4 in deriving an
inconsistency from B;(p ~~B;p), to show that rule nox was capable of handling
the anomaly in uttering (22). Interestingly, rule trlT dces not need 4 to produce an
inconsistency from (22).
The other single place wherc 4 came in, was in establishing the relation between
u7'C and Grice's theory of conversational implicatures, more in particular, the maxim
of quality.52 Let there be no doubt that, if we were forced to give up either trlT or
qualiry, we would prefer to keep the formet Altematively, we might try to `stretch'
the maxim ofbelief further in such a way that uttering ~p would involve B;tp n B,B;~p,
but we do not think this is supported by intuitions or empirical arguments.
Avoiding 4, there is at least one phenomenon we have to explain, viz. the anomaly
in statements such as
(61) I believe that p, but I do not believe that I believe it.
(62) I know that p, but I do not know that I know it.
At first sight, the oddity of thcse examples provides independent evidence for 4.
Fortunately, uTT also explains why one cannot properly use these sentences: since
they are of the form (22) and (46), a contradiction can be derived without using 4.53
It may seem at this point that 4 can be avoided entirely. But things are not as
simple as thar. after all, the following examples seem to require 4 to logically account
for the pragmatic inconsistency.
(63) p, but I do not believe tha~ I believe it.
(64) p, but I do not know whether 1 know it.
This looks pretty much like an indirect argument for 4. Another test case for the rule
t1Ti' is the logical order of the uuerances of:
(65) 1 know it is raining.
(66) It is raining.
(67) I believe it is raining.
s2As was noticed before, t~i does not have to bc stronger than UTT, so there is no need to invoke 4 to
establish such a consequence.
s3For example, uttering (61) implies a contradiction by an argument that only uses (relativized) ICXT:
B;K;(B;p I~ ~B;B;p) ~ B;K;B;p n B;K;~B;B;p ~ B;B;B;p n B;~B;B;p ~ B;B;B;p n
~B; B; B; p.
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If [Trr is correct and 4 holds, then the assertions of (65) and (66) should be equivalent,
modulo the other logical rules. This dces not appear to be right, so either 4 should
be rejected, or another explanation (based on, for example, the Gricean maxims
of quantity and manner) of the difference should be given. By contrast, asserting
(66) seems to imply (67), and here positive introspection of knowledge is called for.
However, perhaps we are relating the semantics of (67) to the pragmatics of (66). On
the same level, and for weak, non-introspective senses of knowledge and belief, the
latter two examples may indeed be independent.
With respect to the interaction ofknowledge and belief, the axiom dubbed X here is
widely accepted. Exceptions to this axiom involvc admittedly irrational senses ofbelief
such as in 'I know he is dead, yet I cannot believc it'. There is little need to strengthen
the connection between knowledge and belief bcyond X. We already provided some
arguments contra scheme iJ for knowledge and plain belief (i.e. Bz~p ~ BxKy~p).
A similar scheme By~p -. KxBx~p dces not seem acceptable eithec54 We did use
a strengthening of the X axiom to derive UTr I~rom the Gricean maxim of quality.
The identification of knowledge as true justificd belief has been disputed by two
diametrically opposed arguments: one point ol' criticism is that justification is not
required for knowledge (cf. Gazdar's argument on page 138), another that even true
justified belief may not suffice for knowledge. In Gettier's paradox55 an agent believes
a true proposition for which he has personal justification, but this evidence happens
to be wrong. This allegedly shows that he has true justified belief, without really
knowing it, and so (37) would be falsified. Yet to me, what the example shows is that
the agent merely believes to have sufficient evidence, i.e. the situation seems correctly
described by Bp ~ p ~ BEp ~~Ep, which is consistent with (37); applying (37) gives
p ~ BKp n~Kp, modulo positive introspection.
Another issue conceming logical strength is also related to irrr. It was noticed that
trre solves Moore's paradox and its epistemic variants, yet does not seem too strong,
logically speaking. This may be the proper place to notice that tfrr' is not the only,
nay, not even the optimum solution with regard to logical strength: for examplc, the
modality KK is superior in that it still accounts for Moore's examples, but is clcarly
weaker in the sense that
B2Kxrp ~ BxKxcp ~ ÍfxKxrp.
Moreover, iCK has the obvious advantage that it is expressible within the uniform
epistemic logic of Kx. Perhaps the modality KyKx was intended as one of the
optional `expectations' displayed in the quotation from [Hi62] on page 140. However,
the weakest possible explanation may no[ be thc best here. In fact, the choice of the
logically stronger modality in uT't' is supported by intuition. Also, the operators B:,
so there is hardly a real advantage of staying within the Kx system. Without feeling
the need to discuss all possible modal solutions for the problem of the assertive force
of indicatives (within ceRain bounds), we noticc that some rather strong modalities,
xB.~p -. K~B.~p is accepted by [KL88], but rejected by Hintikka, see [Hi62, p.52].
uSee [I.e80]
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such as KaB~ are not suitable: the latter one dces not deal with the epistemic variants
of Moon;'s paradox.
5.8 Conclusion
We have described and explained a number ofchallenging pragmatic anomalies con-
nected to Moore's paradox. The rule which explains these phenomena is claimed
to have a very general application to everyday statements. This utterance rule and
the Gricean rule of quality are intimately connected. We have also argued that our
rule is supenor to many other solutions to Moore's puzzle. Our result is equivalent
to a rule suggested (informally) by Lenzen, who arrives at his result by a somewhat
different route (but from the same starting point, viz. Hintikka's work and Moore's
paradox). The formalization givcn may be implemented in a compositional treatment
of the pragmatic meaning of assertions, or rather their effect on knowledge and belief.
Needless to say, this only constitutes an approximation of (one aspect of) pragmatic
meaning.
Yet we argued that our utterance rule is adequate, both on the logical dimension
and on the empiral dimension. It is logically correct, since it is not too strong and
though itself consistent, can account for the observed pragmatic inconsistencies. It
seems empirically correct since it fits the intuition and accords to Grice's maxim of
quality, when the latter is modified in a way that seems necessary anyway.
The analysis is extended to second person variants of Moore's paradox. The
final section indicates that the given explanation does not depend on a normal modal
system; in other words, the explanation can be carricd over to less idealized analyses
of knowledge and belief.
Chapter 6
Total logics of awareness
This chapterl provides a study of total (bivalently interpreted) logics of belief and
awareness, from a general modal perspective.
One fonn of possible world semantics proposed by Fagin 8r, Halpem in (FH88J is
generalized to what we call `sieve semantics', which is essentially Kripke semantics
with a superimposed awareness sieve. For each world, the awareness sieve speci fies a
set of formulas. In general these sets are arbitrary, but for special kinds of awareness
we may constrain them by imposing conditions on the semantics. Sieve semantics
tums out to provide an extremely flexible framework, which is proved to be effectively
equivalent to Rantala's non-normal world semantics. Consequently, every awareness
logic which contains the propositional tautologics can be given a sieve semantics.
After introducing some specific awareness logics, we study their completeness and
correspondence properties. Then these logics are compared to each other, demonstrat-
ing their differences and similarities.
The positive aim of this part of the enterprise is an adequate description of aware-
ness and actual belief, as well as the general model theory required, a`negative' aim
the avoidance of logical omniscience. These goals reFlect two sides of the same coin,
of course.
First we treat some modal logics in which awareness is essentially a syntactic filter
on potential beliefs. Monotonicity conditions on the awareness filter then account for
some kinds of active belief.
Next we treat neighbourhood semantics and related formalisms for active belief.
In a topological metaphor, the different frames of mind which can be attributed to
an agent may be construed as neighbourhood bases interpreting actual beliefs. Some
altematives to neighbourhood semantics are shown to be (almost) equivalent, yet a
standard account is argued to be preferable.
~The present chapter is a modióed version of [Th91 a~. ~c Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992, with
some delerions and extensions, such as a short discussion ol [GG90].
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6.1 Introduction
The ultimate goal of awareness logics is to give a sound and complete, yet descriptively
adequate (modal) logic for awareness in its relation to human belief. Apart from
academic interest this is also important for futur~e wmmunication systems which will
be requimd to act as if they understand how httmans think. Like [Pe90] we do not really
expect machines to become conscious; however, by describing and implementing
formal properties ofconsciousness we can make computers seem more intelligent and
user-friendly.2
The present chapter is a step towards this goal. Although we will not give an
empirically complete description of awareness and actual belief, a first approximation
is provided. More importantly, a general framework is established which enables us to
deal with various types of awareness and actual belief without the need to change the
logic over and over again. Fortunately, since the framework covers earlier proposals
(in fact generalizes one of them), previous insights are preserved and extended with
more details, especially on (weak) introspection properties of active belief.
The impetus to what we call awareness logics are the problems of so-called
`logical omniscience'. This ironic term refers to the fact that standard logics such as
(the minimal) normal modal logic fall short when they are applied to certain cognitive
modes of human beings (or their simulations in Al). The problem is that these logics
would force the agent to know or believe simply too much. More precisely, they
would oblige a person to know all the consequences of his knowledge. For example,
all number theorists now would `know' whether Fermat's last theorem holds or not,
since they know the postulates Ibr ordinary arithmetic.3 This is surely not the case,
in any realistic sense of the word `know': though these mathematicians may be
said to implicitly know the answer to this classical query, nobody is aware of the
answer, i.e. nobody knows it explicitly, so far. Or, more simply and pefiaps even
more convincingly, if somebody believes4 p, he need not (explicitly) believe p or q,
although any logic containing the classical tautologies and the principle
I ~ ~p ~ tl, ~~ B~p -~ B~t(~,
which modalizes the parts of a valid implication, would predict so.
To judge whether these pmblems were rightly ignored in [Hi62], we have to
distinguish between implicit and explicit belief. I believe (explicitly, as a matter of
fact) that Hintikka was trying to model implicit rather than explicit belief and was,
therefore, virtually correct on this point.
Now it may seem easy to circumvent problems of logical omniscience (LO) by
limiting the inferential power. Although this is precisely what awareness logics do,
there are a fairly large number of complications to be dealt with. One is that there
are many sorts of awareness and logical omniscience, and it appears to be difficult to
2See chapters 8 and 9.
3Assuming that the conjecture is not independcnt of Peano's axioms.
~In the sequel we will restric[ ourselves to belief. Much of what wiU be said about belief also goes for
knowledge, however.
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deal with all of them at once. Apart from the forementioned principle I, some other
prominent types of 1.o are:
N F~ ip ~ ~ Bcp
K ~ B(lo -. ~,) ~ (B~p -~ B~,)
C F (B~p n B~) ~ B(~o n~i)
E ~rp.-~~~~Brpf-.B~i
In an Animal Farm-like par~adox, one may say that all types ofLo are equally trouble-
some, but some are more troublesome than others, since these principles are ordered
by the consequence series NK ~ I~ E and IK ~ C.
Another complication for building such logics is that of keeping classical propo-
sitional logic (pL) in the external part of the logic while avoiding omniscience in the
internalpart. For example, Bp v~Bp should be valid but B(p v~p) should not. For
it seems obvious that anyone believes some fact or other, or he does not, and, most
importantly, this holds regardless of the sense of belief involved. But it is not obvious
at all that everyone should have any belief with regard to p at all, and therefore he
need not explicitly believe the tautology p or not p eithec Of course the axioms can
be chosen in such a way that the modal system has the required effect a minimal
solution to this problem would involve just (the modal instantiations of) pL. Some
weak principles such as the converse of C
Ce ~ B(~p n,~) -~ (B~p n B~)
also seem fully acceptable for real belief. A complete specification, however, presup-
poses a clear-cut choice for the notion of 6elief, which unfortunately seems to have
many appearances.
Now a chief difficulty is that removing t.o-inference rules reopens the search for
a suitable model theory, unless we want to abandon semantics altogether. Here some
subtlety is required. For example, a straightforward partial logic which eliminates t.o
will also destroy pL.
It has even been suggested that possible worlds alone are to blame for t.o. This
sweeping statement is in fact not con.ect. As we have seen in chapter 4, partial
semantics can equally well provide Lo, since they may be used to describe normal
modal logics such as K and 54,5 depending on thc mannerof validation. Moreover, by
adding certain modifications and generalizations, different types of t.o may be avoided
in possible world semantics, as this chapter will try to demonstrate.
The different approaches to solve problems of t.o can be divided into:
. purely semantic approaches (i.e. containing a clean model theory, based on
semantie intuitions) - this amounts to weukening the logic;
SI.e., under the peTSpective of mixed jalsifiabil'uy on coherent models. Notice that, in some sense,
[Hi621's model sets contain implicit partialiry.
l52 CHAPTER 6. TOTAL LOGICS OFAWARENESS
. strictly syntactic approaches (based on sets of formulas with limited deducdve
power), such as Konolige's;
. approaches with `syntactically polluted' semantics, such as in the sieve models.
Since in our view a logic has to contain a proper semantics, we will disregard the
second approach. Although the first approach usually involves an overtly partial
semanticsó, to some extent it can be incorporated within the possible world paradigm;
then it is related to neighbourhood semantics. In this chapter we mainly deal with the
last approach. In its least radical fortns one may say that partiality is simulated; in the
more radical forms, we can remove virtually every modal principle, and thus eliminate
every fonn of Lo.
Apart from being based on some variant of possible world semantics, the theories
that we will discuss have the common feature that explicit belief is connected to
implicit belief by adding awareness to it. This can be put into a slogan:
EXPLICIT BELIEF - IMPLICIT BEt.IEF f AWAI2EN[SS
Like all slogans, the statement is rather imprecise. It does not account for the exact
relationship, nor whether the notions are merely semantic or have a syntactic coun-
terpart, nor which notion is primitive, and which one derived. In fact the latter may
depend: sometimes explicit belicf is derived, sometimes awareness is derived. Yet the
equation points at a division of labour: the logical properties of actual belief may be
thought to be present in idealized form in implicit belief, the non-logical character in
the somewhat misty notion of awareness. Sometimes it is even claimed that awar~eness
is an illogical notion. We feel that although it is ttve that awareness has no nontrivial
properties in general (i.e., apart from missing ordinary properties), for special types
we may and will formulate constraints.
6.2 Overview
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 deal with
augmented Kripke semantics and section 6.6 with neighbourhood semantics.
We start with FaginBcHalpem's general awareness logic (GAL), and study its
monotonicity behaviour. Konolige's criticism is discussed and some altematives are
compared to the original logic. Next the special awareness logic is introduced that
describes a weak form ofawarencss related to familiarity with sufficiently many simple
facts. Again monotonicity constraints tum out to be ofvital importance for determining
introspection properties of awareness and bclief, although negative introspection with
respect to explicit belief causes a collapse of the logic. We show that the latter logic
may be considered as a special case of the general awareness logic, by embedding its
semantics into that of the general one.
Then it is shown that a generalization of the GAL models, called sieve models,
provides an extremely flexible semantic framework which is effectively equivalent
óSee [he next chapter.
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to Rantala's non-normal world semantics. Sieve semantics thus covers all awareness
logics which contain at least the classical propositional calculus.
Finally the general theory of neighbourhood models is given in order to deal with
awareness within a frame of mind. It is argued that only very weak conditions should
be imposed on these models. ~vo related, seemingly new forms of model theory
are reduced to special kinds of neighbourhood semantics. Finally neighbourhood
semantics and its variants are shown to be equivalent to branches of sieve semantics,
though the latter is still more general than neighbourhood semantics.
Thmughout the chapter a numberof correspondence and completeness results will
be mentioned or proved. In this way we can uniformize and improve some earlier
proposals on this point.
6.3 The logic of general awareness
In order to obtain sufficient power to model awareness on the one hand and avoid
problems of omniscience on the other, FaginBcHalpem (FBcH henceforth) suggest the
logic ofgeneral awareness. The non-logical nature ofawareness is built into the logic
by making the awareness set A;(w) an arbitrary set of fonnulas. Roughly, awareness
works like a sieve, filtering out explicit beliefs from the bulk of implicit beliefs. This
is pefiaps the most obvious realization of the equation given in the introduction.
The syntactic nature ofawareness is reflected in the presence of a primitive aware-
ness operator A; for each agent i. To each of the m agents explicit (B;) and implicit
(L;) beliefs are attributed.~ So the language is essentially G,,n,{L;};,{a;};,{B;};(Prop)
(or G~ Á ~ for short), although B; can also be introduced by the definition B;~p -
L;~p ~ A;~p.
semantics
(W,R,Á,V) is a model of general awareness, if (W,R,V) is an ordinary (multi-
modal) Kripke model in which W is a set ofpossible worldss, the accessibility relation
R; C W x W(dealing with implicit beliefs) serial, transitive and euclidian, and V an
ordinary two-valued valuation function, i.e. V: Prop x W -~ {0, 1}. Furthennore
A;(w) C Gi,A,á for all i, w, and the truth and validity conditions are standard-type
apart from the non-recursive part caused by .A: y
ra M, w ~ p iff V(P, w) - l(p E Prop);
~ M, w ~~ip iff M, w~ ~p;
~Throughout these sections we will sometimes use B instead of B;, etcetera; within a formula or rule,
modal operators are to be considered as coindexed by default.
gOr states, as FBcH call them.
9[FH881 have S and s where we have W and w, x for our Y, B for R, ~ for Prop, truc for l, false
for 0, true for T, false for 1, ~ for ~, ~ for -a, and - for ~.
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. M, w ~ rp ~ t[i iff M, w ~ rp and M, w~~i;
. M, w ~ L;~p iff M, v~ ~p for every v such that wR;v;
. M, w ~ A;rp iff ip E A;(w);
. M, w ~ B;rp iff ~p E A;(w) and M, v~ cp for every v such that wR;v;
.~ ~p iff M, w~ ~p for all models M and worlds w in M.
completeness and correspondence
This simple semantics enables a nice and easy completeness result:
Theorem 6.1 (FaginácHalpern) ~o
The modal system for the logic of generalawareness is pL f weak SS (i.e. NKD45)I I
for L, and the axiom ~ B;~p H L;~p n A;~p.
Proof: Soundness is obvious and completeness is shown by a straightforward Henkin proof.
Canonical awareness sets are defined by .A;(E) - A;-' [Ej.'Z ~
Despite its simplicitythe framework is a very flexible tool: diffcrent types ofawareness
and explicit belief are easy to model, as demonstrated by a number ofcorrespondences.
Here monotoniciry constraints enter our story.
Definition 6.1 (monotonicity)
(monj) A; is upwards monotone with re,cpect to Ri iff wR;v ~ A;(w) C ,Q;(v)
for all w, v;
(monl) A; is downwards monotone with respect to R; iff wR;v ~ A;(v) C ,,4;(w)
for al! w, v;
(mon-) A; is rnnstantly monotone with respect to R; iff wR;v ~ A;(w) - .A;(v)
for all w, v.
1. Introspection (with respect to awareness) amounts to the axiom Acp -. AA~p.
This corresponds to the condition A[A(w)] C A(w) on structures of general
awareness.
2. Upward monotonicity corresponds to the axiom A~p -. LA~p.
3. Downward monotonicity corresponds to the axiom ~A~p -~ L~A~p.
'o[FH88, theorem 8.4j
"D stands for F L;~p -. ~L;~~p, 4 for F L;~p -~ L;L;`p, and 5 for F ~L;~p -~ L; ~L;~p.
12I.e. ~p E A;(E) q A;~p E E.
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4. C]osure of all A(w) under subformulas (within the `small' language GL ,1)
corresponds to the addition of the axioms:13
~(AL~p v AA~p v A~~p) -~ A~p,
I- A(~p n r~) -~ (A~p n A~i).
5. Next consider the case of awareness of a set of atoms, or rather, of all formulas
containing just those atoms. I.e., for all worlds and every agent there is a
subset ~Y C Prop such that A(w) - G(~Y). In the small language (with B;
introduced by definition), this corresponds to the system consisting of the axioms
F~ ALrp H A~p, ~ AAip ~-. Acp, ~ A~rp H A~p and ~ A(ip n tli) H(Aip n A~i).
6. Finally consider awareness by ]imited time~space bounds, for example (local)
knowledge of a processor (i) in a distributed system.14 This boils down to
requiring reflexiviry of the relations R; and constant monotonicity of A; with
respect to Ri. The corresponding axioms are L;~p ~ ~p, A;~p -~ L;A;~p and
~A;~p -~ L,-,A;~p.
monotonicity effects and evaluation
The generality of this approach enables instantiations for special kinds of awareness.
Here are some comments on these special kinds.
First, with respect to monotonicity, we can inspect the monotone kinds of gen-
etal awareness emphasizing the bilateral relationships among awareness, implicit and
explicit belief.
Proposition 6.1 The implications displayed below are valid under monj, their con-
verses under monJ,, and their bidirectional counterparts (i.e. equivalences) under
mon-:
~mon1 AcP -~ LA~p ~m~i I.~A~ -i ~fi~
~n,on1 Btp -~ LB~p ~moni L~B~p --~ ~B~p
~m~t (B!p n AB(p) -i BBlp ~m~1 B~B(p ~(~B(p n A~BfP)
Proof: straightforward from the definitions. ~
So, in the light of what follows later on, noteworthy instances are ~„~~t Bcp --~ LB~p,
~m~! LBrp -i Btp, ~mon- LB~p H Btp, ~mon1 j,~Btp -~ ~B~P. ~monl ~Btp -i
L-,B~p, and ~mo„- L~B~p ~-. ~B~p.
Second, closure under subformulas, and in particular for conjunctions is allegedly
motivated by reference to the `pragmatically paradoxical' 15 formula B(p n~Bp)
which would become satisfiable without imposing the restriction. In fact, as pointed
13Likewise extended for the full language by axioms sucli as F AB~p --~ A~p.
~~See [FH88, p.57] for details.
1sCf. chapter 5.
156 CHAPTER 6. TOTAL LOGICS OF AWARENESS
out in [vdHM88], something more is needed to make ~B(p ~~Bp) valid: upward
monotoniciry should hold as well.1ó The price to pay is that K- and C-omniscience
are regained, which is sometimes considemd problematic for explicit belief.
Third, for resounce-bounded reasoning it may not be obvious that the ambitious
claims of FBtH can be effectuated. In fact only the case for distributed computations
is dealt with in some detail. FBcH also mention cryptography as one of the possible
applications. The feasibility of this type of application depends on the pt~ecise nature
of the source: is it simply the length of the formulas or some other notion of syntactic
complexity, the size of the possible models, the number of steps of the derivation, or
what? It is perfectly clear that structural limitations (complexity of formulas) will be
easier to incorporate than derivational limitations. Yet recent work on so-called zero-
knowledge proofst~ attempts to captun; resource-bounded reasoning for cryptographic
applications.
Fourth, Konolige claims thal the semantics proposed for general awareness is not
adequate since "the fonnal correspondence between accessibility relations and sets of
awareness sentences breaks down" [Ko86, p.246]. Now, literally this is not the purpose
of the awareness sets. So, let us try to make sense out of this quote by transforming it
into a question: `are there axiom schemes that have no formal correspondent in terms
of a structural constraint on validating frames?' In fact let us consider the 4 axiom for
B: B~p -. BB~p. Konolige apparently suggests that this scheme is troublesome. It
is not difficult to formulate validating conditions: A has to be mont and closed with
respect to B (i.e. ~p E A(w) ~ B~p E A(w)). To get full correspondence we have
to relax these conditions a bit: monT and B-closure only have to hold for formulas in
worlds where they are modally satisfiable.lg Now such a condition is rather unusual,
and perhaps this may have worricd Konolige, but this is not a formal reason to abandon
it. A similar story goes for the 5 axiom of negative introspection of explicit belief.
So most of these specialities seem quite robust, but there has been some criticism
on the general part of the story as welL [Ko86] holds that the logic is essentially
the syntactic approach19 in disguise. We basically disagree. True, the logic contains
a large syntactic component: thc awareness sets consist of (uninterpreted) formulas.
Awareness thus becomes a(gencrally non-recursive) non-logical notion. But there is
also a recursive semantics attached to it, dealing with ordinary logical aspects. This
may seem a rather eclectic approach, combining syntactic and semantic elements, but
here it is precisely what we want: the limited inference is accounted for by a proper
semantics. Konolige wants to abolish the semantics altogether, but this only makes the
logic less insightful - if we would express the inferences by deductive rules only, we
have failed to give a reason for the propemess of the inference. By its axiomatizations,
the logic of general awareness is able to provide the deductive rules as well. Of
t6Cf. [FH88, footnote 6]. Instead ofmonj, [vdHM88, p.29] requ've the stronger mon-.
~~1'he key reference is [GMR85]; see also [HMT88].
1eI.e. for all such frames F, if therc is a V such that F,V,w ~ LlO and ~p E A(w), then both
B~p E A(w) and ~p E A(o) for all v such [hat wRv.
19The syntactic approach, which abolishes all model theory, is strictly based on sets of formulas and
(limited) inference rules.
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course, a purely semantic and fully recursive approach would be preferable, but we
believe this is intrinsically impossible, due to the psychological nature of awareness:
consciousness of the whole need not imply consciousness of all parts, and vice versa.
At this point it may be wise to point at some unanswered questions about axioma-
tizations for sublanguages. It is not obvious which modal systems trigger the various
sublanguages. In order to gain insight into the logical properties of explicit belief:
what is B's own system? What is the complete logic using merely B and A? And
what is the one for just B and L? So far we have only partial answers to these queries.
For example, some valid principles not mentioning L are:
. ~ W ,w: ~ ~ W ,Bw: (N')
.~(B(~p -~ ~i) n B~p n A~,) -~ B~, io
. 1- Brp ~ ~BB~rp
.~(B~p n AB~p n BA~p) --~ BB~p
. ~ (A~B~p n B,A~p) - . B,B~p
Notice that many of these principles resemblc the usual axioms and rules of normal
modal logic with enough awareness built-in. Also notice that N' implies D(~ B~p --~
~B~~p), as well as D~ (~ ~B(~p n~~p)) and other dual relaxations ofprinciples that are
invalidontheirown, such as ~ (B~pnB~t~i) -~ ~B~(~pn~i), the weakened counterpart
of C.
6.3.1 two specialized alternatives
Huang 8t Kwast
In [HK91 ] a special variant of the logic of general awareness is proposed. The
characteristic features of this system are:
. certain conditions on the awareness functions A:
- propositional closure: ~~p E A(w) q tp E A(w) and (~p n~i) E,A(w) q
~p, ~ E ,A(w),
- nested awareness: A~p E A(w) ~ cp E A(w),21
- belief awareness interpretation: A~p E A(w) a L~p E A(w);
. a modified definition of explicit belief (B;):
B;~p - L;~p n A;L;~p.
mThis pmperty was suggested in the chapter of Halpern ct. al.'s forthcoming book, cf. note 36.
Z~The name of this condition stems from the axiom it triggers: AA~p --, Aw.
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Some comments may be in order. To start with the last point, notice that, even without
A;, the new B; (say BHK) can be expressed in terms of in the old B; (B;~) and L;,
but not the other way round:
~ BHK~
~ BiIILi~.
So F8t H's definition is more general. Pertiaps the new definition is more adequate, but
this dces not follow from the alleged argument:
However, according to the [FBr.H] definition, it is possible that [. ..] agent
i may not be aware of ~p in a[n accessible] state t though he believes ~o is
true. [HK91, p.294]
With regard to the above definition the quoted argument is a non sequitur: instead
of implying B;~p -~ A;L;~p, it establishes B;~p --~ L;A;tp, which is validated by monj
of A; (proposition 6.1).
With regard to the constraints on the awareness function .A;, I am willing to believe
the conditions of propositional closure and nested awareness22, but it is diffieult to
accept the belief awareness interpretation. It is especially difficult to grasp the intuition
behind A;L;cp ~ A;A;cp.
One of the prime goals of ~ HK91 ] is to show that by means of the awareness
operator one can define differem kinds of implications, some of which would lead to
K- and I-type omniscience and others not. Yet only part of this aim has been realized.23
Gillet ác Gochet
One complaint which is sometimes directed against GAt. is that the awareness sets
seem to be unstructured wholes, whereas at least one way of knowing and becoming
aware of things is by thinking about them, by `mental computation'. However, a more
structured notion of awareness can easily be incorporated into GAL. One proposal,
capturing resource bounded awareness was executed in [Mo88). Another inten;sting
suggestion was made in [GG90], where the levels of awareness are not based on
computational limitations, but on the syntactic complexity of the formula. Some
essential features of this system are:
. the depth d(French: 'profondeur') of a fortnula is, roughly, the maximum
numberof nested logical constants (including the belief operators) in a formula,
with the exception of ~(which does not count) and H(which counts twice).
~Although we would still prefer the constraint of closure undcr subfonnulas, joined with the mono-
tonicity conditions.
uSome of the reported results aze not ent'trely correct. For ezample, proposition 6.2(c), which is
imponant because it serves as a redefinition for the strong irrtplicalion ti.;, should read: (~p -...; ~b) H
((cp ~~) n A;cp n A;`b n A;A;~rb) [the negation in the last conjunct was left out; the second last
conjunct is not necessary for the equivalence but is vital for the new definition: it ensures Kclosure].
Propositions 6.7 (b) and ( c), which are presumably intended to express I-omniscience, are misleading:
they hotd vacuously since the premises aze false.
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. the awar~eness sets do not depend on the world under consideration, but on the
depth of the fonnulas. In fact [GG90] do not use a more or less `semantic'
notion of awareness A~d~, but directly define awareness-up-to-depth d by means
of a purely syntactic operation on fotmulas.24 Instead of giving the formal
definition, which is rather involved, we illustrate this part of the system by an
example below.
. a definition of explicit belief-up-to-depth d, i.e. B~d~:zs
B~d1 ~P - L;A~dI ~p.
To illus[rate the operation A~dl , consider the following example. On the 0~ level of
awareness, a formula such as p-~ (p v q) is construed as being entirely opaque, i.e. as
a new atom apylPVql. On awareness level 1, the outermost structure of the formula is
revealed: ap --~ apvq. On level 2 and higher, more and more information is revealed;
here it repn~duces the original formula p-i (p V q).
The stratified notion of awareness licenses a similarly layered truth condition for
B(d~. Then valid depth d belief implies the validity of `deeper' belief. Although the
definitions of depth and awareness have some pcculiar features (effecting, for exam-
ple, the questionable validity of Bldl ~~~p H Bldl ~p), the idea of layered awareness
warrants further research.
6.3.2 the logic of special awareness
The specia! awareness logic (sAL) in [FH88] describes the type of explicit belief that
can be related to a number of acquainted facts. ln a sense, this may be regarded as a
recursive altemative to GAL. In this set-up, there is no need for an awareness operator
in the basic language, which can be characterized as G~ L. A syntactic counterpart to
the semantically present awareness can be defined, but it will lack the simple properties
of Ai in GAL.
semantics
Models are of the fonn (W, R, Á, V), where, as in GAL, (W, R;, V ) is an ordinary
(weak S5) Kripke model which is augmented with awareness sets that are now sets of
propositional atoms: A;(w) C Prop for all i, w.Zb
Although the truth assignment to propositional atoms is classical, apartial effect is
reached by restricting truth and falsity of formulas in worlds by means of the awareness
sets. Here ~~ denotes ttuth with respect to ~Y, where ~Y is a set of conscious atoms.
Likewise, ~~ stands for falsiry with respect to ~Y. So w~~ p does not imply
uNotice that this operator At~l is not a modal operator of the logical language.
uAt least, this is [he effect of the truth condition !or B~dl; as far as we can see, the given redefinition
accords to the other proposed definitions, and simplifies matters considerably.
~Again we have changed the notation. FBcH's ~ is replaced by ~~ and ~F by ~ i.
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w~~p, if p~ ~Y. Apart from these restricted truth and falsity relations there is also
an unrestricted classical wth relation (~). These relations are defined by recursion:
. M, w ~~ p iff V(p, w) - 1 and p E tiY (where p E Prop);
M, w ~ ~ p iff V(p, w) - 0 and p E ~Y (p E Prop);
M, w ~ p iff V(P, w) - l(p E Prop);
. M,w~~ ~tpiff M,w ~~tp;
M, w~ ~~~p i ff M, w~~ tp;
M, w~ ~tp iff M, w~ ip;
. M, w ~~ cp ~ tli iff M, w ~~ tp and M, w~~ ~i;
M,w ~~ipn~iiffM,w ~~cporM,w ~~~i;
M, w~ tp ~~i iff M, w~ cp and M, w~~i;
. M, w ~~ L;tp iff M, v~~ cp for every v such tha[ wR;v;
M, w~ ~ L;~p iff M, v~ ~ ~p for some v such that wR;v;
M, w~ L;~p iff M, v~ ~p for every v such that wR;v;
. M, w ~~ B;ip iff M, v ~~~~(wl rp for every v such that wR;v;
M, w~ ~ B;rp iff M, v ~ ~~A (w)~p for some v such that wR;v;
M, w~ B;~p iff M, v~A~(w) cp for cvery v such that wR;v;
.~ ~p iff M, w~ ~p for all models M and world w in M.
Equipped with these definitions a kind of persistence can be shown.
Proposition 6.2 (FaginB~Halpern) 27
If tY C~' C Prop then for all M, w, cp:
. M,w~~rp~M,w~~~cp~M,w~cp
. M,w~~tp~M,w~~ rp~M,w~~p
In particular, we have that w~~ ~p ~ w~ ~p, but not vice versa: the equivalence
breaks down with the falsity case for B;.ZR Proposition 6.2 is a convenient tool for
proving validities.
~[FH88, proposition 4.1(2,3)]
~However, [Wa90, lemma 1] seemingly streng[hens this resul4 that is, if we recursively specify the
atoms in a formula ~p relevant for awareness in w by means of the sets T~,(~p) and T.,(~p), and generalize
his restriction set .A;(w') to an arbitrary ~Y C Prop (to keep the induction going), there is an alleged
converse:
M, w~~ ~p p M, w~ rp á T.,(rp) C~Y,
and likewise for ~~. Unfortunately, the claim is wrong: taking ~Y - Prop and A;(w) - 0 provides a
singleton counter-example for ~p - ~Bp (and similarly with A;(w') instead of ~Y).
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Proposition 6.3
~ BB~p -~ B~p ~ B~p -i L~p ~ L~ .-~ LL~p
~ B~~p ~ ~B~p ~ B~p .-~ BL~p ~ L~~p -. ~L~p
~ B~B~p ~ ~B~p ~ B~B~p -~ ~L~p ~ L~L~p .-. ~L~p
ProoF. R is not only transitive, but in addition serial and euclidian, and therefore dense. So, for
example, M, w~ BB~p ~ foreach v and u such that wRv and vRu : M, u ~~1"ln,~l'1 ~~
for each u such that wRu : M, u ~~l~l ~p ~ M, w ~ B~p. The other cases are similar. ~
Although awareness is not syntactically present, it can be reintroduced. The idea is
that somebody may be said to be aware of (or acquainted with) a simple fact p, if p
is true or false relative to the awareness set in cvery state he considers possible; in
other words, if he explicitly believes p V~p. This is licensed by the observation that
p E.A;(w) ~ w~ B;(p V~p). Likewise, one is aware of a complex fact if one is
aware of all the primitives it wntains. This suggcsts the definition
AcG - n, B(P V ~P)
p in rp
The following proposition relates explicit belief and awareness in the simple case of
fonnulas that are free from modal operators.
Proposition 6.4 (FaginBcHalpern)
!f ~p is purely propositional and ~ cp, then ~ Acp --~ B~p.
Proof: a simple contraposition argument suffices. ~
Notice that the restriction to propositional ~p is cssential. wthout it proposition 6.4
does not hold any longer. Here is a counterexample:
Example 6.1 Consider the model ({w, v}, R, A, V) where R- {(w, v), ( v, v)}, p E
A(w), but p~ A(v); V is arbitrary.
~ A p A : ,~ ~
Now let ~p - Bp V~Bp. Then (i) ~ ~p. Furthermore, A~p - B(p V~p), and
p E A;(w) ~ v~~1~1 p V~p ~ w~ B(p v~p), hence (ii) w~ Acp. Finally,
p~.,4(w)f1.A(v) and vRv, thus v ~~Wl Bpand v~ AIw1 Bp, so v ~~wl BpV ~Bp,
whence by wRv, (iii) w~ Bcp.
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rnmpleteness
To obtain completeness [FH88] need a rather peculiar axiom
ANF ~ rp H tp',
where tp' is a normal form of ~p in which each B; can only have scope over p V ~p
for atoms p occurring in tp. This amounts to ~p' E Gq L. Let us call such a tp' an
awareness normal form (ANF) of tp. FBcH provide a procedure to derive an ANF for
each tp in the original language. Though intricate, the procedure is entirely syntactic.
Therefore it is possible to put thc equivalence of tp and its ANF into an axiom. Notice
this axiom is extremely forceful and enables a succinct axiomatization.
Theorem 6.2 (FaginócHalpern) 29
The modal system for the logic of special awareness consists of pL ( including MP),
weak SS (i.e. NKD45) for L; and the ANF axiom.
Proof: Completeness is shown by a slandard Henkin-style argument in which canonical
worlds are maximally consistent scts and the canonical awareness functions are defined by
p E A;(E) a B;(p V~p) E E. Soundness is unusually difficult to prove, due to the ANF
axiom. ~
monotonicity effects
Notice that the above counter-example can be eliminated by the fairly natural condition
ofupward monotonicity of awareness. After all, it seems rather plausible that once you
are aware of p in some world, you still arc aware of p in each altemative you consider
conceivable. The expectation that the generalization of proposition 6.4 is restored
by this condition tums out to be right. However, with monotonicity we can prove a
stronger result, directly relating the concepts of awareness, implicit and explicit belief.
Thene is one proviso here: the formulas should contain operators related to one single
agent (see example 6.2.)
Proposition 6.5 (one agent) ~m~t (Atp n Ltp) -~ Bcp
This fact, which shows a partial similarity with ~AL, is proved by means of a lemma.
Lemma 6.1 For all monotone single-agentmodels M-(W, R, A, V), worlds w and
v, and formulas ~p such that M, w~ Atp and wRv:
M,v~~w]tpl~M,v~tp M,v ~~w]tpq M,v~tp
M V~inA(w) ~ p Me v~,Y ~~
M~v~~n,t(,o)~a M~v~~~
~[FH88, [heorem 8.2j, vide [Lc., pp.65,66~ for an elaborated comple[eness proof and [l.c., pp.70-74]
for soundness of the ANF axiom.
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Proof: By a laborious simultaneous induction on the swcture of ~p. Let M be a model and
w, v worlds such that wRv and M, w~ A(o (we omit M in the rest of this proofj. We show the
key modal step where ~p is of the form B,~. Assume the lemma to hold for ~, (IH). w~ AB~,,
thus then by the definition of A: w~ A,~ (i.; . for all p in ~: p E A(w)). We need to prove
four equivalences: (notice that the use of tH in the subsequent cases is triggered by transitivity
of R)
~ v~~(V) B,li q`du E R[v] : u~~(~)n~(.) ~(i q(tH) du E R[v] : u k~(') ~i q
v ~ B~i.
~ (~) v ~ ~(~) B~ ~ 3u E R[v] : u ~ ~(~)n~(.),G ~ (tH) 3u E R[v] : u ~ ~(') ~i ~
v~ B~ ~ v~ Btti. (C) Suppose v ~ Btli, then 3u E R[v] : u[~~(') ~i ~(by
monj f proposition 6.2) 3u E R[v] : u ~~(~) ~i ~(tH) 3u E R[v] : u~,(, ~([H)
3u E R[v] : u~~(r) ~i ~(monj f proposition 6.2) 3u E R[v] : u ~~(~)n~(') ~, ~
v ~ ~(~) B~i.
~ y~~sn.t(,.) B~ q tfu E R[v] : u ~~n,t(,.)nJt(.) ,~ q(tH) yu E R[v] : u~~n.t(,) ~G
q v~~ B~, and finally
~ v~~n,~t(,.) B~r(~ q 3u E R[v] : u~ ~n.t(m)n.a(.) ,~ q(Ht) 3u E R[v] : u ~~nJt(.) ~G
qv~~B~i. ~
Proof of proposition 6.5: immediately from lemma 6.1: if M, w~ A~p and M, w[- L~p,
then for any v such that wRv: M, v ~ ~p, so by lemma 6.1: M, v ~~(~) ~p, and thereCore
M, w ~ Brp. ~
One of the corollaries of proposition 6.5 is that ~,,,~i Lcp ~ ~„~,,,t Acp ~ Bcp,
which implies proposition 6.4, now for arbitrary unimodal ~p, since ~~p ~ ~ L~p (N)
is valid.
Corollary 6.1 If ~p E GB,a,L and ~„~~t ~p, then ]-,,,o„t A~p ~ B~p.
Notice that proposition 6.5 (and, afortiori lemma 6. ]) do not generalize to the many-
agents case:
Example 6.2
Consider the two-agent singleton model ({w}, Rt, R2i At, .A2, V) where Rt - RZ -
{(w,w)},At(w) - {p},AZ(w) - OandV isarhitrary. Noticethatthemodeltrivially
satisfies the structural and awareness requirements. Now let ~p -~BZp. Then (i)
At rP - Bt (P V~p), so w~ At cp; (ii) w~A2(w) p~ w[~ B2P ~ w~ ip ~ w~
Li ~p; (iii) w ~ A' (w)"A2(w)p ~ w ,-~ A`(w)B2P ~ w~A~ (w) ~p ~ w~ Bt ~p. In all,
w~ At~p A Lt~ A ~Bt,p.
Also notice that the converse of proposition 6.5 does not hold, irrespective of mono-
tonicity conditions: it is easily verióed that e.g. ~ B(p v q) -. B(p v~p).
However, there are other monotonicity results which are valid for the general
multi-modal language, and are significant both fmm the perspective of correspondence
theory, and from the perspective of doxastic application. These results are all related
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to the 4- and convetse 5-axiom for belief in some way or other, and roughly amount
to (implicit) introspection of explicit belief. First we state the correspondence results
for the different monotonicity types:
Proposition 6.6
1. B~p ~ BB~p is determined by monj onfrarnes.
2. ~B~p --. L~B~p is determined by mon j.
3. ~BB~p -~ L~B~p is determined by mon-.
Proof:
1. First we show that the condition is sufficient. Let A be monj with respect to R. Then
M, w~ B~p ~ for each u such that wRu : M, u ~~lml ~p ~ for each v and u
such that wRv and vRu : M, u ~~l~l"~l'1 ~p ~ M, w~ BB~p. Necessity follows
by contraposition: assume there is a non-monj frame (W,R,A). Then [here exist
w, v E W and p E Prop such that wRv and p E A(w) - A(v). Then w ~ B(p V~p),
yet w ~- BB(p V~p). Together this shows full correspondence.
2. To show that mon J is sufficient, we argue indirectly. Let M be a mon j, model and
suppose w ~~B~p n ~L~B~p. Thus for some v and u such that wRv and wRu and
every v' for which uRv': (i) v~~l~l ~p and (ii) v' ~~lYl ~p. By euclidicity of R we
have uRv and so (iii) v~~lul ~p. Proposi[ion 6.2, (iii) and mon j imply (iv) v~~lYl ,p,
contradicting ( i). monl is also necessary, for if it dces not hold for some frame we have
worlds w and v such that wRv and a proposition p such that p E A(v) - A(w). Then
however w ~ ~B(p v ~p) n ,L~B(pV ~p).
3. sufficiency follows from (1) and (2), and necessity is proved analogously. ~
The logics of special and general awareness partly agree with respect to their
monotonicity behaviour. Compared to proposition 6.1, we notice that the validities in
the first two lines still hold:
Proposition 6.7 The implications displayed below are valid under monj, their con-
verses under mon j, and their hidirectional counterparts (i.e. equivalences) under
mon-:
~,,.o„t A~p --~ LA~p ~moni L~A~ -i ~A~
~moni B~p ~ LB~p ~moni L~B~ ~ ~Btp
Proof: The assertions on the órst line basically follow from the facl that v ~ A~p q `dp in ~p :
p E A(v); those on the second line follow from proposition 6.6. ~
Despite this considerable overlap differenccs abound: ~„~~t B~p -~ BB~p holds in
sAL, but not in ~n~, and the revcrse situation pops up for ~„~~t B~Bip -. A~B~p.
Inspection of the 5-schema for explicit belief (~B~p ~ B~B~p) shows that this
requires a very strong condition on the awareness functions, in fact one which makes
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the system collapse: the distinction between B and L becomes vacuous. The situation
here isvery different from that in GAL, where at least the weakened form of the negative
introspection axiom (~B~p ~ A~B~p) -. B~B~p, could be obtained without running
into a collapse.
Proposition 6.8
1. ~B~p --~ B~B~p is determined by overall totaliry of A3o
2. ~eoeat .4 Bcp r-. Lrp.
discussion
Now as for empirical adequacy, note that IA of types N, I and E is circumvented, but
that K holds again. This means that agents are supposed to be entirely consistent in
their beliefs, which is an idealization, of course. In some respects this logic is similar
to the form of GAL where the awareness sets are closed under subformulas. General
awareness as generated from a set of atoms seems even closer. FBr.H note however that
the formula B~p ~ B(~p V t(i) is not valid according to this kind of general awareness,
which is an advantage of this logic over that of special awareness. What is the precise
relation between the logics of special and general awareness? To make the general
comparison work ( i.e. in the absence ofmonotonicity constraints), A; has to be left out
ofthe language. Then `special' explicit beliefs can simply be pushed into the `general'
awareness sets. More formally, for any sAL modcl M-(W, {R;};, {A;};, V) define
an equivalent GAL model M~ -(W, {R;};, {,Ai};, V), where A;(w) - {~p ~ M, w~
B;~p}. Then M, w~ ~p q M', w~ ~p is shown by a straightforward induction proof.
So,
Proposition 6.9 (reduction of snt. models)
Every sAL model gives rise to an equivalent GAL model.
6.4 Rantala semantics
Hintikka and especially Rantala31 have proposed the addition of nonstandard worlds
which are (according to Hintikka) doxastically orcpistemically accessible but logically
impossible. These rather mysterious entities are somewhat clarified by Rantala who
suggests that nonstandard worlds are arbitrary indices that do not enwunter a validity
test, yet can be arbitrarily `filled' in some cascs. With a slightly disturbing shift
~Different fmm the previous results, for more agents the system has to be homogeneous with respect
to 5 to obtain correspondence. So, the validity of ~B;~p -~ B;~B;~p requ'ves the totatity of alt the A;'s:
di, w: A:(to) - Prop. The proofs are easy exercises.
31V'~de [Hi75], [Ra82a] and (in a very general form) jRa82b].
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in tenninology, Rantala adopts the phrase non-normal worlds for these non-standard
objects.32
A Rantala model for the modal language Gg isof the form (W, W', R, V). Here W
is a set of`normal' worlds and W' a set of'non-normal' worlds; it will be convenient to
put U- W u W'. Then R; C U x U and V: G x U-~ {0,1 }. The truth conditions
for normal worlds w are standard-type - for the connectives they ar~e r~ecttrsively
specióed from the assignments to the atoms. The truth conditions for non-normal
worlds (that may enter when modal fonnulas are evaluated) are free:33 for example,
both tp and ~tp may be true in a non-notmal world w', but then neither should be
false; also neither might be true, but then they are both false. Truth conditions now
are cons[raints on proper valua[ions: (w is normal, u may be non-nonnal, i.e. w E W
and u E U)
. V(~rp, w) - 1 iff V(tp, w) - 0;
. V(Sp ~~, w) - 1 iff V(rP, w) - V( t~i, w) - 1:
. V(D;~p, w) - 1 iff V(~p, u) - 1 for each u such that wR;u;
.~c ~p iff V(~p, w) - ] for each model (W, W', R, V) E C and w E W.
It can easily be shown that Rantala semantics is entirely fiexible: every moda] system
that contains pL is characterized by a class of Rantala models.34 As an example of the
force of this framework [Wa90] shows that
Proposition 6.10 (Wansing)
Each ~n[, model induces a globally equlvalent Rantala model.
Proof:35 Givena cnt, model M-(W, R, Á, V), let M' -(W, W' , B, R, Á, V') beaswcture
suchlha[W'-{A;(w)~iGrnBtwEW},wA;vpv-,A;(w)BtwEW,6;-R;UA;.
B;, L;, A; are interpreted by means of B;, R;, A; respectively. V'(p, w) - V(p, w) if w E W,
and V'(~p, w') - 1 iff ~p E w' 8c w' E W'. Then imposing the usual wth conditions on
normal worlds for connectives and modal operators tutns the structure into a Rantata model
that is equivalent to M on normal worlds, and thcrefore the two models are globally equivalent,
i.e. verify the same formulas. ~
~Rantale's normal worlds correspond to [Kr65b]'s designated worlds rather than to Kripke's normal
worlds. With Kripke, checking validity takes place in designated worlds, with Ranlala in his normal
worlds. There is also a difference in the truth conditions for O: Kripke's non-normal worlds w' reject
any belief whatsoever, i.e. w' [6 t7rp, whereas Rantala's non-normal worlds w' allow an arbitrary truth
assignment to beliefs, i.e. whether or not w' ~ O~p is stipulated by the model. So with Rantala, N is
eliminated not by some constraint on the starting point of evaluation, but by missing information in the
accessible worlds.
33So, they are not open, i.e. the semantics is still total. However, in general truth values sre not
recursively specified.
~Cf. [PW89]. [Wa89]; the canonical model and truth lemma are rather straightforward.
~Our proof slightly departs from W:insing's since he does not treat A; as a genuine modal operator,
with an accessibiliry relation A; of its own.
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6.5 Sieve models
Although proposition 6.10 demonstrates that Rantala models are well-equipped for
awareness logics, it does not show their superiority, neither as a speciflc description
of a certain type of awareness, nor as a general framework. The point is that a
slight generalization of the GAL models already provides an equally basic and flexible
framework: let us simply drop the structural conditions on R; (i.e. do not n:quire
seriality, transitivity and euclidicity).36 Technically, these sieve models ane of the fomt
(W, R, Á, V) where (W, R;, V) is a common Kripke model and A;(w) C G~ for all
w E W. The essential truth condition is like the cAt. one for explicit belief:
w~ t];tp iff tp E A;(w) 8c v~ tp for all v such that wR;v
Then we can prove a converse to Wansing's result:
Proposition 6.11 (reduction of Rantala models to sieve models)
Every Rantala model induces a globally equivalent sieve model.
Proof: A Rantala model M-(W, W', R, V) can be transformed into a sieve model M' -
(W, R', Á, V'), by taking37
~ R;-R;n WxW
~,A;(w) -{~t~i ~ V(1G, v) - 1 for all v E W' such thal wR;v}
~ V'(p, w) - V(p, w) for all p E Prop, w E W.
A straightforward induction on the structure of the formulas shows simulation of truth on these
models:
V(rp, w) - 1 q M', w ~~p, for all w E W.
We will prove the induction step for o;, the other steps are omitted: assume the asser-
tion to hold for some ~p (lH), then V(o;~p,w) - I q dv E R;[w] : V(~p,v) - 1 q
dv E R; [w] n W: V(rp, v) - 1 8t `dv E R; [w] n W' : V(~p, v) - 1 q(by IH t defs. R; and
,A;) b'v E R~[w] : M', v ~ rp 8t ~p E A;(w) q M', w~ ~;tp.
Therefore, since global truth is restricted to W, M~~p q M' ~ ~p. ~
The last two propositions show that Rantala's non-normal world semantics and
sieve semantics are equivalent, and therefore eyually (lexible (the structural condi-
tions for GA[. models do not interfere in Wansing's result). Combining the prcvious
~ After reading an eazly version of [Th91a], Jce Halpern sent me the chapter `Dealing with logical
omniscience' of a forthcoming book on Reasoning aboul Knnwledge, which he is writing in collaboration
with Ron Fagin, Yoram Moses and Moshe Vardi. The section on awareness shows the same relaxation
of structural constraints, which, like with us, may have becn prompted by Wansing's embedding ofGat.
models in non-normal world semantics (proposition ó.lo). Consequently, Halpem's chapter and the
present chapter shaze a number of results, such as proposition 6.11.
~Almost the same construction has independently been suggested by Halpem, cf. jWa90, note 7]. The
generality of the result was apparently overlooked, but Halpem [pers. comm.j notes that this is how he
intended his comment on Wansing's manuscript to be interpreted.
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remarks we obtain a corollary, which is useful forderiving more specific completeness
theorems. It can also be shown directly.
Corollary 6.2 Every modal system containing pL is characterized by a canonical
sieve model.
Direct proof: For a modal system S ~ pL, define the canonical model M-(W, R, Á, V)
by:
. W is the set ofmaximally S-consistent sets of formulas,
. I'R;0 iff t7; ~(I'] C ~,
~ ~t;(r) - o; ' [r],
. V(P, E) - 1 iff p E E.
This enables an easy proof of the truth lemma; since S contains pL we also have Lindenbaum's
lemma. Together this shows completeness in the usual way. t.
A first grumbling remark here is that the proof is almost too easy; the reason for this
ease is that the .A-sets allow an enormous amount of freedom. Specific logics will
be more difficult to handle, since we will be inclined to impose the constraint on the
R-relations instead of on the A-functions, which is impossible in the general case.
Also in this respect sieve semantics and Rantala's non-normal world semantics are
comparable: in the latter case thc valuation type is the second dimension of freedom.
This comparison also indicates that it is somewhat dubious to count A as part of the
frame, as we did earlier. A second remark is that for arbitrarymulti-modal logics, the
R in the sieve models can be dismissed, tuming the semantics into `syntax in disguise'.
So, for the homogeneous modal language Gó the completeness proof above can be
simplified by taking R; - 0, but the earlicr clause fits the heterogeneous language
Gï,~ B, where the logic for each L is nonnal and B~p q L~p ~ A~p. So, for awareness
logics the coexistence of explicii and implicit belief makes us keep the R after all.
6.6 Neighbourhood semantics
In this section we review neighboufiood semantics as a framework for providing
awareness logic. Then we will introduce cluster models and show how they are related
to neighboufiood structures, and we will argue that the latter are still preferable. A
similar story can be told for Jaspars' construal of the [RB80] fusion models. Finally
we will argue that there is no technical reason to maintain such models in the presence
of the framework of sieve models.
Neighbourhood or `Scott-Montague' (sM) semantics can be regarded as a topo-
logical or functional generalization of Kripke semantics.38 First consider a classical
Kripke model M -(W, R, V). We employ some abbreviations:
~ [sr'IM - {v l M, v ~ t~};
~[Mo68], [Sc70j; the functional view has been elaborated by David t.ewis.
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~ R[w] - {v ~ wRv}.
The truth condition for necessity can thus be refonnulated as:
w E [~ip] iff R[w] C [rp],
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in other words, iff [cp] E{X C W ~ R[w] C X}. From this it is but a small step to
replace the principal ólter {X C W ~ R[wJ C X} by an arbitrary set of subsets of
W, a`neighbourhood' (of w). So an sM model ( W, N, V) has the usual W and V and
N(w) C p(W ). The key truth condition is:
w~ O~p iff [~p] E N(w)
The neighbourhood metaphor is clearly inspired by topology (abstract geome-
try) and this way of putting things certainly has pictorial advantages. However, for
symbolic manipulation another formulation is more apt. Compared to traditional
mathematics, the altemative format is closer to algebra than to geometry. The idea
is to consider (syntactic) modal operators also as semantic operators. In a functional
model (W, f, V) a modal t] is interpreted by an operator f:~(W) --~ fr(W), i.e.
[~~] - Í([~]).
These are just two ways of saying the same thing, though.39
Proposition 6.12
Neighbourhood semantics andfunctional semantics are equivalent.
Proof: notice that f and N are interdefinable: w E f(X) q X E N(w) ~
rnmpleteness and rnrrespondence
A completeness theorem is easily found and proven: ~
Theorem 6.3 (Segerberg) The modal logicfor sM semantics is pL t E.
So, omniscience of types N, K, C or I can be avoided. Moreover, sM semantics is of
considerable flexibility, as can be seen in a number of correspondences:
C: (intersection) f(X)fl f(Y) C f(X nY)
N: (fixed unit) f(W) - W
D: (consistency) f(X ) fl f(W - X)- 0
~This duality is reminiscent of the situation in generali-r.cd quantifier theory, where one encounters a
functional vs. a relational view on interpreted determiners, comparable to our neighbourhood vs opcrator
view.
~See [Ch80].
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4: (interiorproperty) f(X ) C f( f(X ))
5: (ezterior-property) W - f(X ) C f(W - f(X ))
Now interpreting o as explicit belief (B), which requirements should be imposed
on N or f? As a prerequisite to this, observe the following evident postulates for B:
D~ ~ ,B(~p n ,~p)
C~ ~ B(~p n~) -~ (B~p n B~)
These principles have simple semantic counterparts:
D~: (fixed aero) f (0) - 0
C~: (upward monotonicity) X C Y~ f(X) C f(Y)
Accepting C~ implies accepting I too, because of the validity of E. So we are stuck
with some types of Lo after all. As a matter of fact, it seems that E and I are
only slightly weaker than N: assume41 some simple observation p and some complex
mathematical truth ~p. So ~ ~p and conscquently ~ p H (p n cp), and therefore
~ Bp ~-. B(p n ~p). In words, if one believes some fact, then one will also believe
that fact and a complicated piece of mathematics. We may conclude that for these
severe types of 1.o neighbourhood semantics is no great help, but it may be used for
some types of omniscience, just like the following two systems do.
6.6.1 Cluster models
To motivate yet another logic, FBr.H claim that
Although the logic of general awareness is quite flexible, it still has the
property that an agent cannot hold inconsistent beliefs. [. ..] Our key
observation is that one reason that people can hold inconsistent beliefs is
that beliefs tend to come in non-interactive clusters. [FH88, p.58]
In this respect an agent is similar to a community in which different persons may
have different opinions, yet no one will defend contradictions. In a nutshell, beliefs
stemming from various frames of mind need not be combined by the agent. In
particular, we may want B~p n B~cp to be satisfiable, but B(~p n~~p) not. So clearly
axiom schema C has to be rejected for this logic. To this purpose FBr.H propose what
we will call `cluster models'.42
d1This argument was suggested by Rcné Ahn.
a2In (FH88, sect.ó] cluster models are called 'Kripke structures for local reasoning'.
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semantics
Cluster models are of the fonn (W, {C;};, V), where W and V are as usual, C;(w) C
p(W)-{0}andC;(w) ~ 0foreachw E W. SoC;(w)isanonemptysetofnonempty
sets of wor[ds. The truth conditions for the connectives are standard-type and those
for the doxastic operators run as follows:43
. M, w~ L;cp iff M, v~ cp for every v such that v E(~EC;(w) T
(i.e. ÍÍCi(w) C ~tP~);
. M, w~ B;~p iff M, v~ cp for all v in some panicular T E C;(w)
(i.e. there is a T E C;(w) such that T C Q~p~, or: C;(w) fl pQcp~ ~ 0).
These clauses enable an evaluation of the behaviour of explicit belief with respect to
the different sorts of omniscience: N-omniscience is obviously restored, i.e. N holds
for explicit belief once again. For if ~p is valid, then Qcp~ - W for any model, and
so B;~p is always true. I is also easily proved valid by the transitivity of C. C is
eliminated, however:
Example 6.3 A,simple counter-example for (Bp ~ B~p) ~ B(p ~~p) is:
Here C(w) - {{w}, {v}}.
This implies that K-omniscience is avoided too, since C and K are deductively equiv-
alent, modulo I and the propositional calculus. The above countennodel shows that
the `consistency' axiom D, which is equivalent to ~(B~p ~ B~cp), is also invalid. Yet
the (by I) weaker axiom D~` is validated: (for B, not for L!)
D~ ~ ,B(cp n ,~p),
i.e. ~~B1. We are ready for a completeness result.
Theorem 6.4 (FagináHalpern) aa
The modal system for the logic of local reasonin~~ is K (i.e. NK) for L;, NID~ for B;,
together with the connecting axiom ~ B;cp ~ L;~p.
A proof of this fact and a discussion of extensions of the system along the dimension of
introspection is omitted since wecan give another, very rewarding result which obviates
the completeness theorem. This is achieved by a direct correspondence between cluster
models and sM-models. Since truth of explicit bclief amounts to containment of a set
of the relevant cluster, and to membership of the relevant neighbourhood, we at least
have to require the neighboufioods to be increasing (-upwards monotone).
~~In an earlier version of [FH88], presented on I1CA185, enother operator S; ('strong belief') pops up,
with interpretadon M, w~ S;~p iff M, v~ rp for all T E C;(w) and v E T(q U C;(m) C[~p]~).
~[FH88, theorem 8.Sj
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Proposition 6.13 (reduction of cluster to neighbourhood models)
For explicit belief, cluster models are equivalent to monotonieally increasing neigh-
bourhood structures with fixed unit and fixed zero. For implicit belief the related
neighbourhoods are in addition intersective (and therefore filters).
Proof: Given a cluster model (W, C;, V} one can easily conswct a neighbourhood swcture
for B; by adding supersets to the clusters:
N;(w) - C;(w) -{X ~ T C X for some T E C;(w)}
N; is increasing and non-trivial, i.c. N;(w) ~ 0 and N;(w) ~ p(W), since C;(w) ~ 0 and
0~ C;(w). The neighbourhoods for L; are formed by taking intersections:
N;(w) -{X ~ n C;(w) C X}
Then N;(w) is either a principal filtcr or degenerated into N;(w) - p(W).
Now if B; is interpreted by N; and L; by N; in the model ( W, N;, Ni, V) (i.e. w ~ B;~p q
[~p~ E N; (w), etcetera), then a straightforward induction shows that both models are equivalent
(i.e. verify the same formulas in the same worlds).
To show the o[her direction, assume a neighbourhood model ( W, N;, Ni, V) where N; is
non-trivial and increasing, and N; is its closure under arbitrary intersections and supersets. In
fact there exist several correct choices for related clusters:
. C; - N;;
. C;(w) - N; (w) -{X E N;(w) ~ Y C X for no Y E N;(w)} (the C-minimal
elements of N;) -
Again an inductive argument proves equivalence of the cluster model and the sM modeL ~
Theorem 6.4 now follows as an almost immediate corollary.
The obvious advantage of such a reduction is that a lot of results become available.
To wit, for neighbourhood structures 4 holds precisely on those neighbourhood frames
that have the interior-property, which after translation into cluster semantics yields:
X E C; (w) ~{v ~ X E C; (v)} E C; (w)
FBcH propose a different condition to ensure positive introspection for both types of
bel ief:
vETEC;(w)~TEC;(v)
This elegant condition implies interiority, and would be preferable because of its
simplicity. Unfortunately it is too strong, i.e. it verifies 4 but does not correspond to
it. Here is a counter-example to full correspondence:
Example 6.4
Let W- {w, v}, C(w) -{{w}, {v}, {w, v}} artd C(v) - {{w, v}}. See figure 6.1
(in the diagrams,C(w) is indicatedby thin lines, C(v) by thick lines). C- Ct has the
interior-properry and therefore verifies 4. However it does not conform to the above
condition: v E {v} E C(w), but {v} ~ C(v).
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Figure 6.1:
A very similar story can be told for negative introspection. 5 schemata are verifled
on frames having the exterior-property:
X~ C; (w) ~{v ~ X ~ C; (v)} E C; (w)
FBcH again propose a mueh mone simple condition:
v E T E C;(w) ~ C;(v) C C;(w)
Again this condition is sufficient but not necessary witness the following counter-
example:
Example 6.5
Let W- {w, v}, C(w) - {{w}, {w, v}} and C(v) - {{w}, {v}, {w, v}}, see
figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2:
C- C1 has the exterior-property and thus verifies ~B~p ~ B~B~p. Nowever it does
not conform to the above condition: v E {w, v} E C(w) and C(v) ~ C(w).
6.6.2 Fusion models
[Ja91b] deals with `confused' belief, as he calls it, suggesting to solve the problem
of why incompatible beliefs apparently do not lcad to total mental collapse. To this
purpose Jaspars uses the idea of `fusion' of worlds from [RB80], but without the need
to stipulate non-standard worlds created by algebraic operations on ordinary worlds.as
`SCf. [Va86] for a different though similar implementation of the `fusion' idea of [RB80]; Vazdi's
account is closer to the otiginal idea, where fusion is achieved by lattice-like operations on worlds.
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ln a fusion model M-(W, R;, V) an accessibility relation R; C W x( p(W) -{0})
typically connects worlds to `fused' sets of worlds instead of to single worlds. The
crucial truth condition is essentially:
. M, w ~ B;tp iff X n[tp]M ~ 0 for all X such that wR;X.
Where [RB80] adds conditions to normalize the logical system, Jaspars considers the
pure semantics and demonstrates its soundness and completeness for the modal system
multi-NI. Our point is that the same strategy applied to cluster models can be used
here too: a reduction to neighbcwrhood models is feasible. This may be surprising
given the `second order' nature of the above truth condition.
Proposition 6.14 (reduction of fusion models)
Fusionmodels correspond to strong, monotonically inereasing neighbourhoodstruc-
tures.
Proof: Starting with a fusion model M-(W, R;, V) , one can construct a neighbourhood
structure N-(W, N;, V) for B; by:
N;(w)-{X ~`dY:wR;Y~XnY~O}.
N; is obviously increasing and strong; by induction M and N aze equivalent.
For the other direction, let N-(W, N;, V) be a neighbourhood model in which every N;
is strong and increasing. Then a related fusion model M-(W, R;, V) can be defined:
wR;X q X C W anci X n Y ~ 0 for all Y such thal Y E N;(w).
This definition is correct since wR;X 8~ W E N;(w) ~ 0~ X C W. We prove the key
induction step for the equivalence of the models, assuming [~p]~ -[~p]f,r (lH):
M, w~ B;~p q for all X such that wR;X: X n[~p]M ~ 0 q(IH) for each X such that
X n Y ~ 0 for all Y E N;(w): X n[rp]~r ~ 0 q' [~p]~r E N;(w) q N,w ~ B;~p.
Here ~' is obvious (take Y-[~p]) and ~' follows by an indirect argument: suppose that
[~p] ~ N;(w) and for each X such that X n Y ~ 0 for all Y E N; (w): X n[~p] ~ 0. Since N;
is monotonically increasing Y~ [~p] for all Y E N; (w), so for all Y E N;(w): Y n[~p]` ~ 0.
The choice X-[~p]` thus leads to the contradiction [~p] n[~p]` ~ 0. So [B;~p]~ -[B;~p]~,r.
The procedure used in this pmof again provides an effective way to incorporate
additional axioms, such as D~` and 4. The corresponding conditions can thus be
derived and coincide to those presented in [Ja9lb].a6
~To wit, the first vansformation used in the proof gives that X ~ N(w) q wRTX`. Thus the
D~ condition 0~ N(w) amounts to wRrW. The usual 4 condition vanslates after contraposition and
replacementof X` by Y to wRt{v ~ roRtY} ~ wRTY.
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6.6.3 comparison
Given the mductions to sM models we see no compelling reason to create a new kind of
semantics. The somewhat greater intuitive appeal of the clusters which are generally
smaller than neighbourhoods is nullified by the difficulty in fonnulating structural
constraints, as illustrated above. And furthermore, neighbourhood models are based
on the simple idea that a proposition corresponds to the set of worlds in which it is
true. Therefore, sM semantics cannot distinguish logically equivalent propositions,
which is generally considered unacceptable for awareness logics.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether these models should coexist with those for general
awareness. It seems that FBtH have overlooked the fact that cluster models essentially
form a special case of the general models for awareness: analogously to the earlier
argument for containment of special awareness into general awareness sttuctures, we
can reduce clustermodels to general awareness models by simulatingvalidated explicit
beliefs in the awareness sets.
Proposition 6.15 (reduction of cluster to sieve models)
Every cluster model induces an equivalent .sieve model.
Proof:47 A cluster model (W, C, V) can be transformecí into a sicve model M' -(W, R, A, V),
by taking
~ wR;v iff v E n C;(w),
~ ,A;(w)-{,(i~M,w~B;t,i}.
A straightforward induction shows simulation of truth on models:
M, w~ rp iff M', w~ rp
The proviso is here that we must be willing to give up the structural conditions on
accessibility. So, seriality, transitivity and euclidicity have to be eliminated; but the
same holds for the treatment of implicit belief in cluster models. More in particular,
we believe there is little motivation to superimpose the awareness function to cluster
models or the like, as[FH88, p.6] ] propose.
A similarand in some respect more general reduction of sM models to sieve models
can also be obtained, by simply taking R; - 0 in thc above proof.
Proposition 6.16 (reduction of sM to sieve models)
Every neighbourhood structure induces an equivalent sieve model.
Despite the fact that neighbourhood semantics is usually bclieved to be the weakest
modal semantics, providing a universal moda] framework, we notice that both Rantala
and sieve models are more general. Therefore, the converse of the last proposition
does not hold, as follows from the respective completeness theorems.
47The referee of 1T'h91a1 rightly notices that this proposition also follows fTOm [Wa90, claim 41 and
proposition 6.11 here.
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6.7 Conclusion and afterthoughts
We have studied a number of `total' awareness logics based on modifications of
classical possible world semantics, either Kripke-style or ScottlMontague-style. Most
of the reseanch reported here was more or less directly connected to the logics proposed
in [FN88]. In retrospect, our contribution has two different aspects: one is theory-
intemal and one theory-extemal.
On the one hand we have developed some total awareness logics further, obtaining
detailed results conceming completeness and correspondence. On the semantic side
conditions of monotoniciry, meaning roughly that what one is aware of in some world
will still be present in the altematives considered possible, tumed out to be important.
Monotonicity conditions often corresponded to (weak) introspection properties of
explicit or actual belief. We notice that though we have solved these correspondence
problems, there are a number of open questions, in particular related to complete and
natural axiomatizations of validity in different (sub)languages.
On the other hand we have compared these logics along the dimensions of gener-
ality and flexibility. Slightly generalizing FBr.H's logic of general awareness GAL, we
obtained a fully general and flexible logic containing what we called a`sieve seman-
tics', which was shown to be eyuivalent to Rantala's (im)possible world semantics.
Just as[Wa90] embedded the logics proposed in (FH88] in Rantala semantics, we were
able to embed them in sieve semantics. In particular, we may summarize the relations
between these logics as follows:
. The most general frameworks capable of modelling every logic containing
the classical tautologies are sieve semantics and Rantala's non-normal world
semantics.
. Subordinated to these most general frameworks are neighbourhood semantics
and the semantics of GAL (which amounts to sieve semantics with accessibility
conditions). These two logics are incomparable: for example, E holds in
neighbourhood structures, but not hold in GAL, D is valid in GAL but generally
not in neighbourhood semantics.
. The special awareness logic is a special case of GAL, i.e. it is stronger than GAL
in the sense that it validates more.
. Cluster and fusion models may be considered to be special cases of neighbour-
hood struetures; their logics are therefore strongec48
Despite the comfort of these results, there are some worries.
Is the most general (awareness) logic necessarily the best? Although `everything'
can be expressed in generalized awareness logic, this logic may not always be prefer-
able. A lot depends on the particular application one has in mind. As Halpem49
aeIn fact the completenessproperties indicate that fusion models are more general than cluster models,
since the former validate less.
a9Priva[e communication. July 1991
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notices, resource-bounded reasoning can be modelled quite naturally within sieve se-
mantics, but it is awkward at best to think of it as a special case of Rantala semantics.
Also, despite the text nyduction, the type of awareness connected to varying belief in
different frames of mind may be modelled more naturally in cluster semantics. This,
of course, is largely a matter of intuition. But then again, how plausible are the sieve
models? After all, the sieve models are based on the notion of possible worlds, which
is an abstraction, especially in the context of belief and knowledge. So, one may argue
that replacing total worlds by partialworlds (or, situations) will be a clear improve-
ment. Moreover, combined with a suitable notion of validity, partial semantics will
automatically exclude a lot of logical omniscience. We will make this move in the
next chapter, but, especially for a logic with both explicit and implicit belief, sieve
semantics is concise and convenient.
Is the generalized awareness logic obtained by sieve semantics still a logic in the
usual sense of the word? In fact, this logic is classical in the sense that it contains all
propositional tautologies, but it is certainly non-classical in the sense that it can model
every consistent set of formulas including these tautologies as if it were a logic. To
some this may go beyond what might be called a`logic' pmper, yet to us this secros
to be an inevitable consequence of modelling such psychological notions as (actual)
beliefor knowledge.
Chapter 7
Partial logics of awareness
In the previous chapter we considered total approaches to awareness and explicit
belief, i.e. bivalent varieties of possible world semantics. Here we advocate a partial
approach to conscious belief. In fact, similar to the richness noticed in part one, there
are several partial approaches to awareness.
7.1 Introduction and overview
Is there a need for a renewed look at awareness`? In the previous chapter we showed
that there are very powerful frameworks (viz. that of sieve semantics and non-normal
worid semantics) that can solve the problem ofmodelling an arbitrary modal logic that
extends the classical propositional calculus. Although the problem of modelling weak
logics for such psychological notions as awareness is thus solved on a technical level,
one often would prefer a more natural representation device.
A more natural approach to the virtues of awareness and the vices of logical
omniscience (t.o) is to move to partial semantics, where the classical truth values
(viz. true and false) may be undefined and sometimes even overdefined, lcading to an,
essentially, 3- or 4-valued logic. After all, the very notion of partiality was motivated
by the idea that one conceives or considers only pan of the world, i.e. the part one
is aware of in one's perception or belief. Therefore we proceed by reinspecting a
standard approach to partial modal logic in the next section and investigate into its
suitability for modelling belief and awareness.
Some of the expressive deficiency of the stanciard partial approach can be removed
by adding new connectives, to wit: non-standard negation and implication, while
keeping the semantics for the old connectives straight. Since this gives rise to renewed
omniscience we also study another approach: keep the syntax straight, but allow a
dual perspective on truth, both partial and complete, within a single system. We also
discuss ways ofdealing with residual problems of awareness, and compare these with
each other, and with total approaches. For reasons of space and preference, we restrict
ourselves to coherent (three-valued) models here.~
1['Th92b] reviews some four-valued approaches advocatul by Levesque and others.
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7.2 A purely partial approach
The initial logical representation language is that of multi-modal propositional logic
G,,n,{e;};(Prop) (G~ for short), with operators B; standing for `agent i explicitly
believes that'. Its semantics consists of the coherent models with the standard
ttvtlt~falsi6ty clauses given in section 4.3. The consequence notion will be that of
relative verification.
Because there are no valid fonnulas in this form of partial semantics, the usual
types of omniscience connected to the modal schemes2 K and C are circumvented.
Moreover, though the inference rules N, I and E are vacuously valid (since the validity
of the premise cannot be realized), they are innocuous now: these rules have no input,
and therefore no output either. For example, B(pV ~p) and B(BpV ~Bp) are neither
valid nor produced by N.
Though the logic deals with belief rather than with awareness, it also provides an
indirect route to awareness: recall from section 6.3.2 that somebody may be said to be
aware of (or, `acquainted with') cp, if every primitive p in ~p has a definite truth value
(1 or 0) in every situation the agent considers possible from the situation she is in,
in other words, if she explicitly believes p V~p.3 Deriving awareness from explicit
beliefs is a promising way to reintroduce one of the central notions in the field.
Since the usual types of t.o are circumvented, and awareness can be derived, the
purely partial semantics for this multi-modal logic may seem quite successful, and this
could be the end of the story. However, there are a number of complications:
. the impossibility of absolute validity apparently excludes the incorporation of
additional properties which are needed to model various types ofknowledge and
belief. Positive and negative introspection ('knowing of what we (do not) know
that we (do not) know it'), tntth of knowledge, and consistency of belief (`not
believing contradictions') cannot be encoded in the usual schemes 4, 5, T and
D, respectively. This will prove to bc a minor point.
. the impossibility of absolute validity also excludes intuitively con:~ect objectéve
truths such as Bp V~Bp.4 More generally, one would prefer a logic that at
least contains (the modal substitutions of) classical propositional logic. This is
a major point.
. unlike absolute validity, we do obtain relative validity. Then it tums out that
many of the eliminated forms of t.o pop up again in relativized form. This is
also a major point.
In a way, the ficst point is cancelled by the third: if the usual types of 1,0, which
are captured by basic modal schemes, are obtainable in a relative shape, this may
2See the introduction to chapter 6.
3See the definition of A~p on page 161.
Í'his may be contrasted to a subjer.tive truth such as B(p V ~p). I use the tetms objective~subjective
in an inwitive sense. The distinction involved dces not conespond to non-modal vs fully modalized (cf.
[I.e84a] etcetera), but to 'intuitively valid' vs 'intuitively contíngent', we suppose.
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also hold for schemes such as 4. For, as in the well-known deduction theorem of
elementary logic, instead of ~ ~p --~ ~t~i one may consider ~p ~ tli as well as, usually, its
contrapositive ~~i ~ ~rp.5
The second point is more serious than the first, since this may involve other
formulas than implications: the closest counterpart of tertium non datur ~ ~p V~tp
seems to be ~p ~ ~p, which is valid in the purely partial semantics under consideration,
but hardly reflects the original scheme. We will sec below that there are fairly easy ways
to resolve the problem of incorporating propositional logic. However, containment of
tautologies may involve the restoration of the deduction theorem and so a solution to
the second problem may reinforce the lurking danger observed in the third point: a
revival of the omniscience connected to, for example, K and I.
The third point is a very serious one. It is also most easily overlooked, since
usually we focus on principles such as N and K. To make the point entirely explicit we
shortly review the deductive system which corresponds to the purely partial semantics
with verificational consequence.
The core system corresponding to the purely partial semantics for modal logic
consists of the tvles of Mt. We repeat some of its highlights:b
(R13) B~p ~ Bi(i ~ B(~p ~~t~i) ( also called C~)
(R15) if ~p ~~t~i then B~p ~ B~, (also called I~)
(R18) B(~p V~,) ~ B~p V B~, (also called K~)
(R19) B(~p n ~~p) ~ ~t(, (moda[ ex falso).
R13 is the relativized counterpart of C, and is therefore dubbed C~. An analogous
similarity holds for R15, which essentially relativizes I. We noticed in chapter 4
that, modulo the other rules, R18 amounts to B(~p -~ ~t(~) ~ Bcp -~ B~i, which is a
relativized form of K.
Although `omniscience' is not a disadvantageous property per se (its pmpemess
depending on the type ofomniscience and the mode of explicit belief), we will try and
see what can be achieved by extending and varying the standard semantics. Different
options will be considered in the next section.
7.3 The recovery of tautologies
We know that there is a very straightforward solution to thc problem how to get our
cherished tautologies back, even within a purely partial semantics. As demonstrated in
chapter 3 and chapter 4, we merely have to change the notion of validity fmm `always
true' to 'never false'. However, the problem is not really how to rewver tautologies,
but how to recover them without tuming thc logic into a normal modal system, in
other words, how to avoid attributing overly strong properties to conscious belief
SIn chapter 4 we provided these 'partial' counterpans of normal modal systems such as S4.
óSee section 4.3.
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and knowledge. The `falsificational' approach indicated above in fact normalizes the
logic and is therefore unfit for our purpose. A similar story can be told about the
supervaluation approach~, cf. section 3.4.6. In the rest of this section we consider two
other options:
. expansion of the language with new `classical' connectives;
. a hybrid approach to truth: simultaneous recutsion on total and partial truth
relations.
7.3.1 expanding the language
One of the most obvious ways to incorporate classical validities is the introduction of
new propositional connectives. Now adding constants (0-place connectives) such as
the primitive T increases the set of tautologies, but T, ~~T, ..., T V ~p hardly reveal
the typical structure of classically valid fotmulas. We would like to mimic classical
tautologies such as cp -~ cp by, for example, a partially valid ~p ~ ~p. But what are the
truth conditions for such a non-standard implication?
In section 3.4.1 we discussed the non-standard implications ~ and ~, which are
defined by means of the non-standard negations ~ and í3, respectively. We noticed the
classical effect of these extra connectives. Since ~ can only be defined on 4-valued
models, we restrict attention to ~ here. We observed that by incorporation of N(or,
equivalently, ~) the classical tautologies can be regained. Moreover, in section 4.5.1
we saw that the ~-free fragment of the modal language (i.e. using only ~, ~, V, B, B)
is entirely classical. So there is a price to pay for capturing the tautologies in this way:
if cp is valid, then B~p is also valid. Also we have ~ B(~p ~~t~i) ~(B~p ~ Br~i). In
other words, N and K hold for ~he ~-frec sublanguages. Therefore, this approach is
deficient for two reasons:
. we have not restored all classical tautologies, but rather have built in a set of
tautologies;
. with respect to these validities, omniscience again holds, in its worst fonn.
We therefore continue our quest for `safe' tautologies.
7.3.2 a hybrid approach to truth
Another way to incorporate tautologies is to adopt a dual perspective on the semantic
states. Worlds as such are complete (someihing must be either true or false in the real
world), but from the point of vicw of the agent they are partial: in general, she only
has information about part of the world. This ideag can be implemented in partial
~At least when supervaluation depends on iruernal extensions. This and other digressions aze discussed
in [Th92b].
'Cf. section 6.3.2 for a similar total proposal due to [FH88] and section 7.5 for comparison.
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semantics by distinguishing two kinds of truth relations. One is the bivalent truth
relation ~, the other the trivalent truth relation ~. Their rounterparts are non-truth
([~) and falsity (~), respectively. A situation is necessarily tnie or false with respect
to ~, but may be undefined with respect to ~.
The definition of a partial model M-(S, B, V) and the trivalent ttvth and falsity




a~ iP I` ~t~i q s [- tP 8t a~ T~i
a~ B;tp q a~ Bitp q t1t E B;[s] : t[- tp
The defini[ion of validity is also entirely straightlorward:
~ ~p iff M, a~ tp for all models M and situations s.
Notice that when checking the validity of a formula, we start with a two-valued
evaluation and are dragged into the three-valued mode only by the modal operators.
In other wonis, it is the doxastic operator which makes one change from objective to
subjective truth, and this seems intuitively correct. Conseyuently, we have a partial
'intemal' logic (i.e. within B) and a classical `extcmal' logic. Let us give some of the
properties of the hybrid system. To start, notice that the relation ~ is indeed bivalent,
and that ~ and ~ are still coherent with respect to each other, in the sense that
a ~ cp ~ a ~ ~p
Coherence can be strengthened to a result that relates partial and classical truth:lo
Proposition 7.1 (propagation) a~ ~p ~ s~ ~p.
Proof: By simultaneous induction on the structure of ~p we prove that s ~ ~p ~ s~~p and
a ~ rp ~ a ~ ~p.
.(basic case) if ~p - p then a~ p~ V(p, s) - 1~ a~ p and a~ p~ V(p, s) - 0~
(coherence) V(p, a) ;E 1 ~ s~ p.
.(induction s[ep) assume the claims above for ccrtain ~p and ,!, (tH), then:
- a ~ ~~p ~ s ~ ~p ~ (IH) s ~ ~p ~ s ~ ~~p:
a~~rp~a~rp~(IH)s~rp~s~~~p.
- a~ rpI`~~a~ rp8ts~ tli~(1H)~s~~páta~tG~a~Son~:
s~ rpAr(i~s~ rpors~tli~(IH)~s~rpors~~~a~rphr(i.
Í'here is a dual possibility for the basic clause: a~ p q V(p, a) ~ 0. Some reflection leams that
this altemative may influence the specific evaluation, but not the class of models involved.
toNotice that a similar result dces not hold for a 4-valued approach: coherence is o( vital importance
here.
184 CHAPTER 7. PARTIAL LOGICS OFAWARENESS
- a~ B: rp q a~ B: ~p:
a~B;~p~3tEB[a]:t~tp~(IH)3tE6[a]:t~~p~a~B;tp. ~
Similar to the purely partial semantics we do not obtain intemal persistence.
Fortunately, the revealing connection between awareness and explicit belief known
from the special awareness logic is conserved: if someone is aware of a tautology, he
believes it.
Proposition 7.2
If cp is purely propositional and ~~p, then ~ Acp ---~ B~p.
Proof: ( by contraposition) Let ~p be a propositional formula such that ~ A~p -. B~p. Then
there is a model M- (S, B, V) and a state s E S such that V ( p;, t) ~ 2 for all t E B[a] and
all atoms pt ,..., p„ occurring in ~p, and, moreover, that M, t' ~ ~p for some t' E B[a]. By
induction it follows that for each ~ E Go{pt ,. ..,p„} and t E B(a]: M, t~ ~ or M, t~ 1G.
Consequently M, t' ~ ~p, and therel~ore by propagation M, t' (aL ~p, thus ~ ~p. ~
The `core logic' of the hybrid semantics consists of classical propositional logic,
the conjunction scheme C and the rule I restricted to modal strong consequence (with
respect to M}):
IMf if ~p I-Mt ~t~i then f- B~p ~ B~t~i
C ~(B~p n B~) -~ B(~p n,~)
Further properties ofexplicit belicf are triggcred by suitable conditions on the frame. In
general, the framework of hybrid tnith is a rather flexible one, more or less comparable
to standard possible world semantics. A remarkable exception to this is the 5 scheme of
negative introspection. The corresponding condition is extremely strong: accessibility
has to be both euclidean and lead to total situations, i.e. states such that every formula
is either supported or rejected. This heavy constraint tums the logic into a normal
modal system (NKS), which, as we have seen, is unfit for our enterprise. Periiaps the
right conclusion from this is thal requiring negative introspection for explicit belief is
very nonsensical, and we should be punished for such a sin. But then we may argue
that positive introspection is almost equally counterintuitive for explicit belief.lt
We may therefore conclude that the hybrid semantics is partly successful. A
number of problems is solved more or less automatically. In particular, we do have
tautologies, but we do not havc N-omniscience. However, we have to confess that
some of the properties attributed to belief in this way are less fortunate. One of the
chief points is the remaining K-omniscience, which is related to the core logic of the
hybrid semantics: in the hybrid system people are forr,ed to believe the conclusions
derivable within their own bclicf. Unlike other authors we do not think that such
closure under implication is acceptable for any sense of explicit belief. We will tum
to this problem in the next section.
't Perhaps the convetse schemata: F BB~p ~ B~p (4~) and H B~B~p y~B~p (5~), called'extraspec-
tion' schematain [vdH91], are preferable to the usual forms of introspection.
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7.4 The elimination of residual omniscience
Despite the relative success of modifications of partial semantics such as the hybrid
approach, we are left with some forms of omniscience. This is sometimes argued
to be inevitable: if the logic is to wntain more than just the modal substitution
instances of the classical propositional calculus, then these extra principles would lead
to new beliefor knowledge, i.e. create omniscience. This argument is not conclusive,
however. The point is that the derived belief may be intuitively acceptable, and this is
what determines whether the type of inference is acceptable for explicit belief; if not,
we arrive at a form ofomniscience that should bc exorcized. To wit,
C~ ~ B(~p n~,) --~ (B~p n B~i)
seems fully acceptable for explicit belief or human knowledge.t2
From the preceding sections it emerges that the principles underlying residual
omniscience may be of one of the following shapes:
. the inference rule I, possibly restricted to strong consequences ( i.e. `tautological
entailments', ex falso and their modal counterparts);
. the schemata C and K, which both combine different beliefs into one.
Recall from previous chapters that
I ~ ~p -~ ~t~i ~ ~ B~p -. B~t~i.
C I- (B~p n B~) -~ B(~p n zl,)
K ~ B( ~P --~ ~G) -~ ( B~P -~ B~G )
Before we start our inquiry into an adequatc partia] semantics for logics avoiding
these principles, we make some general observations.
First, notice that, modulo the accepted principle C~, I is equivalent to the `exten-
sionality principle' E.
E r(~ H~7 ~~ B(P H B~
This equivalence even holds for the relativized counterparts of these principles, with
rL as propositional background logic:
Proposition 7.3
EC~ q I, and simi[arlyfor relarive counterparts: EC~ é~ I
Proof: the pL-equivalence is from [Ch80, theorem 8.11(1)J, thc rL-equivalence is similar. ~
Second, the combination schemata are also intimately related:
~ZYet C~ is rejected for resource bounded knowledge by ~ Mo88J in a computational setting.
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Proposition 7.4 K and C are equivalent modulo pL and I.
Proof: from [Ch80], theorem 8.11(2)t exercise 8.13; also compare the proof of proposition 4.1.
Notice that the latter equivalence only holds in the pn;sence of I; in its absence, C and
K have to be considered separately.
The principles I, K and C will be studied in the rest of this section. We will
confront these principles with two ideas as to how to deal with them:
. recycling awareness
. superimposing awareness
We wil relate these ideas to thc different strategies discussed earlier, although we
restrict ourselves to the standard connectives.
7.4.1 recycling awareness
The first proposal is especially directed to the elimination of rule I for explicit belief13
(or I~ restricted to M} in the hybrid case). It is easy to devise a semantics to this effect:
simply block the truth conditions for modal operators, i.e. regard forrnulas of the fonn
B~p as atomic. This approach is not very flexible, howevec And before we reject the
entire inference rule, notice that ihere are instances of I which are fully acceptable: C~
is one of them! Also, I applied to ex falso produces
I- B(cp n ~cp) -a Brj~
which again is acceptable, since this is a direct propositional consequence of the
consistency of belief:
D~ ~ ,B(~ n ,~)
Nobody explicitly believes contradictions - one's priva[e beliefs may be mutually
inconsistent, but that is a different matter.
Applied to other propositional laws, such as douhle negation, the acceptability
becomes less evident. So,
~ B~~~p -. B~p
seems acceptable for some senscs of belief, but not for all. Still this is an innocent
case compared with truly dubious instances such as
~ B~p -~ B(~i V ~r~i)
~~The approach suggested in this subsection is in fact independent of the nature of the semantics, and
may therefote also be applied to e.g. special awareness logic.
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and
F- B~p ~ B(cp v t~i).
The former is excluded in, for example, the hybrid system, since there I is restricted
to strong consequences, and tertium non datur is not one of these.
The latter is not excluded by the hybrid system. In (LL88), Levesque 8c Lakemeyer
propose a solution to this problem. It is based on the fact that awareness of ~p need
not involve awareness of ~p V ~i. 7'his also holds for the notion of derived awareness
defined earlier. We repeat its definition here.
A~p - ~ B(p v ~p)
p in ~p
So, let us define a new notion of explicit belief BA, henceforth loosely referred to as
'actual belief'
BA ~P - B: ~P ~ A: ~P
With respect to actual belief, some of the worst results due to I are eliminated. In
general, we have that disjunctive weakening does not hold for BA, for example,
BAp -~ BA(p v q) is not valid. Yet, there are almost equally dubious results which
are still validated by the augmented system, e.g. ~ BAp --~ BA(p v~p).
Monyover, though the redefined notion of explicit beliefmay help for a number of
problematic cases related to I, it is easily verified that the other problematic principles,
C and K, still exist.
The next subsection deals with a more radical strategy: use the awareness sieves
introduced in section 6.5.
7.4.2 superimposing awareness sieves
In the previous section we found that `recycling derived awareness' does not provide
a satisfactory solution for all kinds of residual omniscience, though the approach may
be acceptable for a special sense of awareness (acquaintance). We would therefore
like to combine a general semantics based on panial valuations with a mechanism that
controls the notion ofactual belief.
Within the area ofpossible world semantics, such a flexible framework was outlined
in chapter 6. It was essentially a generalization of Fagin 8c Halpem's logic of `general
awareness', without their structural conditions seriality, transitivity, and euclidicity.
This so-called sieve semantics tumed out to be a very general and ftexible frameworíc
for weak modal logics. The idea is now to superimpose the awareness sieve on the
hybrid partial semantics. Of wurse, `recycled' awareness can also be construed as an
awareness filter, but its special structure does no~ wan-ant sufficient ftexibility.
A partial sieve model M-(S, B, Á, V) with hybrid evaluation is defined as
follows. The trivalent trutttrfalsity relations (~ and ~) and the bivalent truth relation
(~) are defined as in the hybrid semantics from section 7.3.2 (for G~). In addition we
have clauses for the actual belief operators BA, which are now interpreted by means
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of awareness sieves and accessibility relations. For each i and a the awareness sieve is
a set of formulas, i.e. .A;(s) C G. Here we consider the logical language G to be built
up in the usual way from propositional variables, connectives and the modal operators
B; and B~. The evaluation procedure for B; is as before, and the additional clauses
for B~ are:
a~ B~rp q a~ BArp q a~ B;ip 8t rp E A;(a)
s~ B~rVq a~ BiiPorrP~,A:(a)
Validity is still defined as universal bivalent truth. Here are a number of observations
which indicate that the `hybrid sieve' semantics fulfils the requirements of a proper
partial interpretation:
~ as before, we have coherence: a~ ~p ~ s~ ~p for every ~p and s;
. moreover, there is propagation: a~ ~p ~ s~ ~p;
. anotheruseful property, also exhibited by the previous partial logics, is what may
be called classical closure14: if V is bivalent for all situations, then s~ ~p q
s~cp;
. the semantics is still externally persistent: extension of the valuation for a fixed
frame ( to which the awarcness sieve belongs) implies preservation of trivalent
truth and falsity.
Is this semantics as general and flexible as total sieve semantics? In other words,
can we still capture every logic which extends classical propositional logic? This
question is answered in the affirmative.
Theorem 7.1
Nybrid sieve semantics is sound and complete for every modal system extending pL
by at least the axiom scheme ~ BA~p -~ B; ~p.
Proof: Let S be a logic that extends pL. So, S is a set of formulas of the language G~ ~,
that contains all the substitution cases of tautologies. S is characterized by the total canonical
model M-(W, R., Á, V) described in the proof of corollary 6.2. By the observed property
of classical closure, the total canonical model belongs to the hybrid sieve semantics. This
guarantees soundness and completeness by the usual truth lemma and Lindenbaum lemma. ~
So, every modal logic that contains all tautologies can be captured by a suitable
class of models. This notion of `modal logic' is very wide: for example the principle
of extensionality (E) need not hold. Also, the notion of completeness is not very
restricted; in its generality the previous theorem is almost void. As in the area
nonnal modal logic, we are in general more interested in what may be called frame
~"Cf. (vB88], and chapter 1 here.
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completeness. Since we know there are normal modal systems which are incomplete
with respect to the class of verifying framests, a similar result may hold for the present
weak systems and semantics. If the sieve counts as part of the frame, it is possible to
single out a number of corresponding conditions for some intuitively valid principles,
such as D' and C~ for B~.
. Ce for B;~, i.e. ~ BA(~p ~~i) ~(BA~p n BA~,) is captured by the condition
that ~p ~ tli E.A.:(s) ~~p, ~ E„4;(s).
. D' for BA, i.e. ~ ~BA(~p ~ ~~p) is captured by the condition that ~p ~~~p ~
.A;(s).
. D(or, equivalently, D') for B;, i.e. ~ ~B;(~p ~~~p) is captured by the condition
that B; is serial: b's3t : sB;t.
. C and C~ hold automatically for B;.
These axioms show an interesting interplay. For example, the different consistency
axioms for BA are related to the one for B;: if B; is serial then D and D~` are valid,
and so is the propositional consequence ~(B;~p n~B;~p). But then, by BA ~ B, we
obtain ~(BA~p n~BA~p), i.e. D holds for BA as well. By C~ this also implies D~`:
~BA(~p ~~~p). The moral from this is that if we want but a few principles to be valid
for B~, the logic for B also has to be weakened, which may be beyond expectation.
However, although usually less explicit belief is connected to a more idealized (i.e.
stronger) logic, we do not see any a priori reason that this has to be the case. For
example, one may implicitly believe a contradiction, without being aware of it. But
when it comes to explicitly believingsomething, I'or example by expressing that belief,
we should not allow inconsistencies (cf. chapter 5). Therefore, it seems preferable to
require D~ for BA, but not for B.
7.5 Partial and total approaches compared
7.5.1 general awareness vs hybrid sieve system
It follows from corollary 6.2 and theorem 7.1 that total sieve semantics and hybrid
partial semantics with a superimposed awareness sieve are extensionally equivalent,
in the sense that the two approaches model the same logics for the restricted language
GBA. Despite this technical equivalence there are differences in underlying intuitions,
especially with regard to the way in which intuitively unacceptable principles are
circumvented: part of the awareness which deals with knowledge of the objects and
notions involved, i.e. with the conceptual information present in the agent, is accounted
for by means of partiality. Another type ofawareness, corresponding to what the agent
actually thinks of at a certain moment, is accounted for by means of the awareness
~SSee Fine(1974), S.K. Thomason (1974), van Benthem (1978,1979,1984) for ever simpler frame-
incomplete systems.
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sieve. The awareness sieve is only effective on propositions which are (partially) true.
and this accords the intuition that we need basic conceptual knowledge before actually
being aware of something.
Of coutse there are other differences as well. The original logic of genetal aware-
ness in [FH88] contains the operators L;, A; and B;. In what we loosely called `the
hybrid sieve semantics' there are the operators B; and B~. Moreover, the B-operator
of the former approach conresponds to the BA~perator of the latter. Finally, the R;
relation in models of general awareness interprets L;, whereas the hybrid sieve relation
B; deals with B;. So there is a clear gap between the two specific systems. Can we
bridge the gap?
First, addition of the operators L; for implicit belief to the hybrid sieve system
is quite straightforward. The model-theoretic counterpart of L; is an accessibility
relation L; (corresponding to R;) such that t~ C B;. If we want our hybrid sieve logic
to coincide with the logic of general awareness, ly has to be subjected to the same
conditions as R;: it should be serial, transitive and euclidean. The new evaluation
conditions for L; are:
a~ L;~pqdtEL;[aJ:t~ ~p
a~ L;~p a 3t E L;[s] : t~~p
s~L;cpqb'tEL;[s]:t~rp
It should be clear from the ~ clause and validity concept of the hybrid approach that
the logic for L; will be entirely nonnal, and due to the accessibility constraints on L;,
its modal system will be (N)KD45.
Second, the awareness operators A; could also be added, with the following simple
truth~falsity conditions:
a~ A;~pt~s~A;rpqcpEA;(s)
a ~ At~P p ~G ~ A;(s)
Then BA could be redefined by BA~p - B;~p n A;~p. We did not take this road in the
previous section, since
a we already have a (derived) awareness operator A;, defined by A;~p - ~ B;(pV
~p) over all p in ~p;
~ addition of new awareness operators A; would lead to unacceptable interaction
with the B;~perators: B;(A;~p V~A;~p) would be validated, which seems
intuitively wrong. (Noticc this problcm dces not occur for BA: ~ B;~(A;~p V
~A;cp).) It is technically possible to avoid bivalence of A; by partializing the
awareness sieves, i.e. duplicate the sieve function A; into the pair ,,4; ,,.4i ,
where A; (s) C G and Ai (a) C G and give appropriately modified trutt~falsity
conditions for the awarencss operator. We have no intuitions about ` negative
awareness' different from lack of awareness, however.
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Third, if the actual belief operator B~ has to cornespond to B in the logic of general
awareness, the operator B from hybrid sieve logic has to have a counterpart in general
awareness logic. It is possible to add such intermediating operators B; for each i, and
duplicate the awareness sieves such that B; is interpreted by means of .A;. A suitable
transformation of a hybrid sieve model into a cnl. model is also feasible.
7.5.2 special awareness logic and partial systems
Without the awareness sieves we can also compare total and partial awareness logics.lb
In many respects sAL is similar to the hybrid system. Both approaches are characterized
by a twofold perspective on truth: total and panial. Are the hybrid system and sAt.
equivalent?
Indeed the two approaches share a large number of properties. For example, both
have the rule IMt, the axiom scheme C, D is modelled by seriality of R; and B;, and
for serial models a strong possibility rule applies:
P' ~~P~~B:B`~,
where B' abbreviates a sequence of operators from {Bt, ..., B,,,}.t~ We also have
proposition 7.2 for both systems. Although we have to impose, apart from transitivity,
the additional condition of upward monotonicity on the models to capture positive
intmspection (4), both systems `crash' when requiring negative introspection (5).
All these properties refer to ezplicit belief; wc can add operators for implicit belief
in the manner of the previous discussion on total and hybrid sieve semantics.
Given this similarity, it may not be surprising that every hybrid validity is also
provably an snl. validity. First we describe a transformation and prove it preserves
truth. Let M-(W, R, Á, V) be an sAL model ( see section 6.3.2.) We can construct
a corresponding hybrid sieve model M' -(S, B, L, V') 1e with: ( ~Y is an arbitrary
subset of G, ~ ~ ~(Prop))
~ S- W x p(Prop) ((w, ~Y) will be written as w,~)
~ w~,B;v,y~,~(wl p wR;v
~ w~yL;v~, q wR;v
~ V'(P, w,t.) -{ V(P~
w) Iff P E~Y
Z otherwise
16In fact an initial goal of snl. was to simulate C.evesque's [Le84a) logic in augmented possible worlds
semantics.
~~By iterative use ofP' one can derive a generalization ol P' in which ilte dual operators B~ ,..., 8,,.
are also allowed in the sequence B'.
~BFor the language restricted to explicit belief ( W, B, V') suffices.
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Lemma 7.1
(i) M, w ~~ rp q M', w~, ~ rp
(ii) M, w~~rp q M', w,y ~ rp
(iii) M, w~ ~ q M', wp,op ~ rp
Proof: by induction on the swcture of ~p. First consider p E Prop:
p: (i)M,w~~pqV(p,w)- 1 8tpE tYqV'(p,w~)-1q M',w~~p;
(ii)M,w~ ~pqV(p,w)-08cpE~YqV'(p,w~.)-OqM',w,y~p;
(iii) M, w~ p q V(p, w) - 1 q V'(p, wp,ep) - 1 q M', wprop ~ p;
Now assume the induction hypothesis (Itt) for ~p and ~,, then:
~: (i) M, w ~~ ~rp q M, w~~~p ~ M'~ w~ ~ ~ q M~, w~ ~„G;
(ii) M, w ~ ~~~p q M, w~~ ~p ~ M', w,~ ~ rp q M', w,y ~~rp;
(iii) M, w~~~p q M, w[~ ip ~ M', wprop ~ rp q M', wprop ~~rp;
n: (i) M, w~~ rpn~i q M, w ~~ ~p 8t M, w ~~ ,,i ~i M', w~ ~ ~p 8t M', w~, ~ ~ji q
M'~w~~ ~Pn~:
(ii) M, w~ ~ ipn~ q M, w~~ rp or M, w~~~i ~ M', w~, ~ rp or M', wy ~ t~ q
M', w~ ~ rp n ~i:
(íii)M,w ~~pn~qM,w ~~pBtM,w ~~q
M'~ wProp ~~~ M~i TUProp ~~ p M~r wP.op ~ l0 n~;
B: (i) M, w ~~ B;rp q b'v E R; [w] : M, v ~~n~~(~) ~p q (IHtdef.ó)
b'v~n.~t:(m) E B;[w,~] : M'~ v~n.t:(,,,) ~ 'G q M~, w~r ~ B:rp:
(ii) M, w~~B;rp q 3v E R;[w] : M, v~ ~n~`(~)rp q(IHtdef.B)
~v~nrt:(,~) E B;[w,y] : M'~ v~nd:(w) ~ rP q M', w~ ~ B:~P;
(iii) M, w ~ B;rp q b'v E R;[w] : M, v ~~~(w) rp q(IHtdcf.B)
dv,Il:(~c) E B~[wProp] : M', v.A:(w) ~ ~ q M~r wProp~ Bi~P q MI, wProp ~ B:~:
L: (i) M, w~~ L;~p q dv E R;[w] : M, v~~ rp q(IHtdef.L)
dv,~ E L;[w~.] : M', v~, ~ ~p q M', w,~ ~ L;rp;
(ii) M, w ~~ L;rp q 3v E R; (w] : M, v~~rp q(IHtdef.L)
3v,~ E L;[wy] : M', v~ ~~p q M', ws. ~ LcrP;
(iii) M, w~ L;~p q b'v E R;[w] : M, v ~ rp q(IHtdef.L)
dvprop E Li[wProp] : M'~ vProp ~~P q M'~ wProp ~ L:rp:
Notice that the lemma does not claim full equivalence of the models involved; in
fact this will be hard to achieve, since M', w~ ~ ~p has no clear counterpart in M if
~ C Prop. The lemma shows containment of the set of snt, validities in the set of the
hybrid validities:
Theorem 7.2 Every formula valid with respect to the hybridpartial semantics is also
valid with respect to snt. semantics.
Proof: by contraposition, if ~p is not valid in snt, semantics, then for some model M and world
w: M, w~ ~p. So, by the lemma ahove, there is a hybrid model M' such that M', wprop ~:p,
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and therefore ~p is invalid for the hybrid semantics. ~
Does the converse of this theorem hold as well? No, it dces not! The main
reason is that the hybrid semantics is more permissive. Unlike the sA~ models it
dces not transfer the set ofdefined propositional atoms from a situation to its doxastic
altematives. The effect of this difference can be seen in a fortnula such as:
BiBi(PV ~P) ~ B:(PV ~P)~
This formula is valid in sAt.; by invoking the notion of derived awareness, we even
have ~ B;A;~p -~ A;ip in SAL.19 T'hese formulas are invalid in the hybrid system.
It is not entirely clear to us whether we should desire the validity of the displayed
formula - it may depend on the notion of awareness involved.
In all, despite these minor differences sAl. and the hybrid semantics are very similar.
We do believe the hybrid models to be more natural, however, since there is no need to
specify more of the content of an altemative doxastic state than the agent is aware of.
Although we are not claiming `psychological reality' for any of the proposals made
here, it is clear, we think, which approach is morc intuitivc in this respect.
hybrid semantics vs expanded language
There is one other connection to hybrid semantics that deservcs attention: its relation to
the expanded language.20 The idea is that the extemal bivalence can also be triggered
by giving the right scope to non-standard connectives, say ~. So, let us try to give a
translation' from ~p E G, n,á,i ~nto ~p' E G, ti ~~ L such that ~ ~p a~ ~p', where
the former validity is in hybrid semantics, and thc latter in the standard semantics.
P' - P (,sa)' - ~s~' (~ ~ ~G)' - (~' ~ ~G') (B~a)' - Bsv (Lw)' - L~v'
The simple effect of this is that each ~ occurring outside the scope of all B's is changed
into ~, and each occurrence within B is left as it is. This already provides a simple
but insightful observation:
Proposition 7.5 Foreach ~p E G,,n,~,~: ~ ~p r~ ~ ~p'
Proof: let M be a paztial Kripke model. Then M, a~ ~p a M, s~ ~p' for all situations a in
M, which can be shown by induction on the complexity of ~p ~
Since a reverse embedding dces not seem obtainable, this shows on the one hand
that the hybrid approach is somewhat more restricted than the method of expanding
the language. On the other hand, the proposition also indicates that the expanded
language contains interesting fragments, such as the one provided by the translation,
with Noutside of B; and ~ inside of it.
19For suppose w~ B;A~~p, then for arbitrary p in ~p and v E R;[w]: ro~~`t~l B~(p v~p) ~
u~~`t~l~~~t'1 p V~p for all n E R~[o] ~ p E A;(w~ fl Ai(ro) and therefore p E A;(w], thus
ro~~`lylpV~p~w~A;rp.
~Following a suggestion by van Benthem.
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7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we first reconsidered standard partial semantics as a candidate for an
adequate logical description of awareness. Indeed this already provides a rather weak
logic, as is required for conscious belief. So, literally speaking, a number of prob-
lematic principles, which are loosely called logical omniscience, are circumvented.
However, the standard partial approach suffers from two major problems: one is that
intuitively valid forms such as Bp V~Bp an; also eliminated, the other is that most
types of logical omniscience come back in relativized form, e.g. Bp ~ B(p V q).
This may be paraphrased by saying that in the standard approach the external part of
the awareness logic (which we wish to be classical) is too weak, and the intemal part
(which we wish to be non-classical) is still too strong.
We therefore proceeded by trying to eliminate these drawbacks. Starting with the
first major problem, one possible solution was to reinsert into the standard language
some of the non-standard connectives introduced in chapter l. We noticed that, though
there are classical sublanguages within the expanded language, this does not remove
invalid formulas as BpV ~Bp. One may suggest at this point that this objection can be
countered by giving `believe or not believe p' a different translation, e.g. BpV tiBp.
Then we considered another strategy: similar to the (special) awareness logic discussed
in chapter 6, have different truth relations within one and the same semantics. We
argued that such a hybrid approach successfully deals with the problem of the `missing
tautologies'. Later it tumed out that this hybrid logic can be embedded into the logic
of the expanded language. So there is a fragment in the expanded language that
corresponds to the standard fomiulas in the sense that classical truth of a formula in
the hybrid system is equivalent to partial truth of its `expanded' translation.
None of these proposals, however, solves the second major problem. Again we
considered two ways of dealing with the problem of `residual omniscience'. One
possibility was to derive awareness from explicit belief, and then add this awareness
to explicit belief. Though a nice and concise option, the effect of this tumed out to be
limited. So, we moved to a more demanding attack: add the syntactic awareness sieves
to the hybrid system. We showed that again the resulting semantics is fully flexible in
the sense that every modal logic extending the classical propositional calculus can be
modelled. Again, forspecific applications, we may constrain the admissibleawareness
sieves by conditions reminiscent of neighbourhood semantics.
Finally, a numberof connections between panial and total approaches to awareness
were made. In particular we showed that the semantics of the special awareness logic
can be embedded in the hybrid semantics proper. We claimed that by virtue of built-in
partiality, hybrid sieve semantics is more natural than total sieve semantics, yet the
greater fneedom allowed in hybrid sieve models might be considered problematic.
In fact, already for sieve semantics there is considerable liberty in the way validities
can be described.21 Now at fint sight the situation is even worse for hybrid sieve
2t For ezample, the modal scheme 4 can be modelled both by the class of Kripke frames with empty
accessibiliry combined with an awareness sieve filtering out formulas of the form Brp ~ BBrp, nnd by
the class of transitive Kripke frames with the coarsest sieve, that lets all formulas pass.
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semantics: partiality may also account for non-valid principles. Yet, we argue that
this extra possibility is not disadvantageous, since the non-validity that is obtained by
partiality is `for fine', as it were. So there is a clear order that determines the locus
of explanation or description of (in)valid principles: first partiality (which is always
present), then accessibility (constrained by general conditions) and finally, as a last
escape mute, by a stipulation on the awareness sieve. Therefore, hybrid sieve models
are at least not inferior to total sieve models in this respect.
Since the class ofhybrid sieve models is larger than the class of total sieve models,
this also seems to present a computational disadvantage. Though this may sound
paradoxically, this need not be true, as we will see in the next part of this thesis.
Part III
Models for Computer Knowledge
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Introduction to part III
In the last part of this thesis we will try and see to what extent (partial) modal logic
can be used to store and retrieve knowledge in computer systems. By storing enough
knowledge into a computer system, we can, in principle, make it easier for the ordinary
user to retrieve information from such a system. The idea is not merely to have enough
basic data in the system, but to let the computer reason about its own knowledge22,
as if it were a human agent. So, we want the system to introspect its knowledge.
Moreover, the system has to know about the knowledge and the ignorance of the user,
in order to provide pragmatically sound answers.
For example, suppose some tour office wonders if a flight information system
knows whether there are regular flights from Amsterdam to Bejing. Now `Do you
know whether there are flights from Amsterdam to Bejing' can properly be answered
by either `Yes' or perhaps `Yes, every Tuesday and Friday', whereas the same question
posed by a tourist longing for a vacation cannot be answered by `Yes', since this would
not be very cooperative, and after all, that is what the system is for. Instead, `Yes,
there is one tomorrow. Do you want to make a reservation?' would be a pragmatically
sound continuation of the dialogue in this case. So the point is that the system has to
know both about the data and its knowledge thereof, and about the knowledge of the
user and the things she would like to know. Given these desiderata, the performance
of present day information systems can hardly be called satisfactory. This is partly
caused by the problem how to store all relevant knowledge of the real world into
the computer (for which facts are relevant?), and partly by the difficulty of knowing
the user's state of mind, and her knowledge and ignorance. The general idea is that
epistemic logic may be helpful to describe world knowledge, as well as knowlcdge
about knowledge and ignorance, etcetera.
There are, essentially, two different ways of using epistemic logic to store knowl-
edge. One is the syntactic approach, which is mostly adopied. In this method the
domain knowledge is represented by a set of fomiulas, a query (or, rather, its proposi-
tional contents) is translated into a logical forrnula, and the program tries to deduce this
fonnula (or its negation) from the basic knowledge. Such theorem proving however
suffers from problems ofundecidability (of first-order logic) or intractibility (of certain
modal logics).
Therefore the other way ofstoring information is studied here. In this method, that
may loosely be called the semantic approach, the knowledge is stored in a(logical)
model. Then answering a query amounts to merely checking whether or not the
formula representing the query is true. This modcl checking is usually relatively easy,
since evaluation of a modal formula at a possible world is determined by the model
structure and the recursive truth conditions. Following the structure of the formula
the truth or falsity of the formula under inspection can thus be calculated in a limited
number of steps, provided the model is finite. The method is therefore tractable and
the whole semantic approach seems promising.
~Cf. the example of the weather station Crom the general introduction.
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The problem here resides in finding a characteristic model. Notice that, of course,
there is no problem finding a model verifying the information, if consistent: this
follows from the completeness theorems proved earlier. Apan from this relatively
easy satisfaction problem there is the more severe problem that such models usually
verify simply too much. So we are looking for what might be called the weakest
verifying model, but then again, these models soon become quite large, sometimes
even infinite. In other words, we are looking for the smallest yet weakest verifying
model. Since `weakest' implies that the model is essentially maximal and `smallest'
that it is minimal, finding such a model is a highly non-trivial task.
In the next chapters we will therefore restrict ourselves to this modeltheoretic
method and choose a strong background logic, usually the modal logic SS or a(partial)
variant of this, and only shortly discuss altemative systems, such as the multi-modal
counterpart of SS and relaxations such as 54.23 Now, at least for computer systems, a
strong epistemic logic such as SS seems quite appropriate. Yet for the simple case of
one single agent (the computer) and a strong modal logic, there are limitations to what
can be modelled in this way. In particular, incomplete information should be ofa form
that allows introspection. But even when such a finite characterizing model (somewhat
wishfully called a`miniature') exists, there may be practical problems related to its
size. It is argued that the latter problem can be solved by introducing partiality into
the possible world models. The use of partial models for the semantic approach to
knowledge-based systems will bc taken up in the last chapter, chapter 9. Before doing
so, we will study classical possible world models in the next chapter.
Although the application of epistemic logic to future information systems is surely
promising and motivates research in this direction, we would like [o emphasize that
we are still far from fully realizing the pmgram. So, what will be achieved in the final
chapters may be viewed as a first modest step towards using models as knowledge-
bases.




The leading question in this chapterl is: Is it possible to store knowledge in a finite
possible world model and use the model as a knowledge base? We show that for
somewhat idealized knowledge (captured by the SS logic) we can effectively find
such a model, given some reasonable backgmund assumptions conceming the sort of
data involved, such as(a kind of) introspection. In fact several possible notions of
model representation are studied and related to corresponding types of inference. We
conclude with some results about extensions and relaxations of the SS logic, which
systems are meant to capture, respectively, the knowledge of distributive systems and
the knowledge of human agents.
S.1 Introduction
This chapter and the next one are devoted to the question whether we can store
information in a logical model which is meant to be used as a knowledge base, so that
the data are not merely encoded and inspected upon querying, but may be combined in
order to derive new conclusions and thus provide a potential infinity ofanswers. As the
class of models for a given set of data can be very large (in general even infinite), one
cannot check whether something follows from thc available information by inspecting
virtually every model. Moreover, we would have to inspect this class of models for
each query over and over again.
One prominent way to deal with this multitude is to enclose all information in one
single finite model, if possible. So the central problem is:
Given a set of data D, is there a characteriiing finite model for D?
~The present chapter is an edi[ed version of [Th92aj, Qc Elsevier Science Publishers 1992. An early
predecessorof this chapter is the Tlu. paper no.l l l in Dutch ('Kripke modellen voor kennisbanken I'),
May 1987. The impetus to the present approach is the local interest in somewhat related work on linked
data bases, see [Bu90]. The formal program executed here is sketched independently in [HV91].
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As far as information is concemed which consists solely of primitive facts -
logically speaking, of (atomic) propositions - and the inferences are also factual (i.e.
purely propositional), there is hardly a theoretical problem, although practice can be
quite difficult. On the theoretical level at which this investigation takes place, the
situation gets complicated when the system not only reasons about facts, but also
about itself. As we have seen in the introduction to part III, this self-reflection is
not an intellectual curiosity, but an essential prerequisite to the success of building,
for example, user-friendly information systems. So it should be possible to express
epistemic self-reflection in the logic. The most obvious way is to use the language of
epistemic logic. In this part of the book the epistemic operator K ought to be read
as: `the system knows that'. When the system has to reason not only about itself,
but also about the knowledge of the user, more epistemic operators will be necessary
(for instance K„ for `user knows that' versus KS for `system knows that'). In this
chapter we will confine ourselvcs mostly to the case of just one `agent', the system
itself. Apart from this we will constrain the logical language in other respects in order
to avoid, for instance, problems of quantification. These restrictions allow the real
problem to come out more clearly. In this way the representation language has actually
become one of propositional modal logic.
The feasibility of finite model representation is wnnected to the strength of the
chosen logical engine. Following, among others [Hi62] and [Le78], we will take
knowledge to be true, and require positive introspection (i.e. knowing, of what one
knows, thai one knows it) and, unlike Hintikka and Lenzen, negative introspection
(i.e. knowing, of what one doesn't know, that one doesn't know it) of the computer
system.2 In all, the logic will initially be the modal system S5. Later on, we will
investigate relaxations of S5, such as S4 (i.e. without negative introspection). Since
our ultimate purpose is to build a many-agents system, we will make some tentative
remarks on the multi-moda[ counterpart of S5, SS~m~.
Since we are adopting a non-syntactic approach, all these axioms and deduction
rules will not be explicitly but implicitly present in the models. Model representation
may even be said to avoid some problems of syntactic approaches, such as the choice
of the specific logical language, the actual representation of knowledge and the way
to perform deduction (cf. [Ro851). An extreme option here is to skip the intermediate
logical language entirely, and directly interpret (a subset of) natural language through
the models.
8.2 Local models
The initial idea of knowledge rcpresentation by Kripke models goes as follows. A
finite amount of (possibly incomplete) information is represented in a finite model
(`miniature'). This model is stored in the computer system and is consulted when a
question is asked which is relevant to the domain of application. A model represents
ZNote, however, that Hintikka and l.enzen aze dcaling with human agents only, so there there is no
disagreement here.
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the information D, we suppose, when it verifies D, but dcesn't verify anything that
dcesn't follow from D, in other words, when all and only consequences of D are
verified. Here D is obviously a finite set of well-formed formulas of the appropriate
epistemic language GK(Prop), where Prop is also finite.3 Usually the evaluation is
considered to start from a fixed world w. We will then speak of a local model (M, w).
M is a standard Kripke model (W, R, V), as described in sections 4.6.1.
Definition 8.1 (M, w) is a local miniature for D iff M is finite and for every ~p:
M,w~ipqD~~p.
In checking whether some structure is a(local) miniature, it tums out to be convenient
to break down the condition of exactly verifying all D-consequences into several parts
(equivalent to the above definition):
Proposition 8.1 (M, w) is a local miniature for D iff
. M is finite,
~ M,w~D,
~ M, w~ rp q D~ ip.
Proof: directly from definition 8.1 and the definition of logical consequence. .
On which (syntactic) conditions does a local miniaturc exist? Consistency of D is
not sufficient: for example, K(p V q) is consistent, but does not have a local miniature:
if M, w~ K(p V q) then (M, w) verifies p and q (or p and ~q, or ~p and q), but
neitherp nor q (nor ~pnor ~q) is a consequence of K(p V q). In fact every incomplete
set of data will be problematic for virtually the same reason.
Theorem 8.1 D has a local miniature iff D is both complete and consistent.4
Proof:
(q) Because of the completeness theorem, the existence of the miniature (M, w) implies
consistency and completeness of D: D y ~p q D~ ~p q M, w~~p q M, w~~~p q
D~~~pqDl--„~.
(G) If D is consistent, it has a local model that can be converted into a finite model (M, w)
for D by a suitable filtration over the elements of D and their subformulae.s Suppose D~~p,
then, since D is complete, D~~~p, so M, w~ ~~p and consequently M, w~ ~p. From
proposition 8.1 it follows that ( M, w) is a miniature. ~
Notice that the nature of the underlying logic iti hardly of importance to the proof.
3See e.g. section 5.3
4Recall that D is complete (in this sense) if D H ~p or D F~rp. D is completc and consistent is
equivalent to: D is maximally consistent (where D -{w ~ D~ ~p}).
sSee [Ch80] or [HC84].
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The theorem holds both for SS and for richer modal systems such as SS~mI, but also
for weaker systems, such as S4, just as long as the logic has the finite model property
(~)6 The finiteness of D is also of vital importance to the proof.
As incomplete infonnation implies logical incompleteness, we may conclude at
this point that local miniatures are unfit for our purpose. In practice the sysiem will, of
course, seldom have complete infomtation at its disposal. Therefore we will continue
our quest for an adequate notion of characterizing model.
8.3 Global models
A local miniature enforces complete knowledge, essentially because each fonnula is
either true or false in the designated world w. In order to avoid the problem, formulas
have to be evaluated in other worlds than w too. L.et cp be (globally) true on a model
M iff for all worlds w in M: M, w~ cp ( notation: M ~ ip). This leads to a different
notion of miniature:
Definition 8.2 M is a global miniature for D iff M isfinite and M~ tp q D~ tp
for every cp.~
Here too, an equivalent but possibly more intuitive form exists:
Proposition 8.2 M is a global miniaturefor D iff
. M is finite,
. M~D,
. M~~p~D~~p.
Observe that the condition of finiteness is essential, both for practical purposes and
for making the search for global miniatures an interesting puzzle. Without finiteness
the following method leads to a(possibly infinite) global ` miniature' for infonnation
of essentially the form Ka, where a is an arbitrary fonnula. Assume the modal logic
to be (a normal extension of) S4, i.e. we may suppose the accessibility relation to be
reflexive and transitive.
Consider the set I' of all non-consequences of Ka. For each ry E I', let My be a
(smallest) counterexample to Ka ~ ry(for logics with the FMP such a counter-model
will be 6nite). Notice that by transitivity and the generation lemma, the counter-model
may be chosen to be generated from a single world in one step.8 Now take the disjoint
union9 ofall such My. Then, apart from finiteness, the union model M meets the other
6A system has the FMP if it is characterized by a classoffinite models. That SS~m~ has the FMP can be
shown by simply multiplying the filtration for S5. Cf. [Ch80], [HC84] and section 4.6.2 here.
'Or, 7H(M) - D, with Ttt(M) -{(p I lll ~~p}.
gSee section 2.3.
9Informally speaking, the operation of disjoint union amounts to putting different models into one
single model, wilhout interconnecting them. Cf. definition 8.3 for a formal statement.
8.3. GLOBAL MODELS 205
conditions of proposition 8.2: since every generated submodel locally verifies Ka,
it verifies a in all its generated submodels (`components'), and so it globally verifies
Ka. The third requirement is met since, by contraposition: if tp is not a consequence
of Ka, then tp is locally falsified in M,~, and so, again by the generation lemma, locally
falsified in M.
Notice this argument canbesimpli fied and, at he same time, generalized toarbitrary
normal systems, once we move to a relation of global consequence.t o Let D~ ~p
denote global consequence, i.e. every global model of D also globally verifies ~p. Now
let M be the disjoint union of counterexamples to D~ ry for all ry. Then obviously
M~ D and M~ ~p ~ D~ ~p. So, we can always obtain a characteristic global
model with respect to global consequences. Caveat: this involves a different notion
of `miniature'. And, once again, finiteness is not guaranteed.
Retuming to the original notion of global miniaturc, we would like to find a
condition that determines when a given set of data is characterized by a miniature.
To get an idea of the problems at stake, we first give a number ofconcrete examples.
Until further notice the modal logic will be S5, so accessibility in the models is an
equivalence relation. t t
First we shall give an example of a miniature For complete information, to contrast
with later examples of incomplete information.
Example 8.1 Take Prop -{p, q} and D-{Kp, K~q}. The minimal global (and
local) miniature M for D is:
P, ~4
The next case concems a simple form of incomplete infonnation.
Example 8.2 Take Prop - {p, q} and D -{K~q}. A global miniature M for D
will rypically be of the following form:
. .~~. .
P, ~4 P, ~4 ~P, ~4 ~P, ~4
This miniature is inspired by the equivalence
K,q ~-. (Kp n K,q) v(,Kp n,K,p n K,q) v(K,p n K,q)
to7'he heuristics of this method was suggested by Johan van Benthem.
~t For different w and v, if both wRro and roRw, then there is a double arrow be[ween w and ro in the
diagrams; if wRro but not vRw (e.g. for non-symmetric S4 models), therc is a single arrow from w to v.
I,ooping arrows which are redundant by virtue of reflexivity (as for S4 and SS models), have been left
out.
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in which case V amounts to an exclusive disjunction. Here, each of the disjuncts has a
characterizing model which corresponds to a component of M. Moreover, the division
into several components is inevitable when not all propositional variables occur in D.
As a matter of fact such a scattered distribution also can be found in cases where the
information is incomplete in another sense:
Example 8.3 Take D-{K(p v q)} and Prop -{p, g}. The global SS miniaturefor
this information is
. .~. .
P,~9 P,9 P, ~9
~ .~~~
P, 9 P, 9 ~P, 9
~ ~~.~
~P, 4 P, ~4 ~P, 9
P,~9
P, 9 ~P, 9
The incomplete knowledge occurring in cxample 8.3 is of an entirely different nature
than the one in the next interesting case:




P, 4 P, ~9
P, 9
~f~~
P, 4 ~P, 9
~P, 4
This result seems diametrically opposed to the suggestion which looms up from
[HM85] that Kp V Kq has no characterizing model (but see sections 8.5 and 8.6
for further analysis).
A final example of a global miniature for a stronger kind of incomplete infonnation
i s:
Example 8.5 Let Prop -{p, q} and D-{K(p H q)}. A globalminiaturefor D is:
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. . -.-.. .
R 4 P,9 ~P, ~4 ~P, ~4
What is the syntactic criterion for the existence of a global miniature? Apart
from mere consistency the altemative of global consistency, i.e. existence of a non-
empty verifying model, comes to mind. Contrary to the local case we note that here
global consistency is neither necessary nor sufficient: the formula (p ~~Kp) V Kq is
globally consistent ( i.e. it has a non-empty global model), but it does not have a global
miniature. For suppose that N is a global miniature for D-{(p ~~Kp) V Kq}.
Then (i) N ~(p ~~Kp) V Kq, and so N~ Kq. For suppose not, i.e. for some
w(ii) N, w[~ Kq, then, by (i), N, w [- p ~~Kp, and thus for some v such that
wRv: N, v ~ p, and again by (i), N, v~ Kq, hence by euclidicity N, w~ Kq,
contradicting (ii). Therefore N~ Kq, yet D~ Kq (the left disjunct can be verified
locally without q being true). Note that although global consistency is of a semantic
nature, it can easily be transposed into a purely syntactic forrnulation (in the sequel
K[D] - {K~p ~ ~p E D}):
Proposition 8.3 D is globally con.ristent iff K[D] is consistent.
Proof: The right-hand condition is dearly necessary, but also sufficient, for suppose K[D] is
consistent, then there is an S5 model M, such that for any c~ E D: M, w~ K~p, thus for the
generated submodel~Z M,~ ~~p, since it can be shown by induction that for every ~i and u
such that wRu : M, u~~i q M,~, u ~~, ( by the generation lemma, cf. section 2.3). ~
So wnsistency of K[D] does not suffice, in fact it is not even a necessary condition
for the existence of a miniature! The point is that thc definition of global miniature
allows of empry models. The empty model verifies evcry formula vacuously, and
so may be used to model inconsistent information. But proposition 8.3 may be
strengthened to the related condition that everything in K[DJ follows from D, or
equivalently D~ ~p ~ D~ K~p, which amounts to thc plausible requirement that
the system knows the data, i.e. a kind of introspection. Wc arrive at the main result of
this chapter:
12Reca11 tha[ M„ is M restricted to the worlds accessiblc from w.
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Theorem 8.2 D has a global miniature iff D~~ K[D]. t3
Proof: this is essentially the heuristic argument given in the beginning of this section, now
using logical finiteness ofS5.'a
(~) The condition is clearly necessary, since if D has a global miniature M, then for every
~p E D: D~~p ~ M~ ~p ~ M~ K~p ~ D~ K~p. Therefore D ~~ K[D], thus by
the completeness theorem D ~~ K[D].
(~) Let ~ be a set of representatives of equivalence classes of formulas induced by the
relation of logical equivalence. Because of the finiteness of Prop and the logical finiteness
of S5, ~ is also finite. Now let M be the disjoint union of the smallest counterexamples to
non-consequences of D: (vide defin ition 8.3 below for details)
M-~{N ~ N [- D, N is tight and reduced, and N ~ ~p for some ~p E~}
Then M is a global miniature according to proposition 8.2:
. M is finite because ~ is finite and each N is too (because it contains no more than 2"
worlds when ~Prop~ - n);
. M [- D;
. if D[rL ~p then there exists a~i E ~ such that ~ ~p H~,, ergo D~~,. So there is a
model ( L, w) such that L, w [- D and L, w~~,. Because D [- K[D], L, w~ K[D]
holds too, and so L~ ~ D and Lw [a` ,(,. L„ is tight, and reduction supplies the N for
which N ~ D and N [a` ~p, and this is a submodel of M, so also M[~ ~p. ~
We used the following notions here:
Definition 8.3 (with M-(W, R, V) and N; -(W;, R;, V;)):
1. M is tight (and R is universal) iff wRu for every w, u E W;
2. M is reduced iff V(p, w) - V(p, v) for each p E Prop ~ w- v;
3. M-~{N; ~ í E I} (the disjoint union of the N;'s) where:
. W-{(w,i)~wEW;},
.(w, í)R(u, j) q wR;u n i - j, andfinally
. V(P~ (w,:)) - Vi(P, w).
Explanatory note: `tightness' guarantees the cohesion of a model structure; the defini-
tion given here is restricted to the (simple) SS case.15 `Reduction' is a purely technical
operation which removes superfluous worlds. Disjoint union1ó combines a number of
models as separate components into a new model; a component of a model is a tight
submodel.
Given the introspection property for D, the proof of theorem 8.2 licenses the
following pr~ocedure for generating miniatures:
t~Recall that M indicates the finite conjunction over the elements of K[D]: if D-{ói,...,á~v}
then ~ K[D] - K6i n--- n Kóx.
tal.ogical finiteness means that, given a finite Prop, there are only finitely many different formulas, up
to equivalence. SS is logically finite, but S4 and SS~mI aze not. Cf. section 4.6.3
'SCf. [HC84].
16See also corollary 2.3.
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(DUl) create the set of all tight reduced models (there are a finite number of them, if
~Prop~ - n at most 2z");
(DU2) take the disjoint union of the D models out of this set.
With this procedure examples 8.2-8.4 are easily constructed. Moreover, theo-
rem 8.2 shows that the procedure does in fact produce a model which is not a miniature
when D is not introspective:
Example 8.6 Let Prop - {p, q} and D -{(p ~~Kp) V Kq}. The construction Du
results in a model that is not a global miniature f'nr D:
. ..---..
P, 9 P, 9 ~P, 9 ~P,9
If one also wishes the procedure Du to succeed when the system is not introspective
with respect to D, one has to switch to a global consequence relation.
8.4 Global consequence and coarse miniatures
From the initial considerations in the previous sect ion the suggestion looms that perhaps
one can avoid the condition of introspection on D by using a global consequence
relation, whilst the notion of `miniature' is accordingly adjusted. We will now elaborate
on this point.
Definition 8.4 ( global consequence)
D~~p iff M~ D~ M~ ~p for every mode[ M. t 7
In many cases it is possible to obtain the just defined notion from the usual relation
of logical consequence by sufficiently augmenting D. In example 8.6, Kq was not
a standard consequence of (p ~ ~Kp) V Kq, but it is a global consequence thereof,
and, perhaps surprisingly, an ordinary consequence of K((p ~~Kp) V Kq), because
in SS this fotmula is equivalent to K(p ~~Kp) V Kq.t 8 The first disjunct of the last
formula contradicts the SS-axioms, so Kq indeed follows now. This suggests a more
general connection:t9
17Cf. [vB85], pp. 37j38.
'BVlde [HC68], p.51, theorem 29.
19In fact, the proposition holds not only for S5, but for every extension of S4. On its turn, this relation is
generalized in [FHV90] to arbitrary normal systems, pmvided we introduce the modality Kf ('common'
knowledge for one agent!), which is interpreted by means of the transitive closure Rf of R. Then we
obtain D~ cy q Kt [D] ~ Kt,p, in accordance with an observation in [GP89].
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Proposition 8.4 D~ ~p a K[D] ~ ~p.
Proof: in analogy with proposition 8.3 ~
The notion of global consequence induces a new type of miniature:
Definition 8.5 M is a coarse miniature for D if M isfinite and M ~~p q D~ ~p
for eachformula ~p.
The notion of course miniature clearly extends that of global miniature, for any global
miniature is also a coarse miniature. The n;verse only holds if the information is
introspective. Yet another way to relate the two notions is:
Proposition 8.5
M is a coarse miniaturefor D iff M is a global miniaturefor K[D].
Proof: follows directly from proposition 8.4 and definitions 8.2 and 8.5. ~
Theorem 8.3 Every D has a coarse miniature.
Proof: notice that K[D] is introspective and apply theorem 8.2 and proposition 8.5. ~
Because the notion `global consequence' as well as `coarse miniature' can be reduced
to standard consequence and glnbal miniature according to propositions 8.4 and 8.5,
these notions are not of importance for S4 and its extensions, but could, in principle,
lead to different results for weaker modal systems.
8.5 Tight miniatures
With example 8.4 we noted that HalpemBcMoses had come up with a seemingly
opposite result for Kp v Kq in [HM85]. One of the causes of this difference is that
they only consider tight models. With this restriction the following procedure (TU)
leads to the greatest reduced tight model, if it exists:
(TU1) take the union of the tight models for D and choose the accessibility relation
to be universal ([he `total union');20
(TU2) reduce the united structure, i.e. identify worlds in the total union model that
assign the same truth-value to each propositional variable;
(TU3) check whether D is still true in this tight structure.
~TF~s amounts to dropping the accetisibility relation from both the models and the truth conditions.
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(The total union of the models M and N will be denoted by M l~ N, the disjoint union
byM~N).
Step Tu3 fails with example 8.4: Kp v Kq has no greatest reduced tight model.
The union model verifies ~Kp ~~Kq, so cannot be a model for D.
Although the notion of a greatest reduced tight model is quite different from that
of a tight miniature, the latter is worth investigating. We restrict the notion of `tight
miniature' to 'tight global miniature', as (again by the generation lemma) a tight local
miniature exists precisely when there is a local miniature.
Because the notion of 'tight miniature' is stmnger than that of `global miniature',
and resembles `local miniature' in other ways too, we may wonder whether conformity
gces even further. This is not the case: it is particularly not so that a tight miniature
characterizes a maximally consistent set, or vice versa; in fact the equivalence (cf.
theorem 8.1) does not hold in either direction: (D is finite, as always)
D has a tight miniature yEa D is complete and consistent.
Proof:
(~) if Prop -{p} then (by the Lindenbaum lemma and logical finiteness) there is a finite
D such that {p, ~Kp} C D, where D is maximally consistent - for {p, ~Kp} is
(locally!) consistent. But D surely has no global model (and so: no tight one either).
(~4) for the invalidity of the converse, consider the tight model M:
P, ~4 P, q
By logical finiteness TH(M) is equivalent to some finite D, e.g. {Kp, ~Kq, ~K~q}. It
is easy to check that M is a global miniature for D. Although D is consistent, it is not
theoretically complete: neither M ~ q nor M ~~q, so, because M is a miniature for
D: D y q and D y~q. ~
A syntactic characterization of this new notion al'ter the style of theorem 8.2 is:
Theorem 8.4 D has a tight miniature iff D is intro.cpective (D ~~ K[D]) and
K-complete (for all ~p : D~ K~p or D F~ ~K~p).
Instead of proving theorem 8.4 directly, we will first show a connection between
the modal conditions mentioned in the theorem and a notion introduced by Stalnaker.
Definition 8.6 A set T offormulas is (SS-)stable iff
1. T contains the pL axioms;
2. T is deductively closed: if ~p E T and ~p ~~i E T then ~ E T;
3. if~pETthenK~pET;
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4. if tp ~ T then ~Ktp E T;
S. T is consistent with respect to pL.21
In 3 and 4 we can replace the conclusion by an equivalence, because of 5. To prove
theorem 8.4 it suf6ces to remark that the conditions for tightness of the miniature can
be reformulated in terms of stability:
Lemma 8.1 D is consistent, K-complete and introspeetive iff D is stable.
Proof: straightforward
Now tight models and stable sets are intimately related:
Theorem 8.5 T is stable qfor some tight M: TH(M) - T.
Proof: [HM85, lemma 2 and proposition 3]
Proof of theorem 8.4: as before we may suppose D to be consistent. If D is introspective and
K-complete, then (by lemma 8.1 here) D is stable, and so, by theorem 8.5, there is an M such
that TH(M) - D. By [HM85, proposition 3] M is reduced and by the logical finiteness of S5,
M must be finite. Consequently M is a tight global miniature for D. The proof of the converse
is quite simple: let M be a tight global miniature for D, lhen (theorem 8.2) D is introspective.
To prove K-completeness, assume that D FJ Ktp, then not M~ Ktp, i.e. for some v and u
such that vRu: M, u~ ~p. But since M is tight, u is accessible from every world in M, thus
M ~ ~Ktp, and so D ~ ~K~p. ~
Although theorem 8.4 showti that the conditions of existence of a tight miniature
hardly differ in strength from those of a local miniature, the former can be fulfilled by
invoking a modal version of the `closed world assumption' (cwn). D is augmented,
resulting in D', by the clauses:
.~p E D~ K~p E D';22
. D If ~p ~~K~p E D'.
(this is again effectively possible by the logical finiteness of SS), after which procedure
TU produces the tight miniature, provided D' is still consistent. In doing so we have
implicitly met the criterion of `honesty' of the system's knowledge, which is dealt with
in the next section.
Z~The use of the letter `T' stems from the fact that 1 and 2 imply that a stable set is a lheory: i.e. if
T H ~p then ~p E T. Moreover, ~ does not have to be restricted to propositional inference, since we can
show that the axioms of SS are containcd in a stable T, which, by 3, is closed under N. Here is a sample
derivation of the fact that T E T: rp E T or ~p ~ T, so ~p E T or ~K~p E T, then since ~p ~(K~p --~ lo)
and ~Krp ~(K~p ~ rp) aze propositionally valid, thus (by 1 and 2) contained in T, we obtain, again by
2, tha[ K~p ~~p E T.
~If D is introspective we may omit K from this clause; in that case D' amounts to an extension of D.
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8.6 Honesty
Which D are permitted, if the system only knows D? For many D such circumscrip-
tion is not possible without stumbling into inconsistencies. Example 8.4 produces a
paradigm: if the system only knows Kp V Kq, then ~Kp and ~Kq, and wnsequently
~Kp ~ ~Kq, which wntradicts Kp V Kq ! This is why such a D is called dishonest:
one cannot sincerely claim to know p or to know q without actually knowing at least
one of the two. Or, closer to natural language, it seems self-contradictory to say you
only know whether p. For proper understanding, a couple of remarks must be made
here.
In the first place we have to distinguish such dishonest knowledge from the case
in which the system only knows that p or q, in other words, when D only contains
the information K(p V q) (cf. examples 8.3 and 8.4). The latter case clearly does not
involve dishonest knowledge: K(pV q) is consistent, even when combined with ~Kp,
~Kq, ~K~p and ~K~q.
In the second place, although Kp V Kq seems unfit to be plain information, it
is proper as the representation of a question (query) or answer. This is reflected in
the fact that ` dishonest' knowledge may becomc proper when embedded: an agent
(human being or computer system) can only know of another agent that it knows p or
that it knows q. So, although K(Kp V Kq) is not honest, Ka(Kbp V Kbq) is.
This is one of the reasons for favouring our more general approach of miniatures:
in a multi-modal setting, dishonest fonnulas can become honest when embedded, so
the `dishonest' miniature may occur as a substructure of the whole `honest' miniature.
Several fonnal criteria for honesty are proposed in [HM85], which are then shown
to be equivalent. We will present two of the five ctiteria here.
Definition 8.7 D is stable-honest if there exist,c a stable T which contains D, and
T f1 pL is a unique minimal set (for D).
This definition is justified by the observation of [Mo85] that every stable T is com-
pletely detennined by T f1 pL, the set of K-free formulas in T. Minimality is prompted
by 'not knowing more than D'. It is shown that a stable set cannot be strictly contained
in another one, therefore we cannot demand minimality of T itself. That unicity is
required may be seen by t~econsidering KpV Kq; notice that either p or q is in its stable
extension (otherwise we obtain ~Kp ~~Kq) - so there is no unique minimum. 23
Definition 8.8 D is model-honest if the total union of the D models is a modelfor D.
Fortunately these two seemingly different notions of `honesty' coincide.
Theorem 8.6 (HalpernácMoses) D is stable-honest iff D i.s model-honest.
~The terminology used here is slightly different from that in [HM85], where uniciry is probably
implied by minimaliry.
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Now what is the connection between their approach and ours?
In the first place: their SS models are much simpler, so why "do it the hard way"
with swctunrd models? The reason for this step lies in the possibility of recursive
extension. Although we have not investigated these cases in full detail yet, it is a
prioriclear that a multi-modal logic (with several agents), and also the unimodal (one
agent) S4 logic cannot do without accessibility relations in their models. So it seems
advantageous to treat the simple SS case on a par.
In the second place we note that, quite different from whai one might expect,
the union model is in general not a tight miniature, but will tum up as the largest
component of the global miniature, in the sense that all components will be submodels
of this largest component.
Theorem 8.7 D is honest a D has a coarse miniature that is closed under total
union of the submodels.
Proof:
(~) By proposition 8.5, D always has a coarse miniature which coincides with the global
miniature M for K[D]. Let M-~{N; : N; ~ K[D]} (cf. the proof of theorem 8.2). Now
if D is model-honest, M will be closed under total union of components, for the N; are both
global models for K[D] and for D.
(G) Suppose M is a global miniature for K[D] that is closed under U of components. Assume
moreover that D is globally consistent (otherwise it is trivially model-honest). Then there must
be a greatest component N. We now prove that N is the greatest D model. Notice that, of
course, N~ D. It remains to be proven that each (tight, reduced) D model is contained in
N. Choose a tight and reduced model L such that L~ D. Again we may suppose L to be
non-empty. L will be finite, so WL -{w,, ..., wk}. Let Prop be {p,, ..., pr}. Now define,
for each world w; E Wy, a formula o; that characterizes the state of affairs in w;. First we
introduce the auxiliary Q;,i for i- I,..., k and j- 1, ..., n.
Pi if VL (Pi ~ w;)- 1
~ti,i - ~pi ifVL(Pi,w;)-0
Q; - o;,, n . . . n ~;,,,
Q - ,If,~, n . .. n ~K~~k
Then for every i: L, w; ~ v; and so L~ a. Now suppose L g N then for each component
C of M: L g C~ for each such C there is an i E{1, ..., k} such that for all worlds w in
C there is a p E Prop for which VL ( p, w; )~ V(p, w). So for any such C and w: C, w~ Q;
holds, therefore C ~ K~o;, and so C ~~o. Thus M~~a, hence D ~~o. This, however,
contradicts L ~ D U {v}. ~
So, another way to express the same result would be that D is honest iff K[DJ
has a global miniature with a maximal component. Notice that the second part of
the proof of theorem 8.7 demonstrates another important fact about miniatures, viz.
their uniqueness. Theorem 8.7 also shows that the notion of `honesty', too, can be
expressed in our framework. In other words, our theory will call the same sets of data
`honest' as [HM85]. It is a totally different matter whether honest information in fact
fits the intuition of determining a knowledge state.
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A borderline case with respect to honesty is the information D-{~Kp}. We
could surmise that thisexample is like the standard counterexample KpV Kq, because
it contains a comparable kind of indeterminacy. This connection seems to be supported
by the equivalence ~Kp .-~ K~p V K(~Kp ~~K~p). But even so, ~Kp differs
from Kp V Kq in that it is in fact honest: the stable extension of D with a uniquely
smallest subset ofpL formulas is the stable set which only contains purely propositional
formulas that are tautologies. The greatest tight model of D is then also the greatest
possible tight model for this Prop. Notice however that by means of our miniatures
we can discriminate various types of very weak knowledge. For example, the above
D-{~Kp} and total lack of information (D - 0) have different miniatures, even
when Prop - {p}:
D: ~ ~ ..-.. ~
~P ~P P
0: ~ ~ .--. ~ .
~P ~P P P
The left-hand model characterizes the information of"not knowingp", whereas the `no
information model' on the right-hand side characterizes full absence of infonnation
about p. This distinction is useful, above all, from a dynamic point of view: the set
0 characterizes complete lack of information at a certain point of time, and can be
consistently extended by the information Kp at some later moment. For D this is not
possible without contradiction. One can imagine this type of inforrnation to occur in
practice in, for example, an automatized weather station: if a measuring-device is out
oforder ordoes not provide a decisive answer, the central data processor has to register
this as not knowing the dimension in question (for instance temperature); compare the
opposite situation where the data from this measuring-device have not yet arrived at
the central computer.
8.7 Dimensions for extension and variation
Various dimensions have been mentioned above:
1. The richness of the representation languagc
2. The logical power of the modal system
3. The kind of semantic structures.
We can vary one or more of these parameters and study their representational possi-
bilities. We shall discuss the different dimensions below.
8.7.1 Richness of the logical language
The syntax can be extended in various ways, for example:
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. with predicates, variables and quantifiers (quantified modal logic);
. by introducing more agents (multi-modal logic).
[Le84b] deals with quantification, even though, in a strict sense, it dces not deal with
knowledge but with uncertain information, i.e. belief. The truth axiom T is then
replaced by the consistency axiom D: ~(B~p ~ B~~p).
Intn~duction of multiple agents is immanent to studies of distributed systems,
where a number of interconnected pmcessors exchange information. For this purpose
a homogeneous logic in which the processors use the same modal system is adequate.
As noticed in [HM85] even SS~m~, multiple S5, poses many problems. Some of these
are surely solvable (we noticed, for example, that theorem 8.1 holds for SS~m~); others
are more difficult (for example defining minimality for SS(m~-stable sets). In fact we
claim that, for the SS~m~-logic, a consistent D does not possess a global miniature,
unless D is at least intmspective with respect to common knowledge (i.e. i's knowledge
of j's knowledge of . .., ad infinitum). Strictly speaking, this involves enriching both
the logical language with an extra operator and the logical system with axioms for
common knowledge, beyond SS~m~. Without common knowledge, there does not
seem to be much hope for a positive result. According to the following conjecture
only inconsistent data have an SS~m~ miniature, viz. the empty model.
Conjecture 8.1 For SS~m~ consistent D do not possess global miniatures.
Proof: L.et D be a consistent set of data. Suppose D has an SS~m~ miniature M. Either D is
valid or it is not.
If D is valid, then M ~ ~p q~ ~p, i.e. M verifies all and only valid formulas. This, however,
is impossible: every finite model globally verifics some nonvalid formula, (FHV91, thm. 4.9].
If D is invalid, then D must be common knowledge in M. To see this let a-~ D,
K~p - K,~p n... n K,n~p, Kn}'~p - KK"~p for all n. Then by assumption M ~ a, and
so by induction M~ K"a for all n, and therefore a~ K"a for all n, where a is nonvalid.
This, we claim, is impossible. For, since a is neither valid nor inconsistent, there are model N
and N' such that N, w~ a and N', w' ~~a. In fact the maximal distances DN(w, v) and
DN~ (w', v') ( where the distance DM (x, y) between ven.ices x and y is defined as the length of
the minimal path from x to y in M) I~or worlds v in N and v' in N' may be chosen not to exceed
the modal depth d of a. Now let u be the endpoint of a longest path in N, and u' similarly
in N'. Next link u and u' by 2d altemating edges: uR~u~, u~RZUZ, uZRiu3, .~., u2d-iRZU'.
Then in the resulting model L: L, w~ a ~~Kna, where n - DN(w, u) f 2d ~ DN~(w', u'),
thus contradicting common knowledge of a. ~
8.7.2 Varying the modal system
The required logical power may cxceed S5 for distributed systems, but mostly one will
have to inspect weaker modal systems than S5. After all, people are not consistent in
their reasoning with knowledge and not logically omniscienteither. For the timebeing,
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the first modal logic to deal with will be S4, the proper logic for human knowledge
according to [Hi62] and [Le78].
As we noticed in section 8.2, S4 has the finite model property, and so theorem 8.1
holds for S4 as well. So, certain types ofcomplete knowledge can be captured by local
models. Incomplete knowledge therefone requires global models. At this point we
may wonder whether theorem 8.2 carries over to S4-knowledge: is the introspection
property D I- ~j(` K[DJ a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a
global miniature? Inspection of the proof of theorem 8.2 however indicates that
the logical finiteness of the background logic is essential. Unfortunately, S4 is not
logically finite24, because worlds occurring in the same component which are identical
as far as truth assignment to propositional variables is concemed, cannot in general be
identified, since different altematives may be acccssible from them. As a consequence
of this, there is no limit to the size of components in a characterizing model, so we
cannot confine ourselves to finite miniatures. Although the condition of globality
should suppress the complexity of the models, it appeats to be difficult to supply an
analogous S4 miniature for example 8.2. For instance the asymmetric generalization
of the SS miniature for {K~q} does not suffice here:
.~.
P~ ~4 ~P~ ~4
P, ~4
.~..
P~ ~4 ~R ~9
~~~
P, ~9 ~P, ~9
In effect the complete lack of information about p prevents the existence of an S4
miniature. Wc can prove this by using the list of formulas mentioned in note 24.
First we define these formulas inductively: ZS
~Po - T:
rPt - P;
tPnf2 - P l~ ~j{~p v j{~~P„),
For n~ 0 neither these formulas, nor their negations follow from D-{K~q}.
Suppose that M is the S4 miniature of D, then, for each n, ~tpn has to be refuted in a
uEven when ~Prop~ - 1, S4 is not Iogically finite. For consider the list of formulas: p, p n~Kp,
pn~K(p v K~p), pn ~K(pV K(~pV Kp)),.. . Semantically the non-equivalenceof the formulas in
question becomes evident because they are discemed by a model containing chains of sufficient length.
uPerhaps more perspicuous equivalents aze: ~pwf2 - p n Íf(~p n Íf~px), where Íf - ~K~, K's
dual, or ~p.tz - ~(P -. K(~p ~ K~~PR)).
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component Mn of M. This is not entirely sufficient to prove the statement, because
Mn could be the component
.~.~
P~ ~9 ~P, ~9
which refutes all fotmulas from the left world. This imperfection can be easily
remedied by considering the formula ~~p„ V ~pn~Z instead of ~~pn. A countennodel of
the new formula must contain, for each n, a directed chain
.--~.--i.... .~.
of at least n worlds, so M cannot be finite.
It seems that very strong conditions are needed for S4 miniatures. One way to
enlarge the feasibility of S4 miniatures is to restrict the set of consequences which has
to be modelled (cf. [Le88]). For cxample, we can restrict the possible consequences to
those of maximum modal depih d. As the heuristics from the beginning of section 8.3
indicates, given such a threshold there obviously are S4 miniatures. This is, ofcourse,
a much more general point: regardless of the actual modal system, the construction
will always yield a miniature for conseyuences upto depth d. And in fact, upto depth 1,
there is no difference between thc modal systems S5, SS~m~, S4 or T, and the restricted
miniatures will thus be equal for these systems.
Although finite characterization in general seems very difficult, we can study S4
knowledge states from other points of view too. Concentrating on honest information
we have to adapt the notion of stabiliry for S4. [Ja91c] gives an abstract, yet elegant
definition ofstability for arbitrary nonnal systems, reminiscent of the work of Konolige
and Moorc.
Definition 8.9 (Jaspars) A set T offormulas is S-stable iff
1. T contains the S-theorems (~s ~p ~ ~p E T);
2. T is deductively closed: ~p E T, ~p -a t,i E T~~i E T;
3. K[T] U~K[T`J is consistentwith respect to S.~
This definition is shown to be equivalent to the even more concise requirement that
T- K-t[E] for some maximally S-consistent E. The new definition of stability is
a correct generalization of Stalnaker's, since for SS both definitions amount to the
same, and accord intuitions. The general notion can be applied to S4, singling out
~~K[T`] - {~K~p ~ ~p ~ T}
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the S4-stable sets. Still we may wonder whether a definition of S4-stability can be
found which is somewhat more transparant and closer to definition 8.6. What clearly
has to change is clause 4 of the original definition, since this amounts to the feature
of'negative introspection', which is typical of S5. However, we want to maintain the
cornespondence between stable sets and theories validated by single models one wayor
the other, so we cannot simply drop condition 4. What is implied by this condition for
SS and has to hold for S4 too is the property of what might be called modal saturation:
K~pVKs~iET~K~pETorK~iET
This leads to the following definition of S4 stability:
Definition 8.10 A set T offormulas is S4 stable iff
1. T contains the S4 axioms;
2. cpET,~p-~~,ET~~iET;
3. if ~p E T then Kcp E T;
4. ifK~pVKij,ETthen~pETor~iET;
S. T is consistent with respect to S4.
The latter definition applies to all normal modal systems which extend NK4; in fact it
is equivalent to definition 8.9 for all nonnal NK4 extensions. Moreover, if we replace
S4 by SS definitions 8.10 and 8.6 are equivalent, so our definition correctly generalizes
Stalnaker's.
Multi-modal logic and systems ofvarious strength can also be fruitfully combined.
One point in the network may deal with knowledge in a different way than others. To
our knowledge, the heterogenous case has not becn investigated yet. Still, this is what
happens when people and computers exchange information.
8.7.3 The nature of the semantic structures
Here, in particular, partial models can be thought of. Although this multiplies the
number of possible worlds and models in principle, it does not necessarily imply that
the system becomes larger and slower: not every world has to be examined when all
infortnation is lacking with respect to a simple proposition; in fact partial miniatures
will mostly be much smaller. This approach will be studied in the next chapter.
An altemative is to allow infinite miniatures on the formal level, and invent a smart
way of finitely representing these infinities. Perhaps Vardi's knowledge stnictures may
be interpreted in this way, i.e. as an implementation of possibly infinite Kripke models.
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8.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have investigated various ways of storing information in Kripke
models. We focussed on attempts to push all information into one finite characterizing
model. The obvious altemative to this idea is a procedure which supplies a counter-
example for every non-consequence. This strategy will always succeed for the usual
notmal systems of modal logic, which possess the finite model property. So, this
strategy is less exclusive. It is not even a priori clear whether this strategy is less
efficient than mere model checking, but it is certainly less elegant: (essentially)
the same things have to be done repeatedly. Therefore, the approach of devising
`miniatures', i.e. finite characterizing models, seems preferable.
The requirement of finiteness, modest though it may seem, poses considerable
constraints on admissible sets of data in most cases of interest. The feasibility of what
may be called semantic knowledge representation in fact tums out to depend on the
background logic and the kind of models involved.
The main division here was between local models and global models. We showed
that incomplete information cannot be characierized by a finite local model (`local
miniature'), in the sense of vetifying precisely the logical consequences of the data in
a designated world. Under comparatively lenient conditions it appeared to be possible
to characterize the data by a global model. ln fact, various kinds of `global miniatures'
qualified. Each kind of miniature was shown to exist under certain necessary and
sufficient conditions on deduction from the data.
The different kinds of miniatures can also be related directly. For example, a
coarse miniature M, which characterizes the global consequences of the information,
models a ifand only if M is a global miniature for K~. Local models can still be used
when we do not want to describe all consequences, but only those of the form K~p. Z~
It should be noted that the condition of finiteness is immaterial for the existence
of local miniatures: if there is a characterizing model, we may as well assume it to be
finite, provided the logic has thc finite model property. For global models 6niteness
really matters, since for introspective information the operation called `disjoint union'
in general produces a countahle characterizing model. The point here is simply that
the 6nite model property is a very common feature among standard modal systems,
but logical finiteness, which appears to be required for global miniatures, is quite
exceptional. For that reason it may be surprising that existence of local miniatures
does not depend on logical finiteness: theorcm 8.1 holds for S4, which is not logically
finite.
Another formal difference between local and global models is that the former
presuppose consistency of thc data whereas the latter do not. Notice however that this
difference is dominated by a de(initional issue, viz. whether we are willing to allow
empty (global) models or not. For the sake of simplicity we did allow empty models,
but noticed that (global) consistency is a prerequisite for any concrete application.
Another question is whether a miniature is uniquely determined by the given
rThis notion of K-miniatwe is related to our eazlier notions by the fact that K[D] has a non~mpty
tight miniawre iff K[D] has a K-miniature.
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information. The answer to this is positive, in any case for SS and modulo reduction
and isomorphy of models.
Existence and uniqueness of miniatures being guaranteed under the stated condi-
tions, it has also been pointed out how miniatunes can be effectively constructed from
simple models, particularly for global and tight miniatures.
In this chapter we did not include complexity considerations.28 Since the size of
the models may be (super)-exponential in the number of atoms, the whole approach
may seem intractable. However, recent research indicates that regularities and smart
heuristics may make model checking quite efficicnt, even for very large structures, cf.
[BC~`90J. Still, reducing the size of the miniature is clearly advantageous. In the final
chapter we will see whether partiality is capable of reducing the size of the miniatures.




In the previous chapter we saw that knowledge representation by means of possible
world models is feasible (at least for SS), but that the resulting models will be ex-
ceedingly large. We suggested that partial logic may help to reduce the size of the
miniature. However, there is a paradox contained in this move. For although partial
models may be smaller, there are more partial models than classical models, for a
propositional atom may receive 3 truth-values instead of 2 in each world. Moreover,
bringing to mind the general procedure leading to miniatures, in the weaker partial
logic there will be more formulas that do not follow from the given information, hence
more counterexamples are needed, including the classical ones, whichjointly lead to a
much largerminiature. Although this construction still works, we will find tha[usually
there will exist a miniature that is much smaller than the `canonical' one indicated
above.
As we saw in chapters 6 and 7, partial epistemic logic may have the advantage that
it is closer to actual human knowledge. Perhaps it is now also possible to capture these
weaker types of knowledge in finite models, such as those triggered by partial modal
systems resembling S4, which was virtuaily impossible for classical miniatures.
As we saw in chapter 3 there are two prevailing perspectives on validity in partial
semantics: verification and (non-)falsification. We use both perspectives in this
chapter, in particular, relative verification and falsification. Most of what follows will
be directed to global miniatures, but we also reconsider local models, because the
set of formulas true in some situation dces not have to be maximally consistent, so,
on the syntactic side, the problem of theoretical completeness (cf. fullness), which
obstructed local miniatures for incomplete information in the classical case, is avoided
by partiality. To prepare the ground for another altemative approach, viz. that of
circumscriptive miniatures, we redefine stabiliry for partial logics.
We provide complexity resulis for some types of information, both for partial
and for classical miniatures. Minimization, which was a rather trivial operation on
classical models (merely identifying propositional lyequivalent worlds withinthe same
224 CHAPTER 9. PARTIAL MODELS FOR KBS
component), now is a productive non-trivial operation: indeed this is what may make
partial miniatures (much) smaller than classical ones.
9.1 Introduction
Why go partial in knowledge representation? The possibility of representing knowl-
edge in finite Kripke models was studied in chapter 8. The main reasons for the present
research stem from resul[s reported in that chapter. Finite representation in classical
possible worlds models (i.e. Kripke structures with a bivalent truth assignment) tumed
out to be possible under certain conditions. For example, some piece of SS-knowledge
a can be characterized by a`global miniature' M (i.e. M verifies precisely all the SS
consequences of a in each world) iff a is introspective (a ~SS Ka).
However, though the existence ofclassical miniatures encourages further research
in this direction, some drawbacks of total models point at the need of partiality in
model-theoretic knowledge representation. For, though the word `miniature' indicates
a tiny thing (reflecting our initial intention), the classical miniatures are by no means
small.l To be more specific, we will calculate the size of one type of classical SS
miniatures below.
Moreover, most positive results were obtained for S5, which is, in some sense,
the simplest non-trivial modal logic. For the epistemic logics S4 (which is somewhat
closer to human knowledge) and SSim) (which is proper for the case of many agents
reasoning according to SS) there seem to be no equally positive results. In particular,
in chapter 8 it was proved that simple incomplete S4-knowledge cannot be modelled
in finite classical Kripke models. A similarly negative result for SS(m) showed that
multi-agent knowledge cannot be modelled, without constraining the set of possible
consequences to fonnulas of limited modal depth.
Finally, we noticed that modal systems such as S4 do not account for the way in
which human beings deal with knowledge - real agents are not perfect reasoners,
therefore they will not know everything that follows from their knowledge. These
observations lead to the following central questions:
. Can we improve upon the complexity of the representation of SS-knowledge?
A priori, partial models seem pmper to diminish the size of the miniatures.
. Can we represent the knowledge with respect to other epistemic logics, such as
S4 and SS(m) by means of partial models?
. Can we represent the type ofknowledge that is closer to the way in which human
beings think, i.e. knowledge that accords to a weaker epistemic logic?2
~ Perhaps this shift parallels the history of the word `minim' (the next item in l.ongmans' Intemational
Reader's Dictionary): formerly a very short note of music, now quite a long one. Also, there is no
consensus on the erymology of the word 'miniature', but the relation to L.atin 'minim' is at least one of
[he possible sources.
Zcf. [FH88] and chapters 6 and 7 here.
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The answers to these points depend on the kind of evaluation.3 Assuming a non-
falsification perspective on valid consequence, we will show that the total miniatures
are among the smaller ones. But under a verification perspective, the gain of partiality
is more substantial since the miniatures will generally be much smaller and will follow
the rules of somewhat weaker logics.
rnmplexity of classical miniatures
Total miniatures soon become very large. In fact, the smaller the relative amount
of information, the larger the model will be. Some of the worst cases are those of
complete ignorance with respect to a number of propositional variables. Assume, for
example, that the only inforntation is Kp and the system is totally ignorant with respect
to (only) three other atoms. Then the miniature will consist of 1024 worlds divided
over 255 components. In general, if there is no information about r atoms, whereas the
other atoms are completely known (i.e. either Kp; or K~p; for, say, i- 1, ..., n- r),
the number of worlds and components of the (smallest!) miniature is superexponential
in r. More precisely,
Proposition 9.1 (size of miniature for simple ignorance)
A classicalminiature modelling complete ignorance of r propositional variables and
complete knowledge of the other variables, has ~ Cr ~- 22r - 1 components and a total
numberof ~Wr~ - 22rtr-I worlds.
Proof: First notice that the miniature is isomorphic to the model that characterizes zero
infonnation with respect to r atoms (simply drop the uniform specification for the known p;
out of the worlds). This model consists of all non-empty tight submodels4 of the largest tight
model for r atoms, which contains 2' ~worlds. So there are 22~ - 1 components. The total
number ~ W, ~ of worlds in this model can be calculated by an easy combinatorial argument:s
Z' r 2` . Z~-i .
~W.~-~i'( { ) -~2T'( i-11 ) -2r
~ ~ 2 i 1 1 -2' 2ZT-i -2Zr}'-1.
.-i :-i t-o l
Notice that a special instance of this proposition is that in which the system has no
knowledge at all of the n propositional variables. This `worst case' analysis is even
of some practical importance: a relational database can be relatively empty, that is,
the number of atomic (predicate logical) formulas may be quite large, whereas the
number of known facts small, and the miniature consequently gigantic (if r ti 100,
~W,~ N lOto~). As we will see, especially with such simple ignorance, partial
miniatures have a dramatically better performance: given the right perspective, the
model will consist of just one world!
3See the chapters 3 and 4 in this book.
4See chapter 8.
SAltematively, Johan van Benthem has suggested that thc number ~ W. ~ may be understnod as follows:
each of the 2' state~escriptions occurs in 22}-t components (equalling the number of subsets ofother
state descriptions to which the state is attached).
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9.2 F-miniatures
First we will give the definition ofan F-miniature, `F' fornon-falsification or falsifiability.
Recall from chapter 3 that M, a~ ~p means that ~p is not false in a according to model
M, M~ ~p that M, a~ ~p for every a in M, and D~ ~p that M, a~ ~p for every
model M and situation a such that M, a~ b for all b E D. So the slash in the con-
sequence relation of relative falsifiability has a fixed meaning and dces not indicate
non-consequence.
Definition 9.1 M is an F-miniature for D iff M isfinite andfor each ~p: M~ ~p q
D ~ ~p.
Or, equivalently, M is an F-miniature iff
. M is finite,
. M ~ D,
. M ~ ~p ~ D ~ ~p.
Until further notice we will concentrate on models with an equivalence accessi-
bility n;lation. Moreover, we assume the models to be coherent, i.e. the truth-value
assignment can be defined or undefined, but not overdefined. Then the logic of the
F-inferences is essentially SS without the (propositional and modal) exfalso rules (but
with the rules of tertium non datur). This logic will be called SSt henceforth.b
We can give a syntactic criterion for the existence of F-miniatures. Both result
and proof resemble the analogous case for classical miniatures.
Theorem 9.1 D has an F-miniature iff D F-ss. ~j(~ K(D).
Proof: (Cf. the proof of theorem 8.2.) Notice that S5' induces a relation of derivational
equivalence H, which corresponds to F~quivalence (i.e. ~p H,I, iff M, a~ ~p q M, s~~
for all M, a). With respect to this equivalence the logic is finite (corollary 4.2) and has the
F'1~tp (theorem 4.12). So the miniature is the finite disjoint union of finite counter-examples to
non-consequences. Using the generation lemma, it is easy to show that this is an F-miniattue
for introspective D. t!
This result demonstrates that for the usual data, such as epistemic formulas of the
form Ka, model-theoretic representation is feasible. It dces not display the form of
the miniature, nor how to arrive at a minimal model. In fact, what dces an F-miniature
look like? In some cases an F-miniature may be a total model, as the following
example will illustrate.
Example 9.1 (simple ignorance)
Let Prop -{p, q} and D-{Kp}. The minimal totalF-miniatureforD is themode[:
óSee chapter 4. Recall that SS' is characterized by the set of rules M' U{T„ 5,}, where Tr and S.




P, ~Q P,9 R4
So, the idea that invoking non-falsification always produces a reduction of the
model (by dropping either positive or negative information) tums out to be wrong.
We can, of course, add partialized components, or, more precisely, despecifications
modulo finite equivalence.~ In the present case this amounts to copying worlds
within a component, reconnect them to the component and finally omit specifications.
Partialization wili lead to larger models, but, more importantly, the resulting miniatures
will be equivalent.
Proposition 9.2 Adding partialized eomponents to an F-miniature results in another
F-miniature(for the same information).
Proof: given some F-miniattue M for D with component N, let N'CN, then M~ N' is
equivalent to M, for there are finite L, L' such that N' - L' C L- N, and so (1) M~ N'
will be finite; (2) suppose for some 6 E D and s in M: N', s~ 6, then by equivalence and
persistence N, s~ ó, thus M, s~ 6, which contradicts M~ D. So we obtain N~ D, and
therefore M~ N' ~ D; (3) if M~ N' ~ ~p then surcly M~,p, and so D~ ~p. ~
The proposition licenses an optimalization procedure: an F-miniature can be mini-
malized by dropping components which are partializations of other components. So,
an F-miniature thus minimalized will usually consist of more or less total components.
Now for those data that can be modelled by a total miniature, we may also consider
whether we can supply a truly partial miniature by replacing a total component by its
different partializations.
Example 9.2 (simple ignorance, continued)
Reconsider D-{Kp} (cf: example 9.1). A minimal F-miniature for D might be
obtainedfrom the total miniature by omitting,rome of the literals. Notice however that
contracting the middle component to the singleton p, will not do: then Kq V K~q will
be non falsified, but Kq V K~q is not a consequence of Kp. Likewise, dropping both
occurrences of `p' in the central component would produce the model
P,.4
.~-...
~9 4 P, 9
~So, NiCNz iff for some finite N~,Na: N~ - N3. Nz - Na and N~ C Na. Here C expresses
extension of valuation for the same frame. Persistence with respect to valuation extension was shown in
chapter 4.
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This model nonfalsifies K~p V Kq v K~q, which is not an F-consequence of Kp.
Similarly, dropping `p' in the right-hand world of the middle component admits the
non-consequence ~Kp V Kq V K~q. Infact, as the readermay check (warning: this
is tedious labour),none of the occurences of `p', `q' and `~q' may be omitted without
loss of characterization.
These examples suggest that minimal total F-miniatures are unique, up to isomor-
phism. The examples and the previous proposition may also suggest the generalization
that classical (SS)- miniatures for some set of data D are always F-miniatures for D
as well. Though tempting, the latter is not true.
Example 9.3 Consider the data D -{Kp, K(p ~ q)}. A total model that verifies
D will also verify Kq. Consequently, essentially the only classical SS miniature for D
will be the singleton model verifying both p and q. But Kq is not an F-consequence
of D, roughly because S5~` does not contain Modus Ponens. So the singleton model ls
not an F-miniature for D. A small F-miniature for D is:
. . ~~ .
~9 ~9 P, 9 P, 4
Another example of the incongruity of classical and V-miniatures may be more
transparant. The point is that for inconsistent data, F~onsequence and SS-consequence
diverge widely.
Example 9.4 Forthe data {Kp, Kq, K~q} the minimal F-miniature is:
P
As in the previous example, there is no total F-miniature for this set ofdata: a total
model that nonfalsifies q and ~q in each world should verify q and ~q in each world,
thus has to be the empty model. But the empty model al,so nonfalsifies K~p, which
does notfollow from the data in 55~.
From these comparisons between (partial and total) F-miniatures and (total) classical
miniatures some generalizations are induced:
. A total F-miniature for D is also a classical miniature for D.
. If D has a minimal F-miniature that is partial, it has no total F-miniature.
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The fitst generalization is easily proved. Looking for a kind of converse notice that
examples 9.3 and 9.4 show that classical miniatures may not be total F-miniatures, in
fact that there is information that has a classical miniature, but no total F-miniature.
So the following question emerges:
Is consistent information modelled by an F-miniatureiff there is a classi-
cal miniature?
From the left to the right this holds trivially (even without consistence): If D has an F-
miniature then D~~. ~j(` K[D] and so D F~ss ~ K[D], thus D has a classical minia-
ture. For the other direction, notice we cannot leave out the consistency requiremenr
a trivial counter-example runs as follows: p ~~p has the empty classical miniature,
but cannot have an F-miniature, since p ~ ~p FjSS. K(p ~~p). This observation can
be transformed into a genuine counter-example: Consider a-(p ~~p) V Kq. a is
consistent and classically equivalent to Kq, and therefore SS introspective. liowever
a is not S5~ introspective, for Ka is falsified in the left-hand world of the following
model, but a is not.
To conclude this section, we notice that in ordinary circumstances F-miniatures will
not be of much practical importance. The reason for this is that though partiality
may leave truth values open, leaving out many propositional specifications in model
structures for incomplete knowledge would lead to wrong results under the present
perspective on validity: simply too many formulas would become valid. We therefore
tum to the other perspective on validity.
9.3 V-miniatures
The notionof `V-miniature' is similarto `F-miniature', with verification ( `V') instead
of non-falsification. The definitions of global verification (M ~ ~p), and relative
verification (also called `strong consequence') arc obvious.H
Definition 9.2 M is a V-miniature for D iff M is finite andfor each ~p: M~ ~p a
D ~ ~p.
Or, equivalently, M is a V-miniature iff
. M is finite,
. M ~ D,
BSee chapters 3 and 4 for details.
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. M ~ ~y ~ D ~ ~p.
As noticed in chapter 4, the set of V~onsequences is usually considerably smaller
than the set of norntal consequences; so the V-miniature may have to represent less,
which is enabled by the possibility of underspecifying worlds for their propositional
contents.
In this section we still restrict ourselves to coherent models with an equivalence ac-
cessibility relation. For relative veri6cation the inference rules will again be somewhat
weaker than the usual SS ones. Call this logic, which is also a variant of good-old S5,
now with the exfalso rules but without tertium non datur: SSt, `coherent verificational
S5'9
We may repeat the question ofcornespondence: which syntactic or deductive qual-
ities of D enable its veriócational representation by a finite partial model? Existence
ofV-miniatures is warranted by the already Familiar syntactic condition of(deductive)
introspection:
Theorem 9.2 D has a V-miniature iff D~SSf ~ K[D].
Proof: ( Cf. the proof of the previous theorem, now in a more symbolic fashion.) The condition
is clearly necessary, but also sufficient. To show the latter, notice that SS} is logically finite and
has the Ftvtp. If ~ is the set of disjunctive normal forms of modal degree 1 (see section 4.6.3),
then ~ is finite, and the disjoint union ofcounter-examples of non-consequences produces
M-~{N ~ N~ D, N tight and reduced 8c N~ ~p for some ~p E~}.
It is easily checked that M is a V-miniature for D. ~
Notice that this theorem guarantees existence of the V-miniature for introspective
information, but does not produce a minimal V-miniature. As a matter of fact, the
model produced in the proof will be usually (much) larger than the classical miniature.
But in many cases smaller models can be obtained, as the examples below will
demonstrate.
The gain of relative verification becomes clear in cases where only part of the
propositional variables are known. Recall that for such simple ignorance the F-minia-
ture amounts to a classical model of superexponential size (in the numberofunknown
variables).
Example 9.5 (simple ignorance)
Assume complete information about pl ,..., pk (i.e. Kp; or K~p; for each i-
1, ..., k), and complete ignorance of the rest. This set of data is modelled by the
singleton miniature M: lo
(~)Pi,...,(~)Pk
9See chapter 4. SSt is characterized by M} u{T„ 5,}.
~oThe correctness of this and the following miniatures is proved in the appendix.
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This example is a case of `simple ignorance': nothing is known about p; for i~ k,
even D Ff ~Kpk~i V~K~pk~t. It contrasts with types of `strong ignordrtce' in which,
for example, there is full knowledge about pt , ..., pk but D~~Kp; ~~K~p; for all
i 1 k.
Example 9.6 (strong ignorance)
Let D-{Kpi, ~KP2i ~K~pZ, ~Kp3i ~K~p3}. D is represented by the following
minimal model:
Pt,Pz Pt, ~Pz~ ~ ~
I~t~,I.. .
Pt , Pa Pt , ~Ps
Notice on the one hand that in cases of `strong ignorance' the information can be
strengthened further: in the above example e.g. D y~K(pZ V p3). Yet adding such
a formula implies an increase of knowledge, so it seems fair to say that the ignorance
would have decreased.
In between simple and strong ignorance there are intermediate cases of semi-strong
(or, partial) ignorance. Here is a paradigm.
Example 9.7 (semi-strong ignorance)
Assume that D-{Kp~, ~KP2}. D is minimall~~ represented by:
Pt,~Pz Pt~~;~
Now adding (negative) information such as ~Kp; has a remarkable effect: it
reduces the size of the classical miniature, but magnifie.c the size of the partial V-
miniature somewhat. To wit, assume the initial infonnation Kp~. As we saw in
the introductory section, the classical miniature for the atoms p~ , Pzi p3 has 32 worlds
(distributed over IS components). Adding ~KP2 leads to some reduction: for thiscase
of semi-strong ignorance the classical miniature contains 28 worlds (12 components).
The final addition of ~K~pZ, ~KP3 and ~K ~P3 (strong ignorance) involves a classical
miniature of20 worlds (and 7 components). As the above examples show, the number
of worlds of partial V-miniatures for these cases of simple, semi-strong and strong
ignorance are 1, 2, and 4, respectively (and just one component in each case).
More generally, (semi-)strong ignorance can be captured by tight V-miniatures
of polynomial, in fact even linear size, whereas their classical counterparts need a
superexponentia! amount of worlds.
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Proposition 9.3 (size of miniatures for (semi-)strong ignorance)
The minimal V-miniature modelling (semi-)strong ignorance with respect to r atoms
and complete knowledge of the others has at most 2r f 1 situations (in 1 component).
A corresponding classical miniature requires at least 22r't worlds, divided over at
least 22r-2 components (if r~ 0).
1'roof: the examples above of (semi-)strong ignorance obviate that the largest minimal V-mi-
niattue will be the one for strong ignontrtce of r atoms, where 2r f 1 sitttations sufóce: apaR
from the known literals, which occur in all situations, one containing p; and one containing
~p; for each unknown p; and one which is empty.
For the classical case, notice that strong ignorance now gives the smallest miniattue. Its
largest component will have 2' worlds ( state~iescriptions). Each set containing more than half
of these state-descriptions will necessarily satisfy both p; and ~p; for all unknown p; (for if
not than there can be no more than 2'-t states in the set), and thus will constitute a wmponent
of the miniature. So we have that
z'
~C,~ ~ ~ ~ 2i ~ - 2 .22~ - 2 ~ 22Tt ~ ~ 22'-2
2--~}1 `
if r~ 0. A similar calculation for the number of worlds shows ~ t
2' r 2' -1 rIWrI )~ i r 2 1- 2r ~ r 2 - l 1- 22'fr-2 ~ 22'-tl i J ` i J2'-~ft z--~
if r~ 0. (the last estimation also holds for the borderline case r- 0). ~
This proposition illustrates our point that partial models are superior to classical
models for at least two reasons: first, they are usually much smaller and, second, more
natural since they tend to grow when information is added. Classical miniatures, on
the other hand, are rather clumsy in describing knowledge. Total Kripke structures
may be said to model ignorance rather than knowledge, which they are supposed to.
One of the additional advantages of partial models is that, since simple ignorartce does
not need to be modelled, only 'relevant' propositional variables (which occur in the
data) have to be taken into account. Conseyuently, we omit the specification of Prop
in examples of V-miniatures.
Since (semi-)strong ignorance is a rather usual type of incomplete knowledge this
is also of some practical importance. Moreover, the resulting miniatures are linearly
dependent on the number ofpartl y known propositional variables, consequently check-
ing whether a fotmula is true can be executed in polynomial time, even with respect to
n- ~Prop~ and ~tp~. Now polynomial time complexity is quite usual, also for classical
models, then meaning: polynomial in ~~p~ and the number of worlds ~ W~,12 which, as
we have seen may be of the order 22". Though [BC~`90] shows that in some cases
ttThe summation may be replaced by a perhaps more insigh[ful argument: more than half of the subsets
of state~fescriptions containing someparticulaz statc will contain at least half of the state-descriptions.
This also yields the number 2' . 2- 2Z -t .
12I am indebted to Edith Spaan for patiently explaining me the relevant complexity argument.
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even large models can be processed, we conjecture that this will be impossible for,
say, (semi-)strong ignorance.l3
The above examples provided V-miniatures consisting of a single component.
More complex types of incomplete knowledge may n~uire several components, how-
ever. Before discussing some more involved examples, let us find the proper analogue
for proposition 9.2. In order to reduce its size, we need to know how V-miniatures are
nelated to partialization. Again the relation C between components of a V-miniature
involves a minimalization procedure, but now in the reverse direction. So, we can
paNy complete components by extending specification of worlds, after which equally
specified worlds may be identified. Completization will also lead to larger models, but
the resulting miniatures will be equivalent.
Proposition 9.4 Adding partially completed components to a V-miniature results in
another V-miniature (for the same information).
Proof: similar to proposition 9.2. ~
By proposition 9.4 a V-miniature can be minimalized by dropping components which
are essentially partial completions of other components. Therefore a minimal V-mi-
niature will consist of `most unspecified' components. This optimization is especially
useful for more complex cases.
Example 9.8 (honest disjunctive knowledge)
The smallest V-miniature for K(p V q) is:
. .~-.. .
P P 9 9
In comparison with the classical miniature14the above model is still small: the clas-
sical S5 miniature is a graph consisting of 12 vertices and ó edges, divided into 7
components.
Although the last miniature wnsists of 3 components, the model as a whole represents
a proper piece of infonnation. One can succesfully declare to know only this or that;
then the miniature has to be restricted to its central component. In so-called dishonest
knowledge such a consistent circumscription is impossible: for example, one cannot
consistently claim to know only whether this or that.t5
13For example, if r- 10 then a partial míniature has at most 21 worlds, yet the classical miniature
Zio
will have something of the order of 2 : 10~, which exceeds the estimated number of protons and
neutrons in the visible part of the universe ...
t~Cf. example 8.3.
~SSee sections 8.5, 8.6, and the conclusion of chapter 8 for a more profound exposition and comparison
of the two approaches, and section 9.5 here.
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Example 9.9 (dishonest disjunctive knowledge)
The minimal V-miniature for Kp V Kq happens to be the model:
P 9
Comparison with the classical miniature~b againpoints at a considerable reduction:
the classical SS miniature has 7 world.r (and 2 edges, S components).
All the previous examples of incomplete infotmation revealed V-miniatures which
were (much) smaller than the classical ones. This suggest the generalization that
representing incomplete knowledge by V-miniatures will always be more efficient.
By inspection of a stronger kind of incomplete information it is shown that this
generalization is not true.
Example 9.10 The minimal V-miniature for K(p H q) is:
. .~-.. .
P, 4 P, 9 ~P, ~4 ~P, ~4
At first sight, things may even get worse in that V-miniatures may be larger than
classical ones.
Example 9.11 The minimal V-miniaturefor {~Kp, ~K~p} is:
~P P
~~~~~~~
The classicalminiature with resliect to Prop -{p} has one world less:
Before jumping to conclusions, note that proposition 9.3 indicates that larger V-mi-
niatures are quite exceptional: for (semi-) strong ignorance the last example is the
only case in which the linear growth function exceeds the superexponential one. Of
course, other types of information may require larger miniatures. However, this dces
not give an increase of the theoretical complexity: after reduction, but even before
minimalization triggered by persistence, the number ofcomponents is at most 23" - 1
16Cf. example 8.4
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and the total number of worlds 3n - 23"-t (cf. proposition 9.1). We have seen that
minimalization usually cuts these numbers down considerably. Moreover, we believe
that the actual absolute excess will be limited.
Given the extensive comparison between partial and classical miniatures in this
section, we can evidently pose the same question as at the end of section 9.2: is
existence of a V-miniature for (consistent) information equivalent to existence of a
classical miniature. Actually, since S5t contains the ex falso rules, the consistency
requirement is immaterial now. Again the implication holds in one direction: if D
has a V-miniature, D is SS} introspective, and SS} is contained in S5, so D is SS
introspective as well, and therefore has a classical miniature. In the other direction the
implication is clearly false: p v~p has a classical miniature (the same as for 0), but
no V-miniature, sincep V ~p Ifssf K(pV ~p).
9.4 Local miniatures
A perhaps more obvious semantic approach to characterize knowledge would involve
Kripke's original local models. The idea is to have a designated world, from which
the evaluation starts, containing the facts, and the accessible worlds containing the
knowledge of these facts, and the knowledge of this knowledge, etcetera.
This approach was rejected in chapter 8 because only complete information can
be described in this way. More precisely, only D which were complete and consistent
theories quali fied. We blamed bivalence in the root world for this obnoxious behaviour.
Now, giving up bivalence, the hope of finding new possibilities for local miniatures
is reviving. So, let us consider local F- and V- miniatures. To that purpose, replace
M in definitions 9.1 and 9.2 by ( M, s). We will discuss both kind of local miniatures
separately.
Local F-miniatures
Like theirglobal partners, the knowledge modelled by local F-miniatures does nothavc
to be consistent. This oddity is illustrated by example 9.4, which also shows that if the
global miniature is a singleton model, it coincides with the local miniature. Moreover,
local F-miniatures do not capture honest disjunctive knowledge. For assume that, for
example, K(pV q) has a local miniature (M, w). Then M, w~ K(pV q), so M, w~ p
or M, w~ q, but neither p nor q are consequences of K(p V q). The conditions for
local F-miniatures appear to be very strong.
Theorem 9.3
D has a local F-miniature iff D is both complete and saturated.t~
Proof: analogous to theorem 8.1, using part of the canonical model by filtration over D t
its subformulas. The suitability of saturation follows from the Henkin completeness proof of
theorem 4.6 in section 4.4. ~
t~Completeness here expresses D F- rp or D I- ~~p, saturation D~~p v tb ~ D~ ~p or D F~.
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Local V-miniatures
Since (global) V-miniatures are more ef6cient then F-miniatures, we may hope for
more success in the case of local V-miniatures than we experienced for local F-
miniatures. However notice that disjunctive knowledge is still troublesome: K(p V q)
has no local V-miniature. The conditions for local V-miniatures are still very strong.
Theorem 9.4
D has a local V-miniature iff D is both consistent and saturated.
Prooi: analogous to the previous theorem. ~
9.5 Alternative: circumscription
Instead of describing knowledge as we did before, we may equally well be engaged in
circumscribing knowledge: i.e. to model what one only knows. A classical model M
circumscribes ~ when M is essentially the largest (tight) model for ~. In this area the
central syntactic notion connected to global models is stabiliry. Following essentially
[Ja91c], we take a stable set to be the theory of a global tight model. Of course the
evaluation type matters, which is reflected here in the choice of the background logic
(S5} or S54): ts
Definition 9.3 A setT offormulus is SS}-stable ifT -{~p ~ M~ ~p}, and SS'-stable
if T-{~p ~ M~ ~p} where M is some non-empry tight model with an equivalence
accessibility relation.
An equivalent definition in syntactic terms is:
Proposition 9.5 T is S5}-stable iff T- K-I [E] -{~p ~ Kcp E E} for some
consistent saturated SS}-theor~~ E. T!s S5~-stable iff T- K-I [E], for some full
saturated SS'-theory E. 19
Prooi: (~) If T is SS}-stable then for some tight M: T-{~p ~ M~~p}. L.et s be a situation
in M, and take E-{~p ~ M, a~ ~p}. Then E is easily checked to be a consistent, saturated
SS}-theory. Moreover, T- K-' [E] since ~p E T q M~~p q M, a~ K~p q K~p E E.
(G) If T- K-' [E] for a consistent saturated S5}-theory E, then the Henkin completeness
proof shows that E can be embedded in the canonical model J1~1 such that for the generated
submodel ME of J~t: ME, E~ ~p q ~p E E, which implies that T is S5}-stable. The proof
for SS'-stability is similar. ~
The novel definition may also bc recast in more traditional terms.
'sIkfinition 9.3 can easily be generalized far an arbitrarypartial semantics.
19For saturated SS'-theories, fullness amoun~s to non~mptiness, cf. section 3.3.
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Proposition 9.6 T is SS}-stable iff
T is a consistent SSt-theory such that K[T] ysst K[T`] iff
1. T is an SS}-theory (i.e. closed w.r.t. ~ss} );
2. ifcpETthenKcpET;
3. ifKcpVKtliETthenrpETor~,ET;
4. cp ~ Tfor some cp.
Proposition 9.7 T is S5~-stable iff
T is anon-empry SS'-theory such that K[T] Ifss. K[T`] iff
1. T is an S5~-theory;
2. if cp E T then Kcp E T;
3. ifKcpVK~iETthencpETor~iET;
4. if cp ~ T then ~Kcp E T.
Proof: by means of the generalized Lindenbaum lemma (proposition 4.6).
The clauses in the last equivalent of the propositions above bear a considerable re-
semblance to those for S4.ZO Notice that clause 2 expresses a kind of introspection, 3
modal saturation and 4 non-emptiness, of T` for SS} and of T for 554, modulo the
other clauses.
Circumscription of knowtedge involves a largest model (a last element in the
ordering of supermodels). The corresponding stable set containing the inforTnation
therefore has to be minimal, in some sense. In accordance with the usual terminology,
let us call the data honest if such circumscription is possible. The double perspective of
models and formulas gives rise to various notions ofhonesty, even for the veri flcational,
c.q. SS} approach.
One subtlety of partial logic is that, different from the classical SS case, an S5t
or S54-stable set is not fully determined by its subset of pmpositional formulas. For
example, ~Kp E T does not imply whether or not p E T for S5~ and whether ~p E T
for SS}. Here is a concrete counter-example for SSt-stability. Consider T- Ttl(M)








mCf. [Ja91c] and chapter 8 here.
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Since Tx(M',0) c Tx(M',1), Trt(M') n pL - Tx(M',0) n Tx(M',1) n pL -
Tx(M',0) n pL - Tx(M) n pL. Buc clearly Tx(M) ~ Tx(M') for ~K~q E
Tx(M')-Tx(M). Thereisadualcounter-exampleforSS'-stability. Thissuggestthat
honesty may be deóned as existence of a minimal stable extension, where minimality
is just ordinary set inclusion. We will leave the elaboration of this point to another
occasion.
9.6 Below and beyond partial S5
Within classical logic the paradigm cases of cautious extension or variation of the
SS system are S4 and SS~m~. The possibilities for miniaturization of information
tumed to be extremely limited f~or these background logics. For the epistemic logic
S4 (advocated by Hintikka) complete information can be represented in a singleton
model. In chapter 8 we conjectured that incomplete information does not have S4
miniatures: this claim has been verified for simple and semi-strong ignorance. The
situation for SS~m~ is even worse: consistent information (whether `complete' or not)
does not have SS~m~ miniatures. Is the situation for partial logic similarly distressing?
To study this in some detail, we will focus on V-miniatures in the rest of this section.
S4} miniatures
Partiality slightly improves the chances for S4} miniatures: both complete knowledge
and simple ignorance can be modelled by singleton V-miniatures. A simple induction
proof shows that S4} and SS} have the same inferences from this kind of infonnation.
Consequently, the miniature of example 9.5 still qualifies with respect to S4t.
For (semi-)strong information we find the opposite situation. For example, con-
trasting to example 9.7, {Kp, ~Kq} has no S4} miniature, for suppose M would
qualify. Then M~ ~Kq, so M~ K~Kq. However, Kp, ~Kq~ K~Kq.
More generally, negative information appears to obstruct possible miniatures.
More challenging are the cases ofpositive partial knowledge, such as K(p V q). We
believe that a characterizing model requires chains of unlimited length, but this has
not been proven with formai ngour yet. On the other hand, the `dishonest' formula
Kp v Kq appears to have the same miniature as in example 9.9.
SS~m~ miniatures
Here the situation is worse. One of the points is that for a multi-agent logic there can
be no complete information without contingent common knowledge, which can not
be expressed in the simple modal language. And without an operator for common
knowledge, we cannot obtain miniatures: the models will always be too strong. In
fact the proof of the nonexistence of SS~m~ miniatures for consistent data can simply
be transposed to the realm of partial semantics. On the other hand, adding an operator
C for common knowledge may not solve all pmblems. Though it is clear that C-
9.7. CONCLUSION 239
introspection is a necessary condition for the existence of S5~ ~ miniatures, it is not
obvious that the condition is sufficient.
9.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we considered the feasibility of partial miniatures. It is argued that
the notion of validity that pays in this respect is relative verification, rather than
falsification. In the latter case the gain in cases of simple incomplete information is
nil, compared to classical miniatures. In the former case the gain is quite good: for
some types of incomplete infomtation, the resulting miniatures are indeed very small.
The explanation for this difference was connectcd to the different direction of what
might be called `miniature persistence': F-miniatures are closed under partialization
of the model, V-miniatures under (partial) completion. Consequently, the smallest F-
miniatures are the most specified (and therefore usually big), the smallest V-miniatures
the least specified (thus small). Therefore, V-miniatures are often quite efficient.
As in the classical case we saw that existence of partial miniatures corresponds
to the information a being introspective, in the sense that a~ K~, where of course
~ is indexed for the appropriate partial modal system. Yet, where the disjoint union
construction essentially supplied the classical miniature, for partial miniatures mini-
mization is a productive and non-trivial next step, especially for V-miniatures.
Different from what might be expected, the notion of local miniature is still un-
suitable for characterizing, for example, disjunctive knowledge. The other altemative
of partial circumscription is related to the definitions of stability with respect to the
partial systems SS} and S5~`. Perhaps it is possible to give smaller partial models,
when circumscribing instead of describing knowledge.
We also had a quick look at some other modal systems, such as the partial coun-
terparts of S4 and SS~m~. In the former case, somc progress has been observed: unlike
for classical semantics, simple ignorance can be modelled now. Yet, for other types
of infonnation in the S4-like case, and in the SStml-like case in general, there does
not seem to be much improvement. This calls for a restriction on the modal depth of
fonnulas that are checked on the model. Then again partiality improves the size of the
miniatures.
Although there are, of course, in general differences when we compare the S5
consequences to the SS} consequences, the obtained minimization is a satisfying
product of the collaboration of modal logic and panial semantics.
Appendix: correctness of V-miniatures
correctness of example 9.5 (simple ignorance)
Proof: Clearly M~ D, and assume that M~ ~p. Let N, s~ D for some model N and
situation s, then for the generated submodel N, also N, ~ D. T'hus MCN„ for M can be
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obtained from N, by omittingall p; specifications for i ~ k and then identify equally specified
situations. Therefore N, ~ ~p, so N, a~ ~p, and consequently D~~p. ~
rnrrectness of example 9.6 (strong ignorance)
Proof: Correctness and minimality of this miniature can be shown by construcdng the semi-
lattice of verifying tight models, partially ordered by C, which has the displayed miniature as
its bottom element. This, however, is a laborious exercise. An easy argument may do just as
well: Notice that every tight model verifying D will consist of situations which at least contain
p~, whereas some situations should contain pz, ~pZ, p3, and ~pj. Now the given model can be
strengthened to any verifying model, and thus minimally characterizes D(cf. proposition 9.4
for formal justification). ~
correctness of example 9.7 (semi-strong ignorance)
Proof: Here a construction of the semi-lattice of verifying components is feasible. In fact there
are two ways to generate this structure. One may inspect the 8 minimal models which have p~
in each world and possibly also pi or ~pZ, and check whether ~KP2 holds in them. Then the
obtained models are ordered for C, and the displayed miniature appears to be the bottom of 3
element semi-lattice. But one may also start with the classical miniature for D: its components
will verify D in the partial sense too.
Pi ~ ~Pz Pi ~ ~Pz Pi ~ Pz
~ ~~~~
Then by weakening ( i.e. partializing and possibly duplifying and identifying situations) the
minimal panial miniature is obtaincd in the end. The latter method often turns out to be more
cfficient. ~
correctness of example 9.8 (honest disjunctive knowledge)
Proof: it suffices to draw the graph of all (reduced) tight V-models for K(p v q), ordered with
respect to C(indicated by lines), where the uphill components are more specific and thus may
be omitted. (see next page) ~
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242 SUMMARY IN DUTCH
Samenvatting
Zowell voor de representatie van kennis in menselijke individuen, als voor de repre-
sentatie van die kennis in computersystemen kunnen er grote voordelen verbonden
zijn aan het gebruik van partiële logica. In partiële logica is het niet zo dat elke bewe-
ring waar of onwaar is: de waarheidswaarde kan ook open gelaten worden. Hcewel
dit de semantiek van de logica op zich ingewikkelder maakt, kan kennisrepresentatie
door middel van partiële logica adequater en efficiënter geschieden dan voorheen met
klassieke logica. Het dcel van dit onderzcek is te tcetsen in hceverre partialiteit hier
inderdaad uitkomst biedt.2
Na een algemene inleiding vangt het procfschrift aan met een technisch deel waarin
verschillende systemen van partiële logica worden onderzocht, zowel op uitdrukkings-
kracht als op geldige redeneerpatronen. Gezien de beoogde tcepassingen wordt hier
de taal van de modale propositielogica beschouwd, waarin naast connectieven (`niet',
`en', `of', ...) ook modale operatoren (`het is noodzakelijk~mogelijk dat') optreden,
die later de rol van kennisoperatoren gaan spelen (`A weet dat', ' A gelooft dat', ...).
Omdat de combinatie van partiële en modale logica nog grotendeels onontgonnen
gebied was, is eerst de partiële propositielogica (dus zonder modale operatoren) be-
studeerd. Met betrekking tot uitdrukkingskracht is hier onderzocht welke semantische
condities met welke propositielogische talen corresponderen. Ook ten aanzien van
geldige redeneerpatronen zijn de mogelijkheden systematisch onderzocht. Een com-
plicerende factor hierbij is het aantal vrijheidsgraden dat de partiële logica kenmerkt:
het aantal waarheidswaarden, hct soort geldigheid, het soort gevolgtrekkingsrelatie,
en de interpretatie van de connectieven. Ons beperkend tot een standaardinterpretatie
van connectieven, hebben wij van de andere aspecten de belangrijkste mogelijkheden
in kaart gebracht. Hierbij bleken een aantal al bekende logica's, zoals de klassieke
propositielogica met partiële semantiek, de logica van sterk gevolg en de basale rele-
vantielogica, vrijwel vanzelf hun plaats binnen deze systematiek te krijgen.
Vervolgens wordt de uitbreiding naar de modale taal bekeken. De complexere
strukturen die nodig zijn om de modale taal adequaat te interpreteren laten helaas meer
toe dan in de modale taal uitdrukbaar is. Om die reden wordt de uitdrukkingskrachtvan
de modale taal niet gerelateerd aan de modellen zelf, maar aan het soort predikatenlo-
gica dat ook met deze modellen geïnterpreteerd zou kunnen worden. Gelukkig bleek
hier een equivalentierelatie tussen de modellen, bekend als `bisimulatie', voldcende
om het typerende predikaatlogische fragment te karakteriseren.
De systematiek ten aanzien van geldigheid, zoals ontwikkeld voor het propositio-
nele geval, bleek geheel en al van toepassing op de modale taal. De belangrijkste noties
van geldigheid zijn beschreven in deducticve systemen (vergelijk de axiomastelsels uit
de wiskunde), die, voor zover ons bekend, nieuw zijn. De zg. volledigheidsbewijzen
~Since the contents of this summary is.predictable fTOm the foregoing text, it may serve to some
readers as a first introduction to a fragment of the Dutch language. The introduction and conclusions of
the chapters together form a summary in English.
ZIn deze samenvatting beperken we ons tot de hoofdlijn van he[ onderzoek, voorbijgaand aan veel op
zich belangrijke technische details en zijsporen.
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van deze beschrijvingen vormen de technische kem van dit proefschrift.
Kenmerkend voor het meest gangbare soort modellen van modale logica is de aan-
wezigheid van een toegankelijkheidsrelatie tussen werelden. Deze toegankelijkheids-
relaties vomten een extra vrijheidsgraad voor de modale semantiek, en door het stellen
van beperkingen daarop is het mogelijk algemene verschillen tussen bij voorbeeld we-
ten en geloven te verdisconteren. Met het oog op latere toepassingen worden een aantal
uit deze beperkingen resulterende modale systemen nader onderzocht. Ook hier blij-
ken klassieke resultaten zoals volledigheidsstellingen, de eindige-modeleigenschap,
nomtaalvormen en (in enkele gevallen) logische eindigheid opgang te doen.
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift wordt de partiële logica toegepast op het
gebied van menselijke taal en kennis. Hierbij blijken partiële systemen daadwerkelijk
grote voordelen te bieden ten aanzien van het modelleren van expliciete menselijke
kennis en bewustzijn, als ook bij het beschrijven van taaluitingen en het verklaren van
daarbij optredende verschijnselen.
Bij het laatste wordt een regel geformuleerd die de bedoeling heeft de `toege-
voegde waarde' van het uiten van een bewering juist in te schatten. Als belangrijkste
proefgeval geldt hierbij de paradox van Moore: waamm is de zin'Het regent maar ik
geloofdat niet', hoewel op zich logisch consistent, toch merkwaardig om te uiten? De
regel van de toegevoegde pragmatische waarde verklaart deze en vergelijkbare geval-
len door de juiste epistemische modaliteit aan de uiting toe te kennen en te laten zien
dat aldus in het geval van Moore's paradox alsnog een logische contradictie ontstaat.
Hoewel we deze a8eidingen in klassieke logica geven, wordt ook aangetoond dat zulks
ook mogelijk is in een veel zwakkere partiële logica.
Bij het aangrenzende onderwerp van mogelijke logica's voor meer realistische
vorrnen van weten en geloven wordt een expliciete relatie gclegd met bewustzijn: we
zullen in de regel niet alle gevolgen van onze kennis kennen, omdat we ons van die
gevolgen niet bewust hoeven zijn. Klassieke logica's verplichten daarentegen wel tot
kennis van alle gevolgen; dit staat bekend als het probleem van logische alwetendheid.
Eerst worden enige totale logica's beschouwd die aanpassingen zijn van de klas-
sieke logica maar nog steeds een totale (niet-partiële) semantiek kennen. Een van
de voorstellen uit de literatuur, nl. de logica van `algemeen bewustzijn', wordt door
een eenvoudige ingreep zo gegeneraliseerd dat deze in feite alle vormen van bewust-
zijn kan uitdrukken, zowel (iniuïtief gesproken) `logische' als `onlogische' vormen.
Aangezien dit resultaat zeer wel als een Pyrrhus-overwinning gezien kan worden (het
kader is zo algemeen geworden dat het in feite lecg is), worden ook andere logica's in
ogenschouw genomen, zowel totale als partiële.
Vooral de laatste zijn wat dit betreft van belang, omdat het partiële kader als het
ware vanzelf, zonderde kunstgrepen uit de totale semantiek, al te sterke eigenschappen
voor weten of geloven kan vennijden. Dit lukt evenwel alleen als de notie van geldig
gevolg wordt uitgelegd als sterk gevolg (relatieve verif~catie): als in een coherente si-
tuatie de premissen waar zijn, dan moet de conclutiie ook waar zijn. Dan ontstaat echter
het probleem dat deze partiële semantiek niet mecr de klassieke tautologieën oplevert,
hetgeen onwenselijk wordt geacht: u gelooft bij voorbeeld dat het regent, of u gelooft
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dat niet, en de semantiek mcet deze geldigheid verantwoorden. Om aan deze com-
plicatie het hoofd te bieden wordt een combinatie van klassieke en partiële semantiek
voorgesteld. De resterende vormen van logische alwetendheid die de partiële benade-
ring onverlet laat, kunnen, zo men dit verkiest, worden geëlimineerd door de al eenier
beschouwde zeef van bewuste formules bovenop het gewone interpretatiemechanisme
te plaatsen.
Tenslotte wordt in het derde deel van dit proefschrift de geschiktheid van partiële
modellen voor het representeren van kennis in computers nader onderzocht. Voor
bepaalde soorten (introspectieve) kennis is de representatie in eindige modellen mo-
gelijk, maar tenminste voor onvolledige kennis leidt dit bij gebruik van een klassieke
interpretatie tot bijzonder grote (superexponentiële) modellen.
De partiële semantiek met rclatieve verificatie kan hier uitkomst bieden: ontbre-
kende kennis kan dan door de afwezigheid van specificaties worden verantwoord.
Toch schuilt hier een addertje onder het gras: in principe overtreft zowel het aantal als
de grootte van de partiële modellen dat van de klassieke modellen. De oplossing van
deze paradox is dat de partiële modellen weliswaar groter kunnen zijn, maar dat we
op die grootte sterk kunnen bezuinigen. Slechts in uitzonderlijke grensgevallen zal
het partiële model (iets) groter zijn het klassieke. In de meest voorkomende gevallen
kan de representatie nu echter aanzienlijk efficiënter; voor eenvoudige vormen van
onvolledige kennis zelfs met modellen waarvan de grootte lineair afhangt van het
aantal feiten waar slechts gedeeltelijke informatie over bestaat.
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